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ABSTRACT
This study examines aspects o f  change and development in two 
peripheral Thai communities. Rural development is  seen as a generic 
term used to describe processes o f change occurring or meant to occur in 
ru ra l areas o f  countries such as Thailand, i t s  d e s i r a b i l i t y  or d irec t ion  
depending on the po in t o f  view o f  the analyst or p ra c t i t io n e r  concerned. 
I t  is  observed tha t p a r t ic ip a t io n  is  stressed increas ing ly  as an 
essential element in such development. Since a dynamic common to most 
forms o f ru ra l  development is  incorporation in to  the wider structures o f 
state and c a p ita l ,  p a r t ic ip a t io n  becomes an issue o f  the "terms o f 
incorpora tion". These d i f f e r  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  depending on which point o f 
view among the many groups o f  "developers" and "developed" we choose to 
adopt.
The main argument o f  the thesis is  i l lu s t ra te d  with reference to 
the s i tu a t io n  o f two recen tly  se tt led  communities on the northwestern 
periphery o f  the Central Plains o f  Thailand. Issues o f ru ra l
development and p a r t ic ip a t io n  are re lated to changes in production 
re la t ion s  being brought about to show tha t incorporation in the name o f 
increasing contro l w ith in  the wider system leads to a loss o f control 
over local material and social resources necessary fo r  production on the 
part o f  the poor. A lte rna t ive  attempts to regain contro l are discussed, 
and im plications fo r  p a r t ic ip a to ry  development as a struggle over terms 
o f incorporation on the part o f  the ru ra l poor are drawn.
The study f i r s t  examines rura l development from a theore t ica l 
perspective, and re la tes  i t  to h is to r ic a l  processes and the Thai social 
formation. I t  goes on to set out the general and local geographical 
contexts o f  recen tly  se tt led  areas. An account o f  production in the 
study v i l la g e s  is  followed by a discussion o f d i f fe re n t ia t io n .  F in a l ly ,  
the themes o f  cooperation and p a r t ic ip a t io n  are taken up and re la ted to 
issues o f  control and power.
( i i i )
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GLOSSARY
Most Thai terms are glossed in the te x t  as they appear. 
However, some words are used frequently  and appear a f te r  th e ir  f i r s t  
usage without t ra n s la t io n .  These are given below.
amphoe = adm in is tra tive  d i s t r i c t ,  also the d i s t r i c t  adm in is tra tion
baht -  Thai un it  o f  currency, approximately UK 2.5p
chaonaa = r ice  farmer
chaorai -  upland farmer
kaan~
phatthana -  development
kamnan = tambon head
paa = fo res t
r a i  = un it  o f  land measurement, 1600 sq.m, or 0.4 acres approx.
s 7 7 krasuang
lak = four m in is tr ie s  with s ta tu to ry  functions a t amphoe
tambon = adm in is tra tive  c lus te r o f v i l la g e s ,  or " s u b -d is t r ic t "
ACRONYMS
ALRO = A g r icu ltu ra l Land Reform Office
BAAC = Bank fo r  A gricu ltu re  and A gricu ltu ra l Cooperatives
CDD -  Community Development Department
CIDA = Canadian In te rna tiona l Development Agency
DAE = Department o f A g r icu ltu ra l Extension
LDAP = Local Development Assistance Programme
LDC = Less developed country
LDD = Land Development Department
MCC = Mennonite Central Committee
NESDB = National Economic and Social Development Board
NGO = Non-governmental organization
NKYFRD = Nong Kha Yang Foundation fo r Rural Development
REGP = Rural Employment Generation Programme
TC = Tambon Council
TPC = Thai Plywood Company
UPRC = Uthaithani Pig Raisers' Cooperative
VC = V illage Committee
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The process o f settlement and subsequent in teg ra tion  o f small 
f r o n t ie r  communities in to  p o l i t i c a l  and economic in s t i tu t io n s  o f  a wider 
society is  o f  in te re s t in at leas t two ways. F i r s t ,  the process is  an
important element in a g r icu ltu ra l expansion and associated 
de fo resta tion . Second, examination o f  the process aids an understanding 
o f changing re la t ionsh ips  between re la t iv e ly  iso la ted  communities and 
the "mainstream" society. The context o f  rapid change in these 
peripheral communities allows p a r t ic ip an t observation o f some key 
aspects o f  such change. In p a r t ic u la r ,  the ethos and themes surrounding 
"development" provide empirical and conceptual fo c i fo r  analysis o f  the 
meaning o f  change to the various actors involved.
The context fo r  th is  study is  a s i tua t ion  o f changing production 
re la t io n s  in two v i l la g e s  in recently  se tt led  Lan Sak d i s t r i c t  o f  
Uthaithani province, Thailand (99°30'E 15°301N). Rural development
is  the subject o f  the study, with an emphasis on the theme o f 
p a r t ic ip a t io n .  I id e n t i fy  a problem in gaining access to ,  and control
over, the material and social resources o f the wider society on the one
hand, and maintaining or increasing control over local resources on the 
o ther. While ru ra l development is  often posited as a means for 
residents o f small communities to pa rt ic ipa te  in contro l over resources 
o f  the wider soc ie ty , the access to v i l la g e  in s t i t u t io n s  and resources 
afforded to s ta te , c a p i ta l ,  and th e ir  local representatives by rura l 
development a t once diminishes control for the m a jo r ity  o f  v i l la g e rs .  
These con trad ic to ry  processes have both material and d iscurs ive  aspects. 
The con trad ic t ion^  thus outlined is v i ta l  to understanding changes
2in te rna l to the communities under study. In th is  l i g h t ,  I sha ll argue 
th a t ru ra l development cannot be examined independently o f  an analysis 
o f  broader issues o f contro l and the exercise o f  power.
The d is c ip l in a ry  o r ig in s  and content o f  the thes is  are in both 
geography and anthropology. The geographical aspect is  brought out in 
two main ways. F i r s t ,  the locale for the study is  contextua lly  
s ig n i f ic a n t  fo r  i t s  p e r ip h e ra l i ty  and the importance o f  th is  geographic 
fa c t  is  evident throughout. Second, the spatia l emphasis is  manifest in 
the stress on problems inherent in lo c a l iz a t io n 3 0f  human control 
over a ra p id ly  changing socio-economic and natural environment. 
This is  c lose ly  connected to the anthropological aspect o f  the changing 
re la t io n sh ip  between a " l i t t l e  community"3 and the wider system. 
However, since a t ten t ion  would only be d iverted away from the problems 
referred to by treatment o f  the community in question p r im a r i ly  as 
" t e r r i t o r y " ,  "p lace", or " l o c a l i t y " , 4 the emphasis is  less on a 
d is c ip l in e  concerned with such un its  than on one whose etymon d ire c ts  i t  
to the people, in a l l  th e ir  d iv e rs i ty ,  who occupy our community.
In th is  in troduction  I present a thematic and h is to r ic a l  
background to the con trad ic t ion  under study. This is  followed by a 
b r ie f  treatment o f  the approach used and a synopsis o f  the thes is . 
F in a l ly ,  notes on fie ldwork methodology and terminology are provided.
1.1 Background
The process by which iso la ted agrarian communities become part o f  
a wider society underlies much o f what is  now termed "ru ra l 
development". This process has both temporal and spatia l dimensions.
3The temporal dimension is commonly referred to in terms such as 
"modernization", movement from a "backward" to an "advanced" s ta te , and 
even "catching up". The spatia l dimension o f  th is  aspect o f  development 
is  spoken o f  as " in te g ra t io n " ,  " l inkage", or " inco rp o ra t io n " . More 
o ften , these dimensions are combined so that physical is o la t io n  implies 
backwardness, while proxim ity to the metropolitan core represents, for 
the community, an im p l ic i t  modernity. Under such terms, a v i l la g e  
"develops" both with changes in the system as a whole over time and by 
change in i t s  pos it ion  w ith in  the system.^
Only by consideration o f these two dimensions can the issue o f
"development" o f a peripheral community in Thailand be understood. For
more than a century, the p r inc ip a l dynamic in Thai ag r icu ltu re  and 
demography has been a steady expansion in the cu lt iva ted  area 
fa c i l i t a te d  by the establishment o f  new communities at fo rest fr inges . 
Following settlement, these communities have seen a gradual in tegra tion  
w ith in  the wider spa tia l economy and p o l i t y ,  such th a t  a m a jo r ity  o f  the 
55,000 v i l lag es  now registered have undergone th is  type o f
transformation during the present cen tu ry .6
I t  would be misleading to represent th is  process o f  settlement, 
in te g ra t io n ,  and contined migration as a un il inea r response to agrarian 
and demographic pressures. At each stage, settlement has been the 
product o f  spec if ic  h is to r ic a l  circumstances concerning both the 
pos it ion  o f Thailand? in the world economy and changes in the domestic 
p o l i t i c a l  economy. This is  re f lec ted  in the pattern o f  settlement at
d i f fe re n t  stages from early  on up to the present day. Moreover, the 
nature and method o f  subsequent in tegra tion  in to  the wider system has 
i t s e l f  been shaped by contingencies spec if ic  to each period. Central to 
the current s i tu a t io n  is  the context o f  ru ra l development.
4Nevertheless, there are ce rta in  c o n t in u i t ie s  th a t  make the 
s i tu a t io n  o f  a recen t ly  se tt led  and rap id ly  integrated fo res t community 
in the mid-1980s analogous i f  not equivalent to th a t  o f  the m a jo r ity  of 
v i l la g e s  th a t have experienced change over a longer period o f time. The 
t ra n s i t io n  from a subsistence based economy dependent on loca l 
resources, whose use and surrounding social re la t io n s  are governed by 
indigenous in s t i t u t io n s ,  to a more commercialized economy with an 
increas ing ly  external o r ien ta t io n  and incorporated in to  the national 
p o l i t y  is  common to both types o f  community. The ra p id i ty  o f  the 
t ra n s i t io n  and special circumstances o f  the p reva il ing  social formation 
mark out the recen tly  se tt led  fo re s t community in ways th a t w i l l  become 
apparent, but i t  is  hoped tha t th is  study o f  two such communities o f fe rs  
ins igh ts  also into the more general s itua tion  perta in ing in established 
v i l 1 ages.
As was intimated above, the process o f  such ru ra l change is now 
normally subsumed under the term " ru ra l  development". Rural development 
emerged as a concern in Thailand as a re s u lt  o f  the uneven development 
o f the national economy a f te r  1960 (Saneh 1983). While Bangkok and 
surrounding areas reaped the material f r u i t s  o f  rapid growth, peripheral 
parts o f  the country showed l im ite d  involvement in the national economy 
(IBRD 1980 : 3 6 f f . ) .  The imbalances tha t th is  created were behind some 
o f  the p o l i t i c a l  changes o f  the 1970s, and the Fourth and F i f th  National 
Economic and Social Development Plans have emphasized the need fo r  rura l 
development. A key element in the strategy o f the F i f th  Plan is  the 
Poverty Eradication Programme, which id e n t i f ie s  approximately one th ird  
o f  the country 's  d is t r i c t s  as " ta rg e t d is t r ic t s "  fo r  special a t te n t io n ,  
a l l  in peripheral areas (NESDB 1977; 1981).
Given th is  apparent s h i f t  o f  focus to the periphery and the above 
context, i t  is  surpris ing to f ind  tha t many ru ra l development
5i n i t i a t i v e s  assume as a s ta rt ing  point a s tab le , well established 
community undergoing change from generations o f " t r a d i t io n a l "  ways 
toward an accommodation o f  the outside world. In part th is  is  probably 
due to the fa c t th a t most studies o f  ru ra l development, i t s  ra t io n a le ,  
and im plica tions have dea lt with such s i tu a t io n s . Population movement 
associated with ru ra l development is  considered mainly in the context o f  
rural-urban migration resu lt in g  from upheavals in established 
communities and opportun it ies  a r is ing  in urban areas, or o f planned 
resettlement, the la t te r  usually resu lt ing  from displacement o f  an 
e n t ire  ex is t ing  community by construction o f  a dam or other 
in f ra s tru c tu ra l  p ro je c t.  I t  is  quite rare to f ind  studies on rural 
development in the context o f  more spontaneous settlement, despite the 
fac t tha t unplanned settlement o f fo res t reserve and marginal lands is  
cu rren t ly  an important dynamic in the a g r icu ltu ra l expansion o f  numerous 
agrarian soc ie t ies .
Thus to t re a t  v i l la g e s  in new areas o f  settlement as somehow 
exceptional and marginal to mainstream a g r icu ltu ra l development is  not 
only to w r ite  o f f  a s ig n i f ic a n t  process in a g r ic u l tu ra l ,  and by 
extension socio-economic change in Thailand; i t  is  also to ignore an 
important feature o f  the areas in which the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB) and other developers are placing increasing 
emphasis. Rural development in such areas takes on a number o f  spe c if ic  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s , by v ir tu e  among others o f  the recent and heterogeneous 
character o f  the settlements, th e i r  f ro n t ie r  nature, the marginal 
s i tu a t io n  o f th e i r  mainly ra in fed ag r icu ltu ra l production, the context 
o f  rapid change, the ru ra l development emphasis on "catching up" with 
less peripheral areas, and spec if ic  government a t te n t io n  to areas on the 
margins o f  s ta te c o n t ro l .
The focus in th is  study o f ru ra l development in the spec if ic
6h is to r ic a l  and geographical context outlined above is on production.
This is  not because other aspects o f ru ra l development (health ,
education, e tc .)  are considered unimportant. However, as is  explained 
and q u a l i f ie d  in Chapter V, production is  often seen both academically 
and by producers themselves as the basis fo r  l iv e l ih o o d ,  while 
production re la t io n s  and th e i r  change are the basis fo r wider social 
re la t io n s  and change the re in , both w ith in communities and between
communities and the outside world. Moreover, in peasant communities
production and other aspects o f  l i f e  are in t im a te ly  re la te d , so a focus 
on th is  aspect a t  once provides an ins igh t into wider phenomena while 
enabling us to estab lish a manageable framework fo r  study. These themes 
are expanded on sh o rt ly .
This brings us to the main theme under study : p a r t ic ip a t io n .  A
perusal o f  development l i t e r a tu r e  over the past decade reveals a heavy 
and growing emphasis on th is  concept by analysts and p ra c t i t ion e rs  
a l i k e . 8 While I do not wish to go into unwarranted d e ta il  at th is
stage, i t  is  appropriate to mention two facets o f  the concept o f
p a r t ic ip a t io n  tha t make i t  espec ia lly  pert inen t to the present study. 
The f i r s t  is  the wide va r ie ty  o f  in te rp re ta t ion s  and app lica tions o f  the 
term, p a r t ic u la r ly  in the Thai context, th a t makes i t  an important 
subject o f  study fo r  an understanding o f the motivations o f the various 
actors on the Thai ru ra l  development stage. The second goes back to the 
spec if ic  ch a ra c te r is t ics  o f  the communities under study, since 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  at whatever level we choose to operate implies involvement 
o f ind iv idua ls  in a wider formation. Thus the re la t io n sh ip  between 
p a r t ic ip a to ry  ru ra l development and the more general incorporation
described above provides a key po in t o f  in te re s t .
A f in a l  point is  th a t an understanding o f  s tra teg ies for 
increasing se lf - re l ia n c e  through p a r t ic ip a to ry  ru ra l development, in
7terms o f a changing re la t io nsh ip  between communities and the wider 
system, cannot re ly  on an und iffe ren tia ted  approach to the community. 
On the con tra ry , the basis fo r  treatment o f a t e r r i t o r y  as a un it  fo r  
po licy  action is  re jec ted , since th is  assumes a f i c t i t i o u s  homogeneity 
o f  in te res t w ith in  tha t geographical area. Current s tra teg ies often 
hold th a t  increasing the to ta l  monetary value o f production in a defined 
area - be i t  na tion , reg ion, or v i l la g e  - necessarily increases the s e l f  
re liance o f  th a t area. By a s im ila r  token, treatment o f  the t e r r i t o r ia l  
community (v i l la g e )  as a u n it  equates community p a r t ic ip a t io n  with 
incorporation in to  the wider system. Ind icators o f  low regional product 
become ind ica to rs  o f  low s e l f  re l ia n ce , p e r ip h e ra l i ty  becomes the 
a n t i th es is  o f p a r t ic ip a t io n .  This is  in manifest con trad ic tion  to the 
subjective experience o f ru ra l producers in the v i l la g e s  under study. 
Thus we re turn to where we started ou t,  and opt fo r an anthropological 
step in to  the rubber f l i p - f lo p s  o f  a Lan Sak peasant.9
1.2 Approach
A few words o f  explanation are necessary regarding the 
multi stranded approach. A note on the perspective adopted is  followed 
by the ra t io na le  fo r  se lection o f  the two communities under study. The 
attempt o f  the study to l in k  the two p a ra l le l but a l l  too often separate 
strands in development debates is  c la r i f i e d ,  and the focus on production 
is  explained. Las tly , the case for a p o l i t i c a l  economic approach is  
made.
The fa lse dichotomy between a b ird 's  eye view and a worm's eye 
view o f  the world is  compounded in the f ie ld  o f  development by the 
continual c o n f l ic t  between "top-down" and "bottom-up" approaches.10
8This study is  concerned p r im a r i ly  with the e ffe c ts  o f  in tegra tion  into
the wider system on small communities and ind iv idua ls  w ith in  those
communities. The in te re s t ,  the re fo re , is  o f  an outs ider looking in ,  
while the subject o f  in te re s t  is  the ins ider looking out. Consequently,
the mode o f descrip t ion  is  omniscient ( in  the l i t e r a r y  rather than
epistemological sense!) and set in terms often alien to  modes o f  thought 
in the communities involved. Yet the perspective taken is th a t o f  the 
v i l la g e r ,  small farmer, ru ra l producer, ru ra l poor, peasant, or whatever 
term is  applied to the a g r ic u l tu ra l is ts  who form the m a jo r ity  o f  most 
v i l la g e  populations and indeed o f  the population of Thailand and other 
developing countries (see section 1.5 below fo r  a discussion o f
te rm ino logy).
Adoption o f such a perspective has three main im plications fo r  
our approach. F i r s t ,  the subjective experience o f  v i l la g e rs  and other 
actors is  considered as o f  inherent importance and not merely as 
i l l u s t r a t i v e .  This means th a t discourse is  o f  in te re s t  and consequently 
drawn on frequen tly . Second, the l i f e  o f  a Lan Sak v i l la g e r  is not 
divided neatly  into parcels th a t conform with academic d is c ip l in e s ,  so 
tha t even where emphases are placed we cannot l im i t  ourselves
exc lus ive ly  to one or another aspect o f  v i l la g e  l i f e  ( c f .  Chambers 1983 
: 22 - 23). Th ird , issues connected with ru ra l development play an
increasing ly important ro le  but s t i l l  not a dominant part in the d a i ly
l i f e  o f  the v i l la g e r ,  which means tha t care must be taken to see 
such issues only as they f i t  in to  the broader schema o f  v i l la g e  l i f e .  
U lt im ate ly , we must recognize the i n d i v i s i b i l i t y  o f  a l ive l ih o o d  in 
which production, consumption, health , education, debt, and so on are 
in t r ic a te ly  bound up. Thus a m u lt i -d is c ip l in a ry  approach opens new 
avenues toward the understanding o f  ru ra l development from the point of 
view, and sometimes through the words, o f  those most in t im a te ly  
involved.
9The two v i l la g e s  selected, Ban Dong and Ban Mai, are both in a 
recently  se tt led  fo res t area on the northwestern periphery o f  the 
Central Plains. One is a lowland v i l la g e  whose economy is  dominated by 
r ic e  c u l t iv a t io n ,  the other an upland^ v i l la g e  whose economy is  
almost exc lus ive ly  given over to cash cropping. One is  a spontaneously 
se ttled  community with l im ite d  state involvement, the other is a
p a r t ia l l y  planned settlement affected by the state land reform 
programme. Although the aim of the study is  not p r in c ip a l ly  one o f  
comparison, the se lection o f  two communities ra ther than one was deemed 
bene fic ia l in o f fe r in g  a more h o l is t ic  view o f the s i tu a t io n  faced by 
Lan Sak v i l la g e rs ,  since these two types represent the broad range of
production regimes and s tra teg ies o f  outside in te rv e n t io n .12 i t  has
also proved useful fo r the observer in helping to sort out common
elements from epiphenomena, a d i f f i c u l t  task when l im ited  to a single 
case study. F in a l ly ,  some comparisons are made where they are deemed 
re levan t, in pa r t icu la r  regarding the d i f fe re n t  leve ls  o f 
commercialization and state involvement between the two v i l la g e s ,  but i t  
must be stressed tha t these are presented in d u c t ive ly ,  since two cases 
with so many variab les are hardly s u f f ic ie n t  fo r  deductive conclusions 
to be drawn from comparison.
A word is  in order as to how the study f i t s  in to  the broader 
development debates. The la t t e r  word is  used in the p lu ra l here because 
a b r ie f  glance at the l i t e r a tu r e  is  enough to show th a t there are two 
broad s tra ins  which run p a ra l le l  but ra re ly  come together. The f i r s t  is  
the discussion o f development in terms o f h is to r ic a l  processes, 
s truc tu res , and in te r - re la t io n s h ip s . The second sees development as a 
range o f  in te rven tio ns , po l icy  options, and programmes. The f i r s t  
debate covers opposing analyses o f  soc ia l,  economic, and p o l i t i c a l  
change in the developing world. I t  is  framed in terms o f broad concepts
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such as modernization, dependency, modes o f production, c a p i ta l is t  
transformation. The second debate is  e s se n t ia l ly  one o f  technique. I t
covers po licy  o r ie n ta t io n ,  in s t i tu t io n a l  design, bottom-up versus
top-down, and so on. At the r is k  o f  fa l l in g  between two s too ls , the 
present study attempts to bring these together in re la t in g  the programme 
side o f  ru ra l  development to broader changes in the social formation on 
the one hand, and suggesting how an understanding of these changes 
provides ins ig h t into the d ire c t io n s  new loca l level in i t i a t i v e s  can 
take, or are prevented from tak ing , on the other. The determinism tha t 
is  sometimes a product o f  the f i r s t  approach (Rostovian and Marxist 
economism a like )  f a i l s  to allow fo r  human agency, while the technocracy 
or in trovers ion  th a t is  associated with the a lte rn a t ive  shuts out 
broader forces tha t cannot be ignored (c f .  Worsley 1984). Rural
development i n i t i a t i v e s  must be seen in terms o f processes such as state 
formation, establishment o f  c o n tro l,  c a p i ta l is t  development o f 
a g r icu l tu re , o r ,  a l te rn a t iv e ly ,  o f  reaction to dominant processes such 
as in negation. The aim o f p a r t ic ip a to ry  development is ,  su re ly , fo r  
people as subjects to devise means to estab lish  control over the way in 
which these broader forces a f fe c t  th e ir  l iv e s .
The emphasis on production takes into account the pr inc ipa l 
d is t ingu ish ing  ch a rac te r is t ic  o f peasant production, which is  th a t i t  
cannot re a d i ly  be divorced from consumption or other aspects o f
l iv e l ih o o d . Since a proportion o f  peasant production is fo r  own use, 
d ire c t  consumption is  a p r inc ipa l ob jec tive . Meanwhile, production 
involves the use o f fam ily  labour, which in turn requires adequate food 
consumption, health , and education in the broadest sense (Bennett 1978 : 
62 - 63). Thus a focus on production provides an entry in to  the central 
element o f  peasant l iv e l ih o o d ,  one tha t is  not divorced from other 
aspects o f  l i f e  to the extent tha t f u l l y  commercialized farming is .
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At th is  point i t  is  pertinent to provide an i n i t i a l  exposure o f 
the fa l la c io u s  model o f  " ra t io n a l production" th a t l ie s  behind 
conventional development th ink ing and has p a ra l le ls  in the p o l i t ic a l  
sphere. Broadly framed, the argument runs as fo llow s. T rad it iona l 
a g r icu ltu re  is  characterized by fe u d a l is t ic ,  pre-modern production 
re la t io n s  whereby factors other than " ra t io n a l"  free market 
considerations (k insh ip , patron c l ien tage , compounded by ignorance) 
determine systems o f production and exchange. Meanwhile, agrarian 
communities remain isolated from a f fa i rs  o f  the s ta te , leading to 
undemocratic forms and perpetuation o f  sem i-feuda lis t ic  s tructures. The 
process o f development involves a ra t io n a l iz a t io n  o f such re la t io n s .  On 
the economic f r o n t ,  ega lita r ian ism  is  fostered by equal access to the 
market through the impersonal medium of cash exchange. A ra t iona l 
d is t r ib u t io n  o f  soc ie ty 's  resources is  achieved by free operation o f  
supply and demand, while m ob il iza tion  o f resources is  enhanced by
opportun it ies fo r gain and accumulation. Legally guaranteed property 
r igh ts  ensure a ra t iona l long term use o f  soc ie ty 's  resources.
Moreover, the state th a t guarantees these r ig h ts  and the in s t i tu t io n s  by 
which i t  does so are contro lled  by the masses, since the process o f 
modernization includes previously iso la ted  v i l la g e rs  in the a f fa i r s  o f  
the s ta te . In sum, development means bringing the backward in s t i tu t io n s  
o f  developing countries in to  l in e  with those th a t have emerged in
Western Europe and North America.
The fa l la c y ,  and thus the f i r s t  h in t a t the con trad ic t ion  in 
p a r t ic ip a to ry  ru ra l development as observed in Lan Sak, l ie s  in 
exclusion in such an analysis o f the the issue o f  power and i t s  
manifestation at various leve ls . As the analysis o f  change in the two 
communities under study shows, " ra t io n a l iz a t io n "  o f the t ra d i t io n a l  
economy does not free ru ra l producers from constra in ts  on production 
faced under t ra d i t io n a l  re la t io n s .  On the con tra ry , these are often
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reoriented such th a t e x p lo i ta t iv e  re la t ion s  become in ternal to the 
communities in question. New economic opportun it ies  reshape the 
“ non-ra tiona l" exercise o f  power, they do not decrease i t .  This has i t s  
p a ra l le ls  in the p o l i t i c a l  arena, in tha t the very process o f 
incorporation in to  the wider p o l i ty  gives the state contro l over v i l la g e  
in s t i tu t io n s  via those whose economic posit ion is  enhanced by changing 
production re la t io n s .  The con trad ic t ion  involved in p a r t ic ip a t io n  l ie s  
in the process by which ra t io n a l iz a t io n  and decen tra liza t ion  are 
manifested lo c a l ly  as concentration and cooptation respec tive ly . The 
approach used here to exemplify th is  is  to include in the analysis the 
study o f  the exercise o f  power.13
A f in a l  note on the approach concerns the p o l i t i c a l  economic
analysis. As was pointed out above, analysis o f  change from the 
perspective o f  the v i l la g e r  must take into account the i n d i v i s i b i l i t y  o f  
various aspects o f  l iv e l ih o o d . Likewise, concern with changing
structures cannot draw a meaningful d is t in c t io n  between economic and 
p o l i t i c a l  aspects o f  these s truc tu res. The increased ro le  o f  cap ita l in 
determining production re la t io n s  in Lan Sak cannot be studied 
independently o f  state in te rventions via physical and in s t i tu t io n a l  
in f ra s t ru c tu re . Likewise, the motivations fo r  the exercise o f power 
cannot be divorced from these very production re la t io n s .  The overlap o f 
p o l i t i c a l  and economic power at the v i l la g e  and other leve ls  is  an
empirical a t te s ta t io n  to th is  fac t ( c f .  Witayakorn 1983; Turton 1984,
1985; Ananya 1985).
1.3 Synopsis
The argument o f  the thesis runs as fo l low s . Rural development is
13
a generic term used to describe processes o f  change occurring or meant 
to occur in ru ra l areas o f  countries such as Thailand, i t s  d e s i r a b i l i t y  
or d ire c t io n  depending on the point o f  view o f the analyst or
p ra c t i t io n e r  concerned. P a rt ic ipa tion  is  stressed increasing ly as an
essential element in such development. Since a dynamic common to most 
forms o f  ru ra l development is  incorporation into the wider structures o f 
state and c a p ita l ,  p a r t ic ip a t io n  becomes an issue o f  the "terms o f 
inco rpo ra t io n " . These d i f f e r  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  depending on which point o f  
view among the many groups o f  "developers" and "developed" we choose to 
adopt. The argument is  i l lu s t ra te d  with reference to the s itu a t ion  o f 
two recently  se tt led  communities on the northwestern periphery o f  the 
Central Plains o f Thailand. Issues o f ru ra l development and 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  are re lated to changes in production re la t io n s  being
brought about to show tha t incorporation in the name o f  increasing 
control w ith in  the wider system leads to a loss o f  contro l over local 
material and social resources necessary for production on the part o f  
the poor. A lte rna t ive  attempts to regain control are discussed, and 
im plications fo r p a r t ic ip a to ry  development as a struggle over terms o f 
incorporation on the part o f  the ru ra l poor are drawn.
The s truc tu re  o f  the thesis warrants a few words o f  explanation. 
I do not adhere s t r i c t l y  to a s ing le  t r ie d  and trusted theoretica l 
approach, the production is t approach outlined above being taken fo r  
i l l u s t r a t i v e  ra ther than de te rm in is t ic  purposes. My i n i t i a l  theore t ica l 
chapter thus draws together a number o f strands into the framework fo r  
analysis o f  development tha t I have adopted. The sections most 
resembling a more conventional l i t e ra tu re  review come la te r  in the 
thes is , since they fo l lo w  more spec if ic  themes (notably d i f fe re n t ia t io n  
in Chapter V I, peasant economy in Chapter V I I ,  and p a r t ic ip a t io n  in 
Chapter V I I I )  rather than the broader s tructure  o f  the thes is . Also, 
ra ther than present a "regional overview" o f the Lower North or Central
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Region o f  Thailand (depending on in which adm in is tra t ive  regional 
c la s s i f ic a t io n  we place Uthaithani province), I give a thematic 
background to recently  se tt led  fo res t areas in Chapter I I I  and not the 
place o f Uthaithani in one or another adm in is tra tive  reg ion , since i t  is  
the h is to r ico -eco log ica l fac t tha t is  the sa l ie n t feature o f  Lan Sak.
Following th is  in tro du c t io n , the exposition begins in Chapter I I  
w ith a consideration o f ru ra l development from a theoretica l
perspective. The place o f  development in wider processes o f  change is  
o u t l in ed , and an "ethos" of development is re la ted to ideologies, 
discourse, and structures at the local le v e l .  The place o f 
in s t i tu t io n a l  change in rura l development is  examined. P a rt ic ipa t ion  is 
considered as a d ia le c t ic  between the various groups o f "developers" and 
"developed", and each o f  these is id e n t i f ie d  w ith in  the current Thai 
social formation and ru ra l development framework.
Chapter I I I  sets the geographical context. The h is to ry ,
patterns, and s ign if icance  o f  settlement in recen t ly  se tt led  fo rest 
areas are considered, w ith special emphasis on the fr inges o f  the
Central Plains. The place o f such areas in a g r ic u l tu ra l  development in 
p a r t ic u la r  and rura l development in general is discussed in h is to r ic a l  
and contemporary perspective.
The spec if ic  s i tu a t io n  o f U thaithani, Lan Sak, and the two study 
v i l la g e s  is  explained in Chapter IV. The h is to ry  and pattern o f 
settlement are de ta iled . Environmental considerations and th e ir  
in te rac t ion  with broader aspects o f production are shown to be 
important. "Developers" and "developed" are id e n t i f ie d  in terms o f  the 
framework set out in Chapter I I ,  w ith a pre lim inary exposition o f  s ta te , 
NGO (non-governmental o rgan iza tions), and indigenous in s t i t u t io n s  along 
with s tructures o f leadersh ip, in te res t groups, commerce, and other
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loca l manifestations o f  the social formation.
Detailed analysis o f  data from the two study v i l la g e s  commences 
in Chapter V, with a study o f  resources for production in the context o f  
changing production re la t io n s .  The a g r icu ltu ra l regime is described,
and th is  is  followed by analysis o f  how access to resources for 
production is  determined in the changing s i tu a t io n .  A deta iled account 
o f production in the two v i l la g es  under study is  then given, with a 
comparison h ig h l ig h t in g  certa in  aspects o f  contro l over production in 
the two communities. At each stage o f  the ana lys is , the place o f  ru ra l 
development in such change is h igh ligh ted .
Chapter VI deals with the consequences o f  concentration of 
control and changed production re la t io n s  w ith in the two communities. 
The f i r s t  part o f  the chapter discusses d i f fe re n t ia t io n  th a t resu lts  
from processes id e n t i f ie d  in the previous chapter. This is  i l lu s t ra te d  
by case studies o f  ind iv idua l households in Ban Dong and Ban Mai. The 
second part examines ind iv idua l responses to shortage produced by such 
d i f fe re n t ia t io n ,  in p a r t ic u la r  measures taken to regain control over 
production. I t  is  shown tha t at present most o f these measures involve 
solutions th a t are detrimental to the environment, fu r th e r  increase 
d i f fe r e n t ia t io n ,  or are external to the community. The im plications fo r  
th is  on ru ra l  development are considered b r ie f ly .
The way in which ru ra l development in i t s  various forms applies 
to increasing contro l by various actors is  approached in Chapter V II via 
the issue o f  cooperation and development. The c o l le c t i v i s t  versus 
in d iv id u a l is t  debate is  summarized as i t  applies to peasant society and 
re la ted to production in Lan Sak. The con trad ic t ion  between an 
in d iv id u a l is t ic  ethos and cooperative programmes is  brought ou t, and the 
approach o f  the various actors toward cooperation is used to show how i t
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re la tes  to the concept o f  con tro l.
Chapter V I I I  brings the various themes th a t have been discussed 
together in a reconsideration o f p a r t ic ip a t io n  in l i g h t  o f  the foregoing 
data. Conceptualizations and rev is ions o f  p a r t ic ip a t io n  are presented, 
and these are used to re-emphasize the two key themes o f  control and 
power. Specific aspects o f  these are discussed, drawing on preceding 
accounts o f  the context o f  ru ra l development and changing production
re la t io n s ,  and spec if ic  schemes are reviewed in l ig h t  o f  th is  new
perspective.
F in a l ly ,  the conclusion re ite ra te s  the dilemma o f  p a r t ic ip a to ry  
ru ra l development. The overall ro le  o f p a r t ic ip a t io n  in ru ra l 
development is  reconsidered. Obstacles to p a r t ic ip a t io n  are
acknowleged, but spaces for action are also h igh ligh ted .
1.4 Fieldwork methodology
The data used in th is  study were co llected during a period o f 
sixteen months' residence in the two study v i l la g e s ,  from March 1984 to 
July 1985. The fie ldwork approach was based on three types o f 
information gathering : pa r t ic ip a n t observation, informal and
unstructured in te rv iew ing , and a structured household survey carried 
out by m yse lf .14 jh ese three methods were mutually re in fo rc in g . 
Observation o f  social and economic patterns and immersion in the
l in g u is t ic  and cu ltu ra l environment o f  the community was a prerequ is ite  
to d ire c t  questioning. To the extent tha t d ire c t  questioning was
applied, questions had to be framed in terms o f sub jec t 's  language and 
experience in order not to impose the researcher's own meanings on
17
respondents' answers. S e n s it iv i ty  was required in knowing what 
questions to pose in what way and how best to fo l lo w  up ambiguous or 
in d e f in i te  answers. Meanwhile, the more structured approach re inforced 
e a r l ie r  p a r t ic ip a to ry  research by arranging information in a form that 
would be re a d i ly  comparable from one respondent to another and th a t 
could be re a d i ly  analysed system atica lly . The mutual reinforcement 
was also he lpfu l in terms o f re la t ion sh ip  with the community. 
P a rt ic ipa t io n  in the l i f e  and work o f  the v i l la g e  to the fu l le s t  extent 
possible established an understanding and rapport th a t proved invaluable 
in la te r  systematic surveying, not least in in te rp re ta t io n  o f  responses 
and assessment o f  th e i r  accuracy On the other hand, the systematic 
survey in the o f f in g  was o f  some use in making the researcher's purpose 
and method more re a d i ly  i n t e l l i g i b le .  On a s im ila r  note, the survey 
reduced the necessity fo r  constant jo t t in g  down o f de ta iled information 
th a t  might have distanced the researcher in e a r l ie r  stages o f  f ie ldwork.
The data gathered were o f two main types. The f i r s t  type was 
basic social and economic data concerning the in te rna l s tructu re  o f  the 
community, means o f  l iv e l ih o o d ,  and production re la t io n s .  The second 
was information about spec if ic  in s t i tu t io n s  th a t  regulate the above. 
Certain information o f  both types is  common to the community as a whole, 
and needed not be included in the household survey. Other information 
concerns ind iv idua l households, and p a r t ic u la r ly  th a t  which needed to be 
aggregated or cross-tabulated was included in the household survey 
carried out among 148 households, or a quarter o f  each community, during 
February to May 1985. The interv iew  schedule and sampling methodology 
is  contained in Appendix 1.
Information gathering fo r the m ajor ity  o f  the time spent in the 
v i l la g e  was by observation ra ther than survey. Both notebooks and tape 
recorders were seen as two edged swords. Constant jo t t in g  down o f
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in formation was avoided, since i t  would have interrupted smooth and 
natural dialogue and created a distance between myself and the
community, l im i t in g  the type o f  information I could expect to obta in .
In p a r t ic u la r ,  i t  would have bared in te re s t in ce rta in  sensit ive  issues 
(such as de fo res ta t ion , corruption) and closed the few avenues o f  access 
to such information. Tape recorders are l ikew ise in h ib i t in g .  A
suggestion by a local o f f i c ia l  to hide one in my shoulder bag was 
rejected on e th ica l grounds. In any case, hours o f  taped conversation 
would have taken a much greater number o f hours to analyze. Most o f  the 
information was recorded in notebooks at in te rva ls  during the day, based 
on memory o f  conversations held and overheard and on other observations 
and ins igh ts . The drawback to th is  approach was information lo s t  due to 
selectiveness o f  memory, but th is  was also an advantage in one respect 
in tha t i t  avoided information overload and heightened aptitude for 
cu l l in g  o f re levan t material from the plethora o f  everyday events. This 
was a s k i l l  th a t developed over time, both with improving 
conceptualization o f  the research theme and with a b i l i t y  to make mental 
notes. Tape recorders were used on two types o f  occasion. One was 
experimental group discussions on certa in  to p ics , which proved quite 
successful in tha t they involved guided exchanges between v i l la g e rs  
ra ther than dialogue between myself and research subjects. The other 
was interviews conducted with selected o f f i c i a l s .
My p a r t ic ip a to ry  mode o f research turned out to go beyond 
involvement in everyday l i f e  o f  the community. Although I stressed from 
ear ly  on tha t I was not bringing or o ffe r in g  anything by way o f 
development aid despite having been introduced to the community by a 
local non-governmental development o rgan ization, I did get involved in a 
loca l i n i t i a t i v e  to dig an i r r ig a t io n  channel in Bung Khiew. I also 
played a part in some o f  the l ia is o n  and coordinating a c t iv i t ie s  o f  the 
bu ffa lo  bank and the Nong Kha Yang Foundation for Rural Development
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(NKYFRD) a c t i v i t i e s  in Lan Sak and helped d ra f t  pro jec t proposals with 
community leaders. Such involvement is  of potent ia l  benef i t  to 
community and researcher a l i ke .  The ou ts ide r 's  wider range o f  contacts
and o f f i c i a l  standing may place him or her as an asset in the hands o f  
v i l l a g e rs ,  whi le the ins ights  gained into contact between o f f i c i a l s  and 
v i l l a g e rs  in the course o f  such work makes the "diversion"  worthwhile 
from a research point o f  view.
1.5 Note on terminology
I wish to provide a b r i e f  note on terminology used in the tex t  o f  
the thes is .  My concern i s  th reefo ld  : to c l a r i f y  use o f  terms tha t  are 
ambiguous or non-speci f ic ,  p a r t i c u la r l y  in a r e l a t i v e l y  new and jargon 
l i t t e r e d  f i e ld  such as ru ra l  development; to explain my a r r iva l  at 
certa in categorizat ions fo r  the purpose o f  f i e ld  research where such are 
to some extent a rb i t r a r y ;  and to explain my use of Thai terms.
The most d i f f i c u l t  rules to apply cons is ten t ly  are those
concerning descr ip t ion of people whose self-images are themselves
mul t ip le  in character. Thus in re fe r r ing  to farmers, peasants, 
v i l l a g e rs ,  rura l  producers, the ru ra l  poor, and so on I am not ta lk ing 
about mutually exclusive groups o f  people. Rather, I use each term 
according to the context in which people are referred to. Thus I use 
" v i l l a g e r "  to re fe r  to those who l i v e  within  the confines o f  the 
v i l l a g e .  I use " ru ra l  poor" when th e i r  r e la t i v e  economic status is
being stressed. The d i f fe rence between "farmer" and "peasant" is more 
problematic : both re fe r  to a l ive l ihood  that is  broader than the narrow 
in te rp re ta t ion  o f  production implied by "rura l  producer", and I prefer 
to use the term farmer except in the context o f  more general debates on
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"the peasantry".
In a s im i la r  ve in, discussion o f  people as " labourers" ,
" tenants" ,  "small farmers", and so on is problematic,  and t h i s  is
discussed fu r the r  in section I l ^ J i  As a r e s u l t ,  I avoid the use o f  
such terms except in a temporary sense.
"V i l lage"  is used to re fe r  to the geographical ly bounded area,
whi le "community" re fe rs  to the social body l i v i n g  within tha t  area.
"Settlement" re fers  to the area o f  residence with in  the v i l l a g e .
Certain concepts are used ra ther loose ly , and i t  is  beyond the 
scope o f  t h i s  thesis to enter into the lengthy debates on 
appropriateness o f  some o f  these terms. Among these is  
"pa t ron -c l ien tage" , which is  used to re fe r  to t ra d i t i o n a l  reciprocal
re la t ionsh ips  between people o f  higher and lower status in Thai society, 
use o f  the term is not intended to general ize about the social 
formation, and i t  is  applied only when no less loaded term is  
appl icab le . Other problematic terms are explained as they appear in the 
th e s i s .
D e f in i t ion  o f  the household is a p a r t i c u la r l y  t r i c k y  task in any 
v i l la g e  study. The term normally used in Thai fo r  census purposes, 
khruareuan, re fe rs  usual ly to those l i v i n g  under one roo f .  However, 
t h i s  may not be equivalent to a discrete production u n i t ,  since parents 
and chi ldren may work f i e ld s  together despite l i v i n g  in separate abodes. 
I t  may also not be s ig n i f i c a n t  as a consumption u n i t ,  since famil ies may 
share th e i r  r i c e  with close kin and eat many o f  t h e i r  meals with those
l i v i n g  in the same compound but under d i f fe re n t  roofs.  The closest I
have come to adopting a formal d e f in i t i o n  o f  the household in Ban Dong 
and Ban Mai has been to t r e a t  i t  as closely  as possible in terms o f  the
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most common local grouping : "khon kin ruam mo'o diawkan : those
eating from the same pot".  Clearly th i s  is  problematic in terms o f  
product ion, although in actual fac t  there is a close i f  not to ta l  
correspondence between households as production and consumption un its .
Since discourse is  one o f  the foc i  o f  in te res t  in th is  study, I 
make considerable use of Thai terms. My method o f  presenting them is  as 
fo l lows. I f  the English t rans la t ion  o f  a Thai word or phrase is i t s  
d i re c t  equivalent and not bound by context,  I give the English word or 
phrase followed by the Thai equivalent.  I f  the Thai word or phrase is 
bound by context or there is  no equivalent t ra n s la t io n ,  I give the Thai 
word or phrase followed by a the English closest equivalent or by a 
l i t e r a l  t rans la t ion  and an explanation i f  t h i s  is  deemed necessary. 
Longer statements are translated as n a tu ra l ly  as possible, with the Thai 
fol lowed by the English. In the case o f  paraphrasing, only the English 
is  g iven .
For t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n  rules appl ied, please see Appendix 2.
Notes
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1. I de l ibera te ly  use the notion o f  contradict ion to indicate a range o f  
processes that underly the ambiguity o f  the term " p a r t i c ip a t io n " ,  and 
which are viewed by various "par t ic ipants "  in d i f fe re n t  ways depending 
on how each is  involved. The argument in th i s  thesis is  that these 
d i f fe re n t  processes are l inked to a central  problem. I use the term 
"contrad ic t ion"  because i t  picks up on both exis t ing uses in neo-marxist 
discussion concerning m a te r ia l is t  conceptions o f  contradict ion and on 
more discursive and log ical senses o f  the term. In keeping with my
concern not to assume any simple dualism between m a te r ia l is t  or 
production re la t io n s ,  on the one hand, and discourse on the other ,  I 
re ta in  a single term in order to show how i t  works out d i f f e r e n t l y  in 
d i f fe re n t  contexts and fo r  d i f fe re n t  people, for a key aim in the thesis 
is to show how these processes are understood or represented by 
d i f fe re n t  par t ies involved. I should also note at th is  point that for 
heur is t ic  purposes, my notion o f  discourse as used here picks up more on 
language use than in a more encompassing account o f  discourse; th is  
concept is  discussed fur ther in the fol lowing chapter.
2. "Local izat ion" is used here in the sense o f  "br inging to [or 
maintaining at]  the local level"  rather than " id e n t i fy ing  the l o c a l i t y  
o f " .  A l te rna t ive ly ,  d is t inguish ing between the Chambers Twentieth
Century Dict ionary (1972 edit ion)  d e f in i t io n s ,  I am discussing
"a s s ig n a t io n ] "  to a place, not "1 im i t [ i n g ] "  to a place.
3. Robert Redf ield 's (1956) essay on the " l i t t l e  community" marked a
turning point in the emphasis o f  modern anthropology in tha t  i t  
i m p l i c i t l y  placed the subjects o f  anthropological study within  a wider 
context than th e i r  immediate, "closed" surroundings. I use "community" 
in the singular here as a concept, whereas my study is  ac tua l ly  based on 
two such communities (see section 1.5 below for discussion of 
terminology).
4. Such mistaken emphasis as a re su l t  o f  re ly ing on aggregated data from 
t e r r i t o r i a l  units has been referred to as an "ecological fa l la cy "  (see 
Alker 1969; Johnston 1981 : 89).
5. Hainsworth (1982) conceives o f  these two aspects o f  development as a 
"rediscovery o f  the idea of progress (p .3) combined with a concern for 
"d i f fus ion"  (p .5). The l a t t e r  has been an important theme in the 
geographer's paradigm o f  development.
6 . According to National S ta t is t ica l  Office data, there were 41,100 
v i l lages  registered in 1965; 45,661 in 1970; 49,178 in 1975; and 55,746 
in 1983.
7. To avoid confusion, I use "Thailand" rather than "Siam" throughout 
t h i s  study since t h i s  i s  the name by which the country is  most popular ly 
known today. In some cases th i s  is  retrospect ive use, since the change 
was only made in 1939.
8. See, fo r  example, FAO 1973, 1981; Cohen and Uphoff 1977; Gal ja r t  and 
Bui js 1979; Pearse and S t ie fe l  1979; IBRD 1980; Thawitong et a l . 1984. 
The theme o f  pa r t ic ipa t ion  is discussed more f u l l y  in Chapter V I I I .
9. I f ind th i s  the most appropriate posit ion in which to stand for two 
reasons : one, f l i p - f l o p s  are the normal footwear o f  Lan Sak v i l l a g e rs ;  
two, as anyone with experience o f  v i l l a g e  l i f e  can a t te s t  to ,  they are 
convenient above a l l  in the ease with which they can be taken o f f  and
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put on when ascending a house, and th is  ease o f  movement in and out o f  a 
v i l l a g e r ' s  shoes is  l ikewise useful for the perspective taken in th is  
study.
10. Johnston and Clark are p a r t i c u la r ly  c r i t i c a l  of  the extremity o f  
posit ions taken in t h i s  debate. They suggest tha t  the d i rec t ion  o f  
i n i t i a t i v e  is secondary to the importance o f  f i t t i n g  technology and 
organization to local needs. Their pa r t ic ipa to ry  framework involves a 
balance o f  cog i ta t ion  (planning) and social in te rac t ion  (act ing ou t ) .  
In an integrated rural  development framework
i t  makes l i t t l e  sense to ask [ loca l  people] what 
they want and t re a t  the i r  answers as the la s t  word 
on the subject ,  only to discover how many other 
people want incompatible th ings. (1982 : 34).
Limit ing ourselves for the time being to discussion o f  perspective
rather than scales o f  ac t ion,  i t  is  true o f  course that whi le b irds can
always return to the ground, worms cannot f l y .  Perhaps, therefore, 
c a te rp i l l a r s  would make a better  analogy fo r  our case, and one o f  the 
ways to f a c i l i t a t e  p a r t ic ipa t ion  in the cogitat ion process is  to speed 
up metamorphosis. A l te rn a t iv e ly ,  the worm has the advantage that i t  can 
go underground. In our peasant analogy t h i s  need not be taken in the 
p o l i t i c a l  sense : Scott 's  concept o f  the "hidden t ra n sc r ip t "  of the 
peasantry tha t  is kept away from those in pos it ions o f  power is  o f  
relevance here; see also his reference to the nocturnal aspect o f  
peasant discourse and resistance (Scott 1986 : 10).
11. "Upland" in the Central Thai context does not imply a great change 
o f  a l t i tu de  from the r ice-growing plains. In t h i s  case the d i f ference 
is one o f  about 100 metres. The s ig n i f i c a n t  feature o f  "upland"
v i l l a g e s ,  or "upland" farming, i s  tha t  they are not suited to r ice
cu l t i v a t io n  due to lack o f  i r r i g a t i o n  and te r rac ing .  Crops grown on 
such upland are hereafter referred to as " f i e l d  crops" ( l o c a l l y  known as 
pheud r a i ) .
12. This immediately raises the issue as to whether Ban Dong and Ban Mai 
can be represented as exhaustive or mutually exclusive in terms o f  the 
range o f  production regimes and stra tegies o f  outside intervent ion in 
Lan Sak. In the f i r s t  instance, the broad range o f  crops produced in 
Lan Sak is  represented within the two v i l l a g e s ,  and the techniques used 
in production are s im i la r  to those used elsewhere in the D is t r i c t .  The 
only two Lan Sak communities tha t  d i f f e r  s ig n i f i c a n t l y  in th e i r  economic 
o r ien ta t ion  from e i ther  Ban Dong or Ban Mai are Paak Meuang, the market 
centre, and Rabam, a small fo res t ry  v i l lage  within  a re -a f fo re s ta t io n  
scheme. These atypical  and peripheral cases respect ive ly  do not warrant 
separate treatment as "types" .  In terms o f  outside in te rven t ion ,  there 
are communities more remote than Ban Dong, but these are a l l  upland 
v i l l a g e s .  In the second instance, i t  must be stressed tha t  there is  a 
good deal o f  overlap between production in Ban Dong and Ban Mai, 
p a r t i c u la r l y  in f i e ld  cropping. However, the o r ien ta t ion  and 
se l f -percept ion o f  v i l l a g e rs  in the two communities i s  d i s t i n c t  (see 
section V.3).  Certain aspects o f  state led development are apparent in 
both v i l l a g e s ,  but in Ban Mai the outsiders'  ro le  has been important 
since the formal establishment o f  the community.
13. See in pa r t icu la r  Foucault (1977 : 222 - 223) on the "panoptic
d isc ip l in a ry  mechanisms" that maintain an asymmetry o f  power with in  
supposedly ega l i ta r ian  regimes. Foucault emphasises the "systems o f  
micro-power" that maintain the "d is c ip l in a ry  l i n k "  behind the 
"contractual l i n k " .  More s p e c i f i c a l l y  in the context o f  agrarian 
change, G r i f f i n  (1979) shows tha t  power re la t ions  as expressed, fo r  
example, through skewed factor pr ices, are more important than a 
Smithian "hidden hand" in determining how benef i ts  o f  such change are
24
d is t r ib u te d .  He concludes tha t :
The reason [ f o r  HYVs f a i l i n g  to a l lev ia te  rural  
problems] l i e s  not so much in inadequate
technology as in inappropriate i n s t i t u t io n s  and 
poor po l icy . The explanation for the l a t t e r ,  in
tu rn ,  l i e s  not in the ignorance o f  those who
govern but in the powerlessness o f  those who are 
governed ( p .259).
Thus supposed " ra t io n a l i z a t io n "  in both i t s  broader and more narrowly 
defined contexts f a i l s  to diminish the relevance o f  power in determining 
social and economic re la t ions .
14. Having already spent some time in Thailand before undertaking f i e ld  
research, I had achieved a degree o f  language fluency before
commencing the v i l l a g e  studies. As a r e s u l t ,  I was able to work without 
having to employ an ass is tan t ,  which I deemed an advantage in
establ ish ing a more d i re c t  re la t ionsh ip  with the community than might 
otherwise have been possible and thence in making observations that 
might have been missed and holding conversations th a t  would have proven 
awkward had I worked through an in te rpre te r  or f i e ld  ass is tant .  This 
proved benef ic ial  also in the systematic survey, since the distance that 
normally ex is ts  between social surveyor and subject was reduced by 
f a m i l i a r i t y ,  which led to the interviews being carr ied out in a more 
informal style than might otherwise have been the case. I t  was also 
benef ic ia l  to carry out the survey with the bene f i t  o f  a knowledge o f  
the area and research topic in tha t  I could fo l low up questions, clear 
up ambiguit ies, and sub jec t ive ly  assess the l i k e l y  accuracy o f  answers.
CHAPTER I I
ACTORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT
The concept o f  development as something a country,  a society,  
a people, or an economy does (or has done to i t )  is recent ,  but the 
processes behind i t  are not. This is  ref lected in the emergence o f  
development in the postwar period as an issue and a science at once 
separate from pre-ex is t ing  d isc ip l in e s  and yet i n i t i a l l y  based on the 
premise that the "developing" or "underdeveloped" soc iet ies were going 
through, or had yet to (or even fa i le d  to) go through, certa in
t ra n s i t ion s  tha t  had brought the "developed" world up to i t s  high levels
o f  p roduc t iv i ty  and consumption within integrated nation states. As a 
r e s u l t ,  development has served in one sense as a cover for underlying 
processes occurr ing at various leve ls  o f  these rap id ly  changing 
soc ie t ies. Most o f  these processes can be found in the h is to ry  o f  the 
"developed" world : state formation, national in tegra t ion ,  growth,
c a p i t a l i s t  t ransformation, urbanizat ion,  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  to name but 
a few prominent ones. Needless to say, t h i s  does not imply tha t  such 
processes take the same form as they did in e a r l i e r  developers ( to use 
the term re t rospect ive ly )  , given the very d i f f e re n t  h is to r ica l
s p e c i f i c i t i e s ,  d i f f e r e n t  cu l tu ra l  and societal  background, and o f  course 
new constra in ts  imposed by the world system that are themselves a 
product o f  e a r l i e r  t r a n s i t io n s .  The relevant point is  rather that such 
processes are now subsumed under the generic term "development", which 
has found i t s  own niche in the ideology, discourse, and structures not 
only o f  in te rna t iona l  bureaucratic organizat ions and western 
un ive rs i t ies  as is  commonly supposed, but also with in  the domestic
framework o f  developing countr ies themselves. The co ro l la ry  o f  t h i s  
extended "rediscovery o f  the idea of progress under the name
development" (Hainsworth 1982 : 3) is tha t  a study o f  cer ta in  aspects o f  
development with in  a nat ional or even a local and h ighly  spec i f ic  
context can reveal a great deal about some o f  the underlying processes 
for which development serves as an intent ional  or unintent ional f ro n t .
That Thai land, fo r  example, is  conceived of as a developing
country is  not j u s t  due to a place in the global d iv is io n  between LDCs
(less developed countries) and (M)DCs ([more] developed countr ies) ,
underdeveloped and (over)developed (see Caldwell 1977), poor and r i c h .
I t  is as much to do with domestic pressures and a domestic awareness. 
Discourse centr ing on development (kaan phathanaa) has found i t s  way 
into p o l i t i c a l ,  admin is t ra t ive,  economic, and everyday aspects o f  l i f e  
in rura l  as well as urban areas. Such a preoccupation shows l i t t l e  in
i t s e l f  about the intended nature or d i rec t ion  o f  development, but i t  
does mean that the development issue is a l i v e  and pervasive one. In 
i t s  praxis and discourse, there fore ,  is  re f lec ted  much about the current 
p o l i t y  and social formation.
I propose in th is  study to concentrate on a p a r t icu la r  theme 
concerning the re la t ionsh ip  o f  ind iv idua ls  and groups to the larger 
society and i t s  resources in an examination o f  ru ra l  development, the 
l a t t e r  an important sub-paradigm with in  the larger f i e ld  o f  development
in general. In th i s  background chapter the ethos o f  rura l  development,
as re f lec ted in i t s  ideological basis,  i t s  discourse, and structures 
surrounding i t ,  provides a context and a s ta r t ing  point fo r  examining
what are to some extent hidden processes-*- a t the v i l la g e  leve l .  
Par t icu la r  a ttent ion is  then given to the ro le  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  change as foc i  for empirical analys is .  The empirical  
stage is  set by an account o f  the Thai rura l  social formation, and th is  
is  related to ex is t ing  structures in rural  development. F ina l ly ,  the 
main theme under study, popular p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  i s  considered in terms o f
the above, and certain contradict ions v is  a v is  p a r t ic ip a t io n  are 
revealed as a consequence.
I I . 1 The Ethos o f  Development
In Thai land, changes tha t  are induced as part o f  the 
transformation o f  the economy and the extended ro le  o f  the state have 
created what I would l ike  to ca l l  an ethos o f  development with i t s  own 
ideological basis or bases, d iscourse(s ) , and structures.  Since the 
F i rs t  National Development Plan was formulated in 1961, development 
through economic growth within a context o f  national securi ty^  has
been a conscious nat ional p r i o r i t y .  To the extent tha t  growth and 
development can be equated, moreover, the Thai nat ional economy has in 
fac t  fared well un t i l  recent ly  when compared with other developing 
economies. A cumulative 6NP growth rate o f  8.6 per cent was achieved 
between 1959 and 1969 (Ingram 1971 : 223), fol lowed by a s l i g h t l y  lower 
rate o f  7.5 per cent during the 1970s (NESDB 1981). However, i t  became 
increasing ly clear tha t  growth alone is  i n s u f f i c ie n t  for even and 
sustained development as inequa l i t ies  between r ich  and poor, centre and 
periphery, and urban (c h ie f l y  Bangkok) and rura l  areas increased and as 
resource deplet ion and environmental de te r io ra t ion  became more
apparent. In 1970 rural -urban income d i f f e r e n t i a l s  in Thailand at 3 : 1 
were among the highest in the world (Panayotou 1983 : 41). Between 1960 
and 1979 per capita income d isp a r i t ie s  between Central and 
Northeastern Thailand rose from 2.4 : 1 to 3.5 : 1 and between Bangkok 
and the Northeast form 5.2 : 1 to 6.0 : 1, whi le during the same period
the ag r icu l tu ra l  land f r o n t i e r  was more or less closed (G i r l ing  1981 :
67) and fo res t  cover was reduced from 53 per cent to 34 percent o f  to ta l  
land area (Boonchana and Thongchai 1983 : 39). These imbalances took on
a p o l i t i c a l  s ign if icance during the 1970s tha t  led the country 's 
planners as well as students, academics, and other concerned groups to 
turn more s p e c i f i c a l l y  to rural  development as a counterbalance to the 
po l ic ies  tha t  had fa i led  to u p l i f t  the l i v i n g  standard o f  many o f  the 
f o u r - f i f t h s  o f  the population who dwell in the countryside.
An ethos o f  development is  thus well estab l ished, in the sense 
o f  an awareness o f  change and concern about how to reo r ien t  that change. 
The current concern for ru ra l  development has sprung from the inequit ies 
o f  a past development strategy based p r imar i ly  on economic growth and 
national securi ty .  The inequ it ies  have been posed as a development 
problem in a number o f  ways : p o l i t i c a l l y ,  as a dangerous gap between 
aspira t ions and achievement; economically, as a f a i lu re  to increase 
p roduc t iv i ty  and create a rural  market; moral ly,  as an unjust social 
d is t r ib u t i o n  o f  the f r u i t s  o f  economic growth. How to ensure a " t r i c k l e  
down" of these f r u i t s  has now become the pr incipal  issue.
However, concealed within  t h i s  broad concern l i e s  a mult i tude 
o f  explanations as to how th i s  unequal state o f  a f f a i r s  has ar isen and 
what s tra tegies should be used to ensure a more balanced form o f  
development. The ethos o f  rura l  development, fa r  from being a 
monol i thic set o f  values, assumptions, and approaches, is  rather a 
heterogeneous mi l ieu  o f  tensions and contradic t ions obscured by an 
apparent consensus associated with th i s  innocuous term. In the various 
manifestat ions o f  t h i s  ethos can be discerned some o f  the hidden 
struggles associated with the processes o f  change th a t  are themselves 
the background to rura l  development.
I I > 1 J  Dev el opment ideology
Before examining state and a l te rna t ive  ideologies of 
development in the rura l  Thai s i tua t ion ,  i t  is worth considering b r i e f l y  
the broader ro le  o f  ideology in e f fec t ing change and domination. Much 
has been wr i t ten recent ly  on Gramscian hegemony as applied to the Thai 
state in an attempt to ide n t i fy  the moral ly accepted basis fo r  power ( in 
contrast ,  tha t  i s ,  to repress ion) . 3 Establishment o f  hegemony re l ie s  
in part on imparting an ideological basis for common action that 
ide n t i f ie s  the interests of the ru le rs  (developers) with those o f  the 
ruled (developed). Imposition o f  the dominant ideology through 
ideological domination therefore serves as the means by which the state 
in i t s  various manifestat ions seeks to achieve legit imacy (Turton 
1984b), and these manifestat ions include various structures involved in 
state ru ra l  development strategy.
Behind state-led rural  development, we have seen, l i e  more 
fundamental processes, primary among which are state formation and 
c a p i t a l i s t  t ransformation. In the context o f  rural  development, these 
processes involve penetration4 of the v i l lage  by state and cap i ta l ,  
e f fec t ing  a reor ien ta t ion  o f  power structures and a change in agrarian 
production re la t ions .  Supporting these basic changes in turn l i e s  an 
ideology that is  expressed pub l ic ly  as an ideology o f  development and 
has acquired i t s  own discourse. The object ive o f  the state developer is  
to transfer t h i s  ideology to the rural  population as part o f  the 
leg i t im iza t ion  process fo r  state a c t i v i t y  in rural  areas. Meanwhile, 
a l ternat ive ideologies emerge from the actual experience o f  rural  
producers (Turton 1984b : 62 f f . )  and from non-governmental approaches to 
development.
Apart from i t s  anti-communist stance, the most c lea r ly  
ide n t i f ia b le  element o f  state development ideology is  the need for
modernization. In a g r icu l tu re ,  t h i s  means a move away from subsistence
oriented production toward commercial crops, an increased ro le  for
capital  through mechanization and use o f  inputs such as f e r t i l i z e r  and
pest ic ides, supported by increased rura l  c re d i t  in pursu i t  o f  higher
y ie lds .  I t  is a c a p i t a l i s t  ideology tha t  promotes individual
accumulation o f  wealth and monetized production re la t io n s ,  one that
promises material  prosper i ty .  Meanwhile, Buddhism as the national
re l ig ion^  -js invoked along with associated moral values such as
honesty, hard work, and punctua l i ty .  This is part  also o f  the broader
n a t io n a l is t  ideology o f  nat ion-rel igion-monarchy and associated ideals 
£o f  u n i t y , 0 order,  and respect fo r  national i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Also present 
is  a s t a t i s t  ideology of un ity through in tegra t ion  o f  national 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  in the name o f  democratization. In short ,  state rural  
development ideology is  one that promotes c a p i t a l i s t  t ransformat ion and 
state penetrat ion as a path from poverty to p rosper i ty ,  from iso la t ion  
to in teg ra t ion ,  from backwardness to c i v i l i z a t i o n .
An important part  o f  v i l l a g e  level rural  development a c t i v i t y  by 
the state i s  devoted to imparting t h i s  ideology, as is  evident from the 
emphasis on t ra in in g  programmes whose content is la rge ly  ideo log ica l .  
One government t ra in in g  manual, fo r example, stresses the importance of 
ideology, whose importance is as "a system of ideas with a plan to 
insp ire  act ions, or abstinence from certa in  act ions, in order to achieve 
the best condit ions possible at a given t ime". Ideology is  to be 
created by exemplary behaviour, symbols, songs, slogans, and 
in s t i t u t io n a l i z e d  t ra in in g .  (National Primary Education Off ice n.d. : 1 
-  2).  Most o f  the songs and slogans in the manual concern respect for 
national i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  u n i ty ,  and individual m ora l i ty .
Non-governmental approaches to development are varied and cannot 
be ide n t i f ie d  with a clear a l te rna t ive  ideology. The pr inc ipal
oppos i t ion is t  ideology, tha t  o f  the Communist Party o f  Thailand 
(CPT) , i s  i l l e g a l  and in d i re c t  challenge to the s ta te ,  so cannot pose 
i t s e l f  in terms o f  rural  development, although many state rural  
development a c t i v i t i e s  were conceived at least in part  as preemptive
measures to the taking hold of th i s  opposit ion i d e o l o g y . 7  M a n y  NGOs
do, however, have an a n t i - c a p i t a l i s t  ideology and emphasize subsistence
before commercial product ion, the bargaining posit ion o f  the poor, and 
t r a d i t i o n a l  (as opposed to state) Buddhist values. Meanwhile, as a
re s u l t  o f  a process o f  what Turton (through Gramsci) ca l ls  "negat ion",  
elements o f  a popular ideology th a t  d i f f e r s  from the dominant state 
ideology can begin to be id e n t i f i e d .
I l ^ l j i  Devel opment discourse
As a tool for analys is ,  language is a two edged sword. On the 
one hand, use o f  language is  reveal ing o f  subjects'  values, motives, 
perspect ives, or other abstract var iables tha t  cannot be measured or 
determined in any other way, but which nevertheless inf luence and help 
explain act ions. On the other hand, language can ju s t  as eas i ly  be used 
by subjects to obscure in tent ions and cannot be taken at face value. 
However, t h i s  l a t t e r  aspect o f  language is not e n t i r e l y  a negative 
inf luence on i t s  in te res t  as an item for study, for ambiguity i t s e l f  
contains s ig n i f i c a n t  meanings tha t  can be interpreted where the context 
is  clear.  Ambiguity may be a del iberate technique to disguise 
in tent ions or paper over con trad ic t ions ,  or i t  may (as is  probably more 
often the case in the present context) be a log ica l  re su l t  o f  
contradic t ions inherent in a p a r t icu la r  process.
Discourse^ also has i n t r i n s i c  in te rest  in that i t  represents
communication and hence in te rac t ion  between subjects under study. In 
Parkin's (1982) analogy, we need not only to in te rp re t  f ixed orders, but 
also to in te rp re t  in te rp re ta t ions  internal  to those orders. Without 
discourse, ideology and non-material inf luences on the formation o f  the 
social subject are devoid of means o f  transmission. Therefore, whi le at 
one level we must be wary o f  l i t e r a l  i n te rp re ta t io n s , a t another we can 
t re a t  discourse as an expression o f  the d ia le c t i c  between groups under
study. In the present context,  the discourse o f  the "developers" and
the counter-discourse o f  the "developed" both give ins igh t  into the
ethos o f  ru ra l  development in Thailand.
Rural development programmes have acquired a vocabulary o f  th e i r  
own, and th is  set o f  lex ica l  items is  a re f le c t io n  o f  the p r i o r i t i e s  
associated with such programmes. Development (kaan phathanaa) is 
often equated with prosper i ty ,  or c i v i l i z a t i o n  {khwaam ja ro e n ) . An
expression o f  underdevelopment is  that a v i l l a g e  is far from
p ro s p e r i t y / c i v i l i z a t i o n  [ k la i  jaak khwaam ja roen) .  Prosperi ty and 
c i v i l i z a t i o n  in t h i s  case take on urban, mater ial  forms : fences, 
s t ree ts ,  e l e c t r i c i t y ,  consumer goods, cleanl iness (s ic )9  ancj r e f l e c t  
the urban o r ien ta t ion  o f  development strategy whereby v i l la g es  and 
v i l la g e rs  are to develop by "catching up". Other concepts tha t  r e f l e c t  
th is  o r ien ta t ion  include convenience (khwaam saduak) associated with 
roads and e l e c t r i c i t y ,  order and t id iness {khwaam rabiab r i a b r o i )  , and
the contraposi t ion o f  r u r a l i t y  as expressed in the word fo rest (paa)
as backward, w i ld ,  dangerous with c i v i l i z a t i o n  {khwaam rungreuang) as
secure, a measure o f  achievement (see Chapter I I I ) .
Discourse associated with development t ra in in g  programmes places 
a tten t ion  and the onus fo r  development on the in d iv idu a l .  Much is made 
o f  the need to develop people {phathanaa khon) by e f fec t ing  moral and 
s p i r i tu a l  development {phathanaa j i t j a i ) . This is  fu r th e r  ref ined in
terms o f  the need to impart values such as d i l igence {khwaam khayan) , 
punctua l i ty  {khwaam trong weelaa) ,10 and honesty {khwaam seusat) 
among other c i v i c  v i r tues .  The impl icat ion is that underdevelopment 
comes from a lack o f  these v i r tues  in ind iv idual v i l l a g e rs ,  and 
lec tu res ,  songs, and exhortat ions place stress on t h i s .  A v i l la g e  is  
seen as ready {phro'm) fo r  development according to the moral f ib re  o f  
i t s  c i t i z e n ry  as defined by outside developers according to these 
values. Programmes such as the national level Phaen din thamt Phaen 
din tho'ng  ( l i t e r a l l y ,  land of [Buddhist] v i r tu e ,  land of gold) 
programme emphasize giv ing up d r in k ,  gambling, and other pursui ts deemed 
as representing obstacles to development.
Another important aspect o f state- led ru ra l  development at the 
v i l la g e  level concerns securi ty {khwaam mankhong) . A number of 
spec i f ic  programmes are j u s t f i e d  in terms o f  v i l l a g e rs '  secur i ty ,  or as 
a means o f  ensuring ease of administrat ion {kaan pokkhro'ng ngaai) .  
More ambiguously, in t rus ion  o f  state structures into the v i l l a g e  (see 
below) are sometimes j u s t i f i e d  as to ensure comprehensive coverage 
{kaanduulae thuatheung) . However, the word duulae impl ies not 
only p a te rn a l i s t i c  "watching over", but also p o te n t ia l l y  repressive 
"keeping an eye on". This control and access by the state represent 
another key element o f  i t s  ru ra l  development strategy as re f lec ted in 
i t s  (a lb e i t  ambiguous) discourse.
The most recent strand of discourse in the various programmes 
involves an attempt to move away from the t ra d i t io n a l  welfare 
{songkhro') ro le  o f  state aid to rural areas. Par t ic ipa t ion  
expressed as " kaan khao maa m i i  suan ruam : l i t .  to come in and take
part"  is an exhortat ion fo r  v i l l a g e rs  to become involved in the 
programmes. Self -help  {kaan chuai tua eeng) is an ideal o f reducing
the dependence o f  v i l l a g e rs  on the state fo r  var ious services. However,
closer examination o f  these concepts as applied reveals an emphasis on 
the doing rather than the i n i t i a t i n g  or deciding, and pa r t ic ip a t io n  or 
se l f -he lp  is  very much on the terms set by outsiders. At i t s  extreme, 
th is  form o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  represents a new type o f  corvee!
The discourse tha t  emphasises urban style prosper i ty  and secur i ty  
as object ives fo r  rura l  development suggests co n t inu i ty  ra ther  than a 
break with previous development strategy. At the same t ime, i t  is  an 
ambiguous form of discourse in the sense that not a l l  groups stand to 
gain equal ly from th i s  prosperi ty  and securi ty.  As w i l l  be seen, rural  
d i f f e re n t ia t io n  and emerging rural  power structures are increasingly 
such tha t  the prosper i ty  favours those with access to cap ita l  and 
transpor t ,  whi le secur i ty is  a p o te n t ia l l y  repressive development within  
the v i l l a g e .  Emphasis on the ind iv idual takes the focus o f f  underlying 
struc tu res, whi le p a r t ic ipa t ion  and se l f -he lp  are based on the 
(unstated) premise that f i r s t  and foremost v i l l a g e rs  require t ra in in g  in 
order to be w i l l i n g  ( in  the case o f  pa r t ic ipa t ion )  and able ( in  the case 
o f  se l f -he lp )  to take on ex terna l ly  defined development tasks without 
having to re ly  on the paternalism o f  the state.
There is  a more general ambiguity th a t  l i e s  behind the 
inherent contradic t ions o f  a strategy of rura l  development through 
national in tegra t ion .  The discourse o f  rura l  development contains much 
that deals with v i l l a g e rs '  increasing th e i r  r i g h t s ,  du t ies ,  and 
re s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  as c i t i z e n s ,  and the unity o f  the Thai people. Implied 
is a sense o f  belonging, o f  the v i l l a g e  as an integral  part o f  the 
s ta te , o f  v i l l a g e rs  as subjects rather than objects o f  state po l icy ,  o f  
farmers as the "backbone" of the nation ( chaonaa pen kraduuk sanlang 
kho* ng chaat) . Yet by the same token, the o f f i c i a l  discourse of 
nat ion, r e l i g io n ,  and monarchy (chaat saat kasat) is reinforced by 
physical and i n s t i t i t u t i o n a l  a cc e s s ib i l i t y  afforded by schemes fa l l i n g
under the aegis o f  rura l  development to establ ish an increasing monopoly 
in terms o f  leg i t imacy o f  state i n s t i t u t io n s  and procedures a f fec t ing  
the everyday social  and economic l i f e  o f  v i l l a g e  and v i l l a g e rs .
To a cer ta in  extent ambiguity succeeds in obscuring some o f  the 
contradic t ions inherent in the rural  development stra tegy,  and to th is  
extent discourse serves a useful function for the state in i t s  
ideological t ra in ing  programmes. Nevertheless, cer ta in  aspects o f  
peasant discourse in react ion to the programmes with which the dominant 
discourse is associated show tha t  contradict ions are not wholly 
submerged. Feelings o f  being cont inua l ly  pestered ( j u k j i k  j a i )  by
ru ra l  development programmes, various development tasks, and so on are
commonly expressed. Many feel forced ( thuuk bangkhap) into 
a c t i v i t i e s .  Individual programmes are punned, fo r  example "Phaen din  
tham, Phaen din tho1 ng" becomes "Phaen din t h o \  Phaen din th a e " , or 
"land o f  desperat ion",  in the words of some v i l l a g e rs .
I t  must be stressed that th is  discourse and counter-discourse is 
not exchanged in neutral  dialogue. Development discourse is  to be
understood in terms o f  power structures within  as well as outside the 
v i l l a g e .  Meanwhile, counter-discourse is  a d ia le c t i c a l  response to the 
dominant discourse, but at the same time i t  is  contained in what James 
Scott c a l l s  the "hidden t ra n sc r ip t "  o f  the powerless. That is  to say, 
those against whom development as re f lected in the dominant discourse is 
o b jec t ive ly  or sub jec t ive ly  biased re f ra in  from presenting th e i r  
counter-discourse in f ron t  o f  i t s  a r t i c u la t o r s .
An enigmatic aspect o f  the dominant discourse is what may be
termed an " im p l i c i t  d i a l e c t i c " ! !  in key terms. "Prachaathipatai  : 
democracy" impl ies (negat ively associated) communism as the a l te rna t ive  
to state ideology. Espousal o f  v i r tues such as winai ( d isc ip l ine )  and
khwaamkhayan (d i l igence) evokes a d isorder ly  and lazy impression of 
"undeveloped" v i l l a g e  l i f e ,  though t h i s  is  never made e x p l i c i t .  The 
unstated a l te rna t ive  to khwaammankhong (securi ty )  impl ies danger in 
opposing coercive elements o f state pol icy at the local leve l .  
Khwaamjaroen, rungreuang ( c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  p ro s p e r i t y ) , and rabiab 
(order) as key object ives w ith in  development discourse imply a cu l tu ra l  
as well as physical underdevelopment represented in the backwardness, 
poverty, and lack o f  regimentation in v i l la g e  l i f e .
A la s t  point on development discourse is  tha t  i t  would be 
wrong to give the impression tha t  the dominant ( s t a t i s t )  discourse and 
the counter-discourse represent exhaustive categories. S ign i f i can t  also 
are non-governmental organizat ions, whose perspective and ideology tend 
to be d i s t i n c t l y  n o n -s ta t is t .  Foremost in the NGQ discourse are 
concepts o f  d ig n i ty  { s a k s i i ) ,  se l f - re l iance  (pheung ton eng),  
decision making power (amnaat nai kaan ta d s in ja i )  , and bargaining 
power (amnaat nai kaan t o ' ro '  ng) and others r e f le c t in g  an a l te rna t ive  
conceptual izat ion o f  ru ra l  development. Of equal in te res t  is  the 
element o f  common discourse, whereby p a r t i c ip a t io n  and sp i r i tu a l  
development, fo r  example, are basic p r inc ip les  o f  NGO approaches to a 
bottom-up, non-mater ia l is t  development strategy. Connotations are 
defined by context,  however, and a study tha t  traced the connotative 
transmutations as items o f  discourse pass from one user to the next 
would reveal the necessity o f  in te rp re ta t io n .12 in each case, "we
should id e n t i f y  as fa r  as possible the circumstances by which the 
apparently chance event becomes an in te rp re ta t ive  insp i ra t ion "  (Parkin 
1982 : x l v i i ) .
I l ^ l j i i  Devel opment s tructures
The broad range o f  a c t i v i t i e s  carried out by the state
bureaucracy at the local level are general ly label led as rura l
development. Attent ion is  directed p a r t i c u la r l y  to the NESDB poverty
concentrat ion d i s t r i c t s .  State programmes consist  o f  a purportedly
benign transformation or i n i t i a t i o n  of legal and administrat ive
in s t i t u t i o n s  and implementation of spec i f ic  schemes directed at local
people's welfare (expressed as yuu d i i  kin d i i  : l i t .  " l i v e  w e l l ,  eat
wel l" )  and increasing ag r icu l tu ra l  production.
The pr inc ipa l  adminis tra t ive  arm of the state at the local level 
i s  the d i s t r i c t  admin is tra t ion, in the form o f  departments o f  the four 
( lo c a l ly )  pr inc ipal  m in is t r ies  [ s i i  krasuang 1ak) . These are not
necessari ly coordinated in a common development s tra tegy, as w i l l  be 
detai led in section I l ^ j ' i  below, but in t ra in in g  programmes they 
come together as the d i re c t  representat ives o f  the state at the local
leve l .  Other state structures support these a c t i v i t i e s ,  such as the 
m i l i t a r y ,  various departments providing occasional services (publ ic 
works, land development), and the Bank fo r  Agr icu l tu re  and Agr icu l tu ra l  
Cooperatives (BAAC), the pr inc ipal  formal a g r icu l tu ra l  c re d i t  
i n s t i t u t i o n .
Government contro l led cooperatives have been in operation in 
Thailand fo r  over 60 years, but these are usual ly l i t t l e  more than 
a g r icu l tu ra l  c red i t  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  mainly cater ing to the b e t t e r - o f f  
farmers. Farmers' associations at the tambon ( s u b -d is t r i c t )  level 
serve a s im i la r  funct ion . Limited attempts at a g r icu l tu ra l  marketing 
and supplying in co l laborat ion with the state run Farmers' Marketing 
Organization have come to l i t t l e .
At the tambon and v i l l a g e  leve ls ,  tambon counci ls and v i l lage
development committees are now integrated into the rura l  development 
framework and play a part in administrat ion of ru ra l  development 
programmes. These bodies are dominated by the kamnan ( s u b -d is t r i c t  
head) and v i l l a g e  heads respect ive ly ,  and th e i r  posit ion as agents o f  
the state in the v i l l a g e  is often fu r ther  enhanced by th e i r  rura l  
development ro les .
Non-governmental organizations now have projects  in many 
d i s t r i c t s .  In 1984, 113 NGOs were working in the f i e l d  o f  development, 
and th is  does not include numerous student development a c t i v i t i e s  (Thai 
Volunteer Service 1984). Most NGOs undertake v i l l a g e  level cooperative 
a c t i v i t i e s  and t r a in in g ,  and they often involve informal leaders from 
among the poorer sections o f  the community.
Rural development structures are presented diagrammatical !y in 
Appendix 7.
I I . 2 Development In s t i tu t io n s
Whatever else development may or may not be, i t  is  commonly 
agreed that i t  involves more than mere technical change. The other 
element o f  change tha t  a f fec ts  the re la t ionsh ip  o f  people to the wider 
society and i t s  resources is  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  change, both in s t i t u t io n a l  
change tha t  is  established in formal arrangements and that encompassed 
in informal understandings.
In s t i t u t io n s  take on many forms, but general ly  defined they are 
"the ru les  o f  a society or o f  organizations that f a c i l i t a t e  coordination 
among people by helping them form expectations th a t  each person can
reasonably hold in deal ing with others" (Ruttan and Hayami 1984 : 204). 
This broad d e f in i t i o n  includes arrangements enshrined in law, 
established by cu l tu ra l  convention, or formulated in some other way. 
They represent the regulatory modif icat ions a society makes to an 
anarchic free fo r  a l l  use o f  power and the means by which cooperation 
toward a common goal can be achieved.
In s t i t u t io n a l  structures thus are concerned with d is t r ib u t i o n  o f  
power in a society.  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  they determine the way in which 
control  is  secured over resources and the way in which decisions are 
made over t h e i r  use. Securing control  may involve mobi l izat ion or 
r e d i s t r i b u t i o n , and resources may be private or communal goods, fo r  
consumption or production. What are commonly referred to as development 
i n i t i a t i v e s  involve implementation o f  new i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangements or 
modif icat ion o f  old ones in order to improve ( in the eye o f  the 
developer)-*-^ such con t ro l .
I I S2 J  I n s t i t u t io n a l  change
In Thai land, uneven urban-led development through growth was 
j u s t i f i e d  by national planners in part by the claim tha t  a leading 
sector would stimulate demand for change in other sectors fol lowing 
Hirschman's (1958) model. In fa c t ,  p o l i t i c a l  repression and the 
abso lu t is t  nature o f  the Thai state has prevented the emergence of 
counterbalancing i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  p a r t i c u la r l y  in rura l  areas (Saneh 1981). 
Development as in s t i t u t i o n a l  change therefore concerns power 
re la t ionsh ips  and ru ra l  development cannot be seen independently o f  
p o l i t i c a l  context,  espec ia l ly  local power structures (see Turton 1987).
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What st imulates or allows i n s t i t u t io n a l  change to take place? 
Ruttan and Hayami ( i b id . )  have developed a theory o f  induced
in s t i t u t i o n a l  innovat ion, in which they id e n t i f y  key demand and supply
side elements inducing i n s t i t u t i o n a l  change. In addit ion to Marx's
emphasis on technical change, whereby d isequ i l ib r ium between material  
forces and ex is t ing  social re la t ions  of production leads to a 
revo lu t ionary s i tu a t io n ,  changes in cu ltu ra l  endowments and resource 
endowments are shown to be important. In contrast to Marxist analysis ,  
moreover, these authors stress the incremental nature o f  changes. On
the demand side, such factors  as increasing scarc i ty  o f  land or r i s in g  
pr ices o f  cer ta in  commodities are shown to induce new production 
re la t ionsh ips ,  for example through property r i g h t s ,  land rental
arrangements, and terms o f  labour contracts. On the supply s ide, 
i n s t i t u t io n a l  innovation - and t h i s ,  o f  course, includes informal or 
even i l l e g a l  i n n o va t io n^  - is  affected by the d is t r i b u t i o n  o f  power 
among in te res t  groups in society and the expected return to p o l i t i c a l  
i n i t i a t i v e s  by these groups. Meanwhile, cu l tu ra l  factors  such as
t ra d i t i o n s  o f  cooperation or moral reciprocal welfare ob l igat ions are 
also important supply side fac to rs ,  as is  ideology as a means o f  
increasing r e c e p t iv i t y  to changes. Education is  suggested as a separate 
factor on the supply side, but should not in fac t  be divorced from
ideology as a means o f  making a population more supportive o f  a
pa r t icu la r  d i re c t io n  o f  change or a l te rn a t iv e ly  o f maintaining aspects
o f  the status quo (see Chayan 1984). The ethos o f  development creates
both supply side and demand side factors  inf luencing the d i rec t ion  of 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  change.
At t h i s  stage i t  must be recal led that "development" is simply a 
term used as an umbrella fo r  more spec if ic  transformations taking place
in a changing society.  A development ideology i s  b u i l t  up in part
through a development discourse tha t  thereby plays a s ig n i f i ca n t  part in
the supply side of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  innovat ion. Meanwhile, less v i s ib le  
processes are at work on the demand side creat ing the condit ions 
inducing i n s t i t u t i o n a l  change. I t  is to the i n s t i t u t i o n s  themselves tha t  
we no w t  urn.
Local level i n s t i t u t i o n s  and devel opment
At the local l e v e l ,  state i n s t i t u t io n s  and v i l l a g e  i n s t i t u t io n s  
have t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been quite d i s t i n c t  from one another, as have 
in s t i t u t i o n s  o f  outside capital  and those o f  v i l l a g e  level production 
re la t io n s .  However, t h i s  d i s t in c t io n  is ra p id ly  becoming b lurred, rural  
development i t s e l f  serving as a primary b lu r r ing  agent.
I n s t i t u t io n s  of the state include local admin is tra t ion, laws 
governing land tenure and other property r i g h t s ,  law enforcement, and 
increasing ly formal v i l l a g e  leadership. Addit ional outside i n s t i t u t io n s  
include c re d i t  and marketing s t ruc tu res, ag r icu l tu ra l  input suppl iers , 
and other agents o f  ca p i ta l .  Unt il  recent ly ,  in many areas, cash 
exchange would have been regarded as an outside i n s t i t u t i o n .  I*5 
Vi l lage i n s t i t u t i o n s  include local ( "na tura l "  : see footnote 18, Chapter 
V I I I )  leadership, temple admin is tra t ion, reciprocal labour arrangements, 
mutual welfare ob l iga t ions ,  kinship structures, informal recognit ion of 
land r igh ts  by usufruct or other c r i t e r i a ,  and assorted cooperative 
community a c t i v i t i e s .
I have argued elsewhere that rural  development serves to render 
less meaningful the con t rad is t inc t ion  between state and v i l l a g e  (Hirsch 
1985). This is  because in the process o f  e f fec t ing  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  change 
so as to give v i l l a g e rs  a greater ro le  in state a f f a i r s  and control  over
resources external to the v i l l a g e ,  the state i t s e l f  gains access to 
v i l l a g e  in s t i t u t i o n s .  This is  the process tha t  leads to b lu r r ing  o f  the 
d is t in c t io n  between what is a state i n s t i t u t i o n  and what is a v i l la g e  
i n s t i t u t i o n ,  as transformed v i l la g e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  increasingly  take on 
state funct ions and serve to l i n k  the v i l lage  economy with external 
c a p i ta l .  A focus on i n s t i t u t i o n s  i s  thus useful in the analysis o f  the 
ro le  o f  rura l  development in a f fec t ing  the re la t ionsh ip  o f  rural  people 
with the wider society. The way in which people control and are 
contro l led by i n s t i t u t i o n s  determines the way in which they pa r t ic ipa te  
in th is  society. Before moving on to consider p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  however, 
we must stress th a t ,  fo r  the purpose of t h i s  study, i n s t i t u t i o n s  are 
taken only as empir ical  units o f  analysis tha t  regulate in teract ion  
within a broader social formation.
I I . 3 Thai ru ra l  social formation and development
So long as the motivat ion behind rural  development arose as a 
re s u l t  o f  the inequ it ies  o f past development s tra tegy, development 
could be posited as a correc t ive  to urban b ias,  neglect o f  a g r icu l tu re ,  
and lack o f  a tten t ion  to rura l  areas in general. The ru ra l  development 
problem was one o f  making good these de f ic ienc ies .  In conventional 
planning terms, i t  was time some o f  the benef i ts  started to " t r i c k l e  
down". Rural development was in e f fec t  a problem of how to d i re c t  
nat ional resources to rura l  areas and thereby to increase the prosper i ty 
and p roduc t iv i ty  o f  these areas.
Such a one-dimensional approach does l i t t l e  to i l luminate  the 
ru ra l  development "problem" or the underlying processes tha t  are a part 
o f  rural  development strategy. Were there to be such a read i ly
i d e n t i f i a b le  problem, framed in terms o f  how best to mobi l ize, d i v e r t ,  
or otherwise organize and use avai lable resources so as to deal with an 
environmental obstacle fo r  common b e ne f i t ,  rural  development would be a 
r e la t i v e l y  simple process. As is  increasingly recognized by development 
social s c ie n t is t s ,  however, the real d i f f i c u l t y  l i e s  in the very absence 
o f  such a consensus on what is  the "problem". The lack may be one o f  
common perception, common analys is ,  common soc io -cu l tu ra l  values, or 
common in te res t ;  more often i t  i s  a combination o f  these.
The actors on the development stage are not a homogeneous group 
o f  people working toward a common id e n t i f i a b le  goal. The most immediate 
d iv is io n  is  th a t  created by the conventional orthodoxy o f  development 
under which " rura l  development is  undertaken fo r  peasants, not by  
them" (Heyer e t a l . 1981 : 1 ) ,  producing a hierarchy o f  "developers" and 
"developed". By v i r tue  o f  th e i r  admin is t ra t ive ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  or 
socio-economic pos i t ion ,  the former are bound to develop, c i v i l i z e ,  
educate, or otherwise elevate the l a t t e r .  Moreover, w ith in  these broad 
c a t e g o r i e s ,16 many fu r the r  d iv is ions  e x is t .  Neither "developers" nor 
"developed" const i tu te  homogeneous groups, and as such they must be 
dist inguished fu r the r  according to the i r  places both in rural  
development and in the broader social formation.
I I>3>i Div is ions in rura l  soc ie ty
Character ization o f  the Thai social formation in terms o f  Marxist 
or other Western categories is  problematic. Despite the considerable 
inroads made by capita l ism and consequent changes in production 
r e la t io n s ,  class structure s t i l l  does not approximate that o f  
indus t r ia l ized  s o c ie t ie s .17 This is  pa r t ly  due to the r u r a l i t y  o f
Thai society ,  with some four f i f t h s  o f  the population s t i l l  l i v i n g  in 
the countryside and much o f  the urban population being f i r s t  or second 
generation urbanites. Moreover, continued change is  such tha t  a s ta t ic  
view o f  class d iv is ions  would carry l i t t l e  meaning. A b r i e f  ou t l ine  o f  
t ra d i t ion a l  d iv is ions  in Thai society w i l l  thus be helpfu l  in sett ing 
the scene for understanding present day cleavages.
Excluding the King at the apex, t r a d i t i o n a l  Thai society was 
character ized by a two class d iv is ion  into nobles and commoners (naai 
and phrai ) .  The former were princes and lesser nobles [khunnaang) , 
who were given rankings expressed in terms o f  r ice land (sakdina) but 
whose real power depended on control  over labour. This ranking was 
obtained i n i t i a l l y  by royal patronage, and by heredi ta ry  process i t  
declined with each succeeding generation. The l a t t e r  consisted of serfs 
who had to pay labour services e i ther  d i r e c t l y  to the King 
{phrai l  uang) or to a local noble (phraisom) ,  and of slaves { thaa t ) 
who had sold themselves in to  debt bondage and comprised one th i r d  
of the population during the mid-nineteenth century. Only the Chinese 
remained outside th is  system, and in so doing assumed an increasingly 
important ro le  as entrepreneurs and f ree ,  mobile labour (Akin 1969; 
G i r l ing  1981 : 25 - 27).
The modernizing reforms during the reign o f  King Chulalongkorn
transformed th is  system, which had lasted through the Ayuthaya and
Thonburi periods and the f i r s t  century of the Bangkok era. In
abolishing slavery and doing away with the corvee, the reforms released 
Thai labour fo r  the f i r s t  t ime. In establ ish ing an adminis tra t ive 
system based on European pr inc ip les  of funct ional  m in is t r ie s ,  a 
bureaucracy was establ ished, which un t i l  1932 was accountable to the
King. Former phrai  and thaat const i tuted a peasantry tha t  was at
once increasing ly  mobile and commercialized, whi le bureaucrat ic
posit ions went to the ru l in g  class, i . e .  the former nobles. Meanwhile, 
secular izat ion o f  education and the beginnings o f  mer i tocra t ic  ideas 
provided a l te rna t ive  ways into the bureaucracy. As such, the two class 
system was maintained, but i t  was one in which a certa in  degree of 
m ob i l i t y  was possible. The bureaucracy, in p a r t i cu la r  the m i l i t a r y  
arm, was strengthened by the abo l i t ion  of the absolute monarchy a f te r  
the 1932 " re v o lu t io n " .18 As society was increasing ly  urbanized and 
westernized, the e l i t e  or upper class was referred to less frequently in 
terms o f  i t s  landed status {naai , sakdina) and more often in terms 
o f  social a t t r ib u te s  as contained in the terms "phuudi i " 
(approximating to gent le fo lk )  and "panyaachon" ( l i t .  " i n t e l l e c t u a l " ,  
but in fac t  re fe r r in g  to a broad section of society regarded as 
educated).
The two-class structure of t ra d i t io n a l  Thai society is  s t i l l  
evident in v i l l a g e  d iscourse.19 For most rura l  dwel lers there are two 
classes o f  Thai : v i l l a g e r  (chaobaan) and o f f i c i a l  (khaaraachakaan :
l i t .  royal servant).  The other main group with which v i l l a g e rs  come 
into contact,  t raders ,  are mostly o f Chinese descent and called 
" j e k " ,  often ju s t  de sc r ip t i ve ly  but sometimes pe jo ra t ive ly .  O f f i c ia l s  
and others o f  higher status are often addressed as n a a i , r e f le c t in g  
the persistence o f  t ra d i t i o n a l  categories in social  discourse. Senior 
local o f f i c i a l s  are addressed and referred to p ub l ic ly  in the th i rd  
person as than , a respectful  ind ica t ion of higher status that is 
also used for ro ya l t y  and monks. The status and secur i ty  associated 
with o f f i c i a l  posit ion is  such tha t  v i l l a g e rs  place high p r i o r i t y  on 
a t ta in ing  such posts for t h e i r  chi ldren as an object ive o f  investment in 
th e i r  educat ion, sometimes expressly in order to hai [ khao]  pen jao pen 
naai khon (have [them] be lords and bosses over o thers) .
The r e la t i v e  s im p l ic i t y  o f  the t ra d i t i o n a l  two-class structure is
based on a r e la t i v e  homogeneity o f  the rural  population in the absence 
o f  caste and the h i s t o r i c a l l y  l im i ted  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  o f  economic 
funct ion in production. However, t h i s  s im p l i c i t y  breaks down with the 
increasing inf luence o f  c a p i t a l i s t  re la t ions  o f  production in rural  
areas, and d iv is ions  m u l t ip ly  w ith in  rural  groups as specia l iza t ion 
increases not only at the regional level but also w ith in  v i l l a g e s .  
Increasingly common are v i l l a g e  e l i t e s  consist ing t y p i c a l l y  o f  some f ive  
per cent o f  the population who, while re ta in ing  the status o f
"chaobaan : v i l l a g e r " ,  cease to be included by poorer v i l la g e rs  as 
"phuak rao : us l o t "  and are sometimes referred to instead as
"sangkhom : v i l l a g e  society" ( fo r  the l a t t e r ,  see Turton 1984b : 30 -
31). As these e l i t e s  develop connections with loca l o f f i c i a l s ,  t h e i r
social  and p o l i t i c a l  pos it ion often becomes ambiguous, and th is  is  an 
important par t  o f  the b lu r r ing  process that was re ferred to in section 
I l ^ J i  above.
In terms o f  rura l  development, the pr inc ipa l  d iv is ion  between 
"developer" (nakphatthanaa) and "developed" (khon ruam phatthanaa) 
is  s t i l l  a key one, with important impl icat ions for pa r t ic ipa to ry
development (see section I I . 4 below). For many purposes, t h i s  d iv is ion  
fol lows c losely  the o f f i c i a l / v i l l a g e r ,  ou ts ide r / in s ide r  cleavage 
described above. However, i t  is increasing ly necessary to look beyond 
the simple dualism in order both to understand more f u l l y  the va r ie ty  o f  
currents subsumed under development and personif ied in the various 
groups o f  developers and to take into account the d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  of 
v i l la g e  society.
I I ^ 3 J i  The "devel opers"
Our main concern here is the range of development a c t i v i t i e s  at 
the local le v e l ,  which were introduced b r i e f l y  in section 
Before moving on to a more detai led account o f  the developers and the i r  
place in the social  formation and change there in ,  the ro le  o f  po l icy  
decided at a non-local level should be emphasized. For the v i l l a g e r ,  
rural  development impinges most v i s ib l y  in the persons of local 
development personnel, but the central ized nature o f  the bureaucracy and 
the increased l inks  between local and national level p o l i t y  and economy 
mean tha t  decisions made at supra- local leve ls  are an important 
inf luence on rural  development. Of pa r t icu la r  inf luence are pr ic ing and 
f i s ca l  po l icy fo r r i c e  and other crops, large scale in f ra s t ru c tu ra l
programmes, fo res t  reserve and land t i t l e  po l icy ,  and ag r icu l tu ra l  
c red i t  programmes. More general in terms of po l icy  but s p e c i f i c a l l y  
geared to rural  development is the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB), which is  responsible fo r  development planning 
but carr ies  no regulatory  p o w e r . 20 Therefore decisions are made by 
technocrat ic government agencies with only l im i ted  reference to
parl iament,  the one forum where nominal representat ives o f  v i l la g e rs
have any inf luence at the nat ional leve l .  Thus to a large extent,
important aspects o f  rural  change are e n t i r e l y  removed from local
d i r e c t io n .
The above notwithstanding, the 1980s have seen a mushrooming of 
development a c t i v i t i e s  at the local leve l ,  and with th is  has come a 
plethora o f  "developers". The pr incipal  commonly recognized d is t in c t io n  
between these developers is  tha t  between state and non-governmental 
(NGO) workers, but w ith in  each o f  these groups fu r ther  di f ferences
ar ise. The present section id e n t i f ie s  common in terests  and 
charac te r is t ics  o f  each o f  these two major groups, and th is  is  fol lowed 
in tu rn  by an account o f  some cleavages within each sector.
Pr ior to discussion o f  the common standpoints and d iv is ions  among
state developers, a considerat ion o f  the place o f  the Thai state in the
social formation is  necessary. Chayan (1984 : 305) and Douglass (1984 :
164) both stress the non-monoli thic nature o f  the state in the Thai
context,  in other words th a t  the state is  not an equivalent for " ru l ing
class" .  Douglass personif ies the state as an
ensemble o f  people in i n s t i t u t i o n s  - m i l i t a r y ,  
bureaucra t ic /adm in is t ra t ive , and law-making - 
which independently and together exercise the 
co l le c t i ve  power o f  the national society over the 
economy ( ibid . ) .
In other words there ex is ts  scope for mu l t ip le  d i rec t ions  o f  state 
act ion and thus also fo r  d i f ferences o f  emphasis, divergence o f  goals, 
non-coordination and even incom pa t ib i l i t ies  among state development 
programmes. On the other hand, Chayan suggests that the 
"bureaucra t ic -au thor i ta r ian"  state that has emerged with and in support 
o f  the increas ing ly  c a p i t a l i s t  social  formation is  one that ex ists 
p r im ar i ly  to serve c a p i t a l i s t  ventures and the bourgoisie by
reproduct ion o f  the social formation, i . e .  by avoiding basic st ructura l
changes. The independence o f  act ion of state developers may therefore 
be more apparent than r e a l , but i t  would nevertheless be an error  to 
t re a t  the state as a m onol i th .21
State led rural  development has been an issue on the national 
agenda fo r  over two decades. During the 1960s, programmes concentrated 
on potent ial  " troub le  spots",  mainly in the Northeast under the U.S. 
backed Accelerated Rural Development scheme. Emphasis was placed on 
bui ld ing roads in to  "sens i t ive  areas", and a close l i n k  was thus
established between ru ra l  development and counter-insurgency and more 
general aspects o f  "national secur i ty " .  This l i n k  was maintained
through the 1970s and re-emphasized during the 1980s with the p o l i t i c a l  
element o f  counterinsurgency contained in the important 66/2523 po l icy  
(see footnote 7).  Returnees from "the fo res t"  ( i . e .  from jo in ing  forces
with the CPT) are o f f i c i a l l y  termed "national development pa r t ic ipan ts " ,  
and the Community Development Department under the M in is t ry  o f  the 
In te r io r  continues to serve the dual purpose o f  welfare and survei l lance 
at the tambon le ve l .
Another aspect o f  state led rural development is  the emphasis on 
increasing the place o f  the ru ra l  sector in the commercial economy. 
This is  effected by ag r icu l tu ra l  extension that emphasises cash cropping 
and new inputs and va r ie t ie s  tha t  are intended to increase output and 
thus a g r icu l tu ra l  surplus. This is  re in forced, as is  the secur i ty  
emphasis, by increased a c c e s s ib i l i t y  afforded by construct ion of 
roads. State ag r icu l tu ra l  c red i t  has also been in support o f  high input 
agr icu l tu re  since 1966, channelled d i r e c t l y  or i n d i r e c t l y  (v ia  
cooperatives and farmers' associations) through the Bank fo r  
Agr icu l tu re  and Agr icu l tu ra l  Cooperatives (BAAC). This programme has 
been expanded g re a t ly  since the mid-1970s, as commercial banks use BAAC 
to f u l f i l  t h e i r  requirements to place at least 13 per cent o f 
investments in the ag r icu l tu ra l  sector.
The two pr incipal  concerns fo r  rura l  development - national 
secur i ty  and growth - s t i l l  obta in,  but the measures taken during the 
1970s and followed by the F i f th  Plan (1982 - 86) reveal a broadening of 
concerns. Following pressure from the Peasant Federation of Thailand in 
1974, the government passed le g is la t io n  including the Land Reform Act 
tha t  establ ished the Agr icu l tu ra l  Land Reform Off ice (ALRO), which was 
charged with rea l loca t ing  i l l e g a l l y  sett led publ ic lands and carrying 
out reform on pr ivate lands in areas o f  high tenancy. K u k r i t ' s  ngern 
phan (revolving fund) scheme was intended to increase rural  employment 
and provide basic in f ra s t ru c tu re ,  and th i s  has been followed up with the 
Rural Employment Generation Programme (REGP), in which tambon level 
decision making is  emphasized. Meanwhile, the F i f th  Plan is  the f i r s t
to address past fa i lu re s  in development strategy and make l im i ted  
suggestions for a reor ien ta t ion  in favour o f  rura l  areas. However, no 
fundamental res t ruc tu r ing  of the bureaucracy is  ev ident.  Rather, 
emphasis i s  given to the area approach, whereby selected target 
d i s t r i c t s  are given special at tent ion by the ex is t ing  local 
administrat ion in the form o f  extra assistance under 33 separate 
programmes, with a to ta l  budget o f  8593 m i l l i o n  baht over the f ive  
year pe r iod .22
The broadened state in te res t  in rural  development can be 
a t t r ibu ted  to a number o f  concerns. F i r s t ,  there i s  a recognit ion among 
many government departments tha t  two decades o f  rapid growth fa i led  to 
improve the l o t  o f  the rura l  poor. NESDB in p a r t i cu la r  fears the 
increase in income d is p a r i t i e s  and notes that i f  measures are not taken, 
the decl ine in ru ra l  poverty may be reversed as the ag r icu l tu ra l  land 
f r o n t ie r  disappears as an o u t le t  for the landless (NESDB 1981 : 278). 
Second, an awareness o f  low p roduc t iv i ty  in rural  areas as re f lec ted in 
low incomes, low level of technology and other inputs,  and low y ie lds 
leads to a sense that Thai agr icu l tu re  has fa l le n  behind other tha t  o f 
Asian countr ies. Thi rd, c o n f l i c t  in rural  areas during the 1970s 
resulted in an increased sense o f  urgency regarding the d is p a r i t i e s  in 
l i v i n g  condit ions and the social gap between v i l l a g e rs  and o f f i c i a l s .  
Fourth, there i s  a recognit ion tha t  i n d u s t r ia l i z a t io n  and economic 
growth depends on the establishment o f  a national market, and th is  means 
ra is ing  incomes in ru ra l  areas (see IBRD 1983). In sum, there fo re , the 
emphasis is  s t i l l  on economic growth and national secur i ty ,  but 
awareness o f  the importance o f  rura l  areas in achieving these ends has 
led to increased state a c t i v i t y  in the countryside.
The foregoing discussion has focused on state developers as an 
"ensemble"; the fol lowing considers the state led rural  development
apparatus as a d i f fe re n t ia te d  e n t i t y .  Although the departments o f  the 
s i 7 krasuang 7ak ( four m in is t r ie s  at the d i s t r i c t  leve l )  are supposed
to act in concert ,  accountab i l i ty  and promotion is  s t i l l  la rge ly
internal to each department. Vert ical  rather  than horizontal  
communication is  the r e s u l t ,  since bureaucratic re la t ionsh ips  are s t i l l  
la rge ly  based on patronage and local level o f f i c i a l s  gain mer i t  points 
( khwaamdii khwaamcho’ b) by fo l lowing orders from the next rung up the
adminis tra t ive ladder rather  than by knowledge o f  or s k i l l  in dealing 
with local a f f a i r s  (Withaya 1984 : 157). The l a t t e r  is inh ib i ted  by
frequent transfers  ordered c e n t ra l l y ,  ostens ib ly  to avoid local
o f f i c i a l s  estab l ish ing a power base. Centra l izat ion is reinforced by 
promotion st ructure  and the status accorded to t ransfer  from d i s t r i c t  to 
provinc ial  level and from provinc ial  level to Bangkok.
The e f fe c t  o f  t h i s  ve r t ica l  at the expense o f  horizontal  l inkage 
is  to i n h ib i t  coordinat ion between the s ta te 's  local level developers. 
Each department w ithin  each m in is t ry  runs i t s  own projects with i t s  own 
budget, and dupl icat ion  is r i f e .  Furthermore, i t  is  in each
department's in te res t  to expand i t s  ro le  at the expense o f  others in 
order to secure larger budget a l loca t ions .  While the in f ig h t in g  related 
to th is  is  la rge ly  a t  the national leve l ,  i t  does l i t t l e ,  given the
nature o f  l inkages described above, to secure cooperation or
coordinat ion between departments in the implementation of local
programmes.23
Other than the s i i  krasuang 1ak , other state agencies have
self-appointed ro les in ru ra l  development. BAAC works independently o f  
the rest o f  the state apparatus.24 j h e m i l i t a r y  operate numerous
programmes tha t  are label led as developmental, and other enforcement 
agencies have followed in th is  mould, notably the pol ice and the
Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC).
The m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  state developers at the local level has been 
shown to lead to dup l icat ion and competit ion. In many cases, i t  goes 
fu r the r  and leads to c o n f l i c t s  o f  i n te re s t .  These may be personal, 
involving competing attempts to control  a p a r t i c u la r l y  luc ra t ive  
source o f  payoffs,  notably fo re s t ry .  A l te rn a t ive ly ,  they may revolve 
around issues where, fo r  example, the Forestry Department's desire to 
preserve fo rest reserve status may be undermined by the Department o f  
Local Admin is tra t ion 's  desire to maintain control  by re g is t ra t io n  (and 
therefore leg i t im iza t io n )  of new sett lement and the Primary Education 
Department's concern to bu i ld  new schools to serve such areas.
NGO developers s ta r t  from a d i f f e re n t  perspective to that o f  
t h e i r  state counterparts. This can best be understood in l i g h t  o f  a 
b r i e f  h is to ry  o f  NGOs in Thailand. Non-governmental approaches to 
development have been in existence for some time, despite suspicion and 
harassment o f  independent i n i t i a t i v e s  by an abso lu t is t  state bureaucracy 
(see section I I b2 J  above). The Thai Rural Reconstruction Movement 
was set up at Chainat in 1969 by Dr. Puey Ungpakorn and others. I t  was 
based on the p r in c ip le  o f  working d i r e c t l y  with the people and learning 
from farmers, based on Dr. James C. Yen's experience and ideas in 
p re-revolut ionary China and the Phi l ipp ines. At the same time as state 
in te res t  in a l l e v ia t io n  o f  rura l  problems increased during the 1973 to 
1976 l ibe ra l  period fo l lowing the October 14, 1973 student upr is ing,
there was a re a l iza t ion  p a r t i c u la r l y  among students that potent ial  
existed fo r  e f fec t ing  rural  change outside state structures. The 
largest  scheme to be set up at t h i s  time was the Maeklong Integrated 
Rural Development Programme, which involved cooperation between three 
u n iv e r s i t i e s .25 In add i t ion ,  a large number o f  students gained f i r s t  
hand experience o f  ru ra l  problems during th i s  period by means o f  student 
workcamps, many o f  which included p o l i t i c a l  consc ient izat ion. This
brought students and v i l l a g e rs  under suspicion and sometimes into 
c o n f l i c t  with state a u th o r i t ie s ,  which fu r the r  increased scepticism 
among the former o f  state development programmes. Following the 1976 
coup and m i l i t a r y  clampdown, non-governmental development work in ru ra l  
areas was proscribed, and many who had previously worked fo r  change 
within the system f led to the forests  to jo in  the CPT, since non-state 
a c t i v i t y  a t  th is  time was regarded as oppos i t ion is t  and those involved 
were placed in jeopardy. However, fo l lowing the 1977 coup and l im i ted 
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  that fol lowed, p a r t i c u la r l y  a f te r  1980, there followed a 
f lou r ish ing  o f  the NGO movement. By 1986 NGOs are working in rura l  
development in a large number o f  d i s t r i c t s .
The extent to which NGO developers are a l te rna t ive  and the 
extent to which they are supplementary to state programmes is  not well 
defined and depends in part  on the NGO developers in quest ion. Many o f  
those working with small scale organizations were involved in student 
a c t i v i t i e s  during the 1970s, and th e i r  perspective d i f f e r s  s ig n i f i c a n t ly  
from that o f  state developers. There is an emphasis on increasing the 
bargaining power o f  v i l l a g e rs ,  often v is  a v is  the bureaucracy. 
Approaches to working with farmers d i f f e r  from those of most state 
developers, being more cadre oriented and less technocrat ic in order to 
reduce status d i f ferences since, l i ke  th e i r  state counterparts,  NGO 
developers general ly come from educated, middle class backgrounds. Most 
NGOs re ly  on funding from abroad, and the sponsoring organizations are 
themselves often keen to see a l te rna t ive  approaches to what are 
general ly perceived as unsuccessful bureaucratic methods. The re su l t  o f  
th is  has been for NGO developers to place stress on issues such as 
p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  s p i r i t u a l  development, s e l f - s u f f i c ie n c y  and working 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  with the poorer groups, rather than technocrat ic,  
m a te r ia l ly  or iented projects  and commercial cropping on an area basis.
On the other hand, l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  by state au tho r i t ies  and 
recognit ion on the part  of  NGOs o f  the necessity o f working within  the 
ex is t ing framework have led to an increasing degree o f  coordinat ion 
between state and NGO a c t i v i t y .  While d i f ferences in approaches and 
suspicions p e rs is t ,  many NGOs work d i r e c t l y  with state o f f i c i a l s  such as 
teachers and health workers. In a move tha t  has at once made NGO 
a c t i v i t y  less precarious but also raised the suspicions o f  many NGO 
developers, the government has indicated a desire fo r  much closer 
cooperation between the state and NGO sectors in the Sixth Plan (1987 - 
1991).26
Within the NGO m o v e m e n t , 27 a number o f d i f f e r e n t  approaches 
is  evident. One approach, which may be characterized as "avoidance" 
(see conclusion to Chapter IV) ,  is  to emphasize t r a d i t i o n a l  cu l tura l  
values and preserve ex is t ing  re la t ionsh ips  against the d is loca t ions  o f  
c a p i t a l i s t  development by "thuan krasae : going against the
curren t " .  The a l te rn a t ive ,  "engagement", involves increasing bargaining 
power and a b i l i t y  to operate with in  the system, accepting that 
c a p i t a l i s t  and other outside forces already a f fe c t  v i l la g e  society.  
Other NGOs take a s p e c i f i c a l l y  Buddhist approach, emphasizing pa r t icu la r  
values with in  a lo c a l l y  bound s i tua t ion  and not regarding themselves as 
part  o f  a wider process. This c la s s i f i c a t io n  is ne ither  exhaustive nor 
mutually exclus ive, but i t  serves to h igh l igh t  the heterogeneity o f  
approach among non-governmental developers, which i t s e l f  leads to a 
running debate at numerous seminars tha t  covers the dilemmas faced by 
independent developers as a re s u l t  o f  cer ta in  contradic t ions tha t  are 
brought out la te r  in t h i s  study.
I t  is  c lear from th is  account that the task o f  rura l  development 
has been taken on in a number of ways by various bodies at d i f f e re n t  
times. Each developer maintains a ro le  in the social formation and
object ives th a t  vary with h is to r ica l  s p e c i f i c i t i e s  o f  the contemporary 
s i tu a t ion .  State st ructures and p r i o r i t i e s  vary not only over time but 
also between and within  government departments or organizat ions. NGO
a c t i v i t y  var ies according to l im i ta t io n s  set by the s ta te , but in 
addit ion the range and d iv e r s i t y  o f  such bodies must be taken into 
account.
11^3a7 7 7 The " developed"
As has already been suggested in the previous sect ion, state 
developers tend to take an undi f fe ren t ia ted  view o f  the rura l  populace 
in the i r  area approach. NGO workers, p a r t l y  as a consequence o f  th e i r  
i n i t i a l  standpoint and p a r t l y  as a re su l t  o f  prox imity to and 
f a m i l i a r i t y  with the problems o f  the rural  poor, take into account the 
heterogeneity o f  v i l la g e  society to a greater extent. The present 
section examines the composition of those who are a l l  too often 
described as " ta rgets"  o f  development. Since even "benef ic ia r ies"  is  
too laden with assumptions regarding the resu l ts  o f  development 
a c t i v i t y ,  I prefer to use the term "developed".
In l in e  with the account o f  the social formation given above, the 
simplest descr ip t ion o f  the developed is "chaobaan : v i l l a g e r " .
However, th i s  f a i l s  to take into account the increasing ly  d i f fe re n t ia te d  
nature o f  rura l  Thai society as a re su l t  o f  changes in production 
re la t ions .  D i f fe re n t ia t io n  is  considered in more de ta i l  in Chapter VI, 
so for the time being the discussion is l im i ted  to a review o f  the 
p r inc ip le  d iv is ions  among v i l l a g e  populations.
The c r i t e r i o n  employed by the National S ta t i s t i c a l  Off ice for
calcu la t ing rural  poverty in 1976 was a cash income below 150 baht per 
month (IBRD 1980 : 62). I f  cash income is  taken as a measure, the rura l  
population shows great ine q u a l i t ie s .  In 1970, the top q u in t i l e  received
51.0 per cent o f  income, as compared to 5.5 per cent for the bottom
q u in t i l e .  Moreover, t h i s  represents a de te r io ra t ion  over the s i tua t ion  
in 1962, implying a sharpening o f  inequa l i t ies  (Panayotou 1983 : 39). 
However, such a measure is inadequate for a number o f reasons. An 
important proportion o f  rura l  production and consumption i s  outside the 
cash economy. Calculat ion of income is o f  l im i ted  s ign if icance when 
household labour is used for home production. In any one year, outlays 
in cap ita l ized farm operations may exceed proceeds. Quite apart from 
t h i s ,  no adequate system o f  income measurement has been established. Of 
greater s ign i f icance ,  there fore ,  are d i f ferences based on production 
p o ten t ia l ,  measured in terms o f  access to basic means o f  production.
Land tenure in rural  Thailand varies from region to region, but
overal l  the s i tua t ion  has not t r a d i t i o n a l l y  involved a high degree o f  
landlessness. This i s  p a r t l y  due to the a v a i l a b i l i t y  u n t i l  recent ly  o f  
uncleared land suited to a g r icu l tu re ,  which has enabled dispossessed 
farmers to clear new areas (see Chapter I I I  below). Nevertheless, 
substant ial  inequa l i t ies  remain, both in quant i ty  and q u a l i t y  o f  land 
owned. Land tenure is  most even in Northeast Thai land, where land is o f  
lowest q u a l i t y .  The areas o f  highest tenancy and landlessness are in 
the f e r t i l e  and well i r r iga ted  Central Plains and val leys o f  the North. 
Table 2.1 shows the s i tua t ion  o f  land ownership in the regions, along 
with the concentrat ion of ownership. The increasing importance of 
cap ita l  in agr icu l tu re  has led to concentrat ion at the v i l l a g e  le ve l ,  
producing a growing landless class who are dependent p a r t l y  or whol ly on 
wage labour in the v i l l a g e  and elsewhere. A concomitant trend is  the 
emergence o f  a l o c a l l y  based landowning minori ty  who use a combination 
o f  ex te rna l ly  raised capita l  and local labour to farm t h e i r  land. In a
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study o f  9 Central Plains provinces, i t  was found tha t  18 percent o f  
farmers possessed l i t t l e  or no land (Suthiporn 1981), whi le 45 per cent 
o f  rural  households in upper northern Thailand were found in a 
subsequent survey to be landless or near landless (ALRO n.d. [post-1982]
: 3 8 ).28 Suthiporn (1981 : 28) points out th a t  the problem of
landlessness is  l i k e l y  to increase ra p id ly  as the land f r o n t ie r  is 
closed (see also Witayakorn 1983 : 127ff . fo r  discussion o f  po la r iza t ion  
in the Central Region).
Inequal i ty  o f  land ownership is  reinforced by unequal access to 
cap ita l  in an a g r icu l tu ra l  economy increasingly or iented to high-input 
ag r icu l tu re .  In part th is  inequa l i ty  is  a product o f  skewed land 
ownership, for access to formal c re d i t  depends do some extent on 
co l la te ra l  in land. I t  has been shown that ag r icu l tu ra l  c red i t  from the 
pr inc ipal formal source, BAAC, is  biased in favour o f  larger farmers, so 
tha t  81 per cent o f  BAAC c l ie n ts  possess more than the median amount o f  
land for th e i r  province (L ightfoot 1985 : 13). Meanwhile, mechanization 
involving "lumpy" investments amidst a general shortage o f  capita l  has 
enabled wealth ier v i l l a g e rs  to p r o f i t  from possession o f  t rac to rs  and 
other items o f  machinery. Informal borrowing at high rates o f  in te res t  
is  not new to rura l  Thai land, but such borrowing is  on an increasing 
scale and more and more frequent ly  involves fe l low  v i l l a g e rs  rather than 
outside middlemen. There is  no evidence to show tha t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
c red i t  replaces rather than adds to non- ins t i tu t iona l  debt.
I t  is  evident that the developed are an increasingly 
d i f fe re n t ia te d  group whose in te rests  not only vary but may be in d i r e c t  
c o n f l i c t .  Nevertheless, attempts to character ize the ru ra l  population 
in simple class terms or other categories are problematic. Not only i s  
the process o f  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  incomplete, with a m a jo r i ty  o f  rura l  
producers re ta in ing  control over what is  a t least perceived as the basic
fac to r  o f production, namely land, but class consciousness as normally 
d e f i n e d 29 not kept up with the material r e a l i t i e s  o f  changing 
production re la t io n s .  Anan (1984 : 1 - 3) speaks o f  "classes and groups 
o f  rural  producers" and uses a production approach to stress the 
contradic t ions in terna l to the northern Thai v i l la g e  where he was 
working, p a r t i c u la r l y  those between wealthy landowners and th e i r  tenants 
and wage labour. Households are c lass i f ied  into f ive  groups : landless 
labourers, poor, middle, and r ich  peasants, and an emerging class o f  
c a p i t a l i s t  farmers. The c la ss i f i ca t io n  was i n i t i a l l y  based on size o f  
land holdings but modified in l i g h t  o f  addit ional information regarding 
production and employment. Anan notes the increasing tendency among 
v i l l a g e rs  themselves to d i f f e re n t ia t e  according to cash as well as land 
holdings ( i b id .  : 10, 409 - 411). Siwarak (1985 : 2) also notes the
need to take into account more than one facto r  o f  production in 
determining class pos it ion. She stresses labour as the pr inc ip le  
ind ica to r ,  both d i re c t  wage labour and labour secured i n d i r e c t l y  by way 
o f  tenancy. Use o f  abstract categories such as land lord , r i c h ,  middle, 
and poor peasants, and landless labourers is  c r i t i c i z e d  and traced to 
Maoist inf luence. Both Anan and Siwarak stress the need for an 
h is to r ic a l  approach involv ing the concrete r e a l i t i e s  o f  class 
d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  by examining changes in production re la t io n s ,  and 
Siwarak notes the slow development in class d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  due to the 
abundance o f  land ( ib id .  : 17). In a case study o f  a central Thai
v i l l a g e ,  f i v e  classes are ide n t i f ie d  : c a p i t a l i s t  land lords, independent 
farmers ( i . e .  farming th e i r  own land),  sharecroppers o f  c r e d i t o r s , 
tenants, and landless labourers. V i l lagers use the term "phuak : 
group" rather  than "chonchan : class" ( ib id .  : 21). Persistence of
the patronage system (rabob upatham) and the effect iveness o f  state 
domination lead to a lag in emergence o f  class consciousness behind 
material  re la t ions  o f  production ( i b id .  : 29, 40).
The two studies quoted above demonstrate the need for concrete 
h is to r ic a l  analysis in examining the development o f  class re la t io n s ,  but 
they also show the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  general iz ing the rura l  social formation 
in crude class terms. Such general izat ion f a i l s  to take into account 
two basic d is junctures : tha t  between material  r e a l i t i e s  as perceived by 
an outside observer and as f e l t  by v i l l a g e rs  themselves; and that 
between the s i tua t ion  in d i f f e r e n t  v i l lages  depending on spec if ic  local 
and h is to r ic a l  experience. This l a t t e r  point i s  evident in the present 
study o f  v i l la g es  only 10 ki lometres apart but with very d i f fe re n t  
experiences o f  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n .  The point to emphasize is  tha t  the 
"developed" cannot be c lass i f ied  on a general basis,  but the s i tua t ion  
o f  each v i l l a g e  must ra ther be examined.
While a s t r i c t  categorizat ion o f  the rural  population into 
r i g i d l y  defined socio-economic groups is  to be avoided, p a r t i c u la r l y  as 
these are categories a l ien  to the conceptual izat ion of v i l l a g e rs  
themselves, more f l u id  but no less pronounced d iv is ions  are a l l  
important. The emphasis here is on the coincidence o f  economic status 
that is  based on a combination o f  control over production and trade with 
the assumption o f  p o l i t i c a l  pos it ion with in  the v i l l a g e  at a time when 
such posi t ion is  increasingly  ambiguous v is  a v is  representat ion o f  
in te res ts .  This coincidence is much more re a d i l y  recogniz ib le  in 
local discourse than are more formal class id e n t i f i c a t i o n s ,  with 
categories such as "hua naa muubaan : v i l l a g e  heads", "khon ruai.  :
the r i c h " ,  or "jao kho'ng r o t  tha i  : t r a c to r  owners" commonly
ide n t i f ie d  as exp lo i te rs  who also control  and bene f i t  from ex te rna l ly  
oriented v i l l a g e  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Through tambon counci ls and v i l la g e  
committees, these formal v i l l a g e  leaders are taking on more and more 
o f f i c i a l  du t ies ,  and many o f  these are in the name o f  development. This 
involves channel l ing state development resources in such a way that the 
blurred margin between o f f i c i a l  and v i l l a g e r  described above now becomes
one between developer and d e v e l o p e d . 8 0
I t  is  at th is  point that the ascribed social ro les o f  "developer" 
and "developed" need to be cal led into question. For i f  ru ra l
development is  to respond to the s i tua t ion  o f  rura l  producers in other 
than a p a te rna l i s t i c  way, then these actors must take on the ro le  o f  
subjects who par t ic ipa te  in making decisions a f fec t ing  th e i r  own l i v e s .  
However, i f  such p a r t ic ip a t io n  is  assumed by key ind iv idua ls  in 
s t ruc tu ra l  contrad ic t ion  to the majo r i ty  at the v i l l a g e  le v e l ,  i t  
impl ies less a decent ra l iza t ion  o f  power than a process o f  cooptat ion. 
In the considerat ion o f  p a r t ic ipa t ion  that fo l lows ,  there fore ,  the 
issues o f  control  and power w i l l  be brought to the fore.
I I . 4 P ar t ic ipa to ry  Development
As was described in section I I . 1, the concern for rural  
development has ar isen due to the imbalances created by an urban 
oriented growth stra tegy. Consequently, rural  development has been put 
forward as a means o f  al lowing the rural  poor to pa r t ic ipa te  in th i s  
growth : both by consumption o f  the f r u i t s  o f  growth tha t  re s u l t  from a 
channel ling o f  state resources to the rura l  sector,  and by production 
within  the wider system by reor ien t ing  agr icu l tu re  to national and 
in te rna t iona l  markets using non-local inputs. A more recent 
in te rp re ta t ion  has been to move away from a paternal welfare approach o f  
providing services in rura l  areas toward encouraging v i l l a g e rs  to 
par t ic ipa te  in many o f  the construct ion pro jec ts , t r a in in g  programmes, 
and other concrete aspects o f  ru ra l  development. Meanwhile, small scale 
non-governmental development organizations emphasize p a r t ic ip a t io n  in 
planning, carrying ou t ,  and fol lowing up pro jects.
Thus i t  appears tha t  as an item of development discourse, 
p a r t i c ip a t io n  (kaan [khao maaj m i i  suan ruam) is ambiguous in i t s  
impl icat ions for the ro le  o f  v i l l a g e rs  in i n s t i t u t i o n a l  change at the 
v i l la g e  le ve l .  Is pa r t ic ip a t io n  merely a r e d is t r i b u t i v e  measure to 
include v i l l a g e rs  in what they have previously been l e f t  out of? 
Indeed, is  p a r t i c ip a t io n  on these terms necessari ly re d is t r ib u t i v e ?  Is 
pa r t ic ipa t ion  effected by persuading or forcing v i l l a g e rs  to jo in  in new 
programmes, or by making v i l l a g e rs  more amenable to in s t i t u t i o n a l  change 
desired by outside developers by concentrat ing on what Ruttan and Hayami 
ca l l  the supply side? Or does p a r t ic ipa t ion  ar ise from f a c i l i t a t i n g  
adjustment o f  local power re la t ionsh ips  such tha t  the new demand 
structure induces i n s t i t u t i o n a l  change that benef i ts  those who suffer  
most under "backward" i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangements? The answer to these 
questions c le a r l y  l i e s  in our d e f i n i t i o n  of p a r t i c ip a t io n .
The most elementary formulat ion o f  pa r t ic ip a t io n  is  a moral 
pos it ion  tha t  holds tha t  in a society producing an ever larger cake, the
s l ices should be shared more evenly than h i t h e r to ,  in other words tha t
a l l  should have a r i g h t  to par t ic ipa te  in the consumption o f  soc ie ty 's  
produce. This re d is t r i b u t i v e  approach to p a r t i c ip a t io n  does not address 
the questions o f  the method by which the cake is produced or o f  who 
takes part in producing i t .  These questions are raised to some extent 
by those who regard pa r t ic ipa t ion  as an opportunity to produce within 
the broader c a p i t a l i s t  economy (IBRD 1980; see also Gould 1981 : 56
for general and Anan 1984 : 365 fo r  spec if ic  c r i t iqu e s  o f  th is
pos i t ion ) .  Under t h i s  i n te rp re ta t io n , pa r t ic ipa t ion  impl ies production 
within the fo rmal , cash economy, ju s t  as "p a r t i c ip a t io n  rates" in 
western economic jargon measures the number o f  people in formal paid and 
taxed employment pos it ions. So-called informal sectors, subsistence 
ag r icu l tu ra l  product ion, or non-economic pursuits  become the an t i thes is
of  p a r t i c ip a t io n .  A s im i la r ly  sup ra -v i l1 age oriented approach to 
pa r t ic ipa t ion  has been discussed above as the state developer 's concept 
o f  kaan khao maa m i l  suan ruam {section
The common facto r  in a l l  the above in te rp re ta t ions  of 
p a r t i c ip a t io n  is the conception o f  state and c a p i t a l i s t  economy as being 
on the " in s id e " ,  whi le v i l la g e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  tha t  are non-s ta t is t  or 
non-cap i ta l is t  in funct ion are so by d e f in i t i o n  on the "outs ide".  
Par t ic ipa t ion  means moving in from the outside and development is 
thereby spread to include a l l .  This i s ,  although i t  may seem a 
contrad ic t ion  in terms, a top-downward view o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n .
A polar opposite perspective is to set p a r t i c ip a t io n  e n t i r e l y  in 
terms o f  v i l la g e  society.  In Thai land, cer ta in  popu l is t  development 
workers and academics maintaining th is  perspective are known as 
" c u l t u r a l i s t s "  ( faa i  watthanatham) . A leading " c u l t u r a l i s t "  suggests 
tha t  i t  is wrong to regard the v i l la g e  as a micro- leve l unit  within  the 
larger macro-level system. In terms o f  v i l l a g e rs '  l ives  and experience, 
the v i l l a g e  is  the macro-level u n i t ,  while outside ("h igher")
inf luences are only secondary, or micro- level according to
v i l l a g e rs '  frame o f  reference (Apichaat 1984 : 21).
Although they represent polar opposites, these approaches share 
the assumption tha t  v i l la g e  and supra-v i l lage (the l a t t e r  pertaining 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  to outside capital  and the state) are i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
separate and th a t  development can only be achieved by subjugation o f  one 
by the other.  As has been suggested in section I l ^ J i  , however, t h i s  
con t rad is t inc t ion  is  no longer appropria te,  and p a r t i c ip a t io n  must hence 
rather be seen as a means o f  adjust ing the terms o f  ind iv idual and 
community re la t ions  within the larger society.  Moreover, d iv is ions  
internal to the v i l l a g e  involve a divergence o f  in te res ts  among
v i l la g e rs  and a pa r t ia l  convergence o f  in te rests  between v i l la g e  e l i t e s  
and state developers. Par t ic ipa t ion  becomes an issue o f  power, and
p a r t ic ipa to ry  development a d ia le c t i c  between d i f f e r e n t  groups over the
nature o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  change.
Par t ic ipa t ion  in i t s  broadest sense re fers  not j u s t  to what 
ind iv idua ls  get from the larger society or how they get " in to "  i t ,  nor 
to a denial o f  the existence or importance o f  inf luences tha t  the larger 
society has over v i l l a g e  l i f e .  Rather, i t  re fe rs  to terms o f  con tro l .  
The " p a r t i c ip a t io n  debate" is detai led fu r ther  and put into context in 
section V I I I . 1 below.
The contrad ic t ion  regarding pa r t ic ipa t ion  under current
development strategy can now be recapitula ted as fo l lows. On the one 
hand, in tegra t ion  o f  v i l l a g e  in s t i t u t io n s  into s u p ra -v i l1 age structures 
gives v i l la g e rs  potent ia l  access to supra- local resources and
inf luence over decisions tha t  a f fe c t  them made at a higher le ve l .  On 
the other hand, the penetrat ion of state and cap ita l  into the v i l la g e  
tha t  is  a concomitant part  o f  t h i s  process transforms v i l la g e  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  in such a way tha t  they take on state funct ions or are 
reduced to monetized re la t ionsh ips  within the larger economic system. 
This reduces v i l l a g e r  control over local resources and decisions in 
deference to state power, which i t s e l f  f a l l s  into the hands o f  powerful 
ind iv idua ls  with in  the v i l l a g e .  Meanwhile, d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  means tha t  
access to the wider resources l i e s  in the hands o f  a v i l l a g e  e l i t e ,  who 
themselves take on state ro les as mentioned above. This means tha t  any 
programme o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  change under ru ra l  development represents not 
so much a changing re la t ionsh ip  between homogeneous v i l l a g e  and separate 
s ta te ,  as in the community development ideal,  as a readjustment o f 
arrangements in terna l to v i l la g e  p o l i t y  and economy.
Conclusion
We have seen that the sense o f  pos it ive  change implied by the 
term " ru ra l  development" serves as an ideological tool  for inf luencing 
the d i re c t io n  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  change in rural  areas. I t  also serves to 
cover over some o f  the contradic t ions inherent in ru ra l  development 
strategy v is  a v is  popular p a r t ic ip a t io n  and the tensions tha t  r e s u l t .  
In the same way tha t  discourse is  o f  general in te re s t  both in what i t  
t e l l s  us about i t s  separate a r t i cu la to rs  and in i t s  ro le  in the 
in te rac t ion  between them, then, so an examination o f  ru ra l  development 
can be expected to shed l i g h t  both on the underlying contradictory  
processes with in  i t  and on the ro le  o f  the actual concept in obscuring 
the contrad ic t ions to the "actors" themselves. An understanding of 
p a r t ic ipa to ry  development requires f i r s t  and foremost a demyst i f icat ion 
o f  the supposed unitary  path to development, and a d ia le c t i ca l  
unravel l ing o f  contrad ic t ions. As was suggested at the beginning o f  
t h i s  chapter, such a task can be approached by a study o f  development in 
a local and spec i f ic  context,  and i t  is  to t h i s  context that we now 
tu r n .
55
Notes
1. Processes such as state formation and c a p i t a l i s t  t ransformation 
are to some extent hidden for a number o f  reasons. One is  that they are 
p r im ar i ly  s ig n i f i c a n t  as generic change at a supra-v i l lage le v e l ,  so 
that they are not immediately l o c a l l y  expl icable as processes so much 
as apparent ly isolated phenomena (e.g. debt, ex te rna l ly  or iented 
leaders, in te n s i f i c a t io n  o f  work). Another is the con t inu i ty  o f  certa in  
social re la t ionsh ips  such as t i e s  o f  k inship or pa tron-c l ien tage, which 
p a r t l y  disguises changes in the nature of these re la t ionsh ips  that 
monetization, for example, br ings about.
2. Thailand was under m i l i t a r y  ru le  during the growth decade o f  the 
1960s and part  o f  the general ly  buoyant 1970s. For much o f  t h i s  t ime, 
the large U.S. m i l i t a r y  presence contr ibuted both to growth and to the 
emphasis on secur i ty .
3. See fo r  example G ir l ing  1984. Gramscian hegemony concerns the means 
by which the bourgeoisie establ ishes i t s  ru le  other than by physical 
force. I t  thus has to do with the basis o f  consent established by a 
dominant class. In t h i s  l i g h t ,  the hegemonic facet o f  ru ra l  development 
in leg i t im iz in g  state a c t i v i t y  in rural  areas is  quite apparent.
4. The penetration concept is  one tha t  must be treated with caution 
insofar as i t  implies a fo rc ib le  v io la t io n  from the outside. Popkin 
(1979) c r i t i c i z e s  the term on these grounds by showing tha t  i t  is  as 
often a case o f  ind iv idua l  " ins iders"  reaching out as o f  "outsiders" 
forcing th e i r  way in.  In th i s  sense, a r t i c u la t io n  would appear 
metaphorical ly more apt a descr ip t ion of the s ta te / c a p i ta l - v i l l a g e  
r e la t io n ,  but spec i f ic  associat ion o f  th is  term with modes o f  production 
makes i t  problematic,  espec ia l ly  when dealing with the state aspects 
(Worsley 1984; Booth 1985). In t h i s  study, I prefer to use the term 
" incorporat ion"  in the sense o f  formation into a body, or absorbt ion, 
implying a two way movement and a d isso lu t ion  o f  the autonomous 
s ign if icance o f  the smaller par t .
5. The ro le  o f  the Sangha (Buddhist adminis trat ion) in Thailand has been 
discussed by a number o f  authors. Somboon (1982 : Chapter 2) shows how 
the Sangha has become connected with and subservient to p o l i t i c a l  
au thor i ty  in a t r a d i t i o n  that stems from patronage o f  the former by the 
l a t t e r  over a long period o f  time. Heinze (1977) describes how th is  
process was enhanced by the various Sangha Acts. The f i r s t  Act, carr ied 
through by King Chulalongkorn in 1902, was designed to create a Sangha 
hierarchy with a single l ine  o f  au thor i ty  ( p .29). Following the 1932 
revo lu t ion ,  Buddhism was invoked in the name o f  nat ional ism, so that 
"being a Buddhist was equated with being a true Thai".  Under Prime 
Minister Phibulsongkram, the second Act o f 1942 reorganized the Sangha 
to resemble the secular m in is t r ies  ( p .32). The th i r d  Act, under S a r i t ,  
was e x p l i c i t l y  in support o f  national anti-Communist ideology, and "any 
progress and especia l ly  national development programmes seemed to rest  
on the support o f  the two p i l l a r s  of Thai cu l tu re ,  the King and the 
monastic Sangha", the l a t t e r  being h ighly  centra l ized ( p .34). Somboon 
concludes l ikewise:
P o l i t i c a l l y ,  the reoganizat ion of the Sangha 
au tho r i ty  st ructure by p o l i t i c a l  leaders has 
f requent ly  been intended to make the re l ig ious  
s tructure an instrument for the promotion o f  
national government p o l i c ies .  (Somboon 1982 : 51)
"Development" through standardizat ion o f  a national Buddhism is evident 
in Lan Sak, for example in the s t ipu la t ion  th a t  every classroom must 
have a 14" Buddha image and pedestal. V i l lagers  in Ban Mai were asked 
by the headmaster to donate 3,000 baht fo r  purchase o f  such an image 
"as a present for the King's 60th b i r thday" ,  since the 10" ex is t ing  one 
was smaller than the regulat ion size. At a development meeting, the Lan 
Sak po l ice ch ie f  claimed that most o f  Lan Sak's temples were "phid 
kodmaai : i l l e g a l " ,  since they were not registered with the Department
of Religious A f fa i r s .
6. The Community Development Department o f  the M in is t ry  o f  the
In te r i o r ,  which has development f ie ldworkers in every tambon 
( s u b - d i s t r i c t ) ,  sets as i t s  f i r s t  po l icy " ( t )o  el iminate c o n f l i c t  among 
people themselves and between people and government" and as i t s  f i r s t  
ob ject ive " ( t ) o  lead the people to coincide in opinion and to have 
ident ica l  fa i t h "  (Suraphol 1976).
7. Of p a r t i cu la r  note is the inf luence o f  prime m in is te r ia l  po l icy
order 66/2523, which out l ined a dual strategy to deal with insurgency. 
In addi t ion to cont inuat ion of the m i l i t a r y  s t ra tegy,  the order 
s t ipu la ted  " p o l i t i c a l "  measures tha t  include a tten t ion  to rural  
development in remote areas. I t  is  in te res t ing  to note that returnees 
under the amnesty po l icy  are ca l led "nat ional development pa r t ic ipan ts " .
8. Discourse as used here means language in context.  As a discrete 
e n t i t y ,  a discourse re fers to language as used or found in a 
pa r t i cu la r  context ,  and tha t  context can be defined e i th e r  by the user 
o f  the language or by the s i tua t ion  in which i t  is  used. The most 
spec i f ic  discourses, there fore ,  are those used by specif ied  groups o f
people in specif ied s i tua t ions .
9. An extreme example is tha t  o f  o f f i c i a l s  exhort ing v i l la g e rs  to impose 
f ines on the owners o f  buffa lo  whose faeces are found on v i l lage  
s treets .
10. See Turton (1984b : 39-40) fo r  discussion o f  the ideological content 
o f  c lock-t ime in the context o f  change in rura l  Thailand.
11. I am grate fu l  to David Parkin fo r  comments on a prel iminary 
research paper th a t  led me to considerat ion o f  t h i s  concept.
12. Even words tha t  are " a l l  things to a l l  men" hold spec i f ic  purpose, 
and by extension meaning, in t h e i r  very ambiguity. Note, fo r example, 
Turton's (1984b : 44) exposition o f  the use of prachaachon to mean 
"the people" as a hegemonic instrument in the Thai context.
13. Whether or not development in any one form is  desirable change 
cannot be answered absolutely : "We can only remark th a t  most people 
want what they mean by development" (Fossi 1977 : 170).
14. Ruttan and Hayami note, fo r  example, the infringement o f  land reform 
ru les on suble tt ing (since the o f f i c i a l  rent is  depressed below the 
equi l ib r ium r e n t ) ,  which is  operable only because o f  the nature o f  the 
d is t r ib u t i o n  of p o l i t i c a l  resources within  a P h i l l ip p in e  v i l l a g e .  See 
Chapter V below fo r  an account o f  a s im i la r  phenomenon in one o f  the 
Thai study v i l l a g e s .
15. Use o f  cash in rural  Thailand became widespread o r i g i n a l l y  fo r  the 
purpose of f u l f i l l i n g  tax ob l igat ions fol lowing a b o l i t ion  o f  the corvee. 
Cash was raised by production of a saleable surplus o f  the main item of 
subsistence production, namely r i c e .  As a r e s u l t ,  cash exchange was 
la rge ly  or iented ex te rna l ly  to the v i l l a g e .  Wage labouring only occured
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on any s ig n i f i c a n t  scale from the 1890s in the core areas o f  sett lement 
(Johnston 1975 : 225). In more peripheral areas, wage labour and cash 
exchange internal  to the v i l l a g e  replaced indigenous modes o f  securing 
labour and exchange at a much la te r  date. These modes are s t i l l  
s ig n i f i c a n t  in Lan Sak and other peripheral areas and w i l l  be discussed 
fu r the r  in Chapter V.
16. The categories o f  "developer" and "developed" are my own, but they 
conform to the s i tua t ion  o f  development within the current social 
formation in which " v i l l a g e r s " ,  " ta rge t  groups", and so on are to be 
developed by those in the posit ion of developers (nakphatthana) . 
The ra t iona le  for t h i s  categorizat ion w i l l  become apparent from the 
discussion below.
17. For a discussion o f  class formation in rural  Thai society,  see 
Turton (1984b : 3 3 f f . ) .  Turton shows how an apparent ly low numerical
level o f development o f  a rura l  working class is  less s ig n i f i c a n t  than 
processes that turn rura l  producers into "wage labour equivalents".  In 
the ideological sphere, embryonic class formation is ev ident,  fo r  
example, in the experience o f  sugar cane producers in northeastern 
Thai land, who feel that production fo r  a local Japanese owned factory  is
" l i k e  working for wages on your own land".
18. The " revo lu t ion"  of 1932, which was in fac t  a coup by disgrunt led 
members o f  the foreign educated urban e l i t e ,  marked the end of the 
absolute monarchy and the beginning of what is termed the "democratic 
era : yuk p rachaa th ipa ta i " . Most o f  th is  period has been dominated by 
the m i l i t a r y ;  fo r  d e ta i l s ,  see G i r l ing  1981 : Chapter 3; Morel! and
Chai-anan 1981 : 50 - 64.
19. The present discussion concentrates on v i l l a g e rs '  perspectives 
rather than abstract s t ruc tu ra l  formulations of Thai society. Turton 
(1984b : 24 - 28) takes issue with the notion o f  co n t inu i ty  in the Thai
social formation, stressing the dismantl ing and reassembling that has 
taken place at various t imes, fo r  example Chula!ongkorn's reforms or 
S a r i t ' s  version o f  sakdina ideology which "no longer corresponds to
actual class re la t io n s ,  and is used man ipu la t ive !y" . While not 
discounting the importance o f  such hiatuses, I would suggest tha t  th is  
very a b i l i t y  to manipulate depends on past formations and 
conceptualizations contained there in .
20. NESDB's F i f th  Five Year Social and Economic Development Plan 
contains an analysis o f rural  problems that represents a s ign i f i ca n t  
departure in bureaucrat ic approach. In analysing the causes o f  rura l  
problems, account is taken o f  mistakes made in past development 
strategy. The key factors  are as fol lows:
- The p r i o r i t y  given to growth has led to neglect o f  rural
areas, p a r t i c u la r ly  peripheral areas.
- Past attempts at development tended to be welfare oriented 
and lacked involvement o f  local people.
- While the central administrat ion lacked ins ight  into the 
causes o f  people's problems, ru ra l  dwel lers themselves were 
also unable to conceive th e i r  causes.
- Such things as roads and e le c t r i c i t y  do not increase 
p roduc t iv i ty  and do not benef i t  people equally.  (NESDB 1981 
: 278)
However, without regulatory  power such an analysis cannot be 
incorporated into spec i f ic  departmental programmes, and in terms o f  
spending the F i f th  Plan period has seen a continuing emphasis on roads 
and e le c t r i f i c a t i o n .
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21. In his analysis o f  community-state re la t ions  in southern I t a l y ,  
Davis (1975) c a l l s  for an "ethnography o f  the state" and o f  other 
supra-community elements. Such has been carried out to a l im i ted  extent 
by Wilson (1962), Riggs (1966), and Morel! and Chai-anan (1981), but 
there is scope fo r  a more specif ic  ethnography o f  the Thai state 
development apparatus.
22. When measured as a proport ion of the GDP fo r  1980 o f  701.3 b i l l i o n  
baht (Suthiporn 1981 : 1), t h i s  amounts to 0.25 per cent on an annual 
bas is .
23. Chai-anan has compared the Thai bureaucracy to a bamboo hedge, in 
which the leaves at the top intermingle while the in f le x ib le  stalks at 
the bottom remain isolated from one another.
24. BAAC is  cu r ren t ly  running an experimental programme in 28 v i l lages  
in which DAE and BAAC o f f i c e rs  work in tandem. However, most a ttent ion 
is  being given to f inding ways o f  increasing farmers' use o f  f e r t i l i z e r  
ra ther than to securing more fundamental improvements in farming methods 
(communication from Paul L ig h t f o o t ) .
25. The Maeklong Integrated Rural Development Programme was set up by 
Dr. Puey Ungpakorn and others as a j o i n t  pro ject between Thammasat, 
Mahidol , and Kasetsart Un ivers i t ies .  These were responsible fo r  soc ia l ,  
publ ic heal th,  and ag r icu l tu ra l  sides o f  the programme respect ive ly .  
The programme had to be abandoned fol lowing the 1976 coup (Akin 1980 : 
9).
26. O r ig in a l ly ,  the government established a State-Private Sector 
Coordinating Committee and included both NGOs and agribusiness in the 
pr ivate  sector (phaak eekachon). More recent ly ,  a Coordinating 
Committee for Rural Development Organizations has been set up in each 
region to l i n k  the two sectors, from which agribusiness is  excluded.
27. Inasmuch as i t  can be defined as such, the NGO movement includes a 
number o f  vo luntary organizations whose perspective d i f f e r s  from that o f 
state developers. Emphasis is  on small scale community based 
programmes, use o f  indigenous social  and material  resources, increasing 
the power o f  the poorer sections o f  the community, and eschewing o f  a 
"b luepr in t "  type o f  development. Many of those working within th is  
movement were students during the p o l i t i c a l l y  act ive period of 1973 to 
1976, and th is  has oriented the i r  approach to rural  problems. Although 
i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to draw a d iv id ing  l i n e ,  the movement does not include 
a l l  organizat ions involved in various aspects o f  development outside the 
state development apparatus. For example, the voluntary organizations 
run by wealthy Bangkokians, often t i t l e d  wives o f  in f lu e n t ia l  persons 
{"khunying"s ) , tend to be more straightforward cha r i t ies  with a 
pa te rna l is t ic  approach to welfare projects. Royal pro jects stand out on 
th e i r  own with the large resources behind them and by v i r tue  o f  th e i r  
exceptional patronage given the place of the royal family in Thai 
socie ty ,  and they cannot be considered as non-governmental in l i g h t  o f  
the close connection between the monarchy and the s ta te. The Population 
and Development Association (PDA) is o f  more indeterminate status, but 
fo r  present purposes i t  is  considered as being outside the movement due 
to i t s  size and semi-bureaucratic method o f  operation and i t s  
non-involvement in j o i n t  NGO a c t i v i t i e s  (seminars, t ra in in g  programmes, 
exchange v i s i t s ) .
28. Nevertheless, inequa l i ty  o f  land ownership in Thailand is s t i l l  
lower than in many other Asian countr ies i f  measured by the Gini 
co e f f i c ie n t  o f  0.41. While South Korea and Taiwan show the lowest
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degree o f  concentration ( c o e f f i c ie n t  o f  0.32 in 1973 fo r  the former) ,
India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and the Phi l ippines a l l  show a higher land
concentrat ion, with f igures o f  0.63, 0.60, 0.54, and 0.51 respect ive ly
(Douglass 1983 : 196).
29. Class consciousness re fe rs  to the subject ive awareness o f  being a 
member o f  an ob jec t ive ly  defined class; the material  basis o f  class must 
precede such consciousness (Fetscher, in Bottomore 1983 : 79 - 81).
Turton (1984b : 36) reveals embryonic forms o f  class consciousness among 
Thai peasants in th e i r  concern with "the immediate and d a i l y  experience" 
o f  "problems o f  the market", which "might suggest a d is to r t i o n  or 
subs t i tu t ion  in consciousness of more fundamental and determining 
re la t ions  o f  product ion, an a ttent ion to the appearances o f  c a p i t a l i s t  
prod u c t io n " .
30. A clear example o f  the coopt ive aspect o f  state development strategy 
that helps in th i s  b lu r r ing  process could be seen at a development 
t ra in ing  session fo r  v i l l a g e  heads and kamnans at Lan Sak in 1985. At 
t h i s  meeting the state o f f i c i a l s  made a point o f  addressing the audience 
as "nakphathanaa thanglaai : fe l low  developers", c le a r ly  changing
th e i r  intended status versus the major i ty  o f  v i l l a g e r s .
CHAPTER I I I
FOREST SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIPHERY
Settlement o f  fo res t  land has been the p r inc ipa l  dynamic of Thai 
ag r icu l tu ra l  expansion for more than a century (Ingram 1971 : 76; 
Silcock 1970 : 40; IBRD 1983 : 3). In the mid-nineteenth century, Siam 
was s t i l l  l i g h t l y  populated in re la t io n  to i t s  a g r icu l tu ra l  po ten t ia l .  
As la te  as 1931 there was a concern for sett lement o f  ou t ly ing  areas, 
whi le no serious p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  overpopulation was in s igh t .  Every 
d i s t r i c t  was s t i l l  w i th in  50 ki lometres o f  an underpopulated area : " a l l  
the out ly ing d i s t r i c t s  need more people" (Zimmerman 1931 : 311). Yet by 
the 1980s, demographic and ag r icu l tu ra l  expansion has been such as to 
make deforestat ion and shortage o f  ag r icu l tu ra l  land a serious concern. 
A number o f  fac to rs ,  including a cer ta in  "momentum" established by the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  and associated expectations tha t  have developed with past 
experience o f  land settlement,  lead to a cont inuing pressure on the 
seriously  diminished supply o f  fo rest land suited to ag r icu l tu re .
To understand the place o f  forest sett lement in rura l  
development, i t  is  necessary to look beyond the common h is to r ica l  image 
o f  an inexorable migratory response to demographic pressures of which 
the current s i tua t ion  is the t a i l  end (e.g. Rigg 1985 : 24 - 25). The 
steady expansion o f  cu l t iva ted  area at the expense o f  fo res t  land in 
Thailand over the past century has taken place at the same time as major 
internal and external s t ruc tu ra l  changes have affected the Thai 
p o l i t i c a l  economy. Of pa r t icu la r  note are expansion o f  the 
bureaucrat ic state apparatus and pa r t ia l  in tegra t ion into the 
in ternat ional  c a p i t a l i s t  system that have taken place since the la te  
nineteenth century (Wilson 1962; Morell and Chai-anan 1981; Chatthip and
Suthy 1981; Chatthip e t .  a l . 1981; Anan 1984). I t  was the l a t t e r  that
led to rapid expansion in the r i c e  economy (Johnston 1975) and la te r  to 
demand fo r  upland crops such as maize, cassava, and sugar cane 
(Uhl ig 1984). In tu rn ,  the pattern o f  s t ruc tu ra l  change has been 
influenced both by the persistence o f  a habitable periphery outside 
centra l ized control  and a resource endowment al lowing ag r icu l tu ra l  
expansion by encroachment on the fo rests .  This has led to a state rural  
development stra tegy tha t  i s  or iented to communities' "catching up" with 
longer sett led areas, t h e i r  transformation from forest {paa) to 
" c i v i l i z e d "  ( ja roen ) s ta tus, and above a l l  in tegra t ion o f  peripheral 
areas into the national economy and p o l i t y .
The present chapter provides the h is to r ica l  and geographical 
backdrop for the area in which the study v i l la g es  are located. However, 
the areas described do not const i tu te  a segmentary region that conforms 
with admin is tra t ive  boundaries.1 Rather, they make up what may be 
termed a "thematic region" in that they are affected by a p a r t icu la r  
common process despite being non-contiguous. They have a common status 
as the "periphery" or " f r o n t i e r " ,  but i t  must be borne in mind that i t  
is in the nature o f  a f r o n t i e r  to be dynamic, and many o f  today's 
established v i l lages  were themselves peripheral in the l i v i n g  memory of 
older inhabitants. The f ro n t ie r  d i f f e r s  from region to region, both in 
pattern and extent. Our focus i s  on one type o f  f r o n t i e r ,  tha t  o f  the 
Central Plains borderlands.
The chapter begins with a descr ip t ion of the extent and pattern 
o f  settlement in h i s t o r i c a l ,  reg iona l,  and social se t t ings.  This is 
followed by an analysis o f  the re la t ionsh ip  between fo rest settlement 
and ag r icu l tu ra l  expansion. Soc io -po l i t ica l  aspects o f  forest 
settlement are discussed from the point o f  view o f  the state and of 
s e t t le rs  themselves, and the s ign if icance o f  the re la t io n sh ip  between
fo res t  sett lement and rural  development is considered.
I I 1 . 1 Extent and pattern o f  forest settlement
Forest sett lement for agr icu l tu re  and associated timber 
operations have la rge ly  been responsible for the deplet ion of Thai land's 
fo rests .  The rate o f  settlement is  such tha t  deplet ion would leave 
l i t t l e  land under fo res t  by the end o f  the century were recent trends to 
continue (Nart 1984 : 86). Yet serious concern over deforesta t ion  is 
r e la t i v e l y  recent. For the most part o f  the past century, forest  
settlement by expansion o f  broad f r o n t i e r s ,  movement into forest  land 
that previously surrounded iso la ted v i l l a g e s ,  and sett lement deep in 
forest reserve areas have been supported by i n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  economic, and 
in f ra s t ru c tu ra l  measures by government and also by agents o f  c a p i ta l .  
Despite notional recognit ion o f  the need for conservation of remaining 
fo rest areas, many current programmes and po l ic ies  support continued 
forest deplet ion.
Hi s to ry  o f  s e t t l  ement
I t  has been estimated that the cu lt iva ted  area in Thailand 
increased s ix fo ld  from 1850 to 1950, representing a 1.8 per cent annual 
increase, whi le the period 1950 to 1970 saw an accelerat ion to 2.7 per 
cent (Marzouk 1972 : 17). Over the period, growth in cu l t iva ted  area 
has outstr ipped population increase (Feeny 1984 : 50). Since the
natural  vegetation o f  much of Thailand is  fo rest  o f  a number o f  
types, most o f  th i s  expansion has been by clearance o f  forest  areas.
This clearance has been compared to the period of medieval forest 
clearance {M i t te la l  te r l  iche Rodungsperiode) in Europe {Uhlig 1984 :
9).  The scale o f  deforestat ion is  d i f f i c u l t  to determine prec ise ly ,  but 
i t  is  l i k e l y  tha t  from the beginning of the twentieth century the forest 
area has declined from over three-quarters to less than one-quarter o f  
the national area (Table 3 .1 ) .3
Unt i l  the mid-nineteenth century, sett lement had mainly been 
along r i v e r  banks and coastal areas in the Central Plains (Sharp and 
Hanks 1978 : 36), in isolated pockets o f  a l lu v ia l  land near watercourses 
in the Northeast, and in intermontane val leys  and plains in the North. 
Expansion o f  c u l t i v a t io n  commenced in earnest with demands for r ice  
exports a f te r  the signing o f  the Bowring Treaty in 1855, although 
Tanabe (1978 : 53 - 54) notes tha t  the expansion was a far from smooth
progression. I n i t i a l l y  sett lement involved clearance o f  new areas in 
the Central Pla ins, but expansion o f  the commercial economy together 
with the need for new r iceland for subsistence needs la te r  also affected 
the North and Northeast. The depression in the r i ce  economy ear ly  on in 
the twentieth century was only a temporary in te r ru p t io n ,  and settlement 
continued apace. Following the Second World War, the ag r icu l tu ra l  
economy d i v e r s i f i e d ,  and settlement o f  upland areas unsuited to wet r ice  
became the main feature o f  a g r icu l tu ra l  expansion.
At each stage, in f ra s t ru c tu ra l  development has played an 
important ro le  in settlement.  In the l a t t e r  part o f  the nineteenth 
century and ear ly  on in the twentie th , construct ion o f  canals played an 
essent ial  part in expansion o f  r i ce  c u l t i v a t io n  (Tanabe 1978 : 5 2 f f . ;
1981 : 222 - 226). The railways constructed ear ly  in the twentieth
century l inked the Northeast, North, and South with Bangkok, opening up 
those regions fo r  commercialization. More recen t ly ,  espec ia l ly  since 
1950, road construct ion has increased a c c e s s ib i l i t y  immeasurably, and
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Table 3.1 Estimates o-f changes in area under -forest 1913—B6
YEAR PERCENT QF TOTAL AREA IN FOREST SOURCES AND COMMENTS
AREA IN FOREST IN '000 HA
1913 1 Z!  J 38,514 Graham (1913 : 347); includes fo /e s ts ,  marsh, and jung le .
1930 70 35,946.4 M in is try  of Commerce (1930 : 35).
1947 63 T su ji ( 1979 : 29); taken from NOA data.
1949 69 32,600 Conner (1978 : 71); area in  fo re s ts  and pasture.
1955 63 32,129 Sukhum (1955 : 8).
1956 58 30,288.3 Pendleton (1962 ! 134); area in  fo re s ts  and pasture.
1959 5B 30,010 Chalermrath (1972 ; 20); o f f ic ia l  estim ate.
1961 56 29,000 Donner (197B ; 133); estim ate from a e r ia l photography.
1961 52 Chalermrath (1972 : 24); guesstimate of fo re s try  o f f i c ia l .
1963 CTTu U 27,100 ADB (1969 : 475); FAQ world fo re s t inven to ry estim ate.
1965 C7JO 27,300 Donner (1978 : 22); land-use survey; probable overestim ate.
1965 <40 Chalermrath (1972 ; 24); guesstimate of fo re s try  o f f i c ia l .
1V 6 6 51 26,500 K r it  (1966 : 5).
1969/70 52 26,900 LDD estimates from a e r ia l photography.
1970 39-49 20,000 -  25,000 Donner ii978 ;  134); au tho r's  guesstimate.
1970 30 T su ji (1979 : 29); guesstimate of fo re s try  expert.
1974 37 19,040 NE3DB (1977 ; 149); estim ate based on s a te l l i t e  imagery.
1975 41 21,063 World Bank estim ate based on s a t te i i t e  imagery,
197B 25 13,018 Wilson (1983 :  133); estim ate based on s a te l l i t e  imagery.
[197B 25 G ir lin g  (19B1 : 71n)3
19B0 <30 NESBB (1981 : 7 ).
C19S0 25.5 Panayotou (1983 : 5); based on FA0/UNEP f ig u re s . ]
[1962 25 13,000 Chirapanda (1982 : 105); estim ate of ALRO o f f i c i a l . ]
C1986 15 Informed u n o f f ic ia l estim ate (P h ilip  S to t t ) . ]
Note : The to ta l land area in  Thailand is  51,.352,000 ha.
[Sources in  brackets sought out by the present a u th o r.]
Source : Feeny (1984 : 53 — 54)
Table 3.2 Expansion o-f the Thai road network 1950 - 1980
YEAR STATE HIGHWAYS 
Paved Unpaved
PROVINCIAL ROADS 
Paved Unpaved
TOTAL LENGTH 
(K ilom etres)
1950 809 5022 - - 5831
1955 1815 5299 - - 7114
I960 2972 5474 151 1967 10565
1965 5046 4436 405 2388 12275
1970 B620 1781 1478 4413 16292
1975 11840 818 3398 4043 20099
19B0 13733 160 8670 5587 2B15i
Mote : These fig u re s  do not inc lude the network of approximately 43000 km 
of ru ra l roads.
Source : Uhlig (19B4 : 126)
th is  has played an important part in the settlement o f  new areas. Table 
3.2 shows the rapid expansion o f  communications in the postwar period.
Settlement has also to be understood in terms o f  changing 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangements concerning labour and land (see Feeny 1982 : 
chapter 6).  Following abo l i t ion  o f  s lavery and la te r  o f  the corvee
under Chulalongkorn's reforms, the peasantry became at once more mobile 
and free to se t t le  new land (G i r l ing  1981 : 6 5 ) .4 In troduct ion o f
wage labour was an important element allowing for entrepreneurial  
settlement.  Meanwhile, reform of the system of land tenure in 1902
increased the incentive fo r  land settlement and improvement. Issuing of 
land t i t l e s  or expectation o f  such has led to an increasingly 
s ig n i f i ca n t  speculat ive element in the motivat ion fo r  land settlement.
Thus sett lement has been in response not only to demographic
pressures, but also to demands o f  the market and changing physical and
in s t i t u t i o n a l  s tructu res. The state has played a ro le  in establ ishing 
the in f ras t ruc tu re  f a c i l i t a t i n g  or encouraging sett lement,  which i t  uses 
as a means o f  increasing control  over the national area.
I l l ^ l j i  Regional patterns o f  sett lement
Settlement o f  fo res t  areas i s  a response to a number o f pressures 
and incent ives, which vary over time and space. Moreover, patterns o f  
settlement are both eco log ica l ly  and c u l t u r a l l y  determined. As a 
r e s u l t ,  these patterns vary considerably from region to region. In 
Thai land, three broad regional patterns o f  sett lement are usual ly drawn.
In Northeastern Thai land, an ega l i ta r ian  v i l l a g e  structure has
/ /
t r a d i t io n a l ly  precluded acqu is it ion  o f  new land from poorer neighbours. 
This has meant th a t m igration fo r  clearance o f fo re s t land is  the only 
a lte rn a t iv e  to subdivision o f holdings, and new v i l la g e s  have
t r a d i t io n a l ly  been established three to f ive  kilometres away from the 
o r ig in a l  v i l la g e  in a "leap frog" process th a t leads to a "leopard spot" 
pattern o f  settlement (Ng 1978 : 42). However, longer distances are
also covered in search o f  be tte r land than tha t normally found in the 
sem i-arid, i n f e r t i l e  Northeast, and distances o f 100 kilometres or more 
may be covered as a group o f v i l la g e rs  moves en masse. Ng c ites  the 
case o f  tra n s fe rra l o f  part o f  a v i l la g e  in Kalasin province to a new 
loca tion  in P ich it  in the upper Central Plains ( i b i d . ) .
In Northern Thailand, where much o f the older settlement is  in
intermontane va lle ys , new land settlement is  patterned accordingly. 
Incremental settlement usually takes place onto higher land adjacent to 
the v i l la g e ,  requ ir ing  te rrac ing  and usually invo lv ing  a move onto lower 
q u a l i ty  land. A l te rn a t iv e ly ,  new communities are established higher up 
the v a l le y ,  o ften commencing with c u l t iv a t io n  o f miang (Northern Thai
tea, the le a f  o f which is  fermented and chewed : see Chayan 1984 :
1 8 7 f f . ) .  With the move into upland cash cropping, the constra in ts  on 
va lle y  settlement are removed, and th is  has led to rapid clearance o f 
upper slopes fo r  p lanting o f maize and other crops. Meanwhile, m ino r ity  
groups such as the Hmong, Karen, L isu, Yao, and Lahu have been extending 
th e ir  s h i f t in g  c u l t iv a t io n  with population growth and engagement in 
commercial cropping, and th is  has led to c o n f l ic t  between groups and 
with lowland Thais. Turton (1975 : 356 - 362) describes Thai
encroachment on Karen settlements as land is  terraced at higher 
e levations. M inority  groups and lowland Thais are also in c o n f l ic t  with 
the s ta te , since much o f the land involved is  o f f i c i a l l y  classed as
fo rest reserve (Uhlig 1984 : 8).
In Central Thailand, settlement o f  fo re s t lands has followed a 
more conventional f ro n t ie r  type o f settlement. This has involved a 
steady movement outward from the older core areas o f  settlement,
p a r t ic u la r ly  the Chaophraya Delta area around Ayuthaya and Bangkok. 
Development o f  communications has been an important determining fa c to r .  
Several fron ts  o f  settlement are apparent at any one time, and these
emerge as a re s u lt  o f  a number o f  factors : a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  land;
popular knowledge o f  such a v a i la b i l i t y ;  the s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  the land fo r  
c u l t iv a t io n  o f a crop cu rre n t ly  in demand; the provision o f
in fra s tru c tu re  such as roads and processing f a c i l i t i e s ;  marketing
s truc tu res ; and provision o f finance by entrepreneurs who encourage
settlement ( ib id .  : 126).
Settlement along the f ro n t ie r  in Central Thailand takes a number
o f  forms. Uhlig , author o f  the most comprehensive study to date o f  the
under-researched subject o f  spontaneous land settlement in Thailand, 
id e n t i f ie s  three types o f s e t t le r .  F i r s t ,  there is  the incremental type 
o f s e t t le r  who opens up land close by to the e x is t in g  community, 
supplementing ex is t ing  c u l t iv a t io n .  Second is  the permanent long 
distance s e t t le r ,  who leaves behind the old area o f  settlement. Third 
is  what is  termed the "commuting" farmer, who maintains the o r ig in a l 
residence but expands c u l t iv a t io n  at some distance - up to 100 
kilometres - from the home v i l la g e  ( ib id .  : 20). Over time, the
composition o f a settlement may change : Moerman's (1968) Ban Ping study
shows evidence o f  movement to dominance by the second from the th ird
type, while the case o f  our study v i l la g e  o f  Ban Mai represents a move
from the f i r s t  to the second type.
I l l ^ l j i i  Social patterns o f  sett lement
Those who engage in fo res t settlement are not necessarily those 
who be ne f it  most from i t .  Early settlement sometimes involved those 
displaced by seizure o f  land by the army or ra ilway a u th o r i t ie s  (e.g. 
Sharp and Hanks : 89). A l te rn a t iv e ly ,  prisoners o f war were settled  in 
areas th a t the central a u th o r i t ie s  wanted developed ( ib id .  : 40 - 42). 
More re ce n t ly , settlement has often been promoted and financed by 
wealthy timber traders , maize and cassava merchants, or sugar m i l le rs  
(Uhlig 1984 : 41). Thus s e t t le rs  d i f f e r  from pioneers in the American 
mould in making do with harsh conditions rather than seeing themselves 
as on an entrepreneuria l mission o f  transforming a wilderness (Sharp and 
Hanks 1978 : 57 - 58).
While there is  usually a voluntary and even pioneering aspect 
to most recent settlement o f  fo res t lands, s e t t le rs  themselves have 
usually faced some sort o f  displacement. This may be due to population 
growth accompanied by a reluctance to subdivide land, at which point 
elder sons and th e ir  young fam ilies  move to c lear new land, a t some 
distance i f  necessary. A l te rn a t iv e ly ,  displacement may be more purely 
economic, due to debt fo rec losure , loss o f tenancy r ig h ts ,  or 
in s u f f ic ie n t  cap ita l to purchase land on the part o f young fam il ies . 
Displacement may be caused by in f ra s tru c tu ra l  schemes, notably dam 
construction and associated re se rvo irs , in which case resettlement is  
usually planned and state d irec ted . Enviromental problems may lead to 
large scale m igration in search o f be tte r  land, p a r t ic u la r ly  in the case 
o f sustained drought in the Northeast. However, problems o f 
drought, f lood ing , and s i l t a t io n  th a t arise from deforesta tion has led 
to displacement more genera lly , espec ia lly  in the piedmont areas on the 
edges o f  the Central P lains. This leads to a cycle o f  m igra tion , fo res t 
clearance, environmental d e te r io ra t io n , poverty, and fu r the r  migration 
in a leapfrogging pattern (Panayotou 1983 : 68).
Several authors have commented on social a t t r ib u te s  tha t 
encourage migration for settlement o f  new lands. Uhlig (1984 : 125) 
suggests th a t Thai farmers are not t ied  to the v i l la g e  community. 
Established mechanisms for settlement are embodied in various social 
p ractices. Matrifocal residence encourages fo res t settlement, as 
sons-in-law are encouraged by parents-in-law  with l im ite d  land to seek 
out new areas. The movement en masse from Northeastern v i l la g e s  is  
supported by re tu rn  v i s i t s  to the home v i l la g e  during the annual Phaya 
paa baa ceremony to pay homage at the Buddhist temple, during which 
fr iends and re la t iv e s  may be to ld  o f  opportun it ies  in the new area o f 
settlement and encouraged to fo l low  (Ng 1978 : 42 - 43). Elsewhere,
contact maintained with home v i l la g e s  likew ise maintains a flow of 
migrants. A l te rn a t iv e ly ,  residents o f  v i l la g es  on the edge o f fo rest 
areas may encounter areas o f settlement or land suited to settlement 
during recreational hunting t r ip s  during the dry season, and th is  may 
lead to a permanent move a t a la te r  date.
The social ch a rac te r is t ics  'of new communities vary, but those on 
the edges o f the Central Plains are popularly renowned for th e i r  
ind iv idua lism  and v io le n ce .5 Indiv idualism is a t tr ib u te d  to a number 
o f fac to rs . The very move to clear new land is  seen as an 
in d iv id u a l is t ic  venture. The staking out o f land is assumed to be 
more concerned with estab lish ing  boundaries and there fore  distance 
between neighbours than in estab lish ing cooperation between s e t t le rs .  
This is  re in forced by the well known m u l t ip l i c i t y  o f  o r ig in s  o f s e tt le rs  
in many areas, reducing the po ten tia l bond of common o r ig in  or previous 
t ie s  th a t might otherwise be maintained. Violence is  presumed to re su lt  
p a r t ly  as a natural consequence o f ind iv idua lism  {tua khra i  tua man : 
each to h is /her own). Land disputes feature prominently in the high 
rate o f  murder tha t characterizes many new areas o f  settlement, since
land t i t l e  is non-existent and claims to land can only be supported by 
influence. This s itua t ion  is  exacerbated by the fac t th a t during 
i n i t i a l  settlement land is p le n t i fu l  and carr ies l i t t l e  value, resu lt ing  
in poorly defined boundaries denoted, i f  a t a l l ,  by marks placed on 
trees. Following migration on a larger scale, land ra p id ly  increases in 
value while the boundary markers have often disappeared, at which time 
disputes a r is e .6 other facto rs  often mentioned are the shortages o f 
state law enforcement personnel in such areas and the use o f  such areas 
as hideaways by fu g i t iv e s  from the law.
While there is some basis fo r  these common perceptions, the 
p ic ture  is  d is to r te d . Indiv idualism o f f ro n t ie r  society can be 
overstressed. As we saw in the previous section, m igration is  commonly 
a jo in t  enterprise involv ing substantia l sections o f  whole v i l la g e s .  
Even where i t  is  more incremental, i t  often involves movement to areas 
where kin or other acquaintances have already se tt led . The i n i t i a l  
process o f "staking out" is normally the prerogative o f  in f lu e n t ia l  
ind iv idua ls  ra ther than the m a jo r ity  o f poorer s e t t le rs .  Where disputes 
develop among the la t t e r  group, i t  is  usually because they have been 
sold, or otherwise allocated in re turn for services rendered, p lo ts  o f 
land tha t overlap with those sold or allocated to o thers. The issue o f 
sta te enforcement personnel is  not c lear cut. In early  stages o f 
settlement, there is  usually l i t t l e  violence and community mechanisms 
are u t i l iz e d  fo r  reso lv ing disputes in the absence o f s ta te  a u th o r i t ie s .  
I t  is  during the la te r  stages o f settlement, which usually coincides 
with the construction o f  roads, d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e s ,  and other aspects o f 
state in f ra s t ru c tu re , th a t violence abounds. I t  is  said tha t the police 
or "phraan : rangers" often use a po licy  o f ge tt ing  r id  of
undesirables (normally referred to as "set/a : l i t .  t ig e r s " ,  or
ru th less men o f violence) at th is  stage by a po licy  o f  "keb" ,  or 
se lective k i l l i n g .  Only when state a u th o r i t ie s  are well established and
land t i t l e s  issued does the violence decline somewhat, but even then 
there is  l i t t l e  evidence tha t th is  is  due to an increased police 
presence.7
The d is t in c t io n  between in d iv id u a l is t ic  and communal s p i r i t  o f 
settlement is  sometimes represented by outs iders as evident in spatia l 
patterns o f settlement. The two types commonly recognized are clustered 
and scattered settlement, or " v i l la g e ' '  and " l in e "  patterns (Uhlig 1984 : 
35). Uhlig suggests tha t the la t te r  pattern is evidence o f 
ind iv idua lism  in the process o f  settlement, since "during th is  stage, 
the re la t io n sh ip  between neighbours is  more characterized by the staking 
out o f personal property than by jo in in g  i t  together" ( ib id .  : 140).
However, he f a i l s  to mention tha t th is  pattern o f  settlement follows 
widespread and longstanding Central Plains preferences for residence 
near the f ie ld s ,  precluding clustered settlement, which furthermore is 
not incompatible w ith cooperative working practices. The h is to ry  o f 
settlement in the study v i l la g es  outlined in the fo l low ing  chapter 
i l lu s t r a te s  the general danger o f u t i l i z in g  form to in te rp re t  func t ion , 
more s p e c i f ic a l ly  in drawing conclusions about the nature o f  f ro n t ie r  
society from patterns o f  residence.
I t  is  important to underscore the pace o f  change tha t is  a 
feature o f  f r o n t ie r  soc ie ty , p a r t ic u la r ly  in the areas with which we 
are most concerned, notably the fr inges o f  the Central P lains. Early 
settlement is  usually for subsistence ag r icu ltu re  on newly cleared 
p lo ts ,  using fam ily  labour. In upland areas, th is  ra p id ly  gives over to 
commercial cropping, which leads to a re la t iv e ly  rapid process o f  social 
d i f fe re n t ia t io n  ( ib id .  : 141, 149). Processes o f  d i f fe re n t ia t io n  are
in t im a te ly  re la ted to the transformation o f the environment. In early  
swidden p lo ts ,  fam ily  labour and local inputs are used in a l l  stages o f 
production. The importance o f  fam ily  labour in ea r ly  settlement cannot
be overemphasized. Prior to c u l t iv a t io n ,  labour is  needed to clear 
land, and a t an even e a r l ie r  stage to lay claim to i t .  In the 
settlement o f  one Central Plains community in the la te  nineteenth 
century:
The provis ion o f  labour, not o f  material
resources, was the problem; and i t  is  no wonder
tha t an enduring t ra d i t io n  developed tha t material 
wealth in Bang Chan should be measured not in
material possessions but in the number o f 
productive workers included in a household over 
the long term (Sharp and Hanks 1978 : 45).
In more recent settlements, th is  overrid ing importance o f  fam ily  labour
ty p ic a l ly  las ts  fo r  three years, a f te r  which a t ra c to r  is  used to plough
the land. At th is  stage money is  borrowed from traders for the f i r s t
time, leading eventually to a high ra te o f  indebtedness and the s ta r t  o f
the process o f  d i f fe re n t ia t io n  (Uhlig 1984 : 165 - 167).
A f in a l  point to note concerning social patterns o f  settlement in 
fo res t areas is  the ro le  o f  in f lu e n t ia l  backers. H is to r ic a l ly ,  
settlement was d irected by the e l i t e .  The Saen Saeb canal area east o f 
Bangkok was se tt led  by prisoners o f war under royal d ire c t io n .  
M inisters w ith d istinguished service were given lands in newly cleared 
areas along with prisoners o f war to develop them (Sharp and Hanks 1978 
: 40 - 42). Ananya (1985 : 88) notes the importance o f  slaves in early
clearance o f lands near Paedriw (Chachoengsao). Once freed, these 
slaves would go on to c lear th e ir  own land. More re ce n t ly ,  cassava and 
maize traders have often financed settlement, fo r example on e ith e r  side 
of the Lorn Sak - Pitsanulok road in Thung Sal eng National Park (Uhlig 
1984 : 47). Traders in fo res t products co llected  by subsistence
c u lt iv a to rs  may encourage and finance expansion o f  c u l t iv a t io n  such as 
fo r  maize ( ib id .  : 149). In the case o f  clearance fo r sugar cane
p lan ting , contro l by the in f lu e n t ia l  persons involved is more d i re c t .  
Contract farmers (pa boei) are hired to clear new land fo r p lan ting .
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Once the land is developed, the pa boei move on to c lear new land, 
while the sugarcane planters ( long juu)  arrange a contract fo r
production with nominal owners o f the land, poor farmers to whom the
land had been sold {luuk r a i )  . This makes i t  d i f f i c u l t  fo r the
a u th o r i t ie s  to suppress incursion on fo res t reserves, since the 
c u l t iv a to rs  are numerous and can eas ily  be bailed out by th e ir  patron. 
In th is  way the "sugarcane fro n t"  in Chonburi has progressed 35 
kilometres in 15 years. Typ ica lly  10 kilometres ahead o f th is  f ro n t  are 
subsistence c u l t iv a to rs  in iso la ted  c learings, who are moved on by 
the long juu  using th e ir  pa boei c l ie n ts  in sometimes v io le n t 
confronta tions ( ib id .  : 212 - 220). An analogous process goes on in
other areas, inc lud ing tha t which is  the focus o f th is  study. In th is
case the in f lu e n t ia l  persons behind settlement are i l le g a l  timber
traders , who promise poor, o ften landless farmers a piece o f land in
exchange for help in timber operations. In th is  case too i t  is  the 
small farmers who take the r isks  o f  a r re s t ,  and in th is  case too the
backers take advantage o f  th is  fa c t  e ith e r  by b a i l in g  out those who are
arrested or by assuring th e ir  c l ie n ts  tha t in such a p o l i t i c a l l y  
"sen s it ive "  area {khet s i i  chomphuu : l i t .  pink area) ,8 the
government would not dare r is k  a liena ting  them by a rre s t .
I I I . 2 Forest settlement and a g r icu l tu ra l  expansion
As was observed in section above, a g r ic u l tu ra l  growth
has been v ia  expansion o f the cu lt iva ted  area, and th is  expansion has 
been achieved la rge ly  a t the expense o f fo res t land. Although forest 
e xp lo ita t ion  has often been fo r  other purposes in the f i r s t  instance 
(notably timber f e l l i n g ) ,  farming is the end use o f  fo res t land where 
th is  is  sustainable in the long term. Since Thailand is  a country whose
economy and population have been oriented overwhelmingly to ag r icu ltu re  
as a way o f  l i f e  and means o f  sustenance, th is  expansion is  o f  primary 
importance in development o f  the present day economy, and by extension 
o f  the national p o l i ty .  This section d e ta i ls  the connection between 
fo rest settlement and expansion o f the a g r icu ltu ra l economy f i r s t  via 
expanded r ic e  c u l t iv a t io n ,  then by d iv e rs i f ic a t io n  in to  upland crops, 
and shows how th is  expansion f i t s  in to  the development o f  the wider 
p o l i t i c a l  economy.
111^2 J  Expansion o f  r i c e  agr icu l  ture
The 75 years fo llow ing the Bowring Treaty o f  1855 saw a 
tw e n ty - f ive fo ld  increase in r ic e  exports. Over the same period, the 
Thai population doubled to about 12 m i l l io n  (Ingram 1971 : 37 - 40). 
Meanwhile, p ro d u c t iv i ty  o f r ice land f e l l  s u b s ta n t ia l ly ,  from 1883 
kilogrammes o f  paddy per hectare in 1906 to 1294 in 1940 (Feeny 1984 :
58). Since r ic e  was and remains the staple food crop, the only way the
balance could possibly be made up was by a rapid increase in the area 
under r i c e ,  from less than 6 m i l l io n  r a i  (1 r a i  = 0.16 ha.) in 1850 
to more than 9 m i l l io n  ra i  in 1905 and 35 m i l l io n  r a i  by 1950. Half 
o f  th is  was in the Central Plains area, which accounted fo r the bulk o f 
exports (Ingram 1971 : 43). This expansion required large scale
clearance o f  fo re s t areas.
Johnston (1975) has studied th is  expansion in d e ta i l ,  covering 
the years 1880 to 1930. He shows th a t much o f the ea r ly  expansion was 
fa c i l i ta te d  by canal construction in the Delta area. Among the e a r l ie s t  
waterways to be constructed, Phasijaroen and Damnoensaduak Canals^ to 
the west o f Bangkok were a product o f  i n i t ia t i v e s  by high-ranking
o f f i c i a l s  using government revenues under th e ir  ju r is d ic t io n .  These 
o f f i c i a l s  had a personal stake in trade and development o f  new land 
fo llow ing the opening o f the economy a f te r  1855. I n i t i a l l y ,  c u l t iv a t io n  
and transport o f  sugar cane provided the main source o f revenue, but 
rapid expansion o f  the r ic e  economy from the 1880s and the boom of the 
1890s created a seemingly insa t iab le  demand for r ic e  and so also fo r new 
rice land (Tanabe 1978 : 58 - 67). Some o f the e a r ly  expansion was not
at the expense o f  fo res t.  The Prawetburirom Canal to the east o f 
Bangkok was dug by government in order to open up grasslands for 
c u l t iv a t io n ,  and land settlement was both encouraged (by exemption from 
land tax fo r the i n i t i a l  period of c u l t iv a t io n )  and regulated (by 
re g is t ra t io n  o f  land). Establishment o f the Siam Lands, Canals, and 
I r r ig a t io n  Company in 1888 by royal and Chinese cap ita l ( ib id .  : 65) 
resulted in a v i r tu a l  monopoly o f  canal bu ild ing  and thus control over 
land settlement by th is  one company. The Rangsit network o f  canals 
northeast o f Bangkok was the most comprehensive r e s u l t ,  accommodating
100,000 new s e t t le rs  on up to 1,500,000 ra i  o f  land by 1905, 
accounting fo r  one quarter o f  r ice land in the Central P lains.
Following th is  period of rapid expansion, there followed a sharp 
but temporary reversal o f  fortunes in the r ic e  economy during the 
period 1905 to 1912, p a r t ic u la r ly  in the newly se tt led  areas. This 
resulted from a combination o f adverse weather cond it ions, disease, 
s i l t a t io n  o f  canals, a r ise  in land taxes, labour shortage, and a f a l l  
in the domestic price  o f paddy brought about by apprecia tion o f about 
one-th ird  in value o f the baht.  The population o f the Rangsit area 
f e l l  by as much as 35 per cent during th is  period due to emigration and 
tenants' abandonment o f  r ice lan d . Although th is  slowdown and localized 
reversal in settlement o f  fo res t lands for r ic e  c u l t iv a t io n  was 
s h o r t - l iv e d ,  i t  was s ig n i f ic a n t  in marking a watershed between boom 
conditions and the more gradual expansion tha t fo llowed. Whereas r ic e
exports had increased more than fou rfo ld  between 1880/84 and 1905/09 
(taking f ive -year means), the period 1905/09 to 1925/29 saw exports less 
than double. This more gradual ra te  o f growth was la rge ly  due to 
shortages o f labour and cap ita l necessary fo r  opening of new lands, 
which had to be raised domestically unlike the s itu a t io n  in Siam’ s 
co lon ia l neighbours. Johnston (1975 : c h .9) suggests th a t  the slower 
ra te  o f  expansion in Thailand than in Burma, fo r example, resulted in 
s u f f ic ie n t  "s lack" in the economy fo r  the Thai peasantry to be able to 
adapt to depression in the 1930s by reversion to subsistence production 
o f  many goods. Farmers responded to the f a l l  in r ic e  prices o f  40 per 
cent between the 1920s and 1934 by increasing th e ir  production. 
This was effected by continued land clearance in order to  maintain cash 
incomes, while cash ou tlay was minimized by fu r th e r  e x te n s if ica t io n  o f 
production and cu tt in g  down on le isu re  time for home production o f  goods 
in place o f cash purchases.^
A notable feature o f  a g r icu ltu ra l expansion during the period 
before the Second World War was the lack o f in te n s i f ic a t io n .  The 
technology and techniques employed in r ic e  farming remained e ssen t ia l ly  
the same throughout th is  period. A number o f  fac to rs  led to a decline 
in land p ro d u c t iv i ty  o f  18 per cent between 1921 and 1941 (Feeny 1982 : 
47). Although th is  has commonly been a ttr ib u te d  to a move onto less 
favourable s o i ls  (e .g . Uhlig 1984 : 13), Feeny (1982 : 4 9 f f . )  shows tha t 
th is  only p a r t ly  explains dec lin ing  y ie ld s , which are also accounted for 
by diminished fa c to r  inputs per u n it  area.
Disruption o f  trade during the Second World War led to a sharp 
decline in r ice  production, but th is  was soon reversed fo llow ing  the end 
o f the war. In the 1950s and 1960s, a number o f  fac to rs  led to a 
slowing down in the rate o f  increase in area o f  r ice lan d . One was the 
growing shortage o f  land suited to r ic e  c u l t iv a t io n ,  as clearance took
farmers onto more and more marginal land. This was concurrent with the 
f i r s t  major steps toward in te n s i f ic a t io n  in r ic e  c u l t iv a t io n  on ex is t ing  
land with the construction o f large scale i r r ig a t io n  works associated 
with the Chaophraya Dam at Chainat and smaller schemes in the Northeast. 
This also allowed l im ited  development o f  new seed v a r ie t ie s  and use o f 
inputs such as f e r t i l i z e r s  and pestic ides, but these la t t e r  had l im ited  
overa ll impact on y ie ld s . Of greater s ign if icance was the expansion o f 
opportun it ies  in non-rice a g r ic u l tu re ,  opening up large areas h ithe rto  
unexploited due to th e ir  u n s u i ta b i l i ty  fo r  c u l t iv a t io n  o f the 
subsistence crop.
Expansion o f  upland ag r icu l tu re
Until approximately 1950, r ic e  c u l t iv a t io n  accounted fo r a stable 
proportion o f a l l  annual cropping in Thailand, approximately 90 per 
cent. As can be seen from Table 3.3, however, the period fo llow ing  1950 
saw a rapid increase in the importance o f  other crops, notably maize, 
sugarcane, and cassava. I t  should be noted tha t the area under r ice  has 
continued to expand, and tha t i t  is  only in re la t iv e  terms tha t r ic e  
c u l t iv a t io n  has diminished in importance.
While the d iv e rs i f ic a t io n  away from r ice  in favour o f upland
crops has been commented on widely (e.g. Ingram 1971 : 237, 261; IBRD
1980 : 10; G ir l in g  1981 : 65 - 66), the close re la t io n s h ip  between th is  
process and th a t o f  fo res t clearance is  re la t iv e ly  unexplored. Social 
aspects o f  th is  re la t io n sh ip  are even less often touched upon. The only 
major work th a t  addresses the some o f the issues is  U h lig 's  1984 study,
and much o f  the present section draws on th is  work unless otherwise
ind icated.
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Table 3.3 Increase in Thai cultivated area I9ct0 — i97S
YEAR : TOTAL CULTIVATED AREA ; RICELAND
ALL
000 ha : index '000 ha: Index i l  oi '000 ha : inas>
: (1950-100) : to ta l :
1950 6271 100 5540 100 '88 731 100
i960 7717 123 592 i 107 77 1796 246
1970 10867 173 7494 135 69 3373 461
1978 15197 242 934-6 169 62 5851 800
DRYLAND / PERENNIALS
: Cassava: Maize : Sugarcane 
I oi : '0 0 0  h a : '000 ha: 000 ha 
to ta l :  : :
12 
23 
31 : 
3? : 
:
14 36 54
72 286 158
225 829 138
323 1356 510
:= = = = = = = = === ==== =
Adapted -from Uhlig 01984 : 123, 124)
Table 3.4 Agricultural investment and productivity in Asia
SERICULTURE AS I CULTIVATED AREA : PADDY YIELD!
COUNTRY QF TOTAL 6QVT. PER CAPITA (HA) : IKS / HA)
INVESTMENT 
1966 : 1974 i976
:
: 1969 : 1978
South Korea 17 28
_______________
0.06 : 4661 6385
Ind ia 15 12 0.29 : 1609 1963
Malaysia 23 20 0.49 : 2315 2502
Pakistan 17 11 0.34 : 2220 2466
P h ilip p ines 14 36 0.20 ; 1681 1972
Sri Lanka 16 16 0.17 : 2565 2895
Taiwan n.a . n.a . 0.01 : 3867 4468
TMIL4SG 12 10 0.41 : 1934 1875
Source : Douglass (19S3 : 196)
As we observed in the previous section, the t ra d i t io n a l  way of
l i f e  o f the Thai farmer has been r ice  growing, and commercialization o f
Thai ag r icu ltu re  was exceptional in the co lon ia l era in being
characterized by increased production o f the subsistence crop ra ther
than a switch to a non- loca lly  consumed cash c r o p . ^  However, more
recent expansion has been in cash crops tha t are fo r  export or to meet
other non-local needs:
The modern clearance settlement, . . . fo l lo w in g  a 
new socio-economic development, has abandoned the 
t ra d i t io n a l  w et-r ice  c u l t iv a t io n  in favour of
marketable crops o f  dry f ie ld  c u l t iv a t io n  (Uhlig
1984 : 27).
The reasons fo r  th is  switch are complex, re la t in g  to p r ic ing  p o l ic ie s ,
marketing s truc tu res , ecological imperatives, and more general social
and economic developments. The r ice  premium^ as a d is incen tive  to
commercial r ic e  cropping is  often quoted as a key element in encouraging
a switch to other crops, but there are a number o f  problems with too
s im p l is t ic  an analysis such as th is .  At the level o f  production, a
subsistence crop such as r ice  whose c u l t iv a t io n  involves c h ie f ly  fam ily
labour and non-cash inputs is  not s t r i c t l y  comparable with upland
crops, which require  cash inputs and en ta il the extra  cost o f  land
clearance. The r e a l i t y  o f  choices fo r  most farmers does not involve
stra ightforward tradeoffs  between crops on a p a r t ic u la r  piece o f  land.
Thus the d iv e rs i f ic a t io n  th a t has taken place a t the national level is
not based on a fundamental change in the pattern o f  a g r icu ltu re  in older
ra in fed r ice  areas, for
the increase in a g r icu ltu ra l production and the 
d iv e rs i f ic a t io n  o f crops were not so much the 
re s u lt  o f  successful in te n s i f ic a t io n  and crop 
d iv e rs i f ic a t io n  in the r ic e  areas, but were mainly 
due to the rapid development in the areas o f  
spontaneous land c learing  ( ib id .  : 125).
This was fa c i l i t a te d  by world market demand fo r the crops suited to
newly cleared upland areas (G ir l in g  1981 : 66n ) , which was tim e ly  given
the u n s u i ta b i l i ty  o f  most o f these areas to r ice  c u l t iv a t io n .
Three crops are pre-emininent in the expansion o f  f ie ld  cropping 
on the fr inges  o f  the Central Plains area. Maize was the e a r l ie s t  f ie ld  
crop to obtain widespread po pu la r ity ,  espec ia lly  a f te r  the in troduction 
o f Guatemalan hard maize during the 1950s. I t s  c u l t iv a t io n  is  spread 
over a diverse range o f  areas, but i t  is the Upper Central Plains 
(ad m in is tra t ive ly  c la ss if ie d  as the Lower North) area tha t is  commonly 
termed Thailand's "corn b e l t " .  Approximately 90 per cent o f  maize 
c u l t iv a t io n  is  fo r export, mainly to supply the feedstock industr ies o f 
Japan and Taiwan. Cassava became popular in the 1960s with increasing 
demand fo r a lte rna t ive  feedstocks by the European Economic Community. 
Although the bulk o f  i t s  c u l t iv a t io n  is now in the Northeast, where i t  
has provided an a lte rn a t ive  to kenaf,13 i t  has also remained popular 
in the Southeast and become so in other Central Plains fr inge  areas (see 
section VA1 J  below). Demand reached a peak during the 1970s when 
a lte rna tives  to grain feedstocks were in high demand, but i t  has since 
ta i led  o f f  and the EEC has set s t r i c t  quotas fo r  import o f  tapioca 
products, leading to overproduction. Sugarcane has a long h is to ry  in 
Thailand, and indeed r ice  spec ia l iza t ion  in the la te  nineteenth century 
had coincided with a decline in the sugar industry (Johnston 1975 : 26 - 
31) tha t was only revived under government encouragement during the 
1950s and 1960s (see section 111^3J i  below). The 1970s saw buoyant 
prices fo r  sugar, and large areas on the eastern and western fr inges o f 
the Central Plains in Chonburi and Kanchanaburi provinces respect ive ly  
were turned over to th is  crop. Unlike maize and cassava, sugar enjoys a 
substantia l domestic market, but over h a lf  is  s t i l l  exported and the 
price received by producers is  dependent on world market f lu c tu a t io n s .
Although the pattern o f settlement fo r upland cropping is th a t o f 
farmers geared to permanent a g r icu ltu re ,  some doubts arise as to the 
long term v i a b i l i t y  o f  the current a g r icu ltu ra l regime in many areas.
Many o f the newly se tt led  areas are o f  low natural f e r t i l i t y ,  and y ie lds  
in the early  years fo llow ing clearance are only obtainable due to a 
residue humic content o f  the so il tha t qu ick ly d iss ipa tes with removal 
o f  the fo re s t cover. Repeated monocropping o f such so ils  can lead to 
rapid loss o f  so il n u tr ie n ts ,  and problems o f so il exhaustion, so il 
erosion, and invasion o f weeds (notably yaa khaa : " roo fing  grass", or
Imperata cyl  indr ica)  are v is ib ly  evident in many areas. Certain so i ls
are suited to long term monocropping o f upland crops given proper 
management and inputs, notably the rendzinas associated with karst 
formations, but these cover a small proportion o f  the areas cleared. 
Thai lowlanders who s e t t le  upland areas do not p ractise  s h if t in g  
c u l t iv a t io n  in the same way as, fo r example, the Lua' (S to tt  1978 : 11 - 
12) ,  and there is  an increasing tendency fo r  so i ls  to be "mined" u n t i l  
they are taken over by yaa khaa , a t which time farmers move on to
clear new areas. As we observe in Chapter VI below, th is  is
in t r ic a te ly  re la ted to socio-economic processes. Uhlig (1984 : 2 0 - 2 1 )  
notes the irony o f  the current po licy  o f  t ry in g  to se tt le  e thnic 
m ino r i t ie s  who in th e ir  s h if t in g  c u l t iv a t io n  practice  may have developed 
the only eco lo g ica l ly  sustainable use o f  the fo res t (Chin 1977 : 110; 
S to tt  1978 : 9 ) , while at the same time lowlanders are moving into what 
inadverten tly  turns out to be temporary swidden a g r ic u l tu re . -^
Thus the settlement o f upland areas contains the paradox o f 
opportun is t ic  adaptation to world market demand tha t re su lts  over the 
long term in impoverishment o f  many o f  those involved in settlement and 
the environment in which they have se tt led . This brings us back to our 
i n i t i a l  observation in section concerning the bene f ic ia r ies
o f settlement, and helps to explain why such areas are home to some o f 
the poorest o f  Thailands poor, while at the same time they are 
represented as the "most dynamic, w ea lth ies t, and innovation-receptive 
agrarian regions" (Uhlig 1984 : 43).
The p o l i t i c a l  economy o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  expansion
In the mid-1980s Thailand is  the world 's  la rges t exporter o f  r ice
and tapioca and an important exporter o f maize and sugar. Yet area
y ie lds  o f  a l l  o f  these products, p a r t ic u la r ly  o f  r i c e ,  are extremely low 
by world standards (Table 3 .4 ) .  An important fac to r  in th is  low
p ro d u c t iv i ty  has been the re liance  on e x te n s if ica t io n  o f  a g r icu ltu re  by 
continuous land settlement rather than in te n s i f ic a t io n  on ex is t ing
lands. Recently y ie lds  in both new areas o f settlement and in some
older areas have shown downward trends. This is  because deforesta tion  
associated with land settlement has resulted in environmental
d e te r io ra t io n  a ffec t ing  ag r icu ltu re  both lo c a l ly  and in older areas. 
The present section shows th a t the extensive pattern o f  a g r icu ltu ra l 
growth is  a re s u lt  o f  conscious choices o f  those in power.
Feeny (1977, 1982) analyses trends in r ic e  p ro d u c t iv i ty  during
the pre-war period to show th a t the decline in y ie lds  was due to a 
divergence between the social ra te  o f  return from investment in
a g r icu ltu re  ( p a r t ic u la r ly  i r r ig a t io n )  and the re tu rn  accruing to the 
e l i te  who made the decisions to invest otherwise (notably in ra ilway 
cons truc tion ). The area under paddy increased by 3.14 per cent annually 
between 1911 and 1941, while the annual increase in output was only 1.91 
per cent (Feeny 1982 : 24). In 1941, paddy y ie lds  in the Central Plains 
were only a t 82.2 per cent o f  th e i r  level o f 20 years e a r l ie r  ( ib id .  : 
45). By the 1970s, r ic e  y ie lds  had recovered to th e ir  1900s le ve ls ,  
but p ro d u c t iv i ty  could hardly be seen to have shown a dramatic
improvement.
Part o f  the explanation fo r declin ing y ie lds  c e r ta in ly  lay in the 
diminishing q u a l i ty  o f  the land being se tt led  fo r  c u l t iv a t io n ,  and much 
of the res t o f  the explanation l ie s  with declin ing  fac to r inputs per 
un it area th a t are themselves associated with e x te n s i f ic a t io n . Feeny 
argues th a t the main reason fo r  lack o f in te n s i f ic a t io n  at a time o f 
increasing demand fo r r ic e  both domestically and on the in te rna tiona l 
market was fa i lu re  to implement the large scale i r r ig a t io n  scheme 
proposed by Van der Heide in 1902 or that proposed a few years la te r  by
1 RWard.13 Pelzer (1945 : 60) suggests th a t the fa i lu re  to implement the
former scheme was a d ire c t  re s u lt  o f  p o l i t i c a l  pressures brought to bear
by landlords in the Rangsit area, who feared the loss o f  tenants tha t
would re s u lt  i f  large new areas o f potentia l r ice land were made
ava ilab le  in Suphanburi and elsewhere. Feeny (1982) analyzes the
p o l i t i c s  o f  the non-implementation o f Van der Heide's proposal in more
depth, showing tha t the Rangsit landlords were in f lu e n t ia l  in palace
c i rc le s .  He estab lishes a d i re c t  connection between fa i lu re  to invest
in i r r ig a t io n  and the decision to invest in ra ilway connection o f the
North, Northeast, and South as an a lte rna t ive  use o f  l im ited  funds
(see also Johnston 1975 : 9 3 f f . ) .  Comparing the ra tes o f  re tu rn  between
the two p ro jec ts , Feeny shows th a t i r r ig a t io n  would have produced a
minimum return o f  19 per cent per annum, as compared with less than one
per cent for the ra ilways. However, the re tu rn  on increased
a g r ic u l tu ra l  p ro d u c t iv i ty  would have been d i f f i c u l t  to recapture, in
p a r t icu la r  in l i g h t  o f  the l im i t  imposed on land taxes under the terms
o f the Bowring Treaty. In general terms,
While the demand for in s t i tu t io n a l  change w i l l
respond to changes in potentia l p ro f i ts  fo r
economic un its  (such as farm producers) associated 
with some change in in s t i tu t io n s  or p o l icy ,  the 
supply w i l l  respond to changes in the poten tia l 
p ro f i ts  fo r  the e l i t e  decision makers. This 
d if fe rence  represents a potentia l source o f  a
divergence in the expected rate o f  re turn  on a 
change for the economic un its  and the e l i t e .  In 
the Thai case th is  divergence was, in fa c t ,  qu ite  
important. (Feeny 1982 : 9)
Railways were seen by the e l i t e  as necessary fo r  national security  
purposes, s p e c i f ic a l ly  in extending central contro l from Bangkok over 
the ou tly ing  regions in l ig h t  o f  European expansionism in surrounding 
te r r i t o r ie s  ( ib id .  : 80 - 84) and prov inc ia l re b e l l io n s  (Johnston 1975 : 
93).
The divergence between ind iv idua l choices and social re turn is 
also evident in the increasing ly  unstable ecology o f  a g r icu ltu ra l 
expansion. As ea r ly  as 1945, deforesta tion  was noted to be responsible 
fo r  s i l t a t io n  o f  canals and r ive rs  (Pelzer 1945 : 62). Non-local
im plica tions o f  settlement have become more acute with the various 
"downstream" e ffec ts  o f  movement onto marginal land and fo rest 
destruction  (notably s i l t a t io n ,  f lood ing , drought), but these are 
d i f f i c u l t  to measure. Panayotou (1983 : 46 - 47) incorporates these 
"e x te rn a l i t ie s "  in to  his assessment o f urgent issues surrounding 
deforestation in the context o f  a g r icu l tu ra l  expansion. U lt im ate ly  
th is  divergence can be seen as a p o l i t i c a l  economic issue in th a t i t  
represents an outcome o f choices by those in pos it ions o f  power (e.g. 
concerning investment p o licy ,  property r ig h ts ,  enforcement), an outcome 
which contains a fa i lu re  o f  in s t i t u t io n s  to equate what ind iv idua ls  are 
encouraged and able to do with the social good.
Although the postwar period has seen increased state a tten tion  
to increasing a g r ic u l tu ra l  p ro d u c t iv i ty ,  a g r icu ltu ra l p r ic ing  and export 
s tra teg ies have played a part in the continued importance o f fo rest 
settlement in a g r ic u l tu ra l  expansion. Following the Second World War, 
in te n s i f ic a t io n  o f r ic e  ag r icu ltu re  was fu r the r stunted by imposition o f 
the r ice  premium, which was i n i t i a l l y  an important source o f  state 
revenue (see footnote 12). Later the premium became more useful as a 
means o f  depressing the price o f  r ic e  for urban consumers, which in turn 
has allowed urban wages to remain low as part o f  the government's
emphasis on ind u s tr ia l  expansion. Meanwhile, the desire to increase 
exports as a basis fo r ind u s tr ia l  expansion and a desire to d iv e rs i fy
a g r icu ltu ra l production away from r ice  led to a set o f  po l ic ies  tha t
combined with favourable world market conditions to promote the 
c u l t iv a t io n  o f upland crops as outlined in the previous section. As we 
have seen, th is  expansion was at the expense o f  fo res t areas ra ther than 
r ice la n d , and the period since 1960 has seen a decline in fo rest area 
from over 50 per cent o f  the national land area to possib ly under 20 per 
cent by 1986. By the mid-1980s, the most peripheral areas are producing 
crops fo r  urban and export markets.
I t  would c e r ta in ly  be wrong to write  o f f  state programmes in 
ru ra l areas in recent years. Construction o f  the Chainat Dam in the 
1950s followed Van der Heide's plans more than h a l f  a century a f te r  they 
were drawn up. Research into improved r ice  seed, pestic ides, 
mechanization, and other aspects o f  c u l t iv a t io n  technology has increased 
fo llow ing i t s  extremely l im ite d  prewar re su lts .  A g r icu ltu ra l extension 
work has aimed at increasing y ie lds  through app lica t ion  o f new 
technology. Yet the fa c t remains tha t investment in the a g r icu ltu ra l 
sector remains extremely low compared with other Asian countr ies , and as 
we have seen y ie lds  remain low while continued fo res t settlement
maintains e x te n s if ica t io n  (Table 3.4 above). As we w i l l  see in the
fo llow ing sections, th is  ex te ns if ica t io n  has been fa c i l i t a te d  not only 
by neglect o f  a g r ic u l tu ra l  investment, but also by other aspects o f  
state spending in ru ra l areas, notably on roads. A g r icu ltu ra l 
development as an opening up o f new areas through improved 
communications ra ther than increasing p ro d u c t iv i ty  in ex is t ing  areas 
thus provides a co n t in u ity  in the p o l i t ic a l  economy o f  a g r icu l tu ra l  
expansion up to the present day.
I I I . 3 Socio-polit ical aspects of forest settlement
We have seen tha t fo res t settlement is  c lose ly  re lated to 
a g r ic u l tu ra l  expansion, and tha t through th is  i t  is  an expression o f 
p a r t icu la r  aspects o f  the Thai p o l i t i c a l  economy. However, expansion 
into  fo res t areas must be seen also in the l ig h t  o f  social and p o l i t ic a l  
phenomena th a t are not in themselves part o f  the a g r ic u l tu ra l  economy. 
An understanding o f the cu ltu ra l background to fo rest settlement 
provides the basis fo r an appraisal o f  the in te rp lay  between centra l and 
peripheral forces th a t l ie s  behind the phenomenology o f  settlement.
I I I > 3 J  Ideas about the forest
Thai conceptions o f  the fo res t are varied, influenced as they are 
by a mixture o f  animism, Buddhism in i t s  various forms, and Western 
ideas a l te rn a t iv e ly  o f  "progress" and "conservation". Popular discourse 
contains much th a t r e f le c ts  the lawlessness, backwardness, and danger 
associated with the fo re s t.  The phrase "paa theuan : l i t .  i l l i c i t  
forest"*®  use(j £0 describe an area tha t is fa r from the centres o f  
power, whether or not there is  anything i l le g a l  going on and whether or 
not there is a c tu a lly  any fo res t remaining in the area. "Khon paa : 
l i t .  fo res t people" is  a pe jora tive  term for the backward, u n c iv i l ize d , 
w ild ,  as opposed to "khon meuang : l i t .  town people", but including
v i l la g e rs  who are not khon paa. V illages th a t are some distance from 
prov inc ia l towns are said to be "yuu nai paa : in the fo res t"  to
indicate th e ir  p e r ip h e ra l i ty . "Kodmaai paa : the law o f the fo res t"  
is  ru le  d ic ta ted  often by in f lu e n t ia l  persons outside the aegis o f  state 
law. "Paa" denotes "w ild" as opposed to the urban, c iv i l iz e d
"baan", such as when applied to animals : w ild  and domestic ca ts , fo r  
example, are maewpaa and maewbaan ( l i t .  house c a t) .
The co n tra d is t in c t io n  between fo res t and a u th o r i ty ,  urbanity ,
c i v i l i z a t io n ,  sa fe ty , metropole is contained in numerous such
expressions and in other forms. One o f  the most in te res t in g  is  a song
tha t has been a rad ica l "Song fo r  L i f e " , 17 a revol u tionary song, and
more recen tly  a "song fo r development" used in one o f  the government's
ideological t ra in in g  programmes:
H istory may have many aspects
But never has the worker been mentioned
Bearer o f  burdens, wader through water and mud,
Creator o f  the c i t y  from the fo res t
The magnif icent walled c i t y
With the blood and muscle o f  the road bu ilder
The way i s  cleared
For others to fo l low .
From one lone ly  fo res t  to another
As a wanderer, only the ground to c a l l  "home"
However c o ld L pain fu l  t dangerous 
Never a f l in c h  o f  fear 
Hurrying fo r th  to clear  
For others to fo llow
Their every footstep l ik e  fading shadows 
Their names and bodies buried w ith in  the land.
(my tra n s la t io n )
Progress as the laudable product o f  forgotten heroes is  set in terms o f 
transformation o f the wild fo res t into a habitable domain.
Trad it iona l ideas about the fo res t are re f lec ted  in various local 
cu ltu ra l p rac tices. In Northeast Thailand, v i l la g e s  maintain a resting  
place fo r  the remains o f  the dead called a paa chaa, which consists 
o f  a small area o f sacred woodland. In add it ion , nearby some v i l la g es  
is an area o f  fo res t th a t belongs to the s p i r i t  o f  the male ancestors 
(ph i i  taa puu) , which cannot be cut fo r fear o f offending these 
s p i r i t s .  Elsewhere non-a ff ina l s p i r i t s  are believed to hold influence 
over areas o f fo re s t ,  and i t  is believed tha t anyone who cuts wood from 
such an area w i l l  soon meet a v io le n t  death. In Chonburi takien trees
are protected by a malevolent female s p i r i t  (S to t t  1978 : 16). In the 
Tai autonomous region o f Xishuangbanna in southern China, fo rests  in 
near p r is t in e  condition  on some 400 "holy h i l l s "  are preserved as the 
gods' gardens and account fo r  between 1.5 and 2.5 per cent o f  the to ta l  
land area (Pei 1985). S to t t  (1978 : 17) mentions the s ign if icance o f
the Buddhist ascetic t r a d i t io n  o f " fo re s t dhamma", which requires the 
fo res t as a place o f re tre a t  and t r a n q u i l i t y .  The forest also 
represents a place o f re tre a t  in other contexts, to be expanded on in 
section l l l , 3 , i i i  below.
Thus fo res t and c iv i l i z a t io n  have been seen as opposites, but 
with ce rta in  forces to be considered before the fo re s t is  destroyed. 
T rad it iona l b e l ie fs  provide an indigenous mode o f  conservation, and 
loca l development workers have noted the "m in i- fo re s t reserves" o f  the 
Northeast. Conservation strategy as pursued by the government has, on 
the other hand, adopted a western approach and does not take into 
account uniquely Thai or other local cu ltu ra l approaches to conservation 
(S to t t  1978 : 18). Recently, a number o f  environmental issues have
achieved prominence, supported by public awareness o f the problems o f 
deforestation through extensive coverage in the national press. The 
controversy th a t  arose over the construction o f the Nam Choan dam in 
Kanchanaburi has been cited as an example o f increased public 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in fo re s t conservation (Nart 1984 : 91; see also Hirsch 
1986).
111,3477 S e t t l ing  and connecting the per iphery
VJe have noted the s ta te 's  concern with in te g ra t ion  o f peripheral 
areas and i t s  connection with land settlement and de fo res ta tion . The
f a i lu r e  to improve a g r icu ltu re  on ex is t ing  land due to investment
elsewhere led to a consequent but inc identa l need to seek out new lands. 
However, the investment in canals, ra ilw ays, and roads, and in certa in  
other in f ra s tru c tu ra l  p ro jects in ru ra l areas established a more d ire c t  
connection between government p r io r i t ie s  and settlement and connection 
o f  ou tly ing  areas.
The centra lized nature o f power in the Thai context has
t r a d i t io n a l ly  meant th a t control radiated out from the centre and
diminished with distance. The concept o f fixed f ro n t ie rs  at the
periphery is  a new one (Withaya 1984 : 150 - 151). As a re s u l t ,  central
a u th o r ity  has normally been established by strengthening adm in is tra tive  
and physical l in k s  between ou tly ing  areas and the cen tre , which for the
past two centuries has been in Bangkok. In the nineteenth century, the
release o f previously t ied  serfs and slaves (phrai and thaat
respective ly ) led to a concern by centra l a u th o r i t ie s  fo r  maintaining 
c o n t ro l :
Such a large group could not be permitted to run 
the r is k  o f  vanishing or o f  abandoning socie ty.
So they were c a re fu l ly  se tt led  on v irg in  or other
lands by newly appointed commune ch ie fs ,
registered at newly b u i l t  d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e s  managed 
by o f f ic e rs  newly tra ined in the recen tly
established c iv i l  service, and supervised by the
newly organized police (Sharp and Hanks 1978 :
88).
Soon a f te r  the signing o f the Bowring t re a ty ,  c u l t iv a t io n  o f new lands
had been encouraged by l i f t i n g  o f  taxes on newly cleared land. During
the reign o f Rama V (1864 - 1910), land settlement was encouraged by 
construction o f  canals as described in section 111,2,1' above. Since 
even e a r l ie r  dates, canal construction had also had a s tra teg ic  aspect, 
notably in the construction  o f the Saen Saeb canal during the reign o f 
Rama I I I  ( ib id .  1978 : 39; Johnston 1975 : 42 - 43). Early in the
twentieth  century, railways were constructed to l in k  peripheral regions 
even fu r th e r  a f ie ld  (see section I I I , 2 , H i  above).
Early on, promotion o f settlement and l in k in g  ou t ly in g  regions 
was achieved by provis ion o f adm in is tra tive  and physical in f ra s tru c tu re  
along with a range o f  incentives and in s t i tu t io n a l  reforms (notably 
property r ig h ts ) .  However, since 1940 the government has been involved 
more d i r e c t ly  in land settlement, in p a r t icu la r  through the Land 
Settlement D iv is ion o f the Public Welfare Department under the M in is try  
o f  the In te r io r  and the Self-help  Land Settlement Schemes o f the 
M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re  and Cooperatives. Uhlig (1984 : 32 - 33) notes 
six other government departments also involved in land settlement, 
while Chirapanda (1982 : 107) counts a to ta l o f fourteen, leading to
numerous problems o f  dup lica t ion  and lack o f coordination (see also 
Demaine 1984). These include the A gr icu ltu ra l Land Reform Office 
(ALRO), set up fo llow ing the 1975 Land Reform Act. Ostensibly 
established to deal with growing problems o f landlessness, p a r t ic u la r ly  
in the Central Plains and parts o f  the Upper North, ALRO has tended to 
locate pro jects  in recently  se tt led  areas in order to le g it im ize  control 
over land tha t would otherwise be occupied by fo res t squatters (Uhlig 
1984 : 36), In some cases fo res t land has been cleared s p e c if ic a l ly  to
make way fo r a "land reform" settlement (see the fo llow ing  chapter fo r
the case o f Ban M a i) .13 In a l l  settlement schemes since 1940, some
230,000 fam il ies  have been se tt led  on 700,000 hectares o f  land. To put 
these f igu res  in perspective, however, there are estimated to be at 
least one m i l l io n  squatter fam ilies  farming four to f iv e  m i l l io n
hectares o f fo res t reserve ( ib id .  : 37 - 39).
Since the 1960s, the largest part o f  government investment in 
ru ra l areas has been in road construction. Concentration in "sens it ive " 
areas such as the Northeast and the cooperation o f the United States 
Operations Mission (US0M) shows the security  o r ie n ta t io n  and the
emphasis on maintaining or increasing central contro l over peripheral
areas. Feeder road construction has received a boost since the 1970s 
with the various tambon schemes (see section I I , l , i i i  above, also 
fo llow ing  chapters), and a major s tra teg ic  road construction scheme has 
been underway in the ea r ly  1980s to make accessible peripheral areas 
tha t had previously been zones o f  influence o f the Communist Party o f 
Thailand. By the mid-1980s, the vast m a jo r ity  o f  v i l la g es  are
accessible by four wheeled motor vehic les. This opens up large areas 
fo r  commercial cropping, and i t  has been noted tha t apart from security  
considerations, road construction is  also concentrated in areas suited 
to c u l t iv a t io n  o f export crops ( ib id .  : 126).19 Roads l in k in g  maize
producing areas with Bangkok have been shown to reduce marketing costs 
by 20 per cent (Goldberg 1979 : 359), while local feeder roads are a l l  
important in making cash cropping feas ib le . Even improved bus
communications promote land settlement in increasing the contact between 
new s e t t le rs  and poten tia l s e t t le rs  in home v i l la g e s  and by increasing 
the p o s s ib i l i t ie s  fo r  "commuter" farming.
Other than provision o f  transport in f ra s t ru c tu re , the government 
has taken a number o f other measures d i r e c t ly  or in d i re c t ly  promoting 
land settlement. In p a r t ic u la r ,  sugarcane p lanting was promoted as part 
o f the import su b s t i tu t io n  and export promotion p o lic ies  o f  the 1960s 
and 1970s. I n i t i a l l y  sugar a c tua lly  had to be imported to feed the
m i l l s ,  but expansion in peripheral areas (see section I I I , 2 J i  above) 
soon made up the s h o r t f a l l ,  and there was a rapid expansion onto fo res t 
lands during the sugar boom o f the early  1970s (Uhlig 1984 : 129 - 32). 
The ro le  o f  ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs was important in th is  process, 
as i t  was also in estab lish ing the marketing s tructures and sometimes 
the finance fo r production o f maize and cassava ( ib id  : 49,135; see also 
Rigg 1986). As in the case o f  sugarcane, c u l t iv a t io n  o f  maize and 
cassava helped by government export promotion has normally been on 
previously forested lands.
An important part o f  increasing control over peripheral areas is  
the establishment o f  adm in istra tive structures. Uhlig (1984 : 140)
characterizes the formation o f  new adm in is tra tive  un its  in newly se tt led  
areas as a type o f  "successive c e l l  d iv is io n " .  This is  the process by 
which a tambon (c lu s te r  o f v i l lag es ) becomes a king amphoe 
{[temporary] branch d i s t r i c t )  with l im ited  adm in is tra tive  functions and 
usually w ith in  three to f iv e  years an amphoe ( d i s t r i c t )  with the f u l l  
range o f functions. The new d i s t r i c t  is  made up o f  several tambons, 
which may themselves eventually be "promoted" to d i s t r i c t  status. 
Johnston (1975 : 36 - 38) suggests tha t creation o f khwaeng
(equivalent to present day amphoe) is  the best evidence we have for
early  population growth and expansion o f c u l t iv a t io n  in Ayuthaya 
province.
The process o f es tab lish ing state control over peripheral areas
by increasing adm in is tra tive  and physical l in ks  is  one fraught with
c o n f l ic t .  Part o f  the c o n f l ic t  is  in terna l to the bureaucracy.
C on f l ic ts  o f  in te re s t  arise between departmental ob jec t ive s , such as the
protection  o f  fo re s t reserve by Forestry Department o f f i c i a l s  as against
the desire fo r  re g is t ra t io n  o f  v i l la g e s  and provision o f  schools by the
In te r io r  and Education M in is tr ie s  respective ly  ( ib id .  : 47). Such
c o n f l ic t  does not only revolve around issues o f  departmental func tion ;
i t  also arises due to the desire fo r  various departments to expand th e ir
range and scale o f  a c t i v i t ie s  (Morel! and Chai-anan 1981 : 49),
re su lt in g  in a competitive du p lica t ion  o f function th a t  may take on a
t e r r i t o r i a l  dimension33 th a t  is most c le a r ly  evident in the staking
out o f  new areas fo r  land settlement programmes (see above). In the
words o f  a senior land reform o f f i c i a l :
Up u n t i l  now, no one can say with a reasonable
degree o f confidence what precise po licy  is  to be 
adopted towards the m i l l io n s  o f squatters in
fo res t reserves (Chirapanda 1982 : 110).
Other areas o f  c o n f l ic t  surrounding land settlement are between s e t t le rs  
and the s ta te . S e tt le rs  on fo re s t reserve land are m is tru s t fu l  o f  state 
in ten t ions  in pro jects  such as land reform, while state o f f i c i a l s  are 
keen to gain adm in is tra tive  control over scattered ou t ly in g  settlements. 
Resettlement or even physical removal of whole v i l la g e s  may re s u l t ,  
while v i l la g e rs  may in tu rn  devise means to evade such co n tro l.
I I I , 3 J i i  The fo res t  haven
Despite the dangers associated with the fo re s t ,  the she lte r ,
resources, lands, and protection afforded have h is t o r ic a l ly  made th is
peripheral environment a source o f security  fo r  ind iv id u a ls .  Onerous
corvee and m i l i t a r y  service up u n t i l  the nineteenth century frequently
caused people to take to the fo rests  (Akin 1969 : 87; Chayan 1984 : 187
- 188; Withaya 1984 : 154), leading to ta ttoo ing  o f bonded men. Early
settlement o f  Bang Chan (now almost a suburb o f Bangkok) was by those
escaping corvee o b l ig a t io n s , since u n t i l  the 1890s
Bang Chan lay beyond the o rb i t  o f  government, i t s  
inhab itants  having 'headed for the woods {pai 
paa)' as e f fe c t iv e ly  as an escaped slave (Sharp 
and Hanks 1978 : 65).
While the corvee was s t i l l  in operation, the option o f f lee ing  to the
fo res ts  gave serfs {phrai)  some sanction on the demands o f th e ir
masters (naai ) ,  since excessive e xp lo ita t ion  would lead to an escape
to the forests  ( ib id .  : 82) a t a time when contro l over labour was more
important than contro l over land (Feeny 1982 : Chapter 6 ). However, the
fo res t offered a d i f fe re n t  source o f  security  once slavery and the
corvee had been abolished:
Once the wilderness had been a re tre a t fo r the 
d isa ffec ted  few. In the new social order the many 
more without a place in the productive scheme had 
to fend for themselves, and the wilderness offered
them a haven (Sharp and Hanks 1978 : 88).
Thus fo res t settlement to avoid control by higher a u th o r i t ie s  was p a r t ly  
replaced by migration in the search fo r means o f  subsistence a f te r  
displacements caused by in s t i t u t io n a l  changes a t the centre.
During the tw entie th  century, the fo rests  as a haven have 
continued to serve both these p o l i t i c a l  and economic functions. 
Disaffected groups took to the h i l l s  and forests fo llow ing  the outbreak 
o f armed h o s t i l i t i e s  between government forces and the Communist Party 
o f Thailand in August 1965. By the mid-1970s, bases had been
established in fo res t areas o f  most provinces, and these served to 
receive those flee ing  p o l i t i c a l  repression fo llow ing  the massacre a t 
Thammasat U n ivers ity  on October 6, 1976. The action o f escape was 
referred to most commonly as "khao paa : going into  the fo re s t" .
As an economic haven, fo res ts  have over the past century yielded 
sustenance mainly in the form of land to m il l io n s  o f  new s e t t le rs  (see 
sections I I I . l  and I I I . 2 above). Although population pressure has been
p a r t ly  responsible fo r th is  displacement, social and economic
displacement has also arisen as a re s u l t  o f  s tru c tu ra l changes. I t  is  
estimated tha t a t least one m i l l io n  rural households are tenants and 
h a lf  a m i l l io n  landless labourers (Chirapanda 1982 : 106), and the 30
per cent o f  farm households tha t th is  represents may choose to seek 
security  in fu r the r  fo res t settlement.
A f in a l  aspect o f  the fo res t haven is the aesthetic one. The 
fo res t as Buddhist re t re a t  has already been mentioned (section I I I , 3 , i  
above), and some fo res t monks have a ttrac ted  large urban lay fo llow ings 
in recent years. This can lead to construction o f  permanent roads, 
b u ild ing s , and other in f ra s t ru c tu re , leading to occasional c o n f l ic ts  
between certa in  sects and local a u th o r i t ie s .  In other cases, monks have
been instrumental in helping v i l l a g e rs  to preserve forest on upland 
watersheds whose destruct ion has been threatened by development 
pro jec ts . A more Western type of aestheticism is manifested in the 
establishment o f  several national parks, but here too there is  a 
c o n f l i c t  between preservation o f  - forest and i t s  opening up as a re t re a t  
for  urban dwel lers.
111,3,1V Forest sett lement and rura l  development
In t h i s  chapter, we have reviewed the process o f  fo rest
sett lement,  i t s  place in overal l  ag r icu l tu ra l  expansion since the 
opening up o f  the Thai economy, and the soc ia l ,  admin is t ra t ive ,  and 
p o l i t i c a l  contexts o f  forest sett lement. So fa r ,  the pattern o f  
settlement has appeared as a matr ix o f  in te rac t ions  between central
au th o r i t ie s  and peripheral populations. These in teract ions are an 
outcome o f  struggles fo r  control  by the groups involved. On the part  o f
the s ta te ,  the objects o f  control have been people and t e r r i t o r y ,  and
l a t t e r l y  economic surplus generated in peripheral regions. On the part 
of peripheral populat ions, the concern has been to maintain control  
a l te rn a t iv e ly  over t h e i r  own labour, physical sa fe ty , and means o f
sustenance. The most recent arena for in te rac t ion  in th i s  d ia le c t i c  is 
th a t  o f  ru ra l  development.
Rural development as directed change in rura l  areas is  na tu ra l ly  
concentrated in those areas in which the "developers" are most concerned 
with the need and potent ial  fo r  change. In the case o f  state
developers, a number o f  considerations are taken into account. As we
have seen in section I I , 3 , i i , there is a close l i n k  between 
development and "secur i ty "  considerat ions, i . e .  the maintenance o f
central ized control  over the p o l i t y .  Other considerat ions, p a r t i c u la r l y  
under the F i f th  Plan, concern reduct ion o f  regional income d isp a r i t ies  
and increasing e f f i c ie ncy  o f  resource use. These considerations combine 
to place the emphasis on peripheral areas, many of which are also areas 
o f  recent settlement.
246 poverty concentration d i s t r i c t s  are earmarked for special
a t ten t ion  during the F i f th  Plan. Most o f  these areas are peripheral to
the older areas o f  sett lement,  since:
In the select ion [ o f  the d i s t r i c t s ] ,  the pr inc ipal 
c r i t e r i o n  w i l l  be the actual physical areas, and 
not the income leve l .  There are two reasons fo r  
t h i s .  F i r s t l y ,  the concept using spat ial  
d is t in c t io n  w i l l  ass is t  in grappl ing with 
important causes o f  poverty concentration 
problems. Secondly, i t  is  necessary to solve 
poverty problems in the areas from where the 
problems o r ig ina te .  I f  the people are not 
urgent ly  assisted they have to f ind ways and means 
o f  l i v i n g .  The re su l t  has been the destruct ion o f  
natural  resources and migrat ion, both temporar i ly 
and permanently. (NESDB 1981 : 281)
The rura l  development measures undertaken in these areas are nominally
concerned with improving the welfare o f  the ma jo r i ty  o f  Thai land's rura l
poor who l i v e  in the ta rget d i s t r i c t s .  While there is no doubt that
many o f  the programmes are sincere ly  intended to f u l f i l  j u s t  th i s
purpose, i t  w i l l  be shown in th is  study tha t  th is  is  only one aspect o f
ru ra l  development as practised by state a u th o r i t i e s ,  tha t  i t  is  an
aspect tha t achieves only l im i ted  success, that cer ta in  measures are
pos i t ive ly  detrimental  even in terms set out by the developers, and most
important ly fo r  the present discussion, tha t  ru ra l  development
represents in one important respect a con t inu i ty  with past attempts to
gain control  in the power struggles between the centra l ized state and
peripheral populations.
I t  is  also necessary to note that most NGO projects are also 
located in peripheral areas. This is  due p a r t ly  to the recognit ion o f
the poverty o f  such areas, but i t  is also considered more pract icable to 
set up community schemes in v i l l a g es  less affected by urban inf luences. 
As we saw in the previous chapter,  NGO a c t i v i t i e s  are often oriented to 
increasing the bargaining power o f  the ru ra l  poor. While the government 
on the one hand welcomes the input o f  resources tha t  NGO schemes provide 
for such areas, i t  is  at the same time often suspicious o f  a l te rna t ive  
approaches in areas considered p o l i t i c a l l y  sen s i t ive ,  and th is  has 
produced another axis in the d ia le c t i c  o f  control  and power in 
peripheral areas.
Conclusion
The issues addressed in th is  chapter give a new perspective to 
the s i tu a t ion  o f  the Thai periphery, which has been equated with areas 
o f  ex is t ing  or recent ly  cleared fo res t .  Rural development in such areas 
is  a cont inuat ion o f  processes o f  a g r icu l tu ra l  expansion and
s o c io -p o l i t i ca l  change d iscern ib le  for more than a century.
Nevertheless, there is  a shortage o f  deta i led data on the process of 
in tegra t ion  o f  which rura l  development is the la te s t  manifestat ion, and
the need fo r  deta i led case studies has been noted (Uhl ig 1984 : 10).
The remainder o f  t h i s  thesis  presents the resu l ts  o f  one such study, 
based on two communities in a peripheral area o f  the Central Plains.
Par t ic ipa t ion  and rural  development are shown to be integral  to the 
d ia le c t i c  between centre and periphery referred to in t h i s  chapter.
N o t e s
1. In t h i s  way, the Thai f r o n t i e r  d i f f e r s  from tha t  elsewhere in
Southeast Asia. In his study o f  pioneer sett lement ,  Pelzer (1945) 
i d e n t i f i e d  large t e r r i t o r i e s  th a t  were f r o n t i e r  zones, notably Mindanao 
in the Ph i l ipp ines  and the Outer Islands in Indonesia. S im i la r l y ,
Cochin China was fo r  long a f r o n t i e r  zone in which Annamese and
Tonkinese pioneers se t t le d  (Scott 1976 : 67).
2. FAO/UNEP (1981 : 430 - 434) i d e n t i f y  5 categories o f  fo res t  in
Thai land, w i th in  which are 15 sub-categories. These are as fo l lo w s ,  
with t h e i r  extent (where es t imable) ,  lo c a t io n ,  and main c h a ra c te r i s t i c s  
noted:
CATEGORY
Closed
broadleaved
Open
broadleaved
SUB-CATEGORY
Trop ica l lowland 
evergreen
Semi-evergreen
ra in fo re s t
Dry evergreen
H i l l  evergreen
Freshwater swamp
Hangrove
Beach fo re s t
Lower mixed deciduous
Dry upper mined 
deciduous
Hoist upper mixed 
deciduous
Dry d ip terocarp
Savanna
Bamboo 
Coniferous 
Scrub form ation
EXTENT (ha) LOCATION
350.000 Far south peninsula
300.000 Rest of peninsula to  ll°N  and 5E below 1000 rc
3.900.000 W Tenasserim l i - 1 6 aN, N Phetchaboon, Dongphraya,
S edge and NE of Khorat P lateau, 3E, N near Laos
350.000 Above 700m in  North, N edge of Khorat Plateau 
Centre, south (mostly cleared fo r  n c e ia n d l
316.000 N, £ peninsula coast, d e lta ,  BE coast 
Sandy beaches along coast
Below 300m in  NE of N Thailand, S of Petchaboon
4.200.000 Above 300m in  Tenasserim N of 12°30 N, through 
f a l l  decidous) N to  Laos
Above 300s in  N ex tre m ity . E and N edges of Korai 
plateau
3.290.000 P la ins and ridges on poor s o i is  m NE, Upper C, N
3.150.000 Patches a l l  over on sandy, la t e r i t i c  s o iis
900.000 Khwae. Naeidonq watersheds, Ni>! border w ith  Burma
200.000 700-1,400m on sandy s o ils  and red loams in  N,NE,C
140.000 From l l aN northward in  peninsular coastal p la in
3. Estimates o f  fo rest area are problematic, depending on whether 
actual forested area or area c lass i f ie d  as forest is  considered. I t  is 
safe to say th a t  government f igures cons is ten t ly  overestimate forested 
area. G ir l ing  (1981 : 67n) quotes an estimate suggesting an increase in 
cu l t iva ted  land o f  4 per cent between 1950 and 1962, 1.6 per cent 1962 
to 1975, and 0.5 per cent 1975 to 1985, with a ha l t  to expansion 
fol lowing closing o f  the f r o n t ie r  by the mid-1980s. However, for 
reasons to be given below, the absence o f  land ide a l ly  suited to 
agr icu l tu re  does not in i t s e l f  prevent clearance fo r  c u l t i v a t io n .  This 
means tha t  there is no clearcut point at which the f ro n t ie r  can be 
regarded as closed.
4. However, there is evidence to suggest tha t  land settlement was 
f a c i l i t a t e d  fo r  some fami l ies  by access to slave labour. Ananya (1985 : 
88} describes how slaves helped in ear ly clearance of land in Theparaj 
and how once freed they went on to clear t h e i r  own land. Johnston (1975 
: 24 - 25) recognizes the ambiguous e f fe c t  o f  a b o l i t io n  of s lavery on 
new sett lement in at once freeing labour but at the same time both 
depriving potent ial  large scale c u l t i va to rs  o f  labour and depriving 
small scale c u l t i v a to r s  o f  t h e i r  only mortgagable secu r i ty ,  i . e .  the 
promise o f  bonded service, with which to raise the f inance for expansion 
o f  c u l t i v a t io n .  Decline o f  the corvee unambiguously favoured increased 
sett lement,  as did i t s  replacement by head taxes which required 
expansion o f  c u l t i v a t io n  for production o f  a marketable surplus.
5. Chonburi has acquired a reputat ion as the "Wild East" o f Thailand 
due to the level o f  v iolence associated with i n f lu e n t i a l  groups in newly 
sett led areas and elsewhere.
6. This i s  comparable to the s i tua t ion  described by Johnston (1975 : 
125), in which the i n i t i a l  low value o f  land along the Prawetburirom 
Canal led to i t s  o r ig ina l  owners leaving the land fa l low  fo r  several 
years fol lowing clearance. Such land would then be sett led and 
cu l t iva ted  by new claimants, resu l t ing  in subsequent land disputes as 
the land increased in value,
7. Johnston (1975 : 186f f . )  gives an account o f  the spread of pol ice 
au tho r i ty  in to  rura l  areas. This appears to have led more to a general 
"sense" of secur i ty  rather  than a demonstrable decrease in cr ime, as law 
enforcement was regular ized in place o f  the ad hoc m i l i t a r y  
suppression campaigns tha t  had previously dealt  with ru ra l  banditry .  I t  
is also suggested that banditry  in f r o n t i e r  areas was p a r t l y  a re su l t  o f  
suppression in more accessible areas o f  older sett lement,  suggesting 
tha t  enforcement displaces rather  than eliminates bandit ry.  The 
presence of fu g i t i v e s  from the law during the period o f  rapid settlement 
o f  Lan Sak to be described in the fol lowing chapter was a facto r  in the 
violence o f  th is  period.
8. Many recent ly  se tt led  forest areas are p o l i t i c a l l y  "sens i t ive "  due to 
th e i r  prox imity to zones o f  recent Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) 
inf luence. They are dist inguished from CPT held areas [khet daeng :
l i t .  red areas) and are a l te rn a t i v e ly  known as "khet saekseum :
i n f i l t r a t i o n  zones". Parts o f Lan Sak were c lass i f ie d  as such in the 
late  1970s.
9. Phasijaroen can be translated as "prosper i ty  from taxes" and 
Damnoensaduak as "convenient t ra v e l " .
10. Such a response is a classic Chayanovian response by the peasantry 
to hard times. Rather than cu t t ing  back on production with a f a l l  in
pr ices, le isure  time was sacr i f iced in order to maintain acceptable
subsistence leve ls .  This is  evidence in favour o f  a strong subsistence
or ien ta t ion  even among the r e la t i v e l y  commercialized Central Plains 
population at t h i s  t ime, and such an o r ien ta t ion  is supported by 
accounts given by e ld e r ly  v i l la g e rs  in Lan Sak o f  the rev iva l  of c ra f ts  
such as weaving during times of shortage during the depression and war 
years. The response was no doubt f a c i l i t a t e d  by the considerable scope 
remaining for expansion o f  r iceland in parts of Thanyaburi and on the 
west bank o f  the Chaophraya, despite more congested conditions in some 
older areas o f  sett lement. This contrasts with the contemporary 
s i tua t ion  in Burma (see Johnston 1975 : Chapter 9).
11. Demand for Thai r ice  was i t s e l f  due to a switch to cash cropping in 
colonial Asia. This resulted in a s h o r t fa l l  in r i ce  production in many 
countries where r ice  was the staple d ie t .  In add i t ion ,  r ice  was needed 
to feed the large migrant labour forces o f  p lanta t ion economies (see 
Johnston 1975 : 19 - 20).
12. The Rice Premium is an e f fe c t ive  tax on r i ce  that was f i r s t  
i ns t i tu te d  in 1955. Between 1955 and 1976, the premium provided the 
government with between 1 per cent and 17 per cent o f  i t s  revenues. The 
ch ie f  bene f i t  o f  the premium fo r  government has been to hold down
domestic r ice  prices and thus also urban wages. Various estimates show 
that farmers would receive anything from 23 to 85 per cent higher 
farmgate pr ices fo r  paddy were the premium to be removed, and there is 
widespread agreement among economists that the premium serves to
discourage in te n s i f i c a t io n  o f  r i ce  production and d i s t o r t s  ag r icu l tu ra l  
incent ives. The pr inc ipa l  bene f ic ia r ies  are state revenues and urban 
consumers, and as such the r i ce  premium represents a regressive resource 
t ransfer  from rura l  to urban populations. Between 1953 and 1963, for
example, the r ice  premium represented 60 per cent o f  the net f low o f
resources from the ag r icu l tu ra l  to the non-agr icu l tura l  sector (Feeny 
1982 : 113 - 114, 116; G i r l ing  1981 : 63; see also in p a r t icu la r  Ingram
1971 : 243 - 261 for arguments for and against the r i ce  premium and i t s
e f fec ts  v i s -a -v is  broader development stra tegy) .
13. The f i b re  crop kenaf, an in fe r io r  subst i tu te  fo r  j u t e ,  is used
mainly in making gunny sacks fo r  r ice  and other gra ins. I t  was promoted
in the Northeast in support o f  ind u s t r ia l i z a t io n  po l icy  from the 1950s
onward (Si lcock 1970 : 77 - 78).
14. Chin (1977) discusses several c la s s i f i c a t io n s  o f  sh i f t in g  
c u l t i v a t io n .  Many o f  these are evolut ionary in o r ien ta t ion  or 
d is t ingu ish  systems according to leve ls  o f  technology. However, the 
most s ig n i f i c a n t  d is t in c t io n  is  tha t  between what Conklin (1957) has 
cal led pa r t ia l  and integral  systems. Integral  systems are those that 
have developed over a long period o f  time and involve cu l tu ra l  and 
ecological adaptation o f  the sh i f t in g  cu l t iva to rs  to th e i r  environment 
in a non-destruct ive use o f  t rop ica l  fo rest land. Par t ia l  systems, on 
the other hand, involve c u l t i v a to rs  fa m i l ia r  with permanent f i e ld  
c u l t i v a t io n  and monocropping, who use so i ls  more d e s t ru c t i ve ly ,  since:
These are often areas where demand for land is 
great and there is  a tendency to tax the so i l  to 
the extent o f  permanent impoverishment. (Chin 1977 
: 109)
Of p a r t icu la r  in te res t  in Chin's survey is  the socio-economic o r ig in  o f
environmental damage im p l i c i t ,  for example in " in c ip ie n t "  s h i f t in g
c u l t i v a t io n  in Latin America. Here, the sh i f t in g  c u l t i v a to r
has l i t t l e  or no pr io r  knowledge of s h i f t in g  
c u l t i v a t io n  techniques and is usual ly forced to 
resor t  to s h i f t i n g  c u l t i v a t io n  as a re s u l t  o f
poverty and land hunger ( fo r  the better s o i l s ) .
This c u l t i v a t o r  is a product o f  the economic and 
social circumstances in the local or national 
community in which he l i v e s .  I t  is found that 
th is  kind o f  c u l t i v a to r  i s  most frequently  
destruc t ive  to the s o i l ,  ( ib id  : 109 - 110)
This l a t t e r  type o f  c u l t i v a t o r  most c lose ly  approximates poorer se t t le rs  
on steep land in Lan Sak.
15. Without water co n t ro l ,  r i ce  agr icu l tu re  in the Central Plains is  at 
the mercy o f  the elements. Whereas 1800 m i l l ime t res  o f  r a in f a l l  are 
needed for ideal c u l t i v a t io n ,  only 1000 to 1500 mi l l imetres  can be 
expected in the Central Plains (Johnston 1975 ; 4; Uthaithani commonly 
receives less than 1000 mi l l imet res  - see Appendix 3) .  Dependence on 
annual f looding by the Chaophraya River before construct ion o f  the
Chainat Dam was r isky  : o f  the 99 years to 1945, only 32 had
sat is fac to ry  water leve ls ;  in 30 years levels were too low; in 22 years 
they were barely s u f f i c i e n t ;  and in 15 years there were f loods (Pelzer 
1945 : 60). Varia t ions in f lood leve ls  have to some extent been evened 
out by the Bhumiphol and Chainat Dams (Donner 1978 : 223 - 225).
16. The word "theuan : i l l i c i t "  i t s e l f  o r i g i n a l l y  meant " fo re s t " ,
" jung le " ,  or "wi lderness" (MacFarland 1944). Modern usage and more 
recent d ic t iona ry  d e f in i t i o n s  re fe r  almost exc lus ive ly  to the metaphoric 
sense o f  the word.
17. "Songs for L i fe "  [phi eng pheua chi w it )  were popular among 
students and other rad ica l groups during the period 1973 to 1976. 
Following the coup o f  October 6, 1976, many o f  these songs were banned
and thus became associated with opposit ion to the government. Several 
o f  these have l a t t e r l y  been taken up by state developers and the i r  
connotations have been transformed by th e i r  new context.  Others remain
popular with students in a period characterized both by a more l ib e ra l
regime and less radical student population.
18. The f i r s t  discussions o f  land reform in Thailand in 1906 placed an 
emphasis on land co lon izat ion rather than re d is t r ib u t io n  (Johnston 1975 
: 379n) .
19. The ambiguity o f  purpose in road construct ion is matched
h is t o r i c a l l y  by ear ly  canal development. Johnston (1975 : 43n) notes 
the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  d i f f e r e n t ia t in g  p o l i t i c a l  and economic motivations o f  
government in such development.
20. Unt il  Chulalongkorn's admin is tra t ive reforms o f  1874, organizat ion 
o f  government m in is t r ies  was p a r t l y  on a t e r r i t o r i a l  rather than a 
funct ional basis (see e.g. Johnston 1975 : 6). The names o f  some
m in is t r ie s  s t i l l  r e f l e c t  th is  organizat ion For example Kaalahoom, or
Defence, was responsible for the Southern region and Mahaad Thai , or 
I n te r i o r ,  for the North (Akin 1969 : 66). G ir l ing  [ a f t e r  Tambiah] (1981 
: 30) re la tes th i s  to the t ra d i t io n a l  "cosmological design" of au thor i ty  
and admin is tra t ion, which involved a " to ta l i z i n g "  o f  re l ig io u s  and 
secular, c i v i l  and m i l i t a r y ,  as well as t e r r i t o r i a l  and func t iona l .  He 
shows how such a t t i tudes  have persisted up to the present despite
s t ruc tu ra l  reforms. Morel 1 and Chai-anan (1981 : 42f f .) character ize
operations o f  the Thai bureaucracy as a type o f  " in te rna l  colonia l ism".
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CHAPTER IV 
CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT IN LAN SAK
The place o f  development in overal l  change was discussed in 
Chapter I I ,  and th i s  was followed by an analysis o f  the re la t ionsh ip  
between development and the rura l  social formation in order to set out 
the s o c io -p o l i t i c a l  context for the present study. Chapter I I I  went on 
to examine the geographical context o f  the study in order to demonstrate 
the s ign i f icance o f  rural  development as the most recent manifestat ion 
o f  a h is to ry  o f  tensions between the Thai centre and periphery. The 
present chapter sets out the local context o f  change and the place o f  
development in th i s  change. A h is to ry  o f  sett lement of Lan Sak is 
followed by descr ip t ion  o f  the two v i l lages  under study. Certain 
aspects o f  change are then examined. F in a l l y ,  an account is  given o f  
the social formation in each v i l l a g e ,  and the local s ignif icance of 
development in overal l  change is  reviewed.
IV .1 The Context o f  Change
Although included in the Lower North region adm in is t ra t ive ly ,  
Uthaithani i s  geographical ly part  o f  the northwest f r inge  o f  the Central 
Plains. Bordering the Chaophraya River in the East, ju s t  below i t s  
emergence as the confluence o f  the Ping, Wang, Yom, and Nan Rivers that 
drain much o f  northern Thai land, Uthaithani r ises  westward into the 
mountains tha t  extend through Kanchanaburi and Tak Provinces into Burma 
(Figs. 4.1 and 4 .2 ) .  Unt il  1961, 73 percent o f  the province was covered 
by fo res t .  By 1982, fo rest cover was less than 43 per cent
1 t 4
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(Boonchana and Thongchai 1983 : 33), and deforesta t ion  continues apace. 
For many years, Uthaithani was known in surrounding provinces and 
fu r the r  a f ie ld  as a province o f  opportun i ty ,  where land was to be had 
v i r t u a l l y  for the taking. I t  also became known as a wi ld f r o n t ie r  area, 
where hazards to l i f e  and limb included malar ia,  wi ld animals, and la te r  
on murderous land disputes. Such were the land pressures in 
neighbouring areas, however, tha t  settlement has continued unabated. 
This was f a c i l i t a t e d  in no small part by the clearance o f  large areas of 
fo res t  under concession to the state-run Thai Plywood Company (TPC) and 
the construct ion o f  roads into a province tha t  as recent ly  as 1966 had 
no hard surfaced road outside the provincial  town and only 40 kilometres 
o f  a l l -weather  l i g h t  surfaced road, and that u n t i l  1978 could only be 
reached by road via a fe r r y  across the Chaophraya River at Manoram. By 
the mid-1980s, a bridge connects the Asia Highway (the main 
Bangkok-Chiang Mai road) with approximately 180 ki lometres o f  hard 
surfaced road and hundreds of ki lometres o f  a l l  weather gravel roads in 
the province (Fig. 4 .3) .
The e a r l ie s t  inhabitants o f  western Utha ithan i1 were Karen 
upland subsistence c u l t i v a to rs .  Lao2 s e t t le rs  were the e a r l ie s t  
lowland people to move into the area. The oldest Lao residents report  
that sett lement in Ban Rai dates from the forced migrat ion o f  prisoners 
of war associated with the defeat of Laos in the re ign of Rama I I I  in 
the ear ly  nineteenth century ( in  v i l l a g e rs '  words, to 'n  Itfeng Jan
taek : the oldest Lao resident to ld  me that his great-grandmother had 
come from Vientiane at t h i s  t ime). Early communities were only
semi-permanent. When someone died of sickness, the small community 
might move on to another part  o f  the fo res t ,  taking only what they could
"haab : carry across th e i r  shoulders on a pole".  The f i r s t  Lao
community in what is  now Lan Sak D is t r i c t  dates from the second decade 
of the twentieth century, and un t i l  the 1950s i t  consisted mainly o f  the
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settlement o f  th i r teen  famil ies at the si te o f  what is now Ban Dong. 
Lao and Karen coexisted mainly in separate communities, but in the case 
o f  one community, Ban I-Dang, in te rmarr ied .
Being Lao impl ies an e th n ic i t y  d i s t i n c t  from the Thai 
(lowlanders) or Karen (upland sh i f t in g  c u l t i v a to r s ) .  In the local 
context,  the Lao occupy an intermediate pos it ion ,  in having for several 
generations l ived an isolated existence in forest communities despite 
having roots in a lowland r i c e  cu l tu re .  Apart from l i n g u is t i c  and other 
cu l tu ra l  d is t i n c t io n s ,  Lao se t t le rs  appear to have developed a re la t i v e  
immunity to malar ia. This and a b i l i t y  to cope with other r igours o f 
forest  l i f e  helped to maintain th e i r  iso la t ion  from lowland Thais, whose 
fear o f  the fo rest was a factor  in h ib i t in g  large scale migration in the 
absence o f  great land pressures. Lao se t t le rs  planted r i c e ,  c h i l l i e s ,  
and other subsistence crops in small fo res t  clear ings. Land r igh ts  were 
according to usufruct,  and fo r  many years a f te r  sett lement land held no 
exchange value. The same held true for t imber, whose abundance and lack 
o f  exchange value prevented competit ive exp lo i ta t ion  o f  th i s  resource. 
Communications were by foot or ca r t  t rack ,  and trade was l im i ted to 
sale o f  fo rest products such as yaang o i l  (from dipterocarpus 
spp.) and skins in exchange for sa l t  and a l im i ted  number of other 
non-local goods. Trade was by bu f fa lo  cart  and carr ied out by lowland 
Thais. Clothes were made o f  c lo th  woven from home spun, home grown 
cotton. Rice was husked by foot pounding. W i ld l i f e  was abundant, and 
the Tap Salao River teemed with f i s h ,  so that there was no need to rear 
l ives tock  other than chickens fo r  meat. The v i l l a g e  leader had only 
occasional contact with the outside world, since to get to the d i s t r i c t  
administrat ion at Ban Rai involved a f u l l  week's round t r i p .  Decisions 
and rules were internal to the community.
In the 1950s the f i r s t  Thai settlement was established at Thung
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Khaa by ente rpr is ing se t t le rs  who came to make a l i v i n g  o f f  trade in 
yaang o i l ,  wh i ls t  maintaining subsistence plots in a s im i la r  fashion 
to the Lao communities. One o f  the e a r l ie s t  s e t t l e r s  became the de 
facto  leader (khon to)  of the community and he took in new se t t le rs  
"who hadn't  received j u s t ic e  ( i . e .  ent i t lement to land) from th e i r  
parents {mai dai rab khwaam yuthi tham jaak pho* mae)". The l o c a l i t y  
had previously been unoccupied apart from a small number o f  Karen, most 
o f  whom moved away into the h i l l s  with the in f lu x  o f  the Thais, and a 
few Lao. This community o f  about twenty famil ies was also r e la t i v e l y  
isolated : a t r i p  to the nearest market town, Nong Chang, took two to 
three days.
Pressures o f  land and increasing problems with lowland 
agr icu l tu re  led to a growing stream of Thai se t t le rs  from neighbouring 
d i s t r i c t s  and provinces in the 1960s. Sett le rs  were mainly landless or 
near landless farmers, or those whose land was in s u f f i c ie n t  in size or 
p roduc t iv i ty  fo r  the i r  chi ldren to make a l i v in g  on. With th is  in f lu x ,  
land sales commenced, a lb e i t  at  neg l ig ib le  pr ices. Foresight had led 
some Lao residents to claim areas o f  forest land which they la te r  
divided among the Thai s e t t le rs .  Likewise, cer ta in  res idents in Thung 
Khaa claimed areas o f  yaang fo rest land that they had worked (measured 
by number o f  trees rather  than by land area) and retained these fo r  
l a te r  sale to new migrants. As land took on value, a claim to a t r a c t  
depended increasingly  on a b i l i t y  to control  i t ,  and t h i s  meant wielding 
a certa in  amount o f  a u tho r i ty .  In order to do so "you must have a 
fo l low ing ,  or group o f  mates : to* ng m i i  phak m i i  phuak".
Nevertheless, despite increasing pressures fo r  new settlement and 
staking out o f  large t rac ts  by in f lu e n t ia l  ind iv idua ls ,  the pace o f  
sett lement remained gradual. Many older Lao residents complain now o f  
th e i r  lack o f  fo res ight 25 or 30 years ago in not staking out land, or
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in giving away land to early Thai s e t t le rs .  Few imagined that within  a 
short space o f  time land would take on such value, or that the 
landscape o f  t h e i r  community would be transformed from a clearing in the 
fo res t  to a c lus te r  o f  planted f r u i t  and coconut trees amid an otherwise 
v i r t u a l l y  tree less landscape dotted by scattered homesteads with th e i r  
own c lusters o f young trees.
The s ig n i f i c a n t  change came with the grant ing of a concession to 
TPC in 1970. This led both to a legal clearance o f  large areas o f  
hardwood fo rest for timber and a luc ra t ive  i l l e g a l  t imber trade ar is ing 
from abuse by subcontractors to the concessionnaires and from the 
su r rep t i t ious  trade in non-concession areas tha t  was now fa c i l i t a t e d  by 
the new timber roads. Where timber had no monetary value twenty years 
ago (many v i l l a g e rs  say they could cry when they th ink  o f  the timber 
they burnt in clear ing subsistence p lo ts ) ,  i t  soon acquired a value far 
in excess o f  the land i t  was standing on. Quick p ro f i t s  were made by 
employing landless se t t le rs  to extract the wood in exchange for promises 
o f  land at token prices or free.^  Clearance of forest by 
concessionnaires and others removed a major cons tra in t  to settlement,  
i . e .  the hos t i le  forest environment. This coincided with a time when 
crop d iv e r s i f i c a t i o n  was encouraged and prices fo r  maize and other f i e ld  
crops^ were buoyant, and when land shortages in the Central Plains 
and elsewhere were increasing. Moreover, deforesta t ion in the west of 
Uthaithani Province had started to cause problems o f  f looding^ and 
perhaps also o f  drought in the lowland eastern par t  o f  the province, 
reducing the p roduc t iv i ty  o f  r ice  agr icu l tu re  in Nong Kha Yang, Meuang, 
Tap Tan, and Nong Chang D is t r i c t s .  This started a v ic ious c i r c le  of 
environmental degradation, poverty,  migrat ion, and fu r the r  deforesta t ion 
that continues to the present. With a l l  these contr ibu t ing  fac to rs , i t  
is  hardly surpr is ing that such a spectacular rate o f  deforesta t ion has 
taken place : the f igures for Lan Sak would be even more dramatic than
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those province-wide were they ava i lab le ,  but the extent o f  deforesta t ion 
can be gauged from Fig. 4.4.
The period of heaviest migrat ion was the mid to la te  1970s. 
The year 1975-76 in Lan Sak saw a 37 per cent population increase from 
13,565 to 18,580, fol lowed by a 34 per cent r ise  the fo l lowing year to 
24,883. By 1979 the population was 32,505 (NSO 1980 : 8 - 9 ) ,  and
38,533 by 1981 (M in is try  o f  the In te r io r  1982). Many o f  the se t t le rs  
came from Nong Chang, Nong Kha Yang, and Tap Tan D is t r i c t s  in the same 
province, whi le others came from neigbouring provinces or from fur ther  
a f i e l d ,  in which case mainly from the Northeast. The vast ma jo r i ty  came 
in pursui t  o f  land. A combination of land a l ienat ion  ar is ing from 
commercialization o f  agr icu l tu re  and debt foreclosure, environmental 
degradation leading to drought and f looding, and population growth had 
forced many to uproot. Often s e t t le rs  came in groups, and on occasion 
whole v i l lages  or sections o f  v i l lages  transplanted themselves from 
Petchaboon and Northeastern provinces.
The period of rapid immigration during the mid-1970s was one o f  
v io le n t  land disputes. V i l lagers speak o f  a sing le month during th is  
period in which there were t h i r t y  murders in Lan Sak, out o f  a to ta l  
population o f  less than 20,000. Even o f f i c i a l  s t a t i s t i c s  show 128 cases 
o f  murder being brought to Uthaithani courts in 1976, mostly in the two 
western d i s t r i c t s ,  and th is  represents only a f ra c t io n  o f  the actual 
to ta l  (Uthaithani Provincial  Administration 1977). Disputes arose over 
the i n d i s t i n c t  land boundaries that had been established when land had 
l i t t l e  value, but which assumed importance once demand fo r  land and the 
timber on i t  pushed up the pr ice o f  both. Author i ty  is  the key to 
control over land, boundaries o f  which were sometimes demarcated by the 
sound o f  a gun f i re d  from a central  point in the fo re s t ,  s ign i fy ing  tha t  
whoever was with in  earshot was on that cla imant 's  t e r r i t o r y .  This area
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also served as a hideaway from the law, since state au tho r i t ies  were 
more or less excluded access to many v i l l a g es .  In f lu e n t ia l  people who 
ruled by the gun were known as " t ige rs "  (set/a). To be a stranger in 
someone e lse 's  t e r r i t o r y  was dangerous, and t h i s  served to re in force the 
cohesion and separateness o f  ind iv idual communities.^
As mentioned above, the government at t h i s  time had re la t i v e l y  
l i t t l e  control  over the area. Lan Sak was s t i l l  a tambon o f  Ban Rai 
D is t r i c t  u n t i l  1975 and only became a f u l l  d i s t r i c t  in 1981. In the 
Thung Khaa kamnan' s words, "by the time a death had been reported at 
the amphoe, a corpse would be ro t te n " .  Police were hardly seen in 
most communities, and un t i l  the late 1970s schooling only extended to a 
few v i l la g e s .  Rules were made and enforced by the community i t s e l f ,  
general ly through an i n f lu e n t ia l  person who may or may not have been 
formal ly  elected v i l la g e  head or kamnan. Early on, s e t t le rs  practised 
a subsistence economy, usual ly br inging with them enough r ice  to t ide  
them over the f i r s t  year and sometimes enough to exchange in bar ter for 
a parcel o f  land. Upland r ice  was planted i n i t i a l l y ,  along with f i e ld  
crops. W i ld l i f e  remained abundant un t i l  large scale forest clearance 
destroyed the natural  habi ta t o f  the larger animals.
Commercialization came both with the construct ion of roads by 
the Highways Department, the Agr icu l tu ra l  Land Reform Off ice (ALRO), 
TPC, and la te r  by v i l l a g e rs  themselves, and with the establishment o f  a 
market at Paak Meuang around 1980 by an in f lu e n t ia l  Chinese trader based 
in Uthaithani.  Meanwhile, th i s  same trader { l a te r  shot dead by a 
business r i v a l  in Lan Sak) provided land for establishment o f  the 
D is t r i c t  admin is tra t ive  headquarters a few ki lometres east o f  Paak 
Meuang, nearby which a pol ice barracks was b u i l t .  At t h i s  time, Lan Sak 
was c lass i f ie d  as a (Communist) " i n f i l t r a t i o n  zone" (khet saek seum) 
due to i t s  proximity  to Umphang D is t r i c t  in Tak Province, which gave the
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government an added in te rest  in establ ishing state con t ro l .
Settlement patterns were varied. The t ra d i t i o n a l  Lao settlement 
is  s im i la r  to that general ly  found in the Northeast o f  Thai land, a 
c lus te r  o f  houses with animals and implements kept under the house, and 
many o f  the f i e ld s  are located at some distance. I n i t i a l l y ,  many o f  the 
new Thai settlements fol lowed th i s  clustered pattern fo r  reasons o f  
secur i ty  and convenience in the common task o f  clearing areas o f  forest 
for subsistence c u l t i v a t io n .  However, with more complete clearance o f  
fo re s t ,  enlargement o f  a g r icu l tu ra l  holdings, reduced concerns about 
secu r i ty ,  and anxiety over f i r e  in the clustered sett lement,  houses were 
moved to near the owners' f ie ld s  in conformity with the t ra d i t io n a l  
pattern o f  sett lement in lowland Uthaithani and elsewhere in the outer 
Central Plains. Small c lusters  o f  settlement can often s t i l l  be 
not iced, but these tend to be extended family units or small groups o f  
se t t le rs  from the same area rather  than representing the en t i re  v i l l a g e  
or community with which the s e t t le rs  ide n t i f y .  L a t te r l y ,  th i s  tendency 
toward dispersal has been checked in some cases by a government po l icy 
o f  grouping houses together,  o f  which more below.
By 1985, v i r t u a l l y  a l l  but the steepest land of Lan Sak is  under 
c u l t i v a t io n .  Forest s t i l l  stands on the steeper mountainsides and in 
the TPC rea f fo res ta t ion  project at Rabam and the por t ion o f  the Huay Kha 
Khaeng w i l d l i f e  reserve ly ing  with in  Lan Sak. A teak stand near Paak 
Meuang stands iso la ted ,  having been pronounced sacred by a widely 
respected monk in Uthaithani,® a reminder o f the forest tha t  covered 
much o f  the area u n t i l  as l i t t l e  as ten years ago. Environmental 
degradation is evidenced in reduced ra in fa l l ,®  periodic  f looding such 
as tha t  in 1983 which caused loss o f  l i f e  and severe damage in Lan Sak 
and in the r icelands o f  lowland eastern Uthaithani,  so i l  erosion and 
g u l l y in g ,  s i l t a t i o n  o f  i r r i g a t i o n  channels, and poisoning of water
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sources by pest ic ides.
These chemical pest ic ides are now part o f  the necessary inputs in 
the a g r icu l tu ra l  regime predominating in Lan Sak. Approximately 50,000 
ra i  were given over to r ice  and 250,000 ra i  to f i e ld  crops in 
1984. O f f i c ia l  s t a t i s t i c s  show yields of r ice  to be nearly 40 
tang (420 kg.) per ra i  , but th is  estimate is almost ce r ta in ly  too 
high as much of the marginal r iceland was affected by drought. Yields 
o f  maize were put more r e a l i s t i c a l l y  at approximately 19 tang 
(300 kg.) per ra i  . Production costs for these two crops was put at 
800 and 750 baht per ra i  respect ive ly  (Lan Sak DAE Off ice 1985).
F e r t i l i z e r  use is encouraged by DAE but is  s t i l l  low, so most o f  the
inputs are seed, pest ic ides, hired labour, and hired machinery.
IV .2 Study v i l lages
Of 33 admin is tra t ive  v i l lages  in Lan Sak D i s t r i c t ,  two were 
selected fo r  deta i led study (Fig. 4.5).  Select ion o f  the v i l la g es  is 
explained in section 1.4 above. One is an extension o f  the early  Lao 
sett lement at Ban Dong, while the other is  an extension o f  the f i r s t  
Thai settlement at Thung Khaa. The f i r s t  represents a lowland 
sett lement based pr imar i ly  on wet r ice  a g r icu l tu re ,  a lb e i t  mostly 
ra in fed ,  with f i e ld  crops important but secondary to the v i l la g e  
economy. The second represents an upland sett lement whose ag r icu l tu ra l  
production is dominated by f i e l d  cropping and with few areas suited to
wet r i c e .  Other notable di f ferences include the nature o f  government
involvement in the two communities, th e i r  age, degree and nature o f  NG0 
a c t i v i t y ,  degree o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  r e la t i v e  importance o f  land and 
c a p i t a l ,  and re la t i v e  s ign i f icance o f  o f f - fa rm employment. S im i la r i t ie s  
include problems of leadership, fact ional ism and fragmentat ion, and
ar
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m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  o r ig ins  o f  the inhabitants. An examination of how these 
two v i l lages  have emerged, changed, and u l t im a te ly  been subject to 
" rura l  development" sheds l i g h t  on the place o f  development in such 
marginal areas more genera l ly.
IVt 2 J  Ban Dong
Ban Dong is an adminis tra t ive v i l l a g e  o f  approximately 300 houses 
located on the north bank o f  the Tab Salao River (Fig. 4.6). I t  
consists o f  a core sett lement o f  mainly Lao fa m i l ie s ,  whose residence
dates from the o r ig ina l  settlement which was located on the opposite
bank o f  the r i v e r ,  and several scattered communities o f  more recent Thai 
se t t le rs  tha t  at once maintain th e i r  own separate cohesion but
nevertheless i d e n t i f y  themselves with Ban Dong by v i r tue  o f  i t s  temple,
i t s  school, i t s  adminis tra t ive  and cer ta in  other func t ions ,  though th is  
id e n t i f i c a t i o n  decreases somewhat with distance and proximity to other 
admin is tra t ive v i l l a g e s . ^
Much o f  Ban Dong is le v e l ,  at an a l t i t u d e  o f  approximately 100 
metres above sea leve l .  A grani te  outcrop forms the core o f  a r idge and 
associated higher area o f  land in the West o f  the v i l l a g e ,  and f i e ld s  
r i se  gradual ly northward in a way that a f fec ts  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  the 
i r r i g a b i l i t y  o f  the r i ce  f i e ld s .
Unti l  the ear ly  1970s, sett lement was mostly near the Tap Salao 
River. A dry season ca r t  t rack made t h i s  one o f  the f i r s t  points o f  
contact for lowland traders,  but the Lao v i l l a g e rs  were v i r t u a l l y  
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  in food, c lo th ing ,  bu i ld ing  m a te r ia ls , and other basic 
necess it ies.  Around th is  t ime, s e t t le rs  mainly from neighbouring Nong 
Chang D is t r i c t  had begun to a r r ive  and to purchase land from the e a r l i e r
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se t t le rs  who had laid claim to large t ra c ts .  I n i t i a l l y ,  these new 
se t t le rs  were preoccupied with clearing s u f f i c i e n t  land for subsistence 
and surviving the hazards o f  forest l i f e .  Wild elephants were feared in 
p a r t i c u la r ,  and f i r e s  had to be kept burning at n igh t  to keep animals at 
bay. The task o f  c learing land was done communally. For these reasons, 
ear ly  s e t t l e r s  clustered th e i r  houses together,  even though th is  placed 
some at a considerable distance from the land that they had 
purchased, staked out,  or been given.
An example o f  one such c lus te r  that was la te r  to become a
community in i t s  own r i g h t  is Bung Khiew. This now scattered settlement
o f  approximately 40 houses is  located three ki lometres north o f  Ban Dong
temple. The e a r l i e s t  s e t t le rs  arr ived here approximately twenty years
ago from Wat Singh D is t r i c t  in neighbouring Chainat Province and Nong
Chang D is t r i c t  in Uthaithani.  These were followed l a t e r  mainly by Nong
Chang s e t t l e r s .  Host o f  the se t t le rs  had received l i t t l e  or no land
from th e i r  parents and some had previously been rent ing r ice land ,  paying
h a l f  t h e i r  crop in ren t .  Typ ica l ly  they would pay 100 to 200 b a h t ^  
l ?per ra i  fo r  fo rest land. Timber on the land would be used to 
construct a house, while the previous owner might have removed some o f  
the larger t rees,  p a r t i c u la r l y  in the case o f  l a te r  s e t t l e r s .  Most o f  
the larger trees would, however, be l e f t  on the land fo r  the f i r s t  few 
years o f  subsistence c u l t i v a t io n .  In the late 1970s TPC cleared the 
area o f  the remaining valuable t imber .13 Unt i l  Bung Khiew v i l la g e rs  
widened the track to accommodate l i g h t  vehicles in 1978, the settlement 
could only be reached by footpath. I n i t i a l l y  houses were clustered in 
two main groups. As the forest was cleared, however, s e t t le rs  began to 
move th e i r  houses closer to the i r  f ie ld s  according to the t ra d i t ion a l  
scattered pattern o f  sett lement. This has to do with the convenience o f  
c u l t i v a t in g  close by, r isks  o f  f i r e  in a clustered sett lement,  and 
subjective factors concerned with a desire for independence and a
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self-perceived ind iv idual ism commonly expressed as "cho‘ p isara : l i t .  
to l i k e  independence" and " t h i i  khrai  t h i i  man : l i t .  each to his/her
own" respect ive ly .  On the other hand, intermarriage within  the 
community has strengthened kinship l inks  and thus the social  cohesion o f  
Bung Khiew. V i l lagers  continue to use Ban Dong temple and school, and 
remain w ith in  i t s  admin is tra t ive boundaries, despite occasional moves to 
es tab l ish  a formal ly  separate community.
In 1976 communications between Ban Dong and Nong Chang, then the 
nearest large market, were improved by construct ion o f  an all -weather 
gravel road, and by 1985 t h i s  has been upgraded to a hard-surfaced road
tha t  runs as far as Paak Meuang. Ban Dong is  connected to th i s  road
across the Tab Salao River by a wooden bridge that is washed away in 
heavy f loods, or by a c i rcu i tous  route via the d i s t r i c t  headquarters. 
In 1983 the v i l l a g e  was e f fe c t i v e l y  cut o f f  by f loods,  except via a 
small r i v e r  f e r r y ,  for several weeks. Meanwhile, the dry-season track 
into Bung Khiew was improved by v i l l a g e rs  themselves in 1984, as was the 
small br idge leading into the sett lement. E l e c t r i c i t y  was extended to
Ban Dong in 1982 but does not yet reach Bung Khiew. A survey was made
in 1984, but v i l l a g e rs  cannot a fford  the 30 per cent o f  connection costs 
that they would be required to contr ibute . Ban Dong has had a temple 
since the early Lao sett lement,  but i t s  s i te  has moved and i t  has been
expanded. Ban Dong primary school was b u i l t  ,in the 1950s, and for long
i t  served many small communities as the only school in Lan Sak.
Ban Dong was o r ig i n a l l y  located in what was "preparatory forest
reserve" { t h i i  t r iam kaan paa sanguan), This meant that o f f i c i a l  1y
land was state-owned, but i t  is  a t ra d i t io n a l  feature o f  land ownership 
in rural  Thailand that ownership is  by usufruct or by staked claim. 
This is  rein forced by the co l lec t ion  o f  tax by the Land Department, 
often to the annoyance o f  the Forestry Department, whose forest reserve
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po l icy  is  undermined since tax receipts are treated as o f f i c i a l  land 
t i t l e  by the h o l d e r s . ^  in Ban Dong, land t i t l e  has more recent ly  
been upgraded to NS3, or exp lo i ta t ion  tes t im on ia l ,  which gives the 
holder r i g h t  o f  t ransfer  and therefore permits use o f  land t i t l e  deeds
as co l la te ra l  fo r  loans. In 1985, the f i r s t  Chanood ( f u l l  t i t l e  deed)
was granted in some parts o f  the v i l l a g e .  Land ownership is  uneven, and 
landless labourers, pa r t ia l  and f u l l  tenants comprise approximately 20 
per cent o f  the households. Average land ownership is  25 r a i .
Wet r i ce  agr icu l tu re  is  the mainstay o f  the v i l l a g e  economy, with 
subsidiary income from maize, m i l l e t ,  mung beans, and other f i e ld  crops. 
A port ion o f  the v i l l a g e  is  i r r iga ted  by a channel dug by early 
s e t t l e r s .  This d i rec ts  water from Paak Meuang weir,  which is 
constructed o f  logs and woven timber panels. A water committee 
maintains the weir and administers water d is t r ib u t i o n  in exchange for a 
fee based on i r r ig a te d  area and paid in r ice .  A few households obtain a 
dry season r ice  crop. However, most manage only a single r ice  crop,
some with a secondary crop o f  mung beans, and the ma jo r i ty  o f  these
depend e n t i r e l y  on r a in f a l l  fo r watering the i r  f i e ld s .  The whole of 
Bung Khiew, fo r example, is  in th is  pos it ion ,  despite several e f f o r t s  to 
d ive r t  i r r i g a t i o n  water. Higher land is used so le ly  fo r  f i e ld  crops. 
Buffalo are s t i l l  used for ploughing, although two-wheeled power 
t i l l e r s  (also known f i g u r a t i v e l y  as " khwaai lek  : i ron buffa lo"  or
onomatopoeical 1y as " ro t  i taek" )  and even four wheeled t rac to rs  are 
increasing ly in use. Threshing is  mostly by hand or using bu f fa lo ,  
although threshing machines are also becoming popular.
Apart from a g r icu l tu re ,  employment w ithin  the v i l l a g e  is  l im i ted .  
Only a few fam i l ies  depend e n t i r e l y  on non-agricu l tura l  incomes, and 
these are e i the r  t raders, a r t isans, or c i v i l  servants. On the other 
hand, many fam i l ies  earn a subsidiary income from occasional a c t i v i t i e s
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with in  the v i l l a g e ,  ranging from hairdressing to se l l ing  homemade 
sweets. Off- farm employment outside the v i l la g e  is  s t i l l  at  a low level 
and involves younger males fo r  the most par t ,  but t h i s  is  increasing not 
only due to the opportun it ies fo r  construct ion work in Bangkok and 
certa in  provinc ia l  towns, but also due to the decl in ing opportuni t ies 
for productive dry season a c t i v i t y  with local resource deplet ion. 
Another increasing employment trend is wage labouring in surrounding 
v i l l a g e s ,  mainly on larger farms and in some cases on sugar estates.
I V B a n  Mai
Ban Mai is  o f  a s imi lar size to Ban Dong. I t  is located 
approximately ten ki lometres southwest, at the foot o f  Khao Manora 
mountain, the beginning of the high mountain ranges (Fig. 4 .7) .  The 
prominent feature of Ban Mai's layout is  the g r id -pa t te rn  nucleated 
sett lement tha t forms the heart o f  the community and t e l l s  o f  the 
p a r t i a l l y  planned nature of settlement.  Meanwhile, scattered homesteads 
reveal the incompleteness o f  th i s  attempt at directed resett lement.
Ban Mai l i e s  a t  an a l t i t u d e  o f  approximately 200 metres above sea 
leve l .  The land is r o l l i n g ,  more level in the East but steepening 
toward the foot o f  the mountains and a t ta in ing  steep gradients near and 
on the mountainsides. Iluay Nam Wing stream runs past the v i l la g e  and 
drains the area into Huay Khok Khwai. Soils are sandy, general ly  o f  low 
to moderate f e r t i l i t y ,  and without tree cover they qu ick ly  lose the i r  
humic content.
Ban Mai is a more recent ly  sett led v i l l a g e  than Ban Dong. The 
longest standing res ident in the area is  an e lder ly  Karen, who moved 
from the nearby Karen v i l l a g e  o f  Ban I-Dang in 1960. Unt i l  1978, most
I SI
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of the area was s t i l l  under dense fo res t .  Small c lusters  o f  houses o f  
ear ly  se t t le rs  who had moved out from Thung Khaa, o f which Ban Mai was 
o r ig i n a l l y  an extension, were scattered in small c learings in the
fo res t .  The economy was based on yaang o i l  tapping and subsistence 
agr icu l tu re .  In 1978, the Agr icu l tu ra l  Land Reform Off ice (ALRO) chose 
Ban Mai as the s i te  for the f i r s t  stage o f  the Tap Salao Land Reform
Project ,  having fa i led  to persuade v i l l a g e rs  at the more established
settlement o f  Thung Khaa to accede to land reform. This involved
immediate clearance o f  the fo res t  by TPC contractors , leaving the area
with in  the land reform borders v i r t u a l l y  t ree less .  Deforestat ion has
since continued apace as land has been cleared beyond the ALRO area.
Following land reform, migrat ion into the newly cleared area was 
rapid. In addit ion to ghost transact ions (land sales to re la t ive s  to 
sa t is fy  land reform rules regarding individual land hold ings) ,  land was 
sold by i t s  previous "owners" to se t t le rs  from lowland Uthaithani and 
several provinces in the Central Region and the Northeast. I n i t i a l l y ,  
many s e t t l e r s  b u i l t  t h e i r  homesteads on or near t h e i r  ag r icu l tu ra l  
p lo ts ,  despite provision o f  separate home plots by ALRO in the 
gr id -pa t te rn  sett lement. Later, ALRO st ipulated that se t t le rs  must 
reside in th is  area, but whi le some complied others have resisted doing 
so, many going to the lengths o f  bu i ld ing token shacks on t h e i r  
al located p lo ts .
Unt i l  1978, dry season car t  tracks were the only means o f  
communication with the outside. With deforestat ion and land reform came 
f i r s t  the logging roads, fol lowed by a network o f  a l l -weather  gravel 
roads b u i l t  by ALRO, which o f  a l l  v i l lages  in the d i s t r i c t  made Ban Mai
phys ica l ly  one o f  the most comprehensively l inked with the outside
despite i t s  remoteness in terms o f  sheer distance. Flooding has on
occasion disrupted communications, p a r t i c u la r l y  in 1983, but ALRO
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maintains the roads at considerable cost.  E l e c t r i c i t y  came to the
v i l la g e  in 1982, bypassing many v i l l a g es  to make Ban Mai one o f  the
f i r s t  v i l lages  in Lan Sak to be e le c t r i f i e d .  Moreover, residents were 
exempted from the 30 per cent v i l la g e  connection charge, although 
individual houses have to pay fo r  connection from the mains, so that i t  
is  mostly the houses o f  wealthier residents which have been connected.
Before 1978, Thung Khaa temple served as a focal point for the 
scattered community, and there was also a small temple in an out ly ing 
forest sett lement.  The temple at Thung Khaa and the school there had 
been b u i l t  by v i l l a g e rs  at the ins t iga t ion  o f  the khon to (see section 
IV .1 above), who was la te r  to r e s is t  land reform. The school and temple 
in Ban Mai were established in 1978 a f te r  de fo res ta t ion ,  and in 1982 a
large concrete primary school was b u i l t  in the v i l l a g e  at a cost of 1.5
m i l l i o n  baht . A health sta t ion and the ALRO o f f i c e  l i e  on the edge o f  
the v i l l a g e .
A key feature o f  the ALRO pro ject has been d iv is io n  o f  the area 
into rectangular plots o f  24 ra i  each. Prior to land reform, the 
forested area had been "owned" mainly by Thung Khaa se t t le rs  who had 
staked a claim to the forest land and worked some o f  i t  fo r  i t s  yaang
o i l .  They had started to divide up some o f  these areas for sale by 
1978. On land reform, ALRO st ipu la ted a single a g r icu l tu ra l  plus house 
p lo t  per family and set land prices at 210 baht per r a i , 
i r respect ive  o f  the locat ion and q u a l i ty  o f  the land. ALRO loans were 
provided for land purchase and zinc roof ing. Subsequently, owners o f  
large t ra c ts  o f  land inv i ted  re la t ive s  and fr iends to sign t h e i r  names 
to p lo ts ,  without necessari ly having to come and work them. Other plots 
were in fac t  sold o f f  to the large number o f  se t t le rs  who were attracted 
by land reform, but ra re ly  at the pr ice s t ipu la ted ,  which was 
considerably below the market pr ice. As a r e s u l t ,  poorer se t t le rs  went
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into debt or forwent the r i g h t  to farm the i r  plo ts  u n t i l  the (covert ly ) 
agreed pr ice had been paid. Meanwhile, once the land had been cleared 
in the ALRO area, i l l e g a l  logging and land clearance beyond the
boundaries commenced, resu l t ing  in deforesta t ion  o f  many steep slopes on 
the mountains Khao lianora and Khao Hin Lek Fai.
An ALRO land t i t l e  can only be transferred by inheri tance or with
the approval of ALRO. This means tha t  i t  cannot be used as co l la te ra l  
on commercial bank loans or be bought and sold f re e ly  on an open land 
market, although the deed can be used as co l la te ra l  on loans from the
Bank for Agr icu l tu re  and Agr icu l tu ra l  Cooperatives (BAAC).
Except fo r on low-lying land to the east o f  Ban Mai and in
g u l l ie s  where water can be held back, wet r ice  farming is  not
pract icab le. The f i e ld  crops grown are maize, mung beans, soya beans, 
tapioca, sorghum, cotton, and to a lesser extent groundnuts, castor ,  and 
sugar cane. Despite the s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  much o f  the area for tree 
c rops ,15 on 1 y a few scattered banana groves break the pattern of
annual f i e l d  cropping.
The nature of f i e ld  cropping has changed d ra s t i c a l l y  since
deforestat ion. Planting in a fo rest or immediate post- fo rest
environment requires few inputs.  Ploughing is unnecessary since the 
soi l is  soft  and a hoe su f f ices .  Weeds and insects tha t  a f fe c t  
monocropped annuals are general ly  not part o f  the forest habita t or 
intercropped f i e ld s  in forest  c lear ings, and under fo res t  cover the
humic replenishment o f  the soil  renders a natural  f e r t i l i t y .  The
re la t i v e  absence of weeds and the lengthy ra iny  season in a fo rest 
environment, moreover, allows f l e x i b i l i t y  in t iming o f  p lan t ing ,  which 
means that family  labour or reciprocal labour exchange predominates. 
However, once th is  environment changes, so i l  hardens under the impact o f
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ra in ,  pests f ind l i t t l e  competit ion in the absence o f  the fo re s t ,  so i l s  
qu ick ly  lose th e i r  f e r t i l i t y ,  and the ra iny season is shortened. As a 
r e s u l t ,  cropping requires increasing inputs, inc luding hired labour, 
while y ie lds decline s ig n i f i c a n t ly .  In Ban Mai, th is  has affected 
poorer farmers the most, fo r  they have to h ire  t rac to rs  fo r  ploughing 
and obtain pest ic ides and sometimes f e r t i l i z e r s  on high in te res t  c re d i t .  
At the same t ime, they are most l i k e l y  to take up wage labouring 
oppo r tun i t ies .
Most f i e ld s  in Ban Mai are ra in fed. The exceptions are where 
r ice  is planted in stream g u l l i e s  and adjacent to a community f ish  pond 
b u i l t  by ALRO, from which water can be pumped in case o f  drought. In 
1985 - 86 ALRO constructed a small dam above the v i l l a g e ,  which might 
eventual ly  serve a l im i ted i r r i g a t i o n  feeder system, at a cost o f  
several m i l l i o n  baht.  In add i t ion ,  ALRO provides a land level ing 
service and removes tree stumps from the f i e ld s  to f a c i l i t a t e  ploughing 
by t r a c to r .
Tractors are now used for ploughing on every p lo t .  A few owners 
h ire  out t h e i r  t ra c to rs ,  often recouping th e i r  cap ita l  out lay in less 
than two years. Planting is done by hand, mostly using hired labour, 
although rec iprocal  labour arrangements are s t i l l  in pract ice among 
poorer households. The same holds true for harvest ing, whi le threshing 
and m i l l i n g  are now mostly by machine.
Full time non-agr icu l tura l  employment in Ban Mai is  l im i ted to a 
few r e t a i l  t raders, pickup owners, and salaried o f f i c i a l s .  Occasional 
work with ALRO is  avai lable  at minimum wage ra tes ,  which are nearly 
double the normal farm labour ra te .  I l l e g a l  fo res t ry  by in f lu e n t ia l  
local timber traders provides another source o f  local employment. Petty 
trade provides a small income fo r  many v i l la g e rs  : there are now 15
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shops in the v i l l a g e ,  and in addi t ion homemade sweets and services such 
as hairdressing provide a small supplementary income. Non-local 
o f f - fa rm  employment is  much more common in Ban Mai than in Ban Dong. A 
large number of young people f ind work on construct ion s i tes  and at 
fac to r ies  in Bangkok, e i ther  during the dry season or year round. 
Increasingly ,  whole fam i l ies  are rent ing out t h e i r  land to wealthier 
v i l la g e rs  and seeking urban employment, due to debt ob l iga t ions  and lack 
o f  cap ita l  to plant t h e i r  own land. Several men from Ban Mai are 
working in the Middle East on two year contracts.
IV .3 Aspects o f  change
I t  is  apparent from the above account that Lan Sak as a whole and 
these two communities in pa r t icu la r  have undergone recent and rapid 
change. In discussing change in recent ly  sett led communities, i t  is 
useful to d is t ingu ish  between i n t r i n s i c a l l y  local aspects, i . e .  change 
tha t  has affected pre-ex is t ing phenomena (notably environment and facets 
o f  the pre-ex is t ing  community), and the non- loca l ly  bound change that 
has affected the substant ial  proport ion o f  these communities that has 
i t s  o r ig ins  elsewhere. The fol lowing discussion concentrates on the 
former aspects, although the l a t t e r  are considered inasmuch as they 
a f fe c t  the present community more genera l ly.
IV> 3 Environment
The most v i s ib le  element o f change in Lan Sak has been 
environmental change, in pa r t icu la r  deforestat ion. This has affected
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not only the immediate v i c i n i t y  o f  the study v i l lages  and other 
deforested areas. I t  has also had s ig n i f i c a n t  "downstream" e f fec ts  in 
terms o f  factors rela ted to water con t ro l ,  and also possibly "downwind" 
e f fec ts  in terms o f  cl imate.
According to the reports o f  ear ly  s e t t l e r s ,  r a i n f a l l  in Lan Sak 
before deforestat ion was f a i r l y  consistent and extended over more months 
of the year than i t  does now. Maize planting in Ban Mai eight years ago 
took place in February or March and in Ban Dong r ice  f i e ld s  were ready 
fo r  transplant ing by June or July each year. Drought was unknown. The 
a l lu v ia l  so i ls  o f  the eastern lowlands of Uthaithani have been worked 
as rainfed r i c e f ie l d s  fo r  many generations, suggesting tha t  r a i n f a l l  was 
once s u f f i c i e n t  for regular r ice  plant ing.
Deforestat ion has caused a radica l change in the r a i n f a l l  regime. 
Local ly ,  r a i n f a l l  is  now inconsistent and extends over a shorter period. 
Maize plant ing in Ban Mai in 1984 took place in Apri l  and May, as is  now 
normal, and r i ce  in rainfed f i e ld s  in Ban Dong was not planted un t i l  
September in many cases. As a r e s u l t ,  ag r icu l tu re  has become a marginal 
and r i s k y  a c t i v i t y  where previously there was a great deal more 
ce r ta in ty .  Meanwhile, many f i e ld s  in Nong Kha Yang D is t r i c t  have la in  
idle for a number of years pa r t ly  due to drought, suggesting tha t  
overal l  r a in f a l l  has decreased over a wider area than that subjected to 
de fo res ta t ion .
The reasons fo r  decreased ra in f a l l  are broadly twofo ld. F i r s t ,  
loss o f  t ree cover increases albedo, resu l t ing  in a loss o f  the cooling 
e f fec t  that leads to condensation, cloud formation, and r a i n f a l l .  
Second, loss o f  t r a n s p i r a t io n , whereby trees return water d i r e c t l y  to 
the atmosphere, resu l ts  in a decrease in re la t i v e  humidity and thus less 
water avai lable fo r  condensation and r a i n f a l l .  The f i r s t  o f  these
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factors has mainly local e ffec ts  and explains the high degree o f  local 
va r ia t ion  in r a i n f a l l  that can now be observed. 16 j | ie second has both 
local and "downwind" e f fe c ts ,  p o te n t ia l l y  decreasing the amount of water 
that f a l l s  as ra in in eastern Uthaithani.  I t  must be noted also that 
th i s  area is  suscept ible to reduced r a i n f a l l  due to i t s  ra in shadow 
loca t ion ,  making i t  p a r t i c u la r ly  dependent on recyc l ing o f  moisture that 
has fa l le n  as ra in  over the mountains to the west (Fig. 4 .8) .
In addi t ion to an altered r a in f a l l  regime, deforestat ion has also 
resulted in changed runof f  patterns. Not only did trees increase the 
amount o f  water returned to the atmosphere; they also delayed the rate 
at which water ran o f f  the so i l  and into streams and r i v e rs .  Water was 
thus held in the so i l  fo r  a much longer period of t ime, and entered the 
streams mainly as groundwater. This led to a r e l a t i v e l y  regular ra te  o f  
streamflow, with minor seasonal va r ia t ion .
Deforestat ion has g rea t ly  increased the proportion o f  r a in f a l l  
enter ing streams as surface runo f f .  Streams tha t  used to f low 
year-round are now dry for several months o f  the year. Even the Tap 
Salao River is reduced to a t r i c k l e  in the dry season, causing problems 
for the Tap Salao i r r i g a t i o n  pro ject  in Nong Chang D i s t r i c t  to the east, 
although th is  is  also pa r t ly  due to local i r r i g a t i o n  channels upstream 
and the pervious nature o f  the sandy r i v e r  bed. On the other hand, 
f looding has become a major hazard, since trees and fo rest so i ls  no 
longer i n h i b i t  immediate runo f f  by absorbing r a i n f a l l .  In 1983, loss o f  
l i f e ,  crops, and l ivestock was widespread in Lan Sak and downstream. 
This is  another fac to r  leading to abandonment o f  r ice lands in Nong Kha 
Yang and Meuang D is t r i c t s ,  which is  in turn a cause o f  migrat ion and 
fu r the r  d e fo re s ta t io n .17 A pos it ive  aspect o f  hydrological change 
associated with deforestat ion in both Ban Dong and Ban Mai is  a r ise  in 
the water table fo r  most o f  the year, resu l t ing  in more accessible well
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water.
Forest so i ls  are productive as long as they are maintained with a 
humus input.  Immediately fo l lowing de fo resta t ion , so i l s  appear f e r t i l e ,  
and in some parts o f  Lan Sak they have maintained th e i r  f e r t i l i t y  in 
part  by manure from draught animals (mainly bu f fa lo )  and in part  due to 
a natural  r e la t iv e  f e r t i l i t y  and low gradients on lowlands immediately 
adjacent to the Tap Salao River,  such as at Ban Dong. For the most 
par t ,  however, s o i l s  are o f  low f e r t i l i t y  and are f r a g i l e .  In Ban Mai 
and some higher parts of Ban Dong, soi l  erosion is  evident in gu l ly ing  
and washing away o f  to p s o i l s ,  whi le reduced y ie lds reveal the rapid loss 
o f  f e r t i l i t y  resu l t ing  from mono-cropping on such so i ls .  Meanwhile, 
f looding fu r ther  east in Uthaithani has deposited i n f e r t i l e  s i l t  on the 
previously f e r t i l e  a l luvium, and soi l  erosion has also led to s i l t a t i o n  
o f  the Tap Salao weir ,  which is  the d is t r ib u t io n  point fo r  the 123,000 
ra i  i r r i g a t i o n  pro ject in Nong Chang D i s t r i c t .  E lder ly  residents o f  
Ban Dong and Ban Mai also a t te s t  to the s i l t a t i o n  o f  local  streams since 
de fo res ta t ion .
I t  is  apparent that environmental change with deforestat ion has 
had detrimental  e f fec ts  on the natural  resource base for ag r icu l tu re ,  
both lo c a l l y  in Lan Sak and more general ly in Utha ithan i ,  and th is  has 
led to a v ic ious c i r c le  o f  environmental de te r io ra t ion  and migrat ion. 
More and more, external resources are required in compensation : dams 
and i r r i g a t i o n  projects for f lood control  and r ice  a g r icu l tu re ,  chemical 
f e r t i l i z e r s  fo r  soi l  f e r t i l i t y . 18
IV ^ 3 J i  Resource s i tu a t io n
14?.
Land r igh ts  have changed from i l l e g a l  but l o c a l l y  recognized 
control  over i n d e f i n i t e l y  demarcated p lo ts  o f  mainly forested land to 
various forms o f  state guaranteed contro l .  In Ban Dong, NS3 and Chanood 
c e r t i f i c a te s  leave the ind iv idual owner with freedom to use and dispose 
of land as he or she wishes, whi le in Ban Mai ALRO re ta ins  a s ig n i f i ca n t  
element o f  control  over disposal o f  land. Outside the ALRO area, fo rest 
reserve land has now been claimed by in f lu e n t ia l  ind iv idua ls  and is in 
the process o f  being parcel led out and sold o f f  cheaply to small 
farmers, some o f  whom have also worked as i l l e g a l  foresters fo r these 
1andowners.
I r o n i c a l l y ,  the freedom to dispose o f  land in Ban Dong has led to 
only l im i ted  concentration o f  land holdings to date, whereas in Ban Mai 
the e f fe c t ive  concentration o f  control over land (inasmuch as i t  was 
ever ac tua l ly  relinquished) has been much more not iceable,  a lbe i t  
through in d i r e c t ,  covert and therefore less v i s ib le  means. This point 
is  o f  in te res t  in that i t  demonstrates the importance of power 
re la t ionsh ips  based on other than state guarantees or free market 
exchange in determining control  over resources, even in a community tha t  
has been affected to an unusually high degree by in t rus ions o f  state and 
ca p i ta l .  This w i l l  be discussed fu r the r  in fo l lowing chapters.
Before large scale deforestat ion and extension o f  roads into the 
area, the u t i l i t y  o f  forests  in Lan Sak was l im i ted  to t h e i r  local use 
value. This included timber fo r  local construct ion, charcoal,  herbs 
that were used as medecines, the f i s h  and w i l d l i f e  tha t  were part o f  the 
forest hab i ta t ,  and assured r a i n f a l l .  Certain items o f  exchange value 
were obtained, notably yaang o i l  and animal skins, but these l e f t  
t h e i r  exp lo i te rs  with an incentive to maintain the fo res t  for sustained 
natural  production o f  what were v i r t u a l l y  the only sources o f  cash 
income. In the words o f  one early  s e t t l e r ,  they refra ined from clearing
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land for other than subsistence crops because they were "huang ton 
yaang : concerned for the yaang trees" since clearing would expose the 
fores t  to f i r e  and threaten th e i r  pr inc ipal  l i ve l ih o o d .  Forest was an 
open resource, but i t s  sheer abundance and lack o f  exchange value 
prevented competit ive use. The only pr ivate  control  over th i s  resource 
was the control  over yaang t rees established by p r io r  claim.
Granting o f  concessions at once made th i s  resource scarce and 
opened up the fo rest fo r  a v i r tu a l  free fo r  a l l  exp lo i ta t ion  in a 
c lass ic  " tragedy of the commons" s i tua t ion  (Hardin 1968; see Panayotou 
1983 : 53 - 55}. Those who may previously have had a stake in
maintaining fo re s t ,  and in any case had l i t t l e  opportun ity  to exp lo i t  i t  
other than fo r  what i t  could produce replenishably, now had both the 
incent ive ( to  make what they could before TPC got to i t )  and the means 
(roads) to make quick p r o f i t s  from timber. The Forestry Department now 
maintains r ig h ts  over both timber in fo rest reserve areas and that 
remaining on p r iva te ly  owned land. However, i n f lu e n t ia l  local people 
and even agents o f  the state ( p a r t i c u la r ly  the local police) continue to 
make p r o f i t s  from i l l e g a l  timber exp lo i ta t ion .
Other than for t imber, fo rest is  also exploi ted fo r  charcoal. 
Previously, wood was abundant on individual plots in both v i l lages .  
However, more complete clearing o f  f ie ld s  fo r  commercial cropping has 
removed th is  source o f  household fue l .  Many households in Ban Dong now 
need to buy t h e i r  charcoal,  and most Ban Mai plots w i l l  be devoid of 
stumps with in  a couple o f  years. This leads to burning of the forest  
f r inge ,  both for household use and as a source o f  cash income for those 
without a l te rna t ive  means o f  subsistence. Thus resource shortages in a 
lowland v i l l a g e  such as Ban Dong in te ns i f ie s  the fo res t  exp lo i ta t ion  in 
more recent ly  deforested areas such as Ban M a i . ^
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Before deforesta t ion  and commercialization o f  a g r icu l tu re ,  inputs 
were minimal and yields were high. The land and associated forest 
resource i t s e l f  provided a l l  tha t  was necessary fo r  c u l t i v a t io n  but the 
labour and seed, the former general ly  family or reciprocal labour, the 
l a t t e r  kept over from the previous year 's crop. With the radical change 
in the ag r icu l tu ra l  regime that has taken place, however, these 
resources are no longer avai lable nor s u f f i c i e n t  and most inputs must 
now be purchased, p a r t i c u la r l y  in Ban Mai f i e ld  cropping, to a lesser 
extent in Ban Dong r ice farming. Most food protein must now be 
purchased, espec ia l ly  in Ban Mai, the majo r i ty  in both v i l la g es  coming 
from pork raised by r i c e  m i l l  owners and some farmers.
Another resource previously avai lable and contro l led  lo c a l l y  was 
knowledge o f  a more or less stable environment, as evidenced by the
deta i led forest  knowledge o f  the longer term residents.  Such knowledge
is  less often recognized as a resource important for production, but
l i k e  resources tha t  can be applied or consumed more d i r e c t l y ,  th i s  too
has been exhausted ( in terms of relevance) in Ban Dong and Ban Mai. 
This has given way to numerous uncer ta in t ies associated with the new 
inputs and technical knowledge tha t  are a part  o f  the environmental and 
agronomic change.
The common element in a l l  these changes in the resource s i tua t ion  
is  the loss o f  local control in favour o f  dependence on external ( i . e .  
non-local)  inf luences. In the case of land r ig h ts ,  fo re s t ry ,  
ag r icu l tu ra l  inputs, knowledge, and other resources a f fec t ing  
production, the rapid environmental and agronomic change and the 
increased ro le  o f  state and capita l  in these two v i l la g es  have placed 
the whole question o f  resource management outside the capab i l i t y  o f  
pre -ex is t ing  local i n s t i t u t i o n s  to cope with.
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IV A3 j ' i i  Production
A key element o f  peasant subsistence production such as that
preva i l ing in the communities of Ban Dong and Ban Mai before
deforesta t ion is the undi f fe rent ia ted nature o f  the subsistence sector. 
Even in the exchange sector ( in th is  case yaang o i l  and other forest  
products), production by ind iv idua ls  varied more in terms of quant i ty
than in terms o f  economic funct ion. Household labour was used in both
cases, rec iprocal  exchange labour in subsistence production, while trade 
was carr ied out by outsiders who brought th e i r  exchange goods by ox-cart  
to the v i l la g e s .  This did not mean an und i f fe ren t ia ted  community : 
d i f f e r e n t i a l  control  over family labour and over yaang trees in the 
case of Ban Mai led to d i f fe rences in economic status. However, these 
inequa l i t ies  were based on d i f f e r e n t i a l  access to cer ta in  resources, and 
not on d i re c t  commoditization o f  labour or other unequal exchange or 
production re la t ions  within the community. Dif ferences in status were 
associated with social  power posit ion with in  the community, but only 
la te r  were these to have a d i r e c t  bearing on the production process.
A t ra n s i t io n a l  period can be iden t i f ied  when ag r icu l tu ra l  
production took on a secondary ro le  to fo res t ry  and land sales as the 
dynamic o f  the local economy, although c lea r ly  th i s  benef i ted d i f fe re n t  
groups fa r  from equal ly.  During th is  period, those with the authori ty  
to lay claim to large areas o f  land enhanced th e i r  posit ions 
considerably through a combination of i l l e g a l  fo re s t ry ,  subcontracting 
for TPC, and se l l ing  o f f  land to new s e t t le rs .  Meanwhile, the l a t t e r  
together with less i n f lu e n t ia l  members o f  the older communities 
continued to make a subsistence l i v in g  in a de te r io ra t ing  environment 
and to take on wage labouring jobs in fo res t ry  in some cases.
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As has been described above, deforesta t ion and a c ce ss ib i l i t y  
afforded by the new roads has transformed the ag r icu l tu ra l  regime. 
Pa r t i cu la r l y  in Ban Mai, cash cropping is now predominant. Unlike the 
s i tua t ion  o f  the previous v i l l a g e  economy, d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  is  r i f e  under 
commercialized a g r icu l tu re .  Tractor owners, shop owners and creditors  
in Ban Mai now contro l  most sectors o f  the v i l l a g e  economy by provision 
o f  inputs and marketing of produce in the i r  s tra teg ic  posit ion as 
intermediar ies between cap i ta l  ( in  the form o f  suppl iers and commodity 
markets) and peasant product ion. Increasingly,  they are taking d i rec t  
control over production by h i r ing  labour to work land over which they
have secured contro l .  This is  accomplished e i ther  by e f fec t ive
foreclosure o f  debtors' land (nominally temporari ly but usual ly for 
several years and sometimes open ended) or by rent ing land of those 
without access to c re d i t  and equipment to produce, and who therefore 
have no a l te rna t ive  but to rent out land at a going rate o f  100 baht 
per r a i  .
In Ban Dong, commoditization o f  labour has been less complete, 
due in part to the importance o f  r i ce  as both a subsistence and cash 
crop and the lower inputs necessary fo r  production. Debt foreclosure is 
leading to a certa in  amount o f  land concentrat ion, however, and r i s in g  
land prices are in h ib i t in g  young farmers from buying land, which is sold 
o f f  in some cases to outsiders who e i ther  rent out the land fo r  cash or 
under sharecropping arrangements, in the case o f  r ice land ,  or plant 
sugar cane on higher land.
Production in both communities is  thus increasing ly  outward
oriented. Control over production is  e f fe c t i v e ly  in the hands o f  those
con t ro l l ing  commodity pr ices and factors o f  production, and these tend 
increasingly to be in f lu e n t i a l  members o f  the community as well as
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outs iders. Moreover, these intermediaries assume new so c io -p o l i t i c a l  
posit ions as st ructures and the funct ional ro le  o f  leadership undergoes 
change.
IV,3,1V Leadership
Ban Dong has had formal ly  appointed, and la te r  elected, v i l l a g e  
heads for some time. In Ban Mai, the v i l la g e  head has only adopted his 
formal pos it ion since land reform. Before that the khon to in Thung 
Khaa commanded au thor i ty  and respect,  as did lesser khon to in smaller 
out ly ing communities. Nevertheless, despite the more c learcut break in 
Ban Mai from inward or iented, community established leadership, to 
formal,  ex te rna l ly  or iented leadership when compared with an apparent 
con t inu i ty  in Ban Dong, the ro le  o f  the v i l l a g e  head or kamnan in the 
la t t e r  has ac tua l ly  undergone some s im i la r  changes.
Ban Dong un t i l  the 1970s was remote from the d i s t r i c t  
headquarters. As a r e s u l t ,  the v i l la g e  head or kamnan ra re ly  
t rave l led  to the Ban Rai d i s t r i c t  seat, and l ikewise d i s t r i c t  o f f i c i a l s  
and pol ice ra re ly  had occasion to v i s i t  Ban Dong. This meant that the 
leader, despite being formal ly  appointed, was answerable f i r s t  and 
foremost to the community o f  which h e ^  was a par t ,  and would be 
seen as the community's spokesman in dealing with the adminis tra t ion. 
In one instance, Ban Dong v i l l a g e rs  ac tua l ly  successfu l ly  pet i t ioned for 
the removal from o f f i c e  of a kamnan who was embezzling re g is t ra t ion  
fees. With state led rural  development in the form of increased 
access ib i l t y  due to road bu i ld ing  followed by designat ion of Lan Sak as 
a s u b -d is t r i c t  and then NESDB p r i o r i t y  d i s t r i c t  under the F i f th  Five 
Year Plan, contact between the v i l la g e  and the administrat ion has
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increased, and the kamnan has served as the pr inc ipa l  intermediary. 
As ru ra l  development funds have been channelled into the area, so 
opportun i t ies  fo r  self-enrichment by v i l la g e  leaders have increased, 
using funds tha t  have come from outside and thus also outside the 
sanction o f  the community.22 point has been reached where the
kamnan is seen p r in c ip a l l y  as an agent o f  the d i s t r i c t  administrat ion 
in the community, with substant ial  mater ial  in te res ts  in maintaining 
tha t  p o s i t io n .23 Meanwhile, his family  economic in te rests  extend far 
beyond Ban Dong, including ownership o f  an a ir -cond it ioned restaurant 
and a construct ion business in the provincia l  town 50 kilometres 
d is tan t .
Ban Mai, meanwhile, remained isolated longer and more completely. 
The khon to referred to above resisted land reform and associated 
roads : in his words, "you can have roads or you can eat r i ce  : j a  m i i  
thanon reu j a  kin khao' \  an a l lus ion to the cu l t i va b le  land that roads 
destroy. He was the undisputed au thor i ty  in the area, and th i s  he 
established by a combination of patronage (e.g. by helping se t t le rs  to 
establ ish themselves as yaang o i l  tappers),  fear (e.g. by a sanction 
o f  violence in the case o f  infringement o f  s t r i c t  ru les  against gambling 
and other unruly behaviour), and respect (e.g. by organizing v i l lage rs  
to bu i ld  the local school and temple in 1968 and 1972 respec t ive ly ) .  
Doubtless one reason he and others resisted land reform was the loss o f  
t h i s  leadership ro le  tha t  he was to su f fe r ,  since he was too old to be 
elected kamnan^4 and d is l iked  dealing with o f f ic ia ldom. On 
the other hand, he negotiated with o f f i c i a l s  to provide a teacher for 
Thung Khaa school, whom he put up at his own house, successful ly 
re s is t in g  the a u th o r i t ie s '  desire to make Thung Khaa a branch of Ban 
Dong school. Four years a f te r  i t s  construct ion, the school was enlarged 
using government funds.
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In the khon t o ' s words, problems came to the community "with
the e lec t ion o f  a kamnan and v i l la g e  head". The kamnan and v i l lage
head who were to emerge in Thung Khaa and Ban Mai respect ive ly  (the 
l a t t e r  was established as a separate v i l l a g e  in 1978) were also 
in f lu e n t i a l  v i l l a g e rs  who were making large p r o f i t s  through the timber 
trade, the former as subcontractor for concessionnaires as well as 
through i l l e g a l  timber operat ions. They d i f fe red  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  from the 
khon t o , however, in the i r  outside connections, both in business and 
in contact with government o f f i c i a l s .  At the time o f  land reform, the 
present Ban Mai v i l l a g e  head was a young and charismatic member o f  one
o f  the ou t ly ing  communities, well established in the area at a time when
considerable upheaval and d is t ru s t  was rampant due to the in f lux  of new 
s e t t le rs .  He was chosen unopposed as head o f  the new v i l l a g e  by a show 
o f  hands at a v i l l a g e  meeting, and he w i l l  remain in tha t  posit ion un t i l  
he is 60 in the year 2005. He now spends large amounts o f  time away 
from the v i l l a g e . 2^ Many v i l l a g e rs  are in debt to him, and he p ro f i t s  
from the new roads with his d a i l y  pickup service to Nong Chang, while 
re ta in ing  e f fe c t ive  control over his lands by rent ing from debtors who 
cannot affo rd to plant t h e i r  own land and now work for him and others as 
wage labourers.
The common element o f  change in v i l la g e  leadership tha t  can be 
observed in these two v i l la g es  is  thus an o r ien ta t ion  outward, and a 
reduced sanction over abuse o f  pr ive lege. In making the i r  increased 
connections with outsiders v i l l a g e rs  re ly  on the v i l la g e  head, and to a 
lesser extent the v i l l a g e  committee, as in termediar ies. These l a t t e r  
obtain th e i r  posit ions by v i r tu e  o f  connections, patronage, or 
sel f-conf idence based on some other form of power base. At the same 
t ime, the d i s t r i c t  admin is tra t ion and interests  o f  c a p i t a l , 2  ^ insofar 
as they can be d is t ingu ished, re ly  on those same people, p a r t i c u la r ly  
the v i l l a g e  head, as entry  points into the v i l l a g e .  With the resources
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at the i r  d isposa l,  they are making i t  both possible and more worthwhile 
for formal leaders to assume the posit ion o f  representat ive o f  the state 
and capital  in the v i l la g e  rather  than vice versa. The greater a ro le  
external resources play in the v i l l a g e  economy, the greater potent ial  
there is fo r  economic gain by such in termediar ies .
IV .4 Development in Lan Sak
This, then, i s  the context in which rura l  development is taking 
place. Development is  at once part o f  the change described and an 
attempt to d i re c t  that change. However, as is  clear from the discussion 
in Chapter I I ,  development i s  not un id i rec t iona l  change. An 
understanding of the parameters and contradic t ions o f  development in Lan 
Sak requires an examination o f  the local actors on th is  pa r t icu la r  
development stage.
IVy4 J  Local "devel opers"
A number of a c t i v i t i e s  tha t  are are genera l ly  termed "rura l  
development" are taking place in or otherwise d i r e c t l y  a f fec t ing  the two 
study v i l la g e s .  A b r i e f  summary here w i l l  help to set the scene for 
examining the actors themselves.
In both v i l l a g e s ,  the four pr inc ipal  m in is t r ie s  with s ta tu tory  
a c t i v i t i e s  a t the d i s t r i c t  level { s i i  krasuang 1ak) have a number of 
schemes. These include housewives' groups and pre-school centres run by 
the Community Development Department (CDD); a g r icu l tu ra l  extension by
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the kaset tambon ( local ag r icu l tu ra l  extension o f f i c e r )  of the 
Department o f Agr icu l tu ra l  Extension (DAE); a c t i v i t i e s  associated with 
the v i l l a g e  primary schools; health stat ions close to each v i l l a g e ;  
frequent t ra in in g  programmes and in te rm i t ten t  "advice" at v i l lage  
meetings; and administrat ion o f  national programmes, such as the Rural 
Employment Generation Programme (REGP) and Phaen Din Thamt Phaen Din 
Tho1 ng (see section I l ^ l j ' i ) .  The tambon council is instrumental 
in the administrat ion o f  these programmes, but i n i t i a t i v e s ,  f ina l  
decisions, and budget a l loca t ions  are made by d i s t r i c t  or prov incia l  
o f f i c i a l s .  Meanwhile, other government agencies have occasional 
a c t i v i t i e s  at the v i l l a g e  level : the Land Development Department has 
carried out a soi l  survey o f  Ban Mai; the m i l i t a r y  hold occasional 
"development" t ra in in g  programmes in both v i l l a g e s ,  the la te s t  being the 
Army Reserve programme {ko* o no'o cho*o) in Ban Dong and National 
Defense Volunteers {o’ o so1 o po'o cho 'o ) in Ban Mai; BAAC is the 
major in s t i t u t i o n a l  c re d i t  i n s t i t u t i o n  in both v i l l a g e s ;  in Ban Mai, 
ALRO plays an important development ro le ,  both in land reform and in 
in f ra s t ru c tu ra l  development. Government is  also act ive in road bui ld ing 
and e le c t r i f i c a t i o n ,  in f ra s t ru c tu ra l  development that a f fec ts  both 
v i l la g es .
NGO a c t i v i t y  in Ban Mai involves t ra in ing  of youths from poorer 
fam i l ies  in cooperative integrated farming methods and other s k i l l s  at 
the youth t ra in in g  centre o f  the province-wide Nong Kha Yang Foundation 
for Rural Development (NKYFRD) ,  with some fol low-up work in the v i l l a g e ,  
including a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the associated Uthaithani Pig Raisers' 
Cooperative (UPRC). In Ban Dong NGO a c t i v i t i e s  are more community based 
and involve a r i c e  bank, a bu f fa lo  bank, and communal f i s h  ponds. These 
l a t t e r  are at present l im i ted to one section o f  the administrat ive 
v i l l a g e , Bung Khiew.
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Most o f  the state developers reside at the D i s t r i c t  headquarters 
( amphoe) or at the market centre o f  Paak Meuang. Senior o f f i c i a l s  are 
from various parts o f  the country, whi le many o f  the more jun io r
o f f i c i a l s ,  inc luding those working at the tambon l e v e l ,  come from
Uthaithani or surrounding provinces. With a few notable exceptions, 
these o f f i c i a l s  soc ia l ize among themselves, barr ing special occasions 
when a de l iberate  show o f  "mixing" is made as a matter o f  po l icy ,  
notably in the monthly amphoe khl euanthi i  (mobile d i s t r i c t ) ,  when 
o f f i c i a l s  spend an evening soc ia l iz ing  and the fo l lowing day providing 
various admin is tra t ive  services in one o f  the 33 v i l lages  in the
d i s t r i c t .
Pub l ic ly ,  state developers present a show o f  un ity ,  and in 
presenting programmes to v i l l a g e rs  i t  is  stressed that thaang
ratchakaan (the state bureaucracy) or rathabaan (the government)
rather  than a p a r t i cu la r  department is  helping. There is  a po l icy o f  
concentrat ing on one v i l l a g e  in each tambon for special a t ten t ion as a 
show v i l la g e  fo r  v i s i t i n g  provinc ia l  and other senior o f f i c i a l s ,  and 
t h i s  br ings various departments together.  Training programmes involve 
o f f i c i a l s  from a l l  four o f  the s i i  krasuang 1ak , and th is  often leads 
to a b lu r r ing  o f  funct ion as ind iv idual  o f f i c i a l s  make semi-po l i t ica l  
speeches on subjects outside th e i r  own f i e ld  of duty (see section 
V I I I >3J i i  below).
On the other hand, ind iv idual programmes are carried out
independently o f  each o ther,  and whi le not normally in open competit ion, 
departments tend to avoid treading on each others'  toes. For example,
the tambon DAE o f f i c e r  to ld  me that she did not bother with Ban Mai
since there are already ALRO o f f i c i a l s  working there, despite the fact  
tha t  the l a t t e r  have no t ra in ing  in or a c t i v i t i e s  concerning 
ag r icu l tu ra l  extension. Meanwhile, dupl icat ion  ar ises, for example in
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the provision o f  community r i ce  barns by both DAE and CDD. The b lu r r ing  
o f funct ion mentioned above is  a product o f  the desire for each
department to expand i t s  range o f  a c t i v i t i e s .  This br ings the pol ice,
m i l i t a r y ,  and other departments which would not normally be thought of 
as developers into the rural  development f i e l d ,  and such a c t i v i t y  also 
doubles as an image bu i ld ing too l .  On occasion, c o n f l i c t  between
departments comes into the open, such as in 1986 when the Lan Sak pol ice
re ta l ia te d  over conf iscat ion o f  one o f  i t s  i l l e g a l  t imber consignments 
by arrest ing a Forestry Department ve h ic le . ^
Developers' a t t i tudes  to development and the developed can be
i l l u s t r a te d  by reference to ALRO o f f i c i a l s  in Ban Mai and the CDD
o f f i c e r  for Lan Sak. The o f f i c i a l  in charge o f  the Tab Salao Land
Reform Scheme is based in Uthaithani but spends lengthy periods at the 
Ban Mai o f f i c e .  Unlike his predecessor, who was on close terms with 
many v i l l a g e rs  and well l i k e d ,  Pid does not mix so c ia l l y  with Ban Mai 
v i l l a g e rs .  Unlike most o f f i c i a l s ,  however, he avoids o f f i c i a l  language 
and is d i re c t  and vernacular in his speech at v i l l a g e  meetings, the main 
forum fo r  communication between ALRO and v i l l a g e rs .  He is  said to be
"du : sharp, aggressive" by v i l la g e rs  who have had to deal with him,
but he i s  also seen as f a i r  and uncorrupt. Pid p r iva te ly  considers Ban
Mai v i l la g e rs  to have benef ited unduly from ALRO's in f ra s t ru c tu ra l
provision and to be ungrateful  in t h e i r  lack o f  in te res t  in ALRO
projects . In p a r t i c u la r ,  he sees fa i l u r e  to repair  roads fol lowing the 
1983 f loods as i r responsib le  and made a point o f  not repa i r ing  roads in 
the v i l l a g e ,  although ALRO undertook repair  work on the agr icu l tu ra l  
roads outside the sett lement.
The CDD o f f i c e r  for Lan Sak has l i t t l e  d i r e c t  contact with 
v i l l a g e rs  except as a speaker at t ra in ing  sessions and at v i l lage  
meetings; those with d i re c t  contact are the tambon level o f f i c e rs .
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The present CDD o f f i c e r  has spent most o f his career in p o l i t i c a l l y  
sensit ive  areas in the Northeast and sees his development ro le  as part 
o f  the p o l i t i c a l  side o f  counter-insurgency stra tegy. In p ract ice, the 
CDD maintains a prominent posit ion in state led ru ra l  development as a 
coordinat ing agency between the tambon council and the amphoe, 
deciding which v i l la g es  are most “deserving" o f help. The CDD o f f i c e r  
stresses the importance o f  f ind ing appropriate local leaders. The f i r s t  
three things he says he looks for as a sign o f  "qu a l i t y "  are a clean and 
t i d y  house, a fence around the house, and a l a t r in e  in or near the 
house. He uses the standard formula o f  poverty, ignorance, and i l lness  
among v i l l a g e rs  to express the obstacles to development. Also prominent 
in his l i s t  o f  obstacles are Chinese merchants and " i th iphon  : 
in f luence".  He suggests tha t  one way to combat the l a t t e r  is  to coopt 
kamnans and others with inf luence by sending them for t r a in in g ,  such 
as on the Phaen din thamL Phaen din tho'ng scheme (see section 
I I J J i ) .
I V , 4 J i  Local developed
In section IV >3 J v  above, the increasingly ambiguous status o f  
v i l la g e  e l i te s  was noted. Since these key ind iv idua ls  with in  the 
v i l la g e  p o l i t y  and economy are seen by fe l low  v i l la g e rs  at least pa r t ly  
as agents o f  the s ta te ,  and since that status is  enhanced by th e i r  role 
in various ru ra l  development programmes, they perhaps ought to be 
discussed along with other "developers". However, due to th e i r  place 
of residence, inc lusion as v i l la g e rs  [chaobaan), and con t inu i ty  in 
social re la t ions  from a time when the d is t in c t io n  between state and 
v i l la g e  was more c lea rcu t ,  they are considered along with th e i r  fe l low 
v i l la g e rs  as the "developed", and t h e i r  changing status is  discussed
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more f u l l y  in the fo l lowing sect ion.
As we observed in Chapter I I ,  c la s s i f i c a t io n  o f  Thai v i l la g e rs  
along r i g id  class l ines is  not possible and is  a l ien to indigenous 
categor iza t ion. V i l lagers  in Ban Dong and Ban Mai do, however, have 
t h e i r  own terms fo r  d is t ingu ish ing  social status. A v i l l a g e r  at a 
development meeting to ld  me that he would have l iked to have talked to 
amphoe o f f i c i a l s  present, but was a fra id  to do so because of the 
l a t t e r ' s  "sak : status'*. The major i ty  o f  poor v i l l a g e rs  in the two
communities re fe r  to the wealthy e l i t e  by f inanc ia l  s i tua t ion  as those 
with "thaana d i i  : l i t .  good sta tus" ,  " khon mi i  tang : people with
money", or even "khon rua i  nai muubaan : the r ich  o f  the v i l l a g e " .  In 
Ban Mai they are often referred to by a more spec i f ic  cha rac te r is t ic  o f  
t h e i r  place in the local p o l i t y  or economy, notably "hua naa muubaan : 
v i l l a g e  heads" or "jao kho'ng r o t  tha i  : t r a c to r  owners". Such
people are usual ly  p u b l i c ly  keen to represent themselves as " chaobaan 
: [o rd inary ] v i l l a g e rs "  or "chaorai chaonaa : [o rd inary ]  farmers",
representing th e i r  own in terests  as those o f  the poor. The kamnan of  
Ban Dong, fo r example, frequently  complains o f  the exp lo i ta t ion  o f  "us 
farmers" by BAAC and various government o f f i c i a l s  who jo in  hands with 
" jek  : ethnic Chinese", despite the fact that he himself  does not 
farm. In p r iva te  discussion, however, many o f  the e l i t e  consciously or 
unconsciously d is t ingu ish  themselves from poorer v i l l a g e rs  by use of 
" chaobaan" in the th i rd  person, "khon suan yai  : the m a jo r i ty " ,  or
more d i r e c t l y  "khon jon  : the poor".
Differences in status can also be ide n t i f ie d  by certa in  social 
patterns. Although in v i l la g e  society there are as yet no formal ly 
exclusive occasions, so c ia l iza t ion  in Ban Mai in p a r t icu la r  is to an 
increasing extent governed by economic status. However, such patterns 
are d i f f i c u l t  to disentangle from other determinants, such as common
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place o f  o r ig in  or present locat ion o f  residence. The l a t t e r  is 
important in the social cohesion and id e n t i f i c a t io n  o f  common in te res t  
with in  sub-communities o f  each o f  the admin is tra t ive v i l lages  under 
study. In Ban Mai th i s  takes the form of small c lus te rs  o f  houses in 
out ly ing areas and residents o f  the same so i  ( lane) in the gr id  
settlement.  In Ban Dong i t  involves communities such as Bung Khiew (see 
section IV>2^i  above), and here community leadership in the person o f  
Boi is  an important resource that has f a c i l i t a t e d  the establishment o f  
r i ce  and buffa lo  banks by v i l l a g e rs .
A clearer statement o f  status is  that p ub l ic ly  pronounced by 
donations to the v i l l a g e  temple in Ban Dong. Other d is t ingu ish ing
features are connections with outs iders, p a r t i c u la r l y  local o f f i c i a l s ,  
and t h i s  takes several o f  the more in f lu e n t ia l  Ban Mai v i l l a g e rs  away 
from the v i l l a g e .  The Ban Mai v i l la g e  head and Thung Khaa kamnan and 
his brother the tambon doctor (himself  an in f lu e n t ia l  Ban Mai 
res ident) are frequently  to be seen at the D i s t r i c t  o f f i c e s .  The DAE
tambon worker in Ban Dong stays at the kamnan' s residence, making
th is  the main point o f  contact fo r  amphoe o f f i c i a l s .  Another source 
of external contact and patronage comes from the loca l member o f  
parl iament,  who owns among his other interests  the la rgest pineapple
estate and canning factory in Thai land, at Cha-am. In return for 
de l iver ing  votes at e lect ion t ime, several Ban Dong and Ban Mai 
v i l la g e rs  receive favours and th is  may take them away from the v i l l a g e  
for periods o f  t ime. For example, the tambon doctor in Ban Dong, who 
also owns a small r i c e  m i l l ,  arranges d is t r ib u t io n  o f  "T " - s h i r t s  o f  the 
MP's Siam Democracy party and organizes patronage o f  the local temple 
f a i r .
In terms o f  production re la t ionsh ips ,  the major d is t in c t io n  
recognized soc ia l ly  in Ban Mai i s  t rac to r  ownership, while in Ban Dong
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i t  is ro le  as a trader and moneylender. M a te r ia l ly ,  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  
goes beyond t h i s ,  and the fol lowing two chapters i l l u s t r a t e  the range o f  
production contra in ts  and opportunit ies faced by Ban Dong and Ban Mai 
v i l l a g e rs .  As w i l l  become c lear ,  the economic in te rests  o f  the 
"developed" are by no means convergent, and th is  has important 
impl icat ions for the d i re c t io n  o f  spec i f ic  development pro jects.
J V J J i i  Development and change
In Chapter I I  i t  was suggested that development is  a generic 
cover for spec i f ic  aspects o f s t ruc tu ra l  change, and tha t  an ethos o f  
development i t s e l f  serves as an ideological instrument in br inging about 
cer ta in  forms o f  change. The present chapter has shown a context o f  
rapid change in Lan Sak, change that has occurred by v i r tue  o f  the 
locat ion o f  the d i s t r i c t  at the f r o n t i e r  o f ag r icu l tu ra l  land expansion 
but which re t rospec t ive !y  has been termed development and which l a t t e r l y  
has been shaped according to the in te rests  o f  state and capita l  in
securing control  over the p o l i t y  and economy o f  an area u n t i l  recent ly  
on the periphery o f  such contro l .  Control has been secured pa r t ly  by
means o f  an incorporat ive rura l  development stra tegy. Meanwhile,
a l te rna t ive  attempts to d i re c t  change on the part  o f  non-s ta t is t  
developers provide separate i n i t i a t i v e s  by and on behalf  o f  v i l l a g e rs .  
L a t te r l y ,  both sets o f  developers have emphasized v i l l a g e r  pa r t ic ipa t ion  
as an essent ial  aspect o f  rural  development, and th is  raises the
question o f  the ro le  o f  v i l l a g e rs  themselves in o r ien t ing  change.
Early i n i t i a t i v e s  by Ban Dong and Ban Mai v i l l a g e rs  were detai led 
in sections IV .1 and IV .2. Such i n i t i a t i v e s  were not considerech'a-t,the 
time as "p a r t i c ip a t io n "  or even as "development", but many o f  the
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a c t i v i t i e s  concerned (clearing tracks and roads, construct ion of 
schools, land improvement) are described in developmental terms 
re trospect ive ! y. These pro jects were undertaken by v i l l a g e rs  
themselves, using t h e i r  own labour and l a t t e r l y  using pooled cash
resources. Since most such pro jects were on a small scale, they usual ly 
involved a common agreement among neighbours over a f u l f i l l i n g  a mutual 
need or overcoming a mutual obstacle. Where d i re c t io n  was involved, fo r  
example in construct ion of Thung Khaa school and temple, local forms o f  
leadership in the person o f  the khon to were employed. This was at a 
time when production in the community was s t i l l  r e la t i v e l y
undi f fe rent ia ted by funct ion i f  not necessari ly by scale. More 
recent ly ,  leadership in the context o f  development pro jects tha t  o r ien t  
change in Ban Dong and Ban Mai has come from the more powerful elements 
in increasing ly d i f fe re n t ia te d  communities. A l te rnat ive  attempts to 
maintain control on the part  o f  less powerful sections o f  the community 
in the context o f  change are less v i s ib le  but w i l l  become apparent in 
the fol lowing chapters.
Thus change in the context o f  development involves an in terp lay  
between a va r ie ty  o f  local and nonlocal actors. I n i t i a l l y  posited as a 
d ia le c t i c  between outside "developers" and local "developed", th i s  
in te rp lay  in a c tu a l i t y  involves a broad range o f  in te re s t  groups within 
which can be iden t i f ied  a number o f sub-d ia lec t ics .  The 
v i l l a g e r /o u ts id e r  dichotomy becomes less relevant in the face o f  new 
d iv is ions and new a l 1iances. Par t ic ipa t ion  in development by one or 
another o f  these groups means taking an active part in the d i rec t ion  o f
change or in co n t ro l l i n g  i t s  e f fe c ts .  Since we are concerned above a l l
with development as incorporat ion , pa r t ic ipa to ry  development becomes a 
struggle over the terms o f  incorporat ion. The struggle that most 
concerns us here is  tha t  over production, and an account o f  changing 
production re la t ions  in the fol lowing chapter shows how th i s  struggle is
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to an increasing extent one that is internal to the community.
Conclusion
To recap i tu la te ,  change in Ban Dong and Ban Mai has resulted in a 
loss o f  control  over resources and decisions a f fec t ing  th e i r  use by a 
majo r i ty  o f  v i l l a g e rs .  Rural development appears to pull  in a number o f 
d i f f e re n t  d i rec t ions  with regard to maintain ing, increasing, or 
decreasing such con t ro l .  A key issue for p a r t ic ipa to ry  rura l  
development is  thus how to maintain or increase con t ro l .  Broadly, 
i n i t i a t i v e s  along these l ines involve one of two possible s tra teg ies. 
The f i r s t ,  which may be termed "avoidance", i s  to reemphasise local 
resources as the basis for the v i l l a g e  economy in such a way as to give 
v i l la g e rs  sanction over resources for production. The problem is
achieving th is  via a non-atav is t ic  approach to development, which means 
accepting the need fo r  new community based in s t i t u t i o n s .  Bung Khiew 
r ice  bank and buffa lo  bank may be seen as steps in such a d i re c t io n .
The second strategy is  to accept at least to some extent the importance
o f  external resources in rural  development, p a r t i c u la r l y  since there is 
already a net transfe r  of resources out o f  the c o m m u n i t y , an{j 
readjust the terms o f  con tro l .  This means deal ing with local power 
s tructu res, which include not only the v i l l a g e  e l i t e  but also state 
elements, although the former can increasing ly be seen as coincident 
with the l a t t e r  (Turton 1987). Independent i n i t i a t i v e s  and 
representat ive leaders are of key importance in t h i s  respect,  while 
obstacles include th rea t ,  long standing pa t ron-c l ien tage , and the
absolutism o f  state ru ra l  development strategy.
I t  is ne ither feasible nor, in the eyes o f  most "developers"
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and "developed" ,  desirable to pursue an a ta v is t i c  course in search o f  a 
lo s t  community that in a l l  r e a l i t y  never ex isted, and in any case such 
an option is pre-empted in Lan Sak by permanent material  transformations 
wrought by environmental change and in f ra s t ru c tu ra l  development. Having 
acknowledged change, the question for analysis o f  the ro le  o f  rural  
development v is  a v is  the posi t ion o f  v i l la g e rs  is  ra ther how i t  re la tes  
to the power pos it ion o f  each o f  the developers and developed, and thus 
in what way the terms o f  pa r t ic ipa t ion  are defined. This requires an 
analysis o f  the impl icat ions o f  various rura l  development i n i t i a t i v e s  as 
they a f fe c t  p a r t i c ip a t io n  o f  the v i l l a g e rs  of Ban Dong and Ban Mai in 
co n t ro l l ing  both local and supra-local resources and decisions a f fec t ing  
th e i r  use. The fol lowing chapter invest igates the determinants o f  
control over resources necessary fo r  production in the two v i l l a g es .
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NOTES
1. Western Uthaithani approximates roughly to what are now Ban Rai and 
Lan Sak D is t r i c t s  (see Fig. 4.2).  Archaeological evidence shows that 
m i l i t a r y  campaigns o f  the Ayuthaya period probably used th is  area as a 
base of some sort  during campaigns against the Burmese. Cave paintings 
provide evidence o f  p reh is to r ic  sett lement.
2. "Lao" is  the ethnic name used by members o f  th a t  group and by
lowland Thais to re fe r  to them. While th is  group did indeed or ig inate 
in what is now Laos, "Lao" is  sometimes used more general ly  also to 
re fe r  to people from the Northeast o f Thailand [ Isaan).
3. Yaang o i l  is obtained by burning a hole near the base of the mai 
yaang tree {Dipterocarpus spp.).  I t  is used in varnishes, and 
lo c a l l y  i t  is used in f i r e l i g h t e r s  fo r  charcoal stoves.
4. Land ownership, and therefore land transact ions, had no legal basis.
At th is  time the land area was c lass i f ie d  e i ther  as fo res t  reserve (paa
sanguan) or preparatory fo res t  reserve [ t h i i  t r iam kaan paa sanguan) .
5. Annuals other than r ice  are hereafter referred to gener ica l ly  as
" f i e l d  crops".
6. Flooding in lowland Uthaithani has also become more severe due to
the construct ion o f  the Chaophraya Dam at Chainat 30 ki lometres to the
South. This has created a backup, which ra ises the water level to
several metres above the f i e ld s  during September and October o f  some
years (most recen t ly ,  1981, 1983, and 1985).
7. This somewhat paradoxical element o f social cohesion co n f l i c t s  with 
the popular and bureaucratic conceptions of f r o n t ie r  settlements as 
anarchic free fo r  a l l  zones. In fa c t ,  the pattern is  ra ther more akin 
to the t ra d i t i o n a l  " c e l l u la r "  corporate v i l l a g e  s tructure described by 
Douglass (1984 : 26) for pre-twentieth  century Central Thailand.
8. Phra Seemaa proclaimed that i l l  fortune would befa l l  those who cut
wood from th is  teak stand. True to his p red ic t ion ,  the few who fa i led
to heed his word have, i t  is said, met premature and v io le n t  death.
9. Evidence for th is  comes mainly from accounts o f  longer term
residents o f  Lan Sak. Meteorological readings at the Lan Sak weather 
s ta t ion  date back only to 1981, hardly long enough to measure the e f fe c t  
o f  deforesta t ion on r a i n f a l l .  Records kept at Uthaithani weather 
s ta t ion show a s ig n i f i c a n t  decl ine in annual r a i n f a l l  over the period 
1957 - 1983 (see Appendix 3).
10. Jeremy Kemp (1985) questions the whole notion o f  "v i l l a g e "  as 
bounded e n t i t y  rather than simply as place where "v i l l a g e rs "  l i v e .  While 
there is i n s u f f i c i e n t  space to take up th is  point in d e t a i l ,  i t  can be 
said that the increasing ly important admin is tra t ive funct ion o f  the 
v i l la g e  gives greater s ignif icance to i t s  borders (a point that Kemp 
touches o n ) , and tha t  even in those domains or for those functions where 
the borders are b lu r red,  association with a spec if ic  community in that 
p a r t i cu la r  domain or for that pa r t icu la r  funct ion i s  s t i l l  evident. 
Thus v i l lages  can be seen as rad ia t ing  out from a centre , boundaries 
being somewhat b lu r red, in a s im i la r  fashion to tha t  o f  the t r a d i t io n a l
state described in Chapter I I .
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11. 1 baht = approximately U.K. 2.5p.
12. 1 r a i  -  1600 square metres = approximately 0.4 acres.
13. The most valuable timbers in th is  area were yaang 
{Dipterocarpus spp.) ,  makhaa (Ormosia) ,  mai praduu
(Pterocarpus macrocarpus) , teng (Shorea obtusa) , sadao
(Margosa) , takhien (Hopea spp.),  and mai daeng {Xyl i a k e r r i ) .
14. Use o f  tax rece ip ts  as land t i t l e  is  a general phenomenon. See, for 
example, Gardener 1979, p . 19.
15. Extension o f  tree cropping was one of the major recommendations o f  
the Land Development Department's 1984 report  on Ban Mai. 
Unfortunately,  the report  l i e s  buried in the stacks o f  the LDD o f f ice s  
in Bangkok, and DAE o f f i c i a l s  (not to mention farmers, many of whom 
expressed an in te res t  in learning what the government surveyors who came 
to take soi l  samples in 1983 had found) remained unaware o f  i t s  
existence a year a f te r  i t s  pub l ica t ion .
16. Local va r ia t ion  in r a i n f a l l  can be dramatic. This is par t ly  
s tochas t ica l ly  determined due to the nature o f  convectional rainstorms, 
which can drench one part  o f  a v i l l a g e  and leave another part dry. A 
general ly higher r a i n f a l l  is also observable near forested areas.
17. The Chaophraya Dam is  also an aggravating cause o f  f looding : see 
footnote 6 above.
18. Chemical f e r t i l i z e r s  are o f  h igh ly  questionable u t i l i t y  in an area 
such as Lan Sak. Apart from the r i s k  associated with use o f  cost ly  
inputs together with uncertainty o f  marginal rainfed ag r icu l tu re ,  
f e r t i l i z e r s  may also have adverse e f fec ts  on soi l  s t ructure and natural  
f e r t i l i t y ,  making ploughing more d i f f i c u l t  and requi r ing ever greater 
appl icat ions o f  f e r t i l i z e r  to maintain steady or even f a l l i n g  yields 
(see Rigg 1985 : 222 - 250). Conversations with farmers in
neighbouring Chainat Province and in Khon Kaen in the Northeast, 
both areas with longer experience o f  f e r t i l i z e r  use, support th is  
concern.
19. The e f fe c t  o f  t h i s  is  p a r t i c u la r l y  local ized due to the i l l e g a l i t y  
o f  commercial charcoal production. This makes transpor t a r isky  
business, which means that demand is usual ly sa t is f ie d  by production 
nearby, or concomitantly tha t  charcoal producers or traders prefer to 
sel l  l o c a l l y  despite the subs tan t ia l l y  higher pr ice to be obtained in 
town. The r isks  involved in such trade are evidenced by a 20,000 baht 
" f i n e "  (br ibe)  paid to the pol ice by one Ban Mai trader in 1984.
20. Because o f  i t s  high investment requirement, long wait necessary (2 
years) for economic re tu rns ,  and necessity of obtaining a quota from a 
re f in e ry ,  sugar cane tends to be a crop l im i ted to large scale farmers.
21. The masculine pronoun is  used here because there are no women 
v i l lage  heads or kamnans in Lan Sak. Indeed, i t  was only in 1981 that 
women were le g a l ly  e n t i t l e d  to stand for such o f f i c e s ,  since which time 
several have been elected in other parts o f  the country.
22. T ra d i t io n a l l y ,  government assistance has been regarded as a free 
g i f t  (kho1ng f r i i ) ,  the administrat ion of which v i l la g e rs  had no 
sanction over. This is not to say tha t  the embezzlement o f  such 
resources goes without comment or resentment - quite the contrary - but 
channels for redressing such pract ice are not avai lable to ordinary 
v i l la g e rs  as they would be in the case of indigenous resources.
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23. The kamnan in Ban Dong, for example, secures luc ra t ive  local 
contracts for his w i fe 's  construct ion business by v i r tu e  o f  his 
pos it ion .  In 1984 he received a 100,000 baht contract for 
construct ion o f  a wooden bridge across the Tap Salao River to replace 
the one washed away in the 1983 f loods. For th is  he used his posit ion 
not only in securing the contract,  but also in conscript ing unpaid 
labour and using wood cut from forest reserve land in addit ion to that 
remaining from the previous bridge.
24. V i l lage heads and kamnans must r e t i r e  at 60 under Thai law.
25. So much so tha t  the myna bird outside his house has learned to say 
"Phuu ya i  mai yuu ro '  k : the headman's not in " !  This has become 
something o f  a v i l l a g e  joke.
26. In f lu e n t ia l  v i l l a g e rs  who are also moneylenders and middlemen 
having connections with larger traders are known as "hua naa" , or 
agents. This demonstrates a conscious recognit ion by th e i r  c l ien ts  o f  
th e i r  intermediary sta tus.
27. A fu r the r  example o f  c o n f l i c t  occurred in 1985 when students from 
Kasetsart Universi ty  held a summer workcamp in Lan Sak. The v i l la g e  in 
which they were to bu i ld  a school was located in a forest  reserve area. 
The Primary Education Off ice was keen to estab l ish  a school, but the 
Forestry Department was re luc tan t  to recognize the r i g h t  o f  v i l l a g e rs  to 
squat on i t s  land. Students asked v i l l a g e rs  to prepare materials  for 
construc t ion, and whi le they were away in Bangkok the Forestry 
Department arrested several v i l l a g e rs  for i l l e g a l  cu t t ing  of wood that 
was to be used fo r  the school. In the end, the students had to move to 
a d i f f e re n t  v i l l a g e  and use concrete blocks instead o f  t imber.
28. Scott (1976 : 206) is c r i t i c a l  o f  inward looking se l f -he lp
solut ions fo r  th is  reason (see section V I I I  below). More
concrete ly ,  i t  has been estimated tha t  approximately h a l f  o f  pre-tax 
income o f  Thai v i l la g es  was paid out via the r ice  premium, import 
du t ies ,  sales taxes, other taxes, and re g is t ra t io n  fees paid by 
v i l la g e rs  between 1965 and 1975. This exceeds the cost o f  education, 
publ ic admin is tra t ion , i r r i g a t i o n ,  and other services received by 
v i l la g e rs  (Feeny 1982 : 116).
CHAPTER V
RESOURCES FOR PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
When the t ra c to r  owner conies to plough our land, we ask:
‘ How much?'
When the seed merchant se l ls  us g ra in ,  we ask:
'How much?'
When the moneylender sets the in te res t  ra te ,  we ask:
'How much?'
And when the middleman comes along to buy our corn, we ask:
' How much?'
Ban Mai v i l l a g e r
Production presents a problematic fo r  development in two main ways. 
F i r s t ,  production re la t ions  represent the basis fo r  social  re la t ions  at 
a broader leve l .  Thus they l i m i t  and to some extent determine the way 
in wh i c h society is  organized,1 in pa r t icu la r  concerning the 
d is t r ib u t i o n  of power a t  var ious leve ls .  Second, production determines 
the to ta l  material  product o f  a society.  As such, i t  is  the basis fo r  
reproduction o f  material  elements o f  the social  order,  and a l te rn a t ive ly  
fo r  ex trac t ion o f  surplus, fo r  investment in new forms o f  product ion, or 
for r e d is t r ib u t io n  o f  the social product. Inasmuch as development is 
concerned with progressive change in social organizat ion and with 
d i rec t ing  the social  product, i t  is  thereby in t imate ly  bound up with 
product ion.
Production is governed in the f i r s t  place by resource^ 
a v a i l a b i l i t y ,  which in turn is  l im i ted  on the one hand by the "soc ia l "  
aspect o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l  access via re la t ions  o f  production and on the 
other by the "physical"  aspect o f natural  a v a i l a b i l i t y  and 
techno logy .  ^ The former becomes r e la t i v e l y  more important as a
measure of control as natural  resource scarc i ty  increases, and the 
in s t i t u t i o n a l  forms o f  control  themselves change concurrently 
w ith, i f  not necessari ly consequently from, increasing sca rc i t ies .  
Development therefore becomes more concerned with i n s t i t u t i o n a l  change 
and less with “ opening up" of untapped natural resources. The physical 
aspect o f technological development plays an important part in 
in tegrat ing local and non-local resources fo r  product ion, i t s e l f  
requi r ing  new in s t i t u t i o n a l  forms.4
This tension between development as increasing to ta l  production 
through in te n s i f i c a t io n  o f  resource use and as a reor ien ta t ion  of 
production so as to e f fec t  more equitable social  re la t ions  is 
pa ra l le l led  by two important dichotomies with respect to resources for 
production. One is the d is t in c t io n  between local and supra-local
resources, with most models o f  development re ly ing  on i n te n s i f i c a t io n  
through progressive in tegra t ion  of production such tha t  local production 
can be increased by non-local inputs. The second is  the issue of 
whether development is p r im ar i ly  a means o f  mobi l iz ing resources for 
production or a r e d is t r ib u t i v e  process for so c ia l ly  more e f f i c i e n t  
and/or equitable p a r t i c ip a t io n  in product ion.5
The present chapter gives an account o f  production in Lan Sak 
with special reference to the two study v i l la g es .  An account o f  the 
ag r icu l tu ra l  regime d e ta i l s  the spat ial  and temporal pat terns, with a 
b r i e f  account o f  the range o f  technology and inputs u t i l i s e d .  The issue 
of choice is considered, and constraints on such are exemplif ied with 
reference to the determinants o f  control  over production in the study 
v i l l a g e s ,  namely modes of access to factors o f  production. This is 
followed by accounts o f  the t iming and patterns o f  production and change 
in such in each o f  the study v i l l a g e s ,  fol lowed by a comparative 
section. Unless otherwise spec i f ied ,  s t a t i s t i c a l  data is  derived from
the systematic survey carr ied out in 1985 (sect ion 1.4 and Appendix 1).
V . l  Production in Lan Sak
I t  is evident from the discussion in Chapter IV tha t  production 
in Lan Sak has undergone recent and rapid change. Ind iv idual  producers 
have gone from rel iance on an abundant natural  environment to an 
increased dependence on external inputs. Meanwhile, production has 
moved increasing ly away from a subsistence o r ien ta t ion  to production for 
the market, p a r t l y  as a re s u l t  o f  change in ecological condit ions and 
pa r t ly  as a consequence o f  increased in tegrat ion through communication 
l in ks  and marketing structures.
That th is  change has resulted in an increased to ta l  product as 
measured in cash-equivalent terms is unquestionable. Less cer ta in  is 
the s u s ta in a b i l i t y  o f  t h i s  level of p rodu c t ion .6 yet what is clear 
from the examination o f  production in Lan Sak tha t  fol lows is  that th is  
reo r ien ta t ion  of production has been associated with changes in 
production re la t ions  which have affected in s t i t u t i o n a l  access to 
resources. These changes have important impl icat ions fo r  social 
reproduct ion, for social  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  and for the re la t ionsh ip  o f  
ind iv idua ls  with the wider community.
While I do not want to ant ic ipate  these changes and the i r  
impl icat ions fo r  control  over production before a deta i led desr ip t ion  o f  
production based on surveys in Ban Dong and Ban Mai, one element is o f  
over - r id ing  importance in that i t  underl ies the pr inc ipa l  contradict ions 
o f  change tha t  are the focus o f  th i s  study. That i s  the less than to ta l  
switch to a market economy contro l led by " ra t io n a l " ,  c a p i t a l i s t
re la t ions  o f  production under which access to land, labour, and capital  
are the product o f  monetized re la t ionsh ips .  The persistence o f  other 
means o f  access to resources fo r  production re f le c ts  power re la t ionsh ips 
tha t  are not simply anachronist ic remnants o f  p re -c a p i ta l i s t  production, 
but are an integral  part o f  the change that has been taking p lace.?
VA1 J  Lan Sak a g r icu l tu ra l  regime
There are both spat ia l  and temporal dimensions to the pattern of 
ag r icu l tu ra l  production in a recent ly  sett led forest  environment such as 
Lan Sak. S p a t ia l l y ,  c u l t i v a t io n  is influenced by gradients, s o i l s ,  
a c c e s s ib i l i t y  to  markets, water supply, and patterns of land holding. 
However, these patterns change over time as land is improved or,
a l t e rn a t i v e ly ,  as so i l  erosion and other forms o f  degradation occur, as 
a cc e s s ib i l i t y  increases, as water control  improves or d e te r io ra te s , as 
land tenure changes occur, and as commodity prices f luc tua te .  This 
pattern and inf luences a f fec t ing  i t  can best be i l l u s t r a te d  with
reference to spec i f ic  crops and parameters a f fec t ing  t h e i r  d is t r i b u t i o n .
Rice. Rice holds a unique place in Thai ag r icu l tu re  as the 
pr inc ipal subsistence crop. I t  is  the crop tha t  farmers are most adept 
a t c u l t i v a t in g ,  and i t  is general ly  the preferred crop. However, r ice  
is  demanding in terms of water requirements and level land, as a re su l t  
o f  which i t  represents only one-sixth o f  the to ta l  cu l t iva ted area o f  
the upland d i s t r i c t  o f  Lan Sak . &
Rice is grown p r im ar i ly  on the level low-lying land near the Tab 
Salao River (Fig 4.5) in the eastern part  o f  the d i s t r i c t .  Here a
l im i ted area o f  land is i r r ig a te d  by water diverted from the r i ve r  and
small streams by lo c a l l y  constructed and managed i r r i g a t i o n  channels. 
However, the m a jo r i ty  o f  r iceland is  e n t i r e l y  ra in fed ,  consist ing of 
level land at elevat ions too high for divers ion of i r r i g a t i o n  
water.^ Meanwhile, the desire to grow r ice  at least  s u f f i c i e n t  for
production, due to an aversion to re ly ing  on an uncertain cash income 
for  purchase o f  such a basic element o f  subsistence, leads many upland 
farmers to c u l t i v a te  often t i n y  plots amenable to r i c e  by v i r tu e  o f  
micro-environmental s u i t a b i l i t y .  These include g u l l i e s ,  shallow
depressions, or even level land adjacent to a water source from which
water can be pumped up.
Nevertheless, Lan Sak is  a marginal environment for r i ce .
Ir r iga ted  areas are low- ly ing and increasingly prone to f looding such as 
tha t  which ruined a large port ion of the crop in la te  1983. Rainfed 
areas are suscept ible to drought to an increasing extent,  as was 
evidenced most recent ly  in 1984. The topography and pattern of land 
holding is  such tha t  fo r  most farmers r isks  cannot be minimized eas i ly  
by the strategy common elsewhere of d iv id ing a household's planting 
between f lood-  and drought-prone areas. This i s  because o f  the gradual 
r ise of land away from the Tap Salao River, which means that only a 
m inor i ty  o f  farmers have land tha t  straddles the boundary between f lood- 
and drought-prone condi t ions. Those who do vary r ice  stra ins 
accordingly ( c f .  Ng 1978 : 40).
Rice c u l t i v a t io n  in Lan Sak requires few inputs. Ploughing is 
general ly carr ied out using b u f fa lo ,  although power t i l l e r s  are becoming 
popular since they are labour-saving and less suscept ible to t h e f t .  
Plant ing and harvest ing are carr ied out by hand, plant ing involving the 
use of nursery beds and transplant ing (except on poorly watered land 
where broadcasting is  sometimes used) and harvesting being by s ick le .  
Chemical f e r t i l i z e r  use is minimal, with bu ffa lo  manure t r a d i t i o n a l l y
it>y
replenishing the s o i l .  Seed is kept over from the previous harvest or 
obtained at the DAE o f f i c e  in s t ra ig h t  exchange fo r  old gra in. Various 
r ice  va r ie t ie s  are used, depending pr inc ipal  1y on i r r i g a b i l i t y  and 
s u s c e p t ib i l i t y  to f lood ing ,  since new va r ie t ies  are short and cannot 
survive inundation as well as t ra d i t i o n a l  v a r ie t ie s .
Riceland is c lass i f ie d  into three types: t h i i  tarn or t h i i  1 urn 
( low - ly in g ) ;  t h i i  klaang (middle);  and t h i i  sung or t h i i  khook 
(elevated).  Rice is  c lass i f ied  f i r s t  and foremost by i t s  growing period 
as khaao nak ( l i t .  heavy r i c e ,  or lengthy growing period of 
approximately six months), khaao kl aang ( l i t .  medium r ic e ,  or 
moderate growing period of approximately f i ve  months), and khaao bao 
( l i t .  l i g h t  r i c e ,  or short growing period o f  approximately four months). 
The heights and a b i l i t y  to grow qu ick ly  i f  inundated increase with the i r  
" namnak" ( l i t .  "weight",  meaning length o f  growing per iod),  thus 
khaao nak , khaao klaang , and khaao bao tend to be grown on t h i i  
tam, t h i i  klaang , and t h i i  sung respect ive ly ,  although th is  is an 
overs impl i f ied p o r t ra ya l . In the high r i s k  environment and without 
adequate water co n t ro l ,  l i t t l e  d i f fe rence in y ie ld  between va r ie t ie s  is 
apparent; where new va r ie t ie s  are used i t  is  p r im ar i ly  for th e i r  short 
growing period. Intensive high-input r i c e  farming is practised only in 
the few f ie ld s  where a re l i a b le  second r i c e  crop can be grown.
Although r ice  production is p r im ar i ly  fo r  subsistence, i t  is also 
the pr inc ipal  source o f  cash income fo r  many farmers. Traders come from 
Uthaithani and Nong Chang to purchase r ice  at prices comparable to those 
found elsewhere in the province. Rice grown for home consumption is  
mi l led mechanical ly, and th is  means for many farmers having to transport 
r i ce  to the m i l l  at Paak Meuang. Increasingly ,  however, small m i l l s  are 
being constructed at the v i l l a g e  leve l .  The terms o f  m i l l i n g  are 
standard: r ice  i s  mi l led in exchange for the bran, broken r i c e ,  and
1 /u
husks. The husks are used in some cases to power the m i l l ,  whi le the 
bran and broken r ice  are e i ther  sold or used by the m i l l  owner for pig 
rea r ing .
Since the ear ly  1980s, many r i c e  farmers have used th e i r  r iceland 
fo r  c u l t i v a t io n  o f  mung beans as a second crop between January and 
March. Other than providing a small subsidiary income, c u l t i v a t io n  o f  
th i s  leguminous crop is  recognized as being benef ic ia l  for soil  
f e r t i l i t y  ( i . e .  by f i x i n g  n i t rogen) . Mung beans are a demanding crop in 
terms of water requirements, even though to ta l  r a i n f a l l  needed is  low. 
In 1984 many farmers recorded a loss due to a complete absence o f  
r a i n f a l l ,  while in January 1985 an unseasonal downpour ruined the crop 
o f  those with low ly ing land. Cate rp i l la rs  have rap id ly  become a 
hazard, and even the expensive insect ic ides are proving ine f fec t ive  as 
the pests appear to bu i ld  up a resistance.
Field crops. Most o f the cu lt iva ted  area o f  Lan Sak is  given 
over to f i e ld  cropping. Although d iv e rs i f i c a t io n  away from r ice  in the 
form of f i e l d  crops has been the pr inc ipal  feature o f  change in cropping 
patterns in Thailand over the past quarter o f  a century (Table 3 .3 ) ,
t h i s  has been a national strategy supported by land sett lement patterns
rather  than a de l iberate  household strategy adopted by the ma jo r i ty  o f  
farmers ( c f .  Uhlig 1984 : 37). This is p a r t i c u la r ly  the case in the
Central Plains and on i t s  fr inges. That is  to say, i t  is  mainly out o f 
necessity rather than farmer preference that the a g r icu l tu ra l  growth 
that has been afforded la rge ly  by settlement o f  new land has involved
non-r ice annuals, since the r iceland f r o n t ie r  had la rge ly  been occupied 
by the 1960s ( i b i d . ) .  This has been supported on the one hand by 
pr ic ing and f isca l  s tra teg ies in favour of f i e ld  crops and un t i l
recent ly  buoyant world market condi t ions, p a r t i c u la r l y  fo r  maize and 
tapioca, and on the other by f i s c a l  po l icy depressing the pr ice o f  r i c e ,
notably the r i c e  premium (Si lcock 1970 : 88 - 90; see also footnote 10
of Chapter I I I  above). However, i t  is  important not to overemphasize 
the enthusiasm, as has sometimes been done (e.g. IBRD 1980 : i i )  with 
which farmers have " d iv e r s i f ie d " .  Comparison of upland cropping and 
r i ce  farming is in any case problematic, given the very d i f f e r e n t  cost 
considerat ions between commercialized and subsistence production (Uhlig 
1984 : 164).
For a period, though, s e t t l e r s  in Lan Sak did appear to be facing 
favourable condit ions for a switch away from the r i ce  farming that most 
would have been accustomed to. Moreover, in some cases, a lb e i t  a 
m ino r i ty ,  the prime motivat ion for settlement in Lan Sak was indeed that 
i t  was thought commercial f i e ld  cropping would be a quick route to 
r iches ,  unl ike the modest, no matter how stable, income that was 
possible under ex is t ing  r ice  c u l t i v a t io n .  Yet others did in fac t  make a 
conscious d iv e r s i f i c a t i o n  decision,  e i the r  by s e t t l i n g  land amenable 
both to r ice  and to f i e ld  crops, or by maintaining l inks with lowland 
r ice  farming through kinship t i e s .  The m a jo r i ty ,  however, had l i t t l e  
choice but to cu l t iva te  according to the d ic ta tes  o f  the 
micro-environment, and th is  meant f ie ld -cropping for the most part .
As has been described in Chapter IV, f i e l d  cropping on newly 
sett led fo res t  land produces highest yields fo r  lowest inputs soon a f te r  
de fores ta t ion ,  and thereaf te r  i t  involves a progressive d e te r io ra t ion .  
This has been accompanied in Lan Sak by unstable and general ly  f a l l i n g  
prices fo r  the major f i e ld  crops fol lowing the e a r l i e r  buoyancy, as a 
re s u l t  of which cer ta in  o f  these have become progressive!y less 
economic. Even many o f  the farmers who ten years ago came to Lan Sak 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  in the hope o f  moving out o f  r i ce  farming into f i e ld  
cropping would now prefer to switch back to r i c e ,  as evidenced not only 
ideo log ica l ly  by expressed preferences, but also economically by the
premium on riceland^-O and phenomenological 1 y by the pattern o f  land 
use.
Maize is the main f i e l d  crop grown in Lan Sak. Cu l t iva t ion  of 
the main crop is  normally from May to August. Production is  almost 
e n t i r e l y  fo r  the market .H  Ploughing is mainly by t r a c to r ,  the large 
Ford 5000s being the most popular. The dominant seed is  the 
commercially developed Suwan 1. Planting is done by hand, in teams o f  
hoe-wielding "diggers (khonkhud) "  and "sowers" {khonyo1d) .
Rodenticides and herbicides are necessary inputs, although in some cases 
weeding is carr ied out by hand so as to decrease dependence on the 
l a t t e r .  Unt i l  1985, f e r t i l i z e r  use was minimal. Harvesting is  also 
manual, and husking is done la rge ly  by machine.
L a t te r l y ,  maize yields have declined s ig n i f i c a n t l y .  This is 
a t t r ibu ted  in many cases to poor seed ("pen man" ,  l i t .  s t e r i l e ;  or 
" k ra thoe i " ,  l i t .  t ransves t i te )  or disease {"pan rook l u u k t i i n "  or 
"pan rook bai 1euang" ,  meaning disease of the stem and leaves 
respect ive ly .  Soil exhaustion is  c lea r ly  a major fa c to r ,  and th i s  is  
acknowledged to varying degrees by maize farmers. As a re su l t  o f
decl in ing y ie ld s ,  many farmers have gone in to  debt from maize
c u l t i v a t io n .  Yields vary according to so i l  type, r a i n f a l l ,  and 
in te ns i ty  o f  c u l t i v a t i o n ,  but overal l  the DAE o f f i c e  reports  an average 
o f 19 tang per ra i  for 1984, which at going pr ices o f  35 baht per
tang is not even enough to cover inputs estimated by DAE to be 750
baht per r a i .  This is not to mention imputed labour costs and 
in te res t  on loans for inputs.
Following the maize harvest, a second crop is  usual ly planted. 
Although some plant a second maize crop, most favour other crops. Mung 
beans, sorghum, and soya beans are the most popular second crops. Al l
these are also r e la t i v e l y  high input crops, rnung beans more so and soya 
beans and sorghum to a lesser degree. Cu l t iva t ion  and m i l l i n g  o f  these 
second crops can la s t  u n t i l  January or February, by which time there is 
l i t t l e  time before f i e ld  preparation in March or Apr i l  for the fol lowing 
season. As a r e s u l t ,  some have turned to less intens ive crops such as 
cassava, which is l e f t  in the ground for nearly a year with l i t t l e  
a t ten t ion .  This allows farmers to seek waged employment for extended 
periods. A l te rn a t iv e ly ,  larger farmers may opt for t h i s  extensive 
form of c u l t i v a t io n  on rented land to minimize labour requirements 
and supervision that is  necessary fo r  other crops. This is  despite a 
general awareness o f  the destruct ive impact that cassava has on the 
s o i l .
A th i rd  stage in ex tens i f ica t ion  of c u l t i v a t io n  is apparent with 
the expansion o f  sugar cane production. Sugar cane is  a crop l im i ted  to 
those with considerable long-term capital  and has been planted by a few 
large owners who gain control  over land e i ther  by purchase or by rental
from debtors who can less and less afford to cu l t iva te  the i r  own land.
From one Lan Sak v i l la g e  in p a r t i c u la r ,  there is  a v i s i b l y  expanding 
green carpet o f  sugar cane engulfing surrounding f i e ld s .  This is a 
progression that pa ra l le ls  tha t which has occurred in other recent ly
sett led forest areas o f  western Thailand, notably in Kanchanaburi
province to the south of Uthaithani.  I ts  fu ture is  uncertain with the 
present i n s t a b i l i t y  in world sugar pr ices, but other forms o f  large 
scale agr icu l tu re  are increasingly popular in Lan Sak and elsewhere, 
notably c a t t l e  ranching.12
V ^ l j i  Choice in Lan Sak Agr icu l tu ra l  Production
Compared with Ban Ping farmers in Chiang Rai province in 1960,
whose basic option was between plough and t ra c to r  ag r icu l tu re  (Moorman
1968), Lan Sak farmers a quarter o f  a century la te r  would at f i r s t  s ight
appear to be ve r i ta b ly  spoiled fo r  choice. Not only are there several
crops to choose between, but each crop can be cu l t iva ted  at each stage
by one o f  a number o f  methods. Moreover, labour and capita l  input
options are numerous. However, i t  is asserted here that th is  choice is
la rge ly  i l l u s o r y ,  since choices o f  crop, c u l t i v a t io n  method, and inputs
are dic ta ted by factors  la rge ly  and increasingly beyond the small
farmer's con t ro l .  In p a r t i cu la r :
The choice of crops [ i n  newly cleared upland
cropping areas] . . .  is  a re s u l t  o f  the dependence
of the farmer on the t rader .  As a re s u l t  o f  the 
pressure of paying back his debts and his 
resu l t ing  ob l igat ion  to de l iver  a l l  y ie lds  a f te r  
the harvest,  the farmer has p ra c t i c a l l y  no other
choice than to cu l t i va te  on his land only those 
crops which are o f  in te res t  to the trader (Uhl ig 
1984 : 166).
Even more s ig n i f i c a n t  is  the fac t  that the very choices that small 
farmers are forced to make move them toward a system o f  agr icu l tu re  in 
which they no longer control key factors  o f production. This becomes 
apparent from the discussion below concerning control  over production 
via access to resources.
Table 5.1 summarizes the production p o s s ib i l i t i e s  for the two 
main crops in Ban Dong and Ban Mai respect ive ly .  The way in which 
farmers in the two v i l lages  respond to these p o s s ib i l i t i e s  has been 
discussed in the previous sect ion, and the fol lowing section shows how 
constra ints in access to key fac to rs  o f  production a f fe c t  choices by 
d i f f e re n t  members o f  the community.
V. 2 Access to Resources fo r  Production
Tabl e
Seed
Preparation
Ploughing
P lanting
Pest
con tro l
F e r t i l iz e r
Harvest
Threshing/
husking
Use
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-1 Production possibilities -for rice and maize in Lan Sak
RICE HA I IE
Hethod Input/O utput Hethod Input/O utput
KEEP OVER/ 
exchange/buy
FOREGONE CONSUMPTION/ BUY/
keen over
CASH/
foreqone sale
BURN/
plough
HOUSEHOLD LABOUR CUT AND BURN/ 
burn/ plough
LABOUR/
tra c to r
BUFFALO/power 0NN/ r ic e /  cash 
t i l l e r /  t ra c to r
TRACTOR/ 
power t i l l e r
CASH/ own
TRANSPLANT/
broadcast
HOUSEHOLD LABOUR/ 
rec ip roca l labour/ 
h ired  labour
SON HIRED LABOUR/ 
re c ip ro c a l labour/ 
household labour
NONE NOME
HERBICIDE/ CASH, HOUSEHOLD LABOUR/
weeding h ired  labour/ rec ip roca l
labour
BUFFALO MANURE/ OWN/ r ic e /  
none/ chemical none/ cash
NONE/cheoicai/
compost
NONE/ cash
BY HAND RECIPROCAL LABOUR/
household labour/ 
h ired  labour 
BUFFALO/ power HOUSEHOLD LABOUR/ 
t il le r /m a c h in e /  rec ip ro ca l labour/ 
by ha nd /trac to r cash
BY HAND
MACHINE/ 
By hand
HIRED LABOUR/househoId 
la b o u r/re c ip ro ca l labour
CASH/ Reciprocal labour/ 
household labour
CONSUMPTION/ FOOD/ 
s a le / keep over cash/ seed
SALE/ 
keep over
CASH/
seed
Note: !he predominant form of production is  ind ica ted in  UPPER CASE.
Control over production means securing access to resources, or 
factors o f  production. Such access is  determined by production 
re la t ions  through i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangements determining de ju re  
ownership through state guaranteed property r ig h ts  and de facto 
control tha t  may not be le g a l ly  guaranteed. U lt imate ly ,  control  may 
depend more or less on e i ther  o f these: there is no guarantee that de 
j u re  r igh ts  w i l l  be associated with enhanced control  over production i f  
other inf luences undermine the signif icance o f  those r ig h ts  (see 
Witayakorn 1983 : 102 - 103). This is  p a r t i c u la r l y  relevant where
agents o f  the state are unable or unwil l ing to enforce, or are co l lus ive 
in i n f r in g in g ,  such r ig h ts .
Land
Control over land in Ban Dong and Ban Mai var ies both in terms o f  
de ju re  ownership and de facto  con tro l .  In Ban Dong land 
ownership is  now guaranteed by the state by N.S.3 exp lo i ta t ion  
tes t imon ia ls ,  which serve to a l l  intents and purposes as land t i t l e  
deeds g iving the holder f u l l  control  over the use and t rans fer  o f  the 
land. Some Ban Dong residents'  land overlaps the boundary into 
neighbouring v i l la g e s ,  which have not yet been granted land t i t l e s .  
Here tax c e r t i f i c a te s  are treated by landholders as t i t l e  deeds for 
purposes of purchase, inher i tance, and even informal c o l l a te ra l ,  but 
they have no legal basis. Unlike N.S.3 c e r t i f i c a t e s ,  there fo re , they 
cannot be used as co l la te ra l  fo r  bank loans.
In Ban Mai, land within  the ALRO area is held under the special 
ALRO land t i t l e .  This guarantees r igh ts  o f  the holder for use, but i t
i n
r e s t r i c t s  trans fe r  except through inheri tance. As a r e s u l t ,  t h i s  land 
t i t l e  cannot be used as formal co l la te ra l  except with BAAC under an 
agreement with ALRO. Other re s t r i c t io n s  include a ban on rental  of  ALRO 
land. Land outside the ALRO area is fo rest reserve and holders have no 
documentary proof o f  ownership. Ownership over such land is established 
by verbal agreement.
Control over land is achieved in any one o f  a number of ways. 
Purchase of N.S.3 land is  a free and s tra ight forward transact ion, 
despite nominal approval that is  required from the D i s t r i c t  Land Of f ice. 
Purchase o f  land without t i t l e  i s  also r e la t i v e l y  unres t r ic ted ,  although 
in the case of land without tax c e r t i f i c a te s  c o n f l i c t s  can ar ise. In 
1984, one Bung Khiew v i l l a g e r  found that his land in a nearby fo rest 
reserve area had been sold by someone else to a th i rd  party:  only a 
d i re c t  and p o te n t ia l l y  dangerous intervent ion redeemed him his land.
Purchase o f  land with N.S.3 t i t l e  is increasing ly  d i f f i c u l t  fo r  
young fam i l ies .  This is  due to the steeply r i s in g  pr ice o f  land. Land 
tha t  sold for 200 baht per r a i  ten years ago now se l l s  fo r  2,000 
baht , and the best p a r t i a l l y  i r r iga ted  land in Ban Dong now commands
7,000 baht per r a i . Ban Mai land has always been sold covert ly  at 
above the ALRO st ipu la ted pr ice. Cheap land is  s t i l l  avai lable in h i l l y  
forest reserve areas at 100 baht per ra i  , but t h i s  is  land of poor 
q u a l i t y  and carr ies  with i t  the r i s k  o f  arrest for i l l e g a l  sett lement. 
Thus there exists  a steep land pr ice gradient,  pr ices r i s in g  with both 
q u a l i ty  o f  land and secur i ty  o f  t i t l e .  As a r e s u l t ,  the best land is 
f a l l i n g  into the hands o f  those with ready c a p i ta l ,  increasing ly  in the 
case of Ban Dong to wealthy outsiders.
Land can be acquired through inher i tance, but the t ra d i t ion a l  
d iv is io n  o f  land among o f fsp r ing  is  inh ib i ted  by a number o f
f a c t o r s . 13 i n Ban Dong, debt has forced a number o f e lde r ly  farmers 
to se l l  rather than to pass on t h e i r  land. In Bung Khiew in 1984 - 
1985, fo r  example, two of the longer-term residents divided up th e i r  
land. One sold a large portion to an outsider from Nong Chang to pay
o f f  50,000 baht in debts to BAAC, a commercial bank, and neighbours.
The other sold his land to his ch i ld ren at h a l f  the going pr ice of 2000
baht per ra i  in order to meet debts. While th is  is  not a d i re c t  form
of debt fo reclosure, i t  represents a long-term trend toward loss o f  
control over land and an i n a b i l i t y  to reproduce the family  production 
unit  : even in the second case j u s t  described, young fami l ies  are
s ta r t ing  o f f  with the burden o f  a land debt.
In Ban Mai, inheri tance of the family p lo t  is  only possible fo r  
one o f  the fami ly ,  since subdivision of holdings is proh ib i ted. I t  is 
too ear ly  to assess the long-term e f fe c t  o f  th i s  or to determine how i t  
w i l l  a f fec t  inheri tance patterns,  but already the so lu t ion for some has 
been to move on to clear or purchase fo res t  reserve land, fo r  others to
take on wage labour in Ban Mai or elsewhere.
In some cases, state guaranteed r ig h ts  to land are not
s u f f i c i e n t .  An example in the case o f  Ban Mai is  tha t  o f  Dam, a migrant
from Ban Dong who helped Pot, a f r iend ,  clear land in 1975. In
exchange, he was given 25 ra i  o f  th i s  land at a time when i t s  cash
value was minimal. This land was duly allocated to Dam on land reform
in 1978, and he has farmed i t  since. In 1984, Pot turned up to demand
15,000 baht fo r  "h is"  land. Unable to pay and fee l ing  the demand 
u n ju s t i f i e d ,  Dam refused. Pot reacted by rent ing the land to another 
v i l l a g e r .  Frightened of Pot (two people were k i l l e d  in nearby Isa the 
previous year in s im i la r  circumstances), Dam went in to  the forest  at 
Thong Lang to rent yaang t rees fo r  tapping in the hope o f  ra is ing  the 
cash. However, he only j u s t  broke even, the whole family  having caught
malaria, and in ear ly  1985 was unable to pay Pot when he again demanded 
payment. By Apri l  1985, Pot had raised the demand to 20,000 baht , 
with threats  to Dam's l i f e  i f  he could not raise the money with in  a 
week. Dam spoke in formal ly  with the v i l l a g e  head, who suggested he t e l l  
ALRO but declined to intervene on Dam's behalf .  Dam f e l t  tha t  going to 
ALRO would only make Pot more v io le n t ,  and ALRO is  seen not to intervene 
in such cases. Dam f led with his family back to re la t ive s  in Ban Dong 
and Pot continues to rent out the land. Dam summarizes his ra t iona le  
quite c lea r ly :  "Having no land is  better than my chi ld ren having no 
fa ther and my wife no husband. (Mai m i i  t h i i  d i i  kwaa 1uuk mai m i i  
p h o \  mia mai m i i  phua)".  This is  a stark example o f  where power has 
superceded state guarantees in access to land.
Less extreme cases re s u l t  from the a b i l i t y  o f  i n f lu e n t ia l
v i l l a g e rs  to gain access to  land by rent ing debtors' land at token rates 
and in some cases in l ie u  of i n te re s t .  ALRO ru les p roh ib i t  rental  of 
land, since the land reform ideal is  to encourage equal family size 
p lo ts .  However, the people involved in i l l e g a l  rent ing include the 
v i l la g e  head, tambon doctor ,  and other in f lu e n t ia l  moneylenders within  
the v i l l a g e .  ALRO has neither the w i l l  nor the means to enforce i t s  
ru les against such people, some of whom are in any case by v i r tue  o f  
th e i r  pos it ion  minor state funct ionar ies .  The same held true of 
sales o f  land by in f lu e n t i a l  local people to newcomers at pr ices in
excess o f  the ALRO pr ice ,  which in many cases meant tha t  the ALRO loan
was in s u f f i c i e n t  fo r  f u l l  purchase. In some cases t h i s  has meant that
Ban Mai fami l ies  are unable to work the land tha t  is  le g a l l y  t h e i r s ,  and 
fear o f the owner prevents them from bringing the matter into the open. 
While ALRO is  aware o f  the problem, i t  admits helplessness in enforcing 
i t s  own ru les .
Foreclosure is s t i l l  uncommon but nevertheless an increasingly
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important means o f  land acquis i t ion  in Ban Dong. In Bung Khiew, fo r  
example, one farmer had to se l l  a l l  his r iceland in 1984 to pay o f f  a 
debt to a Ban Dong v i l l a g e r .  His in tent ion  was to move on to newly 
cleared fo res t  land in Bung Waeng along with another landless Bung Khiew 
v i l l a g e r .  Many Bung Khiew v i l la g e rs  expressed uncertainty  as to whether 
they would be able to survive another drought year such as 1.984,13 
More common, but less overt ,  is  the rental  of Ban Mai land by wealthy 
farmers described above, which often amounts to foreclosure in a l l  but 
name. The owners o f  rented land express uncertainty as to the period o f  
re n ta l .  In some cases, such land has been put over to sugar cane, which 
is  at leas t  a three-year and sometimes a four-year investment.
Whereas renta l  is a strategy o f  the b e t t e r - o f f  for control  over
land in Ban Mai, in Ban Dong i t  tends to be the landless or
near- landless who rent land (Table 5 .2 ) .  Usually the land rented is 
s u f f i c ie n t  for subsistence requirements only.  Three broad types of 
rental  contracts e x is t :  cash, ka , and baeng suan . The f i r s t
involves a f ixed payment in cash, the second in r i c e .  The la t t e r  is  a 
sharecropping agreement, with one- th ird to tw o - f i f t h s  o f  the r i ce  crop 
the normal payment; a second crop o f  mung beans may be cu l t iva ted  
without charge. The operator is responsible fo r  a l l  inputs. In the 
case o f  baeng suan, the rent may be reduced at the d isc re t ion  o f  the 
owner in a bad year. Fixed payments are increasing ly  preferred by 
landlords as g iving a predictable income. 13 Even tenants with assured 
income sometimes prefer the ka system. They see i t  as giving more 
incentive to increase y ie lds ,  and also prefer being able to sel l  r i ce  
immediately a f te r  i t  is  harvested and threshed.
The o r ig in a l  means of securing control  over land, staking claim 
to i t ,  is  more or less precluded now tha t  even the steepest land behind
Ban Mai has been claimed. Much o f  t h i s  land has been claimed by
i n f lu e n t ia l  people in Ban Mai, Thung Khaa, and surrounding v i l lages .  
Some o f  these staked out or bought th is  land as a re su l t  o f  having had 
to se l l  land within  the ALRO area. I t  is  sold o f f  to landless fami l ies 
as fa r  a f ie ld  as Ban Dong fo r  the same price as they would pay to rent 
land fo r  a single year in t h e i r  own v i l la g es .
Table 5.2 Tenant cha rac te r is t ies  in Ban Dong and Ban Mai
% of  v i l l a g e rs  Average land Income as
who rent land owned { r a i )  % of average
Ban Dong 29 13 44
Ban Mai 21 33 150
Despite the complexity o f  control  over land in Ban Dong and Ban 
Mai, cer ta in  s ig n i f i c a n t  points can be drawn from the above patterns. 
Legal ownership and actual control  over land do not necessar i ly move in 
the same d i re c t io n .  Aspects o f  power, i n a b i l i t y  o f  household production 
units to reproduce themselves in an increasingly commercialized v i l la g e  
economy, and discrepancies between state guarantees and th e i r  praxis a l l  
work against control  over land by the poorer, less powerful sections, 
both inside and outside the two v i l la g e s .  In Ban Dong, where state 
control  over land is re s t r i c te d  to guarantees over property r i g h t s ,  such 
processes are above board and to some extent v i s ib le  but usual ly take 
the form of undramatic intergenerat ional trends ra ther than b la tant 
dispossession. In Ban Mai, where state contro ls  are greater and 
nominally more equitab le , most o f  the processes are covert and thus 
la rge ly  in v is ib le  to outs iders, but more sharply f e l t  by those 
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For most Ban Dong and Ban Mai v i l l a g e rs ,  water is contro l led by 
thewadaa (the gods). Atho ugh the r i t u a l  of parading a cat in a cage 
(hae maew) is s t i l l  practised occasional ly i f  the f i r s t  ra ins are 
la te ,  fo r  most i t  i s  a matter o f  chance and where possible r i s k  
minimizat ion st ra teg ies are taken accordingly.  In Ban Dong, water 
storage in r ice  paddies is  maximized by the usual pract ice o f  d ik ing .  
In some cases paddies have been created by l e v e l l in g .  The a v a i l a b i l i t y  
o f  commercial machinery on hire has led some o f  those with s u f f i c i e n t  
capital  to undertake such l e v e l l i n g ,  and i t  is an expressed desire o f  
many even in Ban Mai to use any cap ita l  that should come th e i r  way for 
leve l l ing  to enable water storage and r ice  pi a n t in g .13 ALRO has 
undertaken some le v e l l in g  work for ease o f  ploughing in Ban Mai, but 
t h i s  has fa i led  to prevent serious erosion on steeper ALRO land. 
Indeed, in 1984 poor t iming o f  grading work led to an almost to ta l  loss 
o f  pi led up topso i l  down a g u l l y  from one fam i ly 's  land with the a r r iva l  
o f  the f i r s t  r a in s .
In Ban Dong, water is contro l led communally through an elected 
i r r i g a t i o n  committee. This committee looks a f te r  the bamboo and log 
weir at Paak Heuang and the channels that d iv e r t  water from the Tap 
Salao River to the lower- ly ing r ice  f i e ld s  of Ban Dong. Although th is  
is  an indigenous group, D is t r i c t  au tho r i t ies  have recent ly  attempted to 
formalize control  and now attend group meetings. Several attempts have 
been made by Bung Khiew v i l la g e rs  to d iv e r t  water to th e i r  f i e ld s ,  but 
so far without success. One such attempt is  documented at length in 
Chapter V I I .
Both in Ban Dong and in Ban Mai, natural  streams provide an 
in te rm i t ten t  source of water for r i ce  c u l t i v a t io n .  Water can be 
diverted by the owners o f  land adjoining these streams. In a few cases,
i t  may be possible to practise f ish  farming where enough water can be 
held back. Since there is  no community or legal sanction governing the 
use o f  t h i s  resource, upstream farmers have the advantage o f  p r io r
access.
On a larger  scale, two long term projects tha t  w i l l  a f fec t  Ban 
Dong and Ban Mai are under way. One is the large 565 m i l l io n  baht
dam at Rabam (see Map 5),  which w i l l  store water in an 11,390 ra i
reservo i r  as part  o f  the larger Tap Salao i r r i g a t i o n  pro jec t .  Because 
th is  was f i r s t  planned in the ear ly  1970s when l i t t l e  o f  Lan Sak was 
under c u l t i v a t i o n ,  no provision has been made fo r  diversion of
i r r i g a t i o n  water to Lan Sak f i e ld s  except for a resett lement s i te  at
Phet Mam Pheung. 123,000 ra i  o f  land in Hong Chang are scheduled to 
receive water from th is  p ro jec t ,  which w i l l  be completed by 1990 at the 
ea r l ie s t  and involves no local planning or management o f  i r r i g a t i o n .  I t  
w i l l  benef i t  Ban Dong, however, in reducing flood r i s k .  The other
pro jec t  is a smaller dam costing about 3 m i l l i o n  baht (excluding 
d is t r ib u t i o n  channels), b u i l t  above Ban Mai in 1986. I r r i g a t io n
potent ial  is s t i l l  uncertain, and Ban Mai v i l la g e rs  have had no part in 
the planning o f  t h i s  dam. The immediate benef i t  ant ic ipated by poorer 
fami l ies was a sustained period of wage employment at minimum wage rates 
(nearly twice the ag r icu l tu ra l  wage) in construct ion o f  the dam, but 
th i s  has fa i led  to mater ia l ize (see section V I I I . 3 . i i i  below).
Insofar as trends in control  over water are discernable, one
tendency is  worthy of mention. This is a de te r io ra t ing  natural
s i tu a t io n ,  which farmers at least had the means o f  adapting to i f  not 
co n t ro l l ing  absolute ly ,  matched by a compensatory programme o f  large
scale w o rk s .^  However, where control by adaptat ion in the past was
in the hands o f  ind iv idual farmers and community i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  the large 
scale programmes are run by the bureaucracy. In one important respect
there is thus decl in ing control  over th is  resource fo r product ion.
V>2>i i i  Capital
The increasing external o r ien ta t ion  and de te r io ra t ing  natural 
resource s i tu a t ion  o f  the v i l la g e  ag r icu l tu ra l  economy in Lan Sak mean 
that local resources are i n s u f f i c ie n t  for sustained or increased 
production. As a r e s u l t ,  control  over non-local inputs to agr icu l tu re  
assumes importance. This is  determined by access to both short- term 
cap ita l  for seasonal production inputs and long-term cap i ta l  fo r  control  
over non- local!y  produced factors o f  production.
Except fo r  those with income surplus to consumption and minimum 
production requirements, access to c red i t  is the means o f  securing 
control  over c a p i t a l .  Credit  is  usual ly divided into i n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  or 
formal,  c re d i t  and non- ins t i tu t iona l  , or informal,  c re d i t .  The former 
is  at f ixed and r e la t i v e l y  low in te res t  rates but l im i ted  to those who 
f u l f i l  set condit ions regarding co l la te ra l  or other forms o f  guarantee. 
The l a t t e r  is  at var iable  and r e la t i v e l y  high in te res t  ra tes ,  but is 
accessible to those who would otherwise not q u a l i fy  fo r  an equivalent 
loan from in s t i t u t i o n a l  sources. This is  often because the guarantees 
covering the l a t t e r  type of loan are not based on le g a l l y  foreclosable 
assets but ra ther  on u n o f f ic ia l  tenure o f  land, even less tangible t ie s  
o f  pa t ron-c l ien tage, or exert ion o f  au tho r i ty .  Table 5.3 shows the 
proportion o f  c re d i t  received from each source in the two v i l la g e s .
Ban Dong and Ban Mai farmers have four potent ia l  sources o f  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c re d i t .  These are b r i e f l y  out l ined below, as are 
parameters a f fec t ing  th e i r  importance to various groups. .
1. Commercial bank loans. These are l im i ted  to wealthier
v i l l a g e rs .  The normal co l la te ra l  here is land with N.S.3 or Chanood 
t i t l e .  However, machinery or other read i ly  saleable assets can also be 
used. The advantage o f  such c re d i t  is  tha t  a loan can be obtained up to 
the value of proffered c o l l a te ra l .  Also, i t  is  arranged on an 
indiv idual basis. Only 4 per cent o f  Ban Dong v i l l a g e rs  and no Ban Mai 
v i l l a g e rs  reported having such loans (Table 5.3).  In 1984-85, the
in te res t  rate fo r  short and medium term loans was 18.5 per cent per 
annum.
2. Bank fo r  Agr icu l tu re  and Agr icu l tu ra l  Cooperatives 
(BAAC). This is the most important source of i n s t i t u t i o n a l
ag r icu l tu ra l  c re d i t .  Hypothet ica l ly ,  any farmer is  e n t i t l e d  to a BAAC 
loan. The need for ind iv idual co l la te ra l  as guarantee is replaced by 
the j o i n t  l i a b i l i t y  system, whereby any number o f  farmers from six 
upward guarantee each o ther 's  repayment. I t  is possible, there fo re , 
tha t  even landless farmers can q u a l i f y  fo r  loans. In p ract ice ,  however, 
there are considerable obstacles to poorer farmers obtaining loans. 
Local BAAC loan o f f i c e r s  are re luc tan t  to accept landless or otherwise 
assetless new members. Likewise, local groups are re luc tan t  to 
guarantee members who may be unable to repay t h e i r  loans. The bias o f  
BAAC loans in favour o f  larger  farmers has been adequately documented 
(e.g. L igh t foot  and Fox 1983 : 43). In fa c t ,  BAAC f igures show tha t  in 
Uthaithani as a whole, t h i s  bias is  considerably less severe than 
elsewhere (L igh t foo t  1985 : Table 1). In Ban Dong and Ban Mai many 
poorer farmers are members o f  BAAC. However, fo r  reasons that w i l l  
become apparent, t h i s  does not give them equal access to loans. In 
1984, one th i rd  o f  Ban Dong farmers and one quarter o f  Ban Mai farmers 
took out BAAC loans. In 1984-85 the BAAC annual ra te  o f  in te res t  was 14 
per cent,  r i s in g  to 17 per cent on defau lt  o f  the one year loan
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Table 5.3 Access to credit in Ban Dong and Ban Mai
Bari Bong Ban !iai
Cumulativt 
No. of 
d»bt« ,'■/ j
1 debt
2 debts
3 debts
Cr«d1 tor*
Commercial
banks
BAAC
Cooperatives
A g ric u ltu ra l
middlemen
V illa g e
traders
Relatives
TOTAL
56
4
I of v il la g e rs  C red it I of to ta l
rece iv in g  c re d it  given c re d it
4
33
11
7
26
11
93
172,000 6 . 1
844.000 29.8
132.000 4.7
478.000 16.9
562.000 19.8
644,000* 22.7
2,B32,000 100.0
81
at
I of v il la g e rs  C red it I of to ta l
rece iv ing  c re d it  given c re d it
25
15
67
20
0
792.000
332.000 
2,290,000
0. 0
18.2
7.6
52.6
132
756,400 17.4
184,000 4.2
4,354,400 100.0
* Hare than 90 per cent of th is  is  accounted fo r  by 2 debts, those of a schoolteacher and v il la g e  trade r.
Notes i Total amounts of c re d it are estimated by m u ltip ly in g  the 25’/. sample to ta l bv 4. 
Numbers of debts and c re d ito rs  may not t a l l y  due to  rounding.
con t rac t .
In addit ion to one-year (short- term) loans, medium and long term 
finance is offered by BAAC at s l i g h t l y  higher in te res t  rates. This is 
secured almost exc lus ive ly  by b e t te r - o f f  farmers and used fo r  the most 
part for purchase of a g r icu l tu ra l  machinery. In 1985, a wealthy Ban 
Dong resident was bu i ld ing a r ice  m i l l  in Bung Khiew, using a 250,000 
f ive  year BAAC loan. The formation and operation o f  BAAC groups w i l l  be 
described fu r the r  in Chapter V II .
3. Government cooperatives and farmers1 associa t ions. These 
organizations ex is t  mainly as sources of ag r icu l tu ra l  c re d i t .  They 
obtain finance from BAAC at an interest rate 3 per cent below th e i r  
lending ra te ,  which is  in l ine  with tha t  of BAAC. Repayment records o f  
these organizations are very poor when compared with d i re c t  lending. 
This is  la rge ly  due to t h e i r  lack o f  personnel or sanction when compared 
with other c red i to rs .  As a r e s u l t ,  BAAC now a l locates r e la t i v e l y  l i t t l e  
c re d i t  v ia these organizat ions. In 1984, 11 per cent of Ban Dong
farmers took cooperative c re d i t ,  from Lan Sak Agr icu l tu ra l  Cooperative 
(LSAC) and Ban Dong Farmers' Associat ion (BDFA). This amounted to less
than 5 per cent o f  to ta l  and only 11 per cent o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c red i t  in
Ban Dong. BDFA now gets no support from BAAC, so i t s  c re d i t  operation 
is  r e la t i v e l y  i n s ig n i f i c a n t ,  re ly ing  on members' subscript ions as a pool
o f  revolving c re d i t .  I t s  other funct ion of se l l ing  r ice  via the
Farmers' Marketing Organization (FMO), fo r  which many farmers o r ig i n a l l y  
jo ined, lapsed a f te r  a year as FMO did not carry on i t s  pre fe rent ia l  
marketing service. In Ban Mai, ALRO set up a cooperat ive, membership o f  
which is  compulsory for a l l  non-BAAC members. I t  has no funct ion other 
than supplying ag r icu l tu ra l  c red i t  and has an abysmal repayment record: 
in 1984, 139 out of 145 borrowers defaulted. 15 per cent of Ban Mai 
farmers took out cooperative c re d i t  in 1984, representing 30 per cent o f
lo o
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c re d i t .
Table 5.4 In te rest on debt in Lan Sak
FORM OF INTEREST
Cash In kind Free
Commerc ial 100 -
Bank (18.5% pa)
c
R BAAC/Coop. 100 - -
E (14% pa)
D
I Middleman 82 13 5
T (3-5% pm) (15-25 tg ps)
0
R Vi 11 age 47 47 6
Trader (5-10% pm) (10-30 tg ps)
Relative 75 25
(3-4% pm)
Figures are percentages showing the inc idence o f  in te res t
charged by various c red i to rs .  Figures in brackets show the
range o f in te res t  rates.
pa = per annum pm = per month ps - per season tg = tang
4. Hire-purchase. In Ban Mai, th is  is  used mainly fo r  
f inancing purchase o f  consumer goods such as re f r ig e ra to rs  and 
te lev is ions .  However, power t i l l e r s ,  other vehic les, and other items of 
ag r icu l tu ra l  machinery are also commonly sold under such schemes, and
most Ban Dong h-p loans are fo r  the mult i-purpose power t i l l e r s  and
t r a i l e r  attachments. E ffec t ive  in te res t  rates are usual ly in excess 
o f  20 per cent per annum. The hire-purchase item i t s e l f  serves as 
c o l l a te ra l .  This necessitates a steady income, since several 
consecutive missed payments enable the h-p company to repossess without 
compensation, as not in f requently  happens in Ban Dong and Ban Mai when 
aggressive sales ta c t i c s  re su l t  in v i l l a g e rs '  making
purchases beyond the i r  means.^
Non- ins t i tu t iona l  c red i t  is o f  three main types. Although the
discussion here is  l im i ted to cash borrowing, i t  should also be
mentioned that borrowing in kind is common, p a r t i c u la r l y  r i c e .  Whether 
or not t h i s  i s  considered as borrowing for production depends on our 
conceptions and functional d i f f e re n t ia t io n  of the peasant household 
economy. This type o f  borrowing is  discussed fu r the r  in section
VI I  .5 J i .
1. Agr icu l tu ra l  middlemen. This is  the main form of
non - in s t i tu t io na l  c re d i t  in Ban Mai. Agr icu l tu ra l  middlemen have as
th e i r  pr inc ipa l  securi ty the crop i t s e l f ,  since c red i to rs  are obliged to
sel l  t h e i r  produce to them. They thereby estab l ish  a monopsony
posit ion. In te rest is usual ly paid in cash, at 5 per cent per month fo r
an ordinary loan. In Ban Dong, only 7 per cent o f  v i l l a g e rs  borrow from 
a gr icu l tu ra l  middlemen, whereas in Ban Mai two th i rd s  o f  a l l  v i l l a g e rs  
borrow from th i s  source. Most Ban Dong v i l l a g e rs  borrow from middlemen 
in nearby Paak Meuang, whi le Ban Mai v i l la g e rs  go fur ther  a f ie ld :  many 
borrow from Nong Chang or Uthaithani,  and some go as far a f ie ld  as
Lopburi and Takhl i in neighbouring provinces. In one respect th is  
demonstrates the pa t ron-c l ien t  nature of the cred itor-debto r  
re la t ionsh ip ,  since most o f  the more d is tan t  l inks  are remnants of past 
t i e s  in areas from which the debtor has migrated.
2. V i l lage t ra d e rs . For those unable to secure an outside 
loan due to in s u f f i c ie n t  connections or lack of tangible
c o l l a t e r a l ,  wealthy v i l l a g e rs  provide an increasingly  important source 
o f  c re d i t .  Most o f  these are v i l l a g e  t raders, and in Ban Mai they are 
known as "hua naa" , or agents [ o f  middlemen], since they obtain c red i t  
from middlemen t y p i c a l l y  at 2 to 3 per cent per month. They lend in 
cash; the pr inc ipal  is repaid in cash, but the in terest is often repaid 
in kind, t y p i c a l l y  20 to 30 tang of  r i ce  or maize per thousand baht 
borrowed. With a maximum f ive  month period between borrowing and 
repayment, t h i s  works out to at least 12 per cent and as much as 24 per 
cent per month in te res t  equivalent.  Sometimes the whole crop goes in 
ju s t  paying o f f  in te re s t ,  and an even larger amount needs to be borrowed 
to get through the fol lowing year. Debtors are obliged to buy th e i r  
inputs,  se l l  th e i r  produce, and very often to plough th e i r  land using 
the services o f  t h i s  same c re d i to r .  In Ban Dong, v i l l a g e  traders serve
as a source o f  secur i ty  in that they can be cal led on fo r  cash loans at
any t ime, but in Ban Mai poorer v i l l a g e rs  complain tha t  the shop owners 
now have to see the crop in the f i e ld s  before they w i l l  advance any cash 
c re d i t .  In Ban Dong 26 per cent o f  v i l l a g e rs  borrow from v i l lage  
traders, whi le in Ban Mai 20 per cent borrow from th is  source. In Ban 
Mai, cer ta in  c red i to rs  lend to poor famil ies who would otherwise have no
191
source of c a p i t a l ,  not out o f  sympathy but due to th e i r  reputat ion as 
being able to exert au tho r i ty .  I t  is known, fo r  example, that Saeng, a 
wealthy trader and t ra c to r  owner, k i l l e d  a man in his youth, and th is  is 
l inked to his a b i l i t y  to ext ract payment without the need fo r  co l la te ra l  
( " khao mai to 'ng phuud siang dang mai mi l  khrai  klaa biaw ro '  k : He 
doesn't  have to raise his voice : no-one would dare cross h im . . . " ) .
3. Family and close r e l a t i v e s . I f  loans from re la t ions  are o f  
short durat ion,  no in te res t  is  charged. In any case, such loans are 
general ly  o f  small amounts. In some cases, they are a matter o f 
r e c ip ro c i t y ,  whereby two d is ta n t l y  re lated households who might 
otherwise expect in te res t  t a c i t l y  agree to help each other over periods 
o f  shortage.
Many households depend on more than one source o f  c re d i t .  This 
strategy is  necessary for a number o f  reasons. BAAC c re d i t  is  popular 
fo r  i t s  low in te re s t ,  but other factors dr ive small farmers back toward 
dependence on the same informal lenders tha t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c re d i t  is  
supposed to replace. One is tha t  BAAC c red i t  is i n s u f f i c ie n t  in both 
quant i ty  and f l e x i b i l i t y  to cover both production and consumption 
requirements. BAAC adopts the conventional c a p i t a l i s t  separation of 
production from consumption. I t  therefore sees i t s  concern with the 
peasant household as l im i ted  to the ro le  o f  the l a t t e r  as a production 
un it  and lends accordingly,  f a i l i n g  to take into account even imputed 
family  labour costs in ag r icu l tu ra l  production. As a r e s u l t ,  most
households have not enough cash to see themselves through the year. 
This is  p a r t i c u la r l y  true in Ban Mai, where v i r t u a l l y  everything
necessary for subsistence must be bought, including r i c e .  In addi t ion , 
t iming of BAAC loans is  i n f l e x i b le .  Borrowing is once a year, to be
repaid with in  twelve months for short term loans. As a r e s u l t ,  many are
forced to resort  to in ter im loans from middlemen or wealthy v i l l a g e rs ,
and to a lesser extent r e la t i v e s ,  in order to make ends meet throughout 
the year. A fu r the r  problem with BAAC c re d i t  is  the s t ipu la t ion  that
seed and (as o f  1985} f e r t i l i z e r  must be taken in kind as part  o f  the
loan, otherwise no ent i t lement to c red i t  is  g iven .21 This is despite 
the fac t  tha t  many farmers have reservations about the s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  
the seed used compared with local va r ie t ies  in th is  marginal 
environment, for example concerning i t s  a b i l i t y  to withstand drought 
during middle growth. Even BAAC o f f i c i a l s  could provide no s c ie n t i f i c  
ra t iona le  for replacing i t  every y e a r . 22 F e r t i l i z e r  is o f  even more 
uncertain s u i t a b i l i t y ,  and i t  i s  clear tha t  most farmers do not want i t .  
This is evidenced by the fac t  that in 1985, most Ban Mai c l ie n ts  o f  BAAC 
sold th e i r  f e r t i l i z e r  to Paak Meuang traders at less than the price they 
were forced to buy i t  fo r by BAAC. This, together with the general
associat ion of BAAC with unmanageable debt, contr ibutes to the
frequently expressed sentiment that is at once a pun on BAAC c re d i t :
"Ngern klurn kl  aai pen ngern klum ([BAAC] group money has become worry
money)".
Middlemen and wealthy v i l la g e rs  maintain a hold on the i r  debtors
in a number of ways. One is the increasingly insa t iab le  demand for
c red i t  with commercialization o f  ag r icu l tu re  and corresponding increase 
in inputs. Another is  the debt cyc le , whereby outstanding debts are 
carried over (with in te res t  accruing) on the understanding that the 
debtor w i l l  continue to use the trading and mechanical services o f  the 
same merchant and/or t ra c to r  owner the fol lowing year. This is a 
remnant t i e  of pa t ron-c l ien tage, although i t s  m u l t ip le x i t y  has 
diminished. However, the a t t i tude  o f  c red i to r  as provider { t h i i  
pheung , l i t .  "one to depend on") remains strong. Moreover, there is 
usual ly a greater pressure to repay a n o n- ins t i tu t iona l  loan before an 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  loan, due to the pressure (kaan reng : l i t .  "hurrying")
brought to bear and the higher in terest rate a c c r u i n g . 23
On a phenomenological plane, the d i f fe rence between formal and 
informal debtor-c red i to r  re la t ions  is  re f lec ted  in the actual p r i o r i t y  
for repayment. Al together 24 of the 148 Ban Dong and Ban Mai v i l l a g e rs  
interviewed defaulted on one or more debts while paying back the other.  
Table 5.5 shows in which cases debts were repaid f i r s t  and in which they 
were outstanding. I t  is  in te res t ing  to note tha t  o ve ra l l ,  debt is 
repaid more promptly to informal than formal lenders. This is  pa r t ly  
due to the higher ra te  o f  in te res t  accruing on such loans. I t  is  also 
due to the a b i l i t y  o f  middlemen to "rush : reng" repayment, whi le BAAC
and espec ia l ly  cooperatives have l i t t l e  sanction. L a t te r l y ,  many BAAC 
members have in fac t  made desperate attempts to pay back th e i r  loans so 
as not to "sia prawat : spoil  [ t h e i r ]  records" and d isqua l i fy
themselves from fu r th e r  c re d i t .  This was evident in Ban Mai in 1985, 
when groups o f  BAAC c l ie n ts  arranged to borrow from v i l la g e  traders at 
10 per cent for a sing le month in order to repay t h e i r  BAAC loans and 
obtain the fo l lowing year's loan, which was immediately used to repay 
the trader.  This i s  one o f  the c learest  examples o f  the downward sl ide 
into permanent m u l t ip le  debt faced by many Ban Mai v i l l a g e rs .
Table 5.5 P r io r i t y  in debt repayment 
CREDITOR
Relative Vi l lage Middle BAAC Coop Comm.:Total
p
R
trader man bank
I High 1 7 15 3 1 1 28
0
R
T
Low 4 3 1 6 14 0 28
T
Y
Note: The to ta l  is 28 in each case because 4 o f  the
24 debtors defaulted on two debts.
Among informal lenders, middlemen are repaid most promptly, 
v i l l a g e  traders next,  and re la t ive s  l a s t ,  since greater f l e x i b i l i t y  is 
possible in a more int imate debtor-cred i to r  re la t ionsh ip .  I t  is also
possible fo r  kin or fe l low v i l l a g e rs  to repay p a r t i a l l y  in kind, for 
example in labour serv ices . ^
In summary, the expansion o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c re d i t  has increased 
the overal l  level o f  debt rather than replaced e xp lo i ta t ive  
n o n - in s t i tu t io na l  debt. In Ban Dong the average long term farmer debt 
is  6,400 baht , in Ban Mai 9,400 baht. Less than ha l f  o f  th is  is 
l e f t  over from the previous year 's current debt, the remainder 
representing debt outstanding from previous years. This outstanding 
long-term debt is  increasing rap id ly  in both communities, p a r t i c u la r l y  
so in the commercialized economy o f  Ban Mai.
The demand fo r  c re d i t  and resu l t ing  debt a r ises,  as suggested 
above, from the need fo r  ever greater inputs in commercial ag r icu l tu re .  
Supposedly h igh-y ie ld ing  maize seed - from which not a single farmer I 
spoke to reported having noticed better resu lts  - is  a precondit ion fo r 
c re d i t  fo r  other purposes. Given freedom of ac t ion ,  most farmers would 
u t i l i z e  a single stock o f  seed for about three years before purchasing 
new stock even i f  they were to use the HYVs Suwan 1 or Suwan 2. An 
aggressive po l icy  o f  marketing by the Charoen Pokaphan (CP) company, 
which uses BAAC meetings as a forum, also plays a part .  Impressive 
charts show the y ie ld  to be expected with CP seed compared with local 
v a r ie t ie s ,  backed up by evidence from demonstration plo ts  which have 
been in tens ive ly  cared fo r ,  watered, and f e r t i l i z e d  on top grade so i ls  
in Lopburi province. This is  recognized by local farmers, who comment 
that "khao m i l  weel aa fao duu 1ae ta l  o 'd  y i i p  s i i  : they [CP]
have time to mollycoddle [ the p lo ts ]  24 hours a d a y . . . " .  Seed accounts 
for 15 percent o f  cash inputs in f i r s t  crop maize p lan t ing ,  but only 1.5
i  y o
per cent fo r the second crop since seed is kept over from the f i r s t  
harvest. For r i c e ,  seed only accounts for 5 per cent o f  cash inputs 
(Table 5.6a) .
Herbicides are necessary fo r  maize c u l t i v a t io n  in p a r t i cu la r .  
Since the fo res t  environment has been a l tered, weeds have become a major 
problem. P a r t i cu la r ly  rampant are yaa khommunit25 ( l i t .  communist 
grass) ,  yaa khaa (Imparatus c y l in d r i c a ) ,  and yaa phong 
{Thysanol aena maxima K tze) . The f i r s t  o f  these has l i t t l e  use, 
except p o te n t ia l l y  fo r  compost. Yaa khaa is used fo r  thatching and 
yaa phong fo r  making brooms, but they are otherwise seen as pests. 
Two types o f  herbicide are used: yaa khum yaa , which is  p reventa t ive , 
and yaa khaa yaa,  a weedki l ler  which is sprayed twice during growth. 
The f i r s t  o f  these has detr imental  e f fec ts  on the s o i l ,  f e l t  in 
pa r t icu la r  by those who plant mung beans as a second crop. The precise 
nature o f  the po l lu tan t  e f fe c t  on water sources is unknown, but f i sh  
disease is e v iden t .26 Herbicides account for 10 per cent o f  cash 
outlays for the f i r s t  crop o f  maize, 5 per cent for the second crop.
Po ten t ia l l y  more hazardous both d i r e c t l y  to human health and 
in d i r e c t l y  in t h e i r  e f fec ts  on w i l d l i f e  are insect ic ides.  Every year 
farmers spraying insect ic ides suffer serious re a c t io n s .27 These 
chemicals have become necessary in pa r t icu la r  fo r  mung beans and cotton, 
both affected by c a te rp i l l a r s .  However, the various pests quickly 
acquire a resistance to the pest ic ides. Moreover, those using l i t t l e  or 
no pest ic ide protect ion come o f f  worse i f  th e i r  neighbours use i t  than 
i f  none is used at a l l ,  since the damage is  then concentrated in th e i r  
f i e ld s .  As a r e s u l t ,  farmers are forced into an ever less e f fe c t ive  
cycle o f  insec t ic ide  use. Insect ic ides account for 16 and 26 per cent 
respect ive ly  o f  investment for upland and r iceland mung bean 
c u l t i v a t io n ,  and f u l l y  69 per cent fo r  cotton.
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Unt i l  1985, f e r t i l i z e r  use in Ban Dong and Ban Mai was minimal. 
In r ice  ag r icu l tu re  i t  was l im i ted  to the small areas o f  dry season 
i r r iga ted  crops, while i t  was only used in a few cases and in small 
quant i t ies  fo r  other crops. The reasons fo r  such low usage are
manifold. The pr inc ipal  reason is  the uncertainty o f  r a i n f a l l  and lack 
of confidence that the expense is warranted. Many fear the dependence 
(khwaamkhoey) on f e r t i l i z e r  that the soi l  acquires once i t  is  used and 
the hardening o f  the so i l  tha t  resu l ts  from protracted use. Such fears 
are j u s t i f i e d  by experience e l s e w h e r e . 28 Indeed, many o f  the negative 
ideas that Lan Sak farmers have about f e r t i l i z e r  come from f i r s t  or 
second hand experience in other areas, since many re ta in  l inks  with the 
d i s t r i c t  or province from which they moved to Lan Sak. Another reason 
is tha t  the so i l  is s t i l l  productive {"din yang mai s i  a : the soi l  is
s t i l l  u n spo i l t11) since i t  has only been used fo r  a short time. The
d i s t r i c t  DAE o f f i c e  has a po l icy  of achieving a standard f e r t i l i z e r  
usage o f  25 kg per ra i  and does not d i f f e re n t ia te  between s o i l s .  This 
crude approach does l i t t l e  to raise farmers' confidence in chemical 
f e r t i l i z e r  use. I t  is  not surpr is ing,  there fo re , tha t  when in 1985 BAAC 
st ipu la ted tha t  i t s  c l ie n ts  take f e r t i l i z e r  as part o f  t h e i r  loan, 
the react ion was one of feel ing "forced ( thuuk bangkhap)' \ and
evidence to the aversion to f e r t i l i z e r  use is  i t s  resale as described 
above. On the other side, DAE and BAAC regard the low use o f  f e r t i l i z e r  
as symptomatic of the ignorance (euphemist ical ly phrased as "khaad 
khwaamruu : l i t .  lacking in knowledge", rather  than the more d i re c t  
" la lo e i  : ignorant")  of farmers, although ind iv idual  f i e ld  o f f i ce rs
understand and sometimes accept as va l id  the farmers' case but are 
powerless to contravene the o f f i c i a l  po l icy .
The other major use o f  cap ita l  in seasonal production is  in the 
h ire  or purchase o f  machinery. The most important item here is out lay
1 u /
for ploughing. In Ban Dong r ice  ag r icu l tu re ,  ploughing by buf fa lo  is
s t i l l  prominent, but power t i l l e r s  are increasing ly  popular. This 
involves a cap ita l  out lay o f  30,000 to 40,000 bah t , depending on terms 
o f  purchase and what accessories (such as t r a i l e r ,  pump) are acquired. 
I f  they are not bought o u t r ig h t ,  BAAC medium or long term cred i t  is 
avai lable for some, but most depend on hire-purchase. 18 per cent of 
farmers in the two communities have power t i l l e r s ,  and of these 
two- th i rds  use them only for t h e i r  own f ie ld s .  Four wheel t ra c to r  
owners, on the other hand, use the i r  machines p r in c ip a l l y  fo r  h ir ing  out 
to other v i l l a g e rs .  Not even the largest farms warrant f u l l - t im e  use o f  
a t r a c to r ;  meanwhile, ploughing for upland cropping is now almost 
exc lus ive ly  by means o f  t r a c to r .  Rates vary from 70 to 120 baht per 
r a i  fo r  a single t i l l a g e ,  although more is charged i f  the land is
newly cleared or heavi ly  overgrown with weeds. To purchase a second 
hand Ford 5000 t ra c to r  requires at least 200,000 baht and is thus
l im i ted  to those with substant ial  ca p i ta l .  In Ban Dong and Ban Mai such 
capital  has been acquired through land sales, i l l e g a l  fo re s t ry ,  or 
trade. On the other hand, the cost can be recouped in less than two 
years i f  the t ra c to r  is put to f u l l  use. This means being able to h ire  
i t  out elsewhere during the local slack seasons. One Lan Sak t rac to r  
goes as far a f ie ld  as Paak Chong in Korat a f te r  the second ploughing. 
Personal connections external to the v i l la g e  are important in t h i s  case. 
For the majo r i ty  o f  upland farmers, p a r t i c u la r l y  in Ban Mai, h i re  of a 
t ra c to r  is  the sing le most cos t ly  cash input. I t  accounts fo r  38.1 per
cent as a whole, 35.1 per cent in Ban Dong and 39.0 per cent in Ban Mai.
For maize c u l t i v a t io n  i t  accounts fo r  40.7 per cent o f  inputs,  while for
cassava and sorghum 54.3 and 57.3 per cent o f  costs respect ive ly  go on
t rac to r  ploughing. Even for r i c e ,  t rac to r  ploughing now accounts for 
nearly h a l f  o f  a l l  cash inputs,  but th i s  is  h a l f  o f  a smaller out lay 
(Table 5.6).
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TABLE 5.6a Proportion of cash expenses incurred in each stage of 
c u l t i v a t io n  : ALL
7i l l  age Seed Pi ant­ Herb­ Insec t­ F e r t i ­ Spray­ Weeding Harvest h i l l i n g Trans­ OUTLAY INCOME ftV. RAI
ing ic ide ic id e l i s e r ing port PER RAI PER RAI PLANTED
baht baht (No.pitg)
RICE! 49.3 5.1 9.3 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 13.4 19,0 3.1 105 866 16.1 \ 69 i
RICE2 0.0 0.0 tc0 J. £ 0.0 0 . 0 3 . i 0 . 0 0.0 58.8 2.9 0. 0 269 1088 5.0 (3)
RICE3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 . 0 0.0 0 , 0 0 , 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 . 0 0 NA 1.0 i l l
HAIZE1 40.7 15.0 0. 1 10.0 0 . 2 0.1 1.2 3 ,3 12.3 7.5 6.0 -■0\ 646 23.4 (991
HAIZEZ 69.4 1.5 3.1 5.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.6 9.9 6.9 2.6 118 219 21.4 (7)
HAIZE3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 B7.5 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 160 900 1.0 (1)
HUNG! 35.5 12.1 0.0 0.0 16.1 0.2 2.0 0.0 28.1 4.7 1.4 267 405 16.6 (73)
HUNG2 26. B 9.8 0.0 0.0 26.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 32.6 0.7 0.1 215 496 11.2 (25?
CASSAVA 54.3 2.5 7 T■ sj 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.6 0.0 3.3 406 699 17.7 (3)
SOYA 30.8 12.1 0.0 0.0 6.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.7 16.6 B. 4 389 1575 20.0 {1}
CuTTQN 10.2 8.1 0.0 0.4 68.8 0.0 0.0 4.5 6.1 0.0 1.9 966 2740 4.2 (5)
SORSHUh 57.3 10.3 1.4 0,0 1.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 14.5 10.6 4.0 144 246 16.1 (13)
COti PEA 14.0 46.4 0.1 0.0 17.1 0.0 5.9 0,0 11.1 0.0 5.4 153 146 10.5 (4)
CASTOR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 1500 2.0 (1)
TOTAL 38.1 9.6 4.2 6.0 6.0 0.2 1.5 1.7 22.3 6.1 4.2
TABLE 5.6b Proport ion of cash expenses incurred in each stage of 
c u l t i v a t io n  : Ban Dang
Ti l l  age Seed Plant­
ing
Herb­
ic id e
Insec t­
ic id e
F e r t i ­
l i z e r
Spray­
ing
Weeding Harvest h i l l i n g  Trans­
port
OUTLAY 
PER RAI 
baht
INCOME 
PER RAI 
baht
AV. RAI 
PLANTED 
(No.p ltg)
RICE! 46.3 0.0 10.6 0.4 0,0 0.1 0.2 0.2 16.0 23.0 7 7 100 938 18.5 (51)
RICE2 0.0 0.0 35.2 0. 0 0.0 7 {J. 1 0.0 0.0 58.8 2.9 0.0 269 1088 5.0 C3>
RICE3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 NA 1.0 ! l i
mm 37.7 7 7 ^ 7 7 7.1 0.0 0.0 1. 0 5.6 8.4 8.1 6.2 214 097 14.2 (34)
HA1ZE2 85.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 5.1 1.1 83 120 12.5 (2)
HAIZE3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 87.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 160 900 1.0 ( I )
MUNG 1 37.2 6.1 0.0 0.0 19.2 0.0 2.0 0.0 29.5 4.9 1.0 n?r 463 8.4 (19)
HUNS2 27,4. 10.3 0.0 0.0 25.9 0.0 3,5 0.0 32.3 0.6 0.1 204 473 11.2 (24)
CASSAVA - - - - - - - - - - - - - (0)
SOYA - - - - - - - - - - - - - (0)
COTTON 9.2 17.2 0.0 0.0 7 j . 6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 .0 820 2700 4.5 (2)
SORSHUH 44.8 11.3 2.0 0.0 3.7 0.0 1.2 0.0 18.0 17.2 1.9 144 • 413 14.0 (5?
COWFEA 16.9 50.0 0.0 0.0 8.1 0.0 4.8 0.0 20.2 0.0 0.0 112 156 6.5 (2)
CASTOR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 o 1500 2.0 (1)
TOTAL 35.1 / ,  6 7.8 3.4 7.5 0.3 1.7 2.3 24.9 7.1 2.2
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TABLE 5.6c Proportion of cash expanses incurred in  each stage of 
c u l t i v a t io n  : Ban Kai
l i i l a g e Seed Plant­ Herb­ in sec t­ F e r t i ­ Spray­ Needing Harvest h i l l i n g  irans- OUTLAY IfiCOHE AV. RAI
ing ic ide ic ide l i z e r ing per i PER RAI PER RAI PLANTED
baht baht •NQ.pItg)
RICEI 59.3 21,9 5.1 0.1 0,0 0.3 0.0 0.0 4.8 5.8 2.7 119 660 9.1 (18;
RICE2 - - - - _ - - - - - - - - 10 i
R1CE3 - - - - - - - - - - _ - - -  (0)
HftlZEl 42.2 11.2 3.9 U .6 0.3 0.2 1.3 2.1 14.3 7.1 5.9 337 768 28.1 (65)
HAIZE2 62.8 2.2 4.4 7.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.8 10.7 7.6 " TW ft 131 259 25.0 (5)
MAIZE3 - _ - - - - - - - - - - - SO,1
KUNBi 34.9 14.2 0.0 0.0 15.1 0.2 1.9 0.0 27.6 4,6 1.5 278 384 19.5 (54)
MUNB2 14.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.8 0.0 12.3 0.0 41.2 3.3 0.0 406 1035 5.0 i l )
CASSAVA 54.3 2.5 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 36,6 0.0 3.3 406 699 17.7 (3)
soya 30.8 12. i 0.0 0.0 6.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.7 16.6 B. 4 389 1575 20.0 ( I )
COTTON! 10.9 1.9 0.0 0.6 65.6 0.0 0.0 7.5 10.2 0.0 3.1 1063 2767 4.0 (3)
B0RGHUI1 65.2 9.7 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.4 6.4 5.3 144 142 17.4 (8)
COWPEA 1 1 . 1 42.8 2.3 0.0 26.1 0.0 7.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 10.7 193 136 14.5 (2;
CASTOR - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (0)
TOTAL 39.0 10.2 3.1 6.8 5.5 0.2 1.5 1.5 21.4 5.B 4.9
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = : m = = r :
n.b. RICEi is  the p r in c ip a l  r ic e  crop; R1CE2 is  the secondary, i r r ig a te d  r ic e  crop; RICE3 is  g lu t inous r ic e .
HAIIE1 is  the p r in c ip a l  maize crop; HAIZE2 is  the secondary maize crop; HAIZE3 is  sweetcorn.
KUNG1 is  the upland mung dean crop fo l low ing  HAIIE 1 s MUNG2 is  the nce ia nd  suing bean crop fo l low ing  RICEI.
The income fros; unsold r ic e  is  calcula ted at 29 baht per tang.
£ U U
V ,2 Jv  Labour
Labour for production is secured in three main ways. F i r s t ,  
household labour {tham eng) provides the basis fo r  peasant 
product ion.29 Second, reciprocal labour (ao raeng or long 
khaek) provides the means fo r social mobi l iza t ion o f  labour fo r  tasks 
beyond the capacity o f  household labour. Third, waged employment 
[ jaang] commoditizes labour with in  the monetized economy. Two 
addi t ional  minor forms o f  labour are free labour given to re la t ive s  and 
neighbours, and community labour secured by d ic ta te  or agreement.
Household labour is  the form o f  labour over which the household 
production un i t  has most d i re c t  con t ro l .  Control over household labour 
depends f i r s t  and foremost on reproduction o f  the family  un i t .  This in 
turn requires adequate leve ls  o f  food consumption and health, both 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y  secured la rge ly  from own production and l o c a l l y  available 
resources. However, recent changes have altered th is  s i tua t ion  g rea t ly ,  
and cash is  now important for both forms o f  bodi ly  sustenance. In the 
case o f  food, most fami l ies in Ban Hai purchase the bulk o f  th e i r  
requirements, including r i c e .  In Ban Dong, subsistence production s t i l l  
commonly provides basic food needs, although most fami l ies  supplement 
th is  with cash purchases. However, in the case o f  medicine cash has 
become necessary with the decl ine in t ra d i t i o n a l  herbal pract ices, 
re l iance on modern drugs and hosp i ta ls ,  and the need fo r  cash payment to 
local doctors who in the past would have taken payment in kind (e.g. 
r i c e ,  chickens, labour services) .  The sl ide in to  debt is  commonly 
prec ip i ta ted by medical expenses, and these may in turn ar ise from 
i l ln e ss  re lated to production (see footnote 26 and the cases of Phad and 
Porn in section below).
T ra d i t io n a l l y ,  control  over household labour would have been an 
important asset in a s i tua t ion  o f  r e la t i v e  land abundance and low 
capital  inputs. In p a r t i c u la r ,  c learing of fo rest land in Lan Sak and 
maintaining a claim to land depended on "having a fo l lowing or 'mates' : 
mii  phak m i l  phuak" , at the heart o f  which would have been a close and 
preferably large family  ( c f .  Ananya 1985 : 83 - 84). Several o f  the
most in f lu e n t ia l  v i l l a g e rs  in Ban Mai, fo r  example the v i l l a g e  head and 
the tambon doctor,  come from large Thung Khaa fam i l ies .  With 
increasing land sca rc i ty ,  changing means o f  securing control  over land, 
and the growing importance o f  capita l  inputs in the production process, 
the advantages o f  control  over household labour diminish in re la t ive  
s ign i f icance. Indeed, an excess o f  household members can be a l i a b i l i t y  
in terms o f  increased consumption demands.30 Furthermore, in the 
r e la t i v e l y  closed v i l l a g e  economy, household labour was f u l l y  under the 
control  of the household production un i t .  Declining opportun it ies for 
employment o f  such labour and increasing o f f - fa rm  employment, on the 
other hand, cause young people to leave the i r  fami l ies  at an age where 
they are most product ive.31 This is  widespread in Ban Mai in 
pa r t i cu la r .  Many o f  the young people who leave lose contact with th e i r  
parents, and large remittances from children working in Bangkok or 
elsewhere are the exception rather than the ru le .  40 per cent in Ban 
Mai and 26 per cent in Ban Dong who l i v e  away from home send no 
remittance at a l l .  Despite these changes, a cer ta in  amount o f  household 
labour is s t i l l  important for most stages in the ag r icu l tu ra l  production 
process, as i s  evident from Table 5.1.
The major exceptions are in non-r ice a g r icu l tu re ,  where ploughing 
is  done mostly by t ra c to r  because o f  two main environmental constra in ts .  
One is the hardening of the soil  tha t has taken place fol lowing 
deforesta t ion ,  which makes use o f  draught animals d i f f i c u l t .  This is
compounded by the e f fe c t  o f  t ra c to r  ploughing i t s e l f ,  which fu r ther  
compresses the soi l  and leads to the formation o f  a hardpan, while not 
providing nutr ients  and the healthy s t ruc tu ra l  e f fe c t  tha t animal manure 
has on the s o i l .  The other constra in t  is  the shortened plant ing season, 
which means tha t  the period for ploughing is short .  Delays are 
therefore r i s k y ,  and ploughing early  is  not pract icable because o f  
weeds. M i l l i n g ,  husking, and threshing is mainly by machine because o f  
the need to get produce sold qu ick ly .  The buyer usual ly also m i l l s ,  
husks, or threshes the produce.
Household labour is not s u f f i c ie n t  for many o f  the stages o f  the 
cropping process, since there is  only a "window" o f  a few days due to 
weather rela ted factors or to the need for even plant ing and harvest ing. 
This has always been true in r i c e  c u l t i v a t io n .  Reciprocal arrangements 
have been a t r a d i t i o n a l  method of securing control  over v i l l a g e  labour 
within the community but beyond the individual household. These 
arrangements w i l l  be discussed in more de ta i l  in Chapter V I I ;  fo r  the 
time being, discussion is  l im i ted to the trends in use o f  t h i s  form o f  
labour.
Ao raeng has diminished in importance rap id ly  throughout the 
Central Plains (Ananya 1985 : 92; G i r l ing  1981 : 45). In Lan Sak i t  is 
s t i l l  common in r ice  harvesting and in maize p lan t ing ,  but otherwise i t  
is  used decreasingly (Table 5 .7 ) .  Previously, ao raeng would be used 
for r ice  transplant ing and other parts o f  the ag r icu l tu ra l  production 
cycle.  Important ly,  control over such labour depends not on access to 
cap ita l  or other external resources, but on two i n t r i n s i c a l l y  domestic 
resources, namely household labour and social re la t ions  within the 
community.32 Reasons fo r  the decl ine o f  ao raeng are suggested in 
Chapter V I I .  Meanwhile, Table 5.8 shows tha t  a b i l i t y  to depend solely 
on household and reciprocal labour var ies both between crops and between
203
Table 5.7a Proportion o-f non-househald labour hired/reciprocal : ALL
Planting Spraying Weeding Harvesti ng
RICEI 657. R
(No.pitg) 
877. H 1007. H 707. R
RICE2 S27. H - - 1007. H
RICE3 - — - _
MAIZE1 547. H 977. H 637 H 857. H
MAIZE2 927. H 1007. H 1007. H 807. H
MAIZE3 - - _ -
MUNG1 907. R 957. H - 977. H
MUNG2 _ 1007. H - 947. H
CASSAVA 887. R - - 817. H
SOYA - - - 1007. H
COTTON 1007. R — 1007. H 657. H
SORGHUM 1007. H 1007. H 767. H
COWPEA 797. R 1007. H - 1007. H
CASTOR — — — —
Table 5.7b Proportion o-f nan -household labour hireid/reciprocal : Ban 
Dong
Planting Sprayi ng Weeding Harvesting
(Na.pitg)
RICEI 677. R 1007. H 1007. H 697. R
RICE2 827. H - - 1007. H
RICE3 - - - -
MAIZE1 537. R 1007. H 627. H 607. H
MAIZE2 - - - 1007. H
MAIZE3 - - - -
MUNG1 - 1007. H “ 917. H
MUNG2 - 1007. H - 947. H
CASSAVA - - ~ -
SOYA - - - _
COTTON - - - -
SORGHUM 1007. H 1007. H - 827. H
COWPEA 1007. R 1007. H - 1007 H
CASTOR — — — —
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Table 5-7c Proportion o-f non-household labour hired/reciprocal : Ban
Mai
PI anti ng Spraying Weedi ng Harvestir
(No.pitg)
RICEI 55'/. H 100% R — 79% R
RICE2 - - - _
RICE3 - - - -
MAIZE1 567. H 97% H 637. H 89% H
MAIZE2 927. H 100% H 1007. H 797. H
MAIZE3 - - - -
MUNG1 90% R 94% H - 98% H
MUNG2 - 1007. H - 1007. H
CASSAVA 88% R - - 81% H
SOYA - - 1007. H
COTTON 100% R - 100% H 657. H
SORGHUM 1007. H - - 70% H
COWPEA 100% H 1007. H - 100% H
CASTOR - _ - -
n.b. RICEi is the principal rice crop; RICE2 is the secondary, irrigated 
rice crop; RICE3 is glutinous rice. MAIZE1 is the principal maize crop; 
MAIZE2 is the secondary maize crop; MAIZE3 is sweetcorn. MUNG1 is the 
upland mung bean crop -following MAIZE1; MUNG2 is the ri cel and mung bean 
crop -following RICEI.
H = HIRED LABOUR 
R = RECIPROCAL LABOUR
CUD
communities fo r  the same crop. In general, subsistence rather than cash 
crops can be produced using so le ly  these domestic labour resources, and 
the less commercialized economy o f  Ban Dong shows a greater re l iance on 
household and reciprocal labour than Ban Mai even fo r  cash crops.
Table 5.8 Households using only own and rec iprocal  labour in labour 
intens ive stages o f  production' for each crop
Ban Dong Ban Mai
RICEI 62.7 (69.8) 83.3 (24.0)
RICE2 33.3 (4.1) - (0.0)
RICE3 100.0 (1.4) - (0.0)
MAIZE1 38.2 (46.6) 12.3 (86.7)
MAIZE2 50.0 (2.7) 40.0 (6.7)
MAIZE3 100.0 (1.4) - (0.0)
MUNG1 31.6 (26.0) 14.8 (72.0)
MUNG2 12.5 (32.9) 0.0 (1.3)
CASSAVA - (0.0) 33.3 (4.0)
SOYA - (0.0) 0.0 (1.3)
COTTON 100.0 (2.7) 33.3 (4.0)
SORGHUM 40.0 (6.8) 12.5 (10.7)
COWPEA 50.0 (2.7) 50.0 (2.7)
CASTOR 100.0 (1.4) - (0.0)
* Plant ing, spraying, weeding, harvest ing
Note : Figures in brackets represent % planting that crop
While the importance o f  household labour and reciprocal labour 
has been d im in ish ing, h i r ing  o f  labour has been on the increase. In Ban 
Dong 62 per cent and in Ban Mai 68 per cent o f households are engaged in 
paid ag r icu l tu ra l  employment. Although the wealthier farmers are the 
larger employers, even small , capital  d e f ic ie n t  households employ labour 
at some stages o f  the ag r icu l tu ra l  production process. As a re s u l t ,  40 
per cent and 57 per cent o f  Ban Dong and Ban Mai households respect ive ly  
are simultaneously ag r icu l tu ra l  labourers and employers o f  labour. 
Table 5.6 shows the extent o f  use o f  hired labour r e la t i v e  to reciprocal 
labour in each stage o f  c u l t i v a t io n  o f  various crops in the two 
v i l  1 ages.
I t  should be noted that securing even wage labour is not e n t i r e l y  
independent o f  social  re la t io n s .  Use o f  the term "khaek : l i t .  guest" 
as opposed to " luuk jaang : l i t .  employee" is a con t inu i ty  o f
discourse that underl ies a cer ta in  con t inu i ty  of funct ional status in 
the producer-labourer re la t ionsh ip .  Proof o f  th i s  l i e s  in the treatment 
of wage labourers working alongside reciprocal labourers as ordinary 
khaek, whereas quite d i f f e re n t  expectations are held of teams of 
whol ly hired labour. Wealthier farmers who employ so le ly  or mainly wage 
labour r e c ru i t  from large pools a l l  round the v i l l a g e ,  although 
p r a c t i c a l i t y  often involves having to "bo1 k khaek : l i t .  t e l l
labourers" who l i v e  close to each other in order to save time in 
summoning labour. Smaller farmers re c ru i t  from with in  a l im i ted  c i r c le ,  
often employing khaek from fami l ies  who la te r  employ them. Teams o f  
rec iprocat ing fami l ies  during the planting season w i l l  h ire  labour f i r s t  
and foremost with in  the c i r c le  when i t  comes to harvest ing.
Nevertheless, even though wage labour does not e n t i r e l y  undermine 
the importance o f  social re la t io n s ,  control  over ag r icu l tu ra l  labour 
depends to a decreasing extent on i n t r in s i c  household resources and to a 
greater extent on the a b i l i t y  to hire labour. This in turn requires 
access to c a p i ta l .  As a r e s u l t ,  poorer households suffer  a loss of 
control over labour fo r  product ion, since they are at once unable to 
summon reciprocal labour,  as in the past, and at the same time are 
constrained in th e i r  a b i l i t y  to h ire  wage labour. Such households thus 
become net suppl iers  of wage labour, while wealthier households manage 
to secure labour beyond what could be achieved using only household 
resources.
Management o f  labour shows a q u a l i ta t i ve  change in the move from 
household and reciproca l labour to hired labour. No supervision is  
required fo r  household labour, since those involved are a l l  part o f  the
same production and consumption un i t .  I t  is often said by v i l l a g e rs  
tha t  they prefer working on the i r  own land, since "tham maak dai maak; 
tham noi dai noi : do a l o t  and you get a l o t ;  do l i t t l e  and you get
l i t t l e "  and "neuai ko‘ phak dai : i f  you're t i red  you can re s t " .  In 
the case o f  reciprocal labour,  supervision is l im i ted  to pointing out 
which f i e ld s  are to be planted when. Any members o f  the "host : 
jaophaap" household in the f ie ld s  w i l l  work alongside the khaek, 
whi le rests  are taken by common agreement. The knowledge tha t  the task 
is  to be reciprocated prevents sh i rk ing ,  but the work is  more relaxed 
and t iming more f l e x ib le  than hired labour : i f  a f i e ld  is  f in ished 
ear ly ,  khaek may go home ear ly ;  i f  a small amount remains to be done 
at going home t ime, khaek of ten stay on to f i n is h  the job as they 
would on t h e i r  own f ie ld s .  For hired labour, on the other hand, 
supervision is much s t r i c t e r .  An adult member o f  the h i r ing  household
supervises the work, c a l l s  the breaks, and occasional ly  admonishes
slackers. Timing is s t r i c t l y  by the clock.
Agr icu l tu ra l  wage labour rates are well below the minimum wage in 
Uthaithani province of 54 baht per day. In Ban Dong and Ban Mai in 
1984 the standard rate was 30 baht.  Occasionally t h i s  r ises to 35 
baht at  times o f  peak demand, fo r  example during the height o f  the 
plant ing season in Ban Mai. Larger employers o f  labour even bring in 
teams from lowland v i l lages  during such periods. An increasing 
incidence o f  re l iance on cash income from wage labour means tha t  the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  such labour has increased, espec ia l ly  in Ban Mai. This 
has been accompanied by stagnant or f a l l i n g  wage ra tes. Despite 
i n f l a t i o n ,  the normal rate has not r isen for four years. Even more 
t e l l i n g  is  the r ice  wage as a l te rna t ive  to cash payment in Ban Dong.
The eldest residents report  that th is  once standard form of payment has
stood at one tang of paddy fo r  as long as they can remember. This 
same tang payment is fo r  the employer equivalent to s l i g h t l y  less than
the 30 baht cash wage, and fo r  the employee i t  amounts to s l i g h t l y  
more than the r ice  that could be obtained for the cash w a g e . 3 3  
Meanwhile, the pr ice o f  r ice  has fa l len  s tead i ly  r e la t i v e  to the overal l  
pr ice index. The downward pressure on wages is  f e l t  acutely by those 
most a ffected. I t  is  explained by one Ban Mai landless labourer as 
being due to the fac t  that " p i i  n i i  khaek maak khao lomjom 1oei mai 
mii  thun tham ra i  : t h i s  year there are many labourers [ l i t .  guests];  
they've gone under [ l i t .  sunk] so have no capita l  to plant [ t h e i r  own] 
f i e ld  crops". Harvesting wages fo r  f i e ld  crops are usual ly at piece 
ra te ,  by the sack fo r  maize and by the basket fo r  mung beans. Piecework 
harvest rates in Ban Mai have fa l len  recent ly  with dec l in ing crop prices 
and reduced y ie lds .
In summary, t r a d i t i o n a l  forms o f  labour were contro l led within 
the household and the community. Commoditization o f  labour removes 
these l im i ta t i o n s .  I t  gives those with capital  potent ia l  control  over a 
much wider pool o f  labour than they could secure by t r a d i t i o n a l  means. 
At the same t ime, i t  means that those without cap ita l  become themselves 
the commodity subject to control by monetized re la t io n s .
V>2^v Fuel
Fuel for cooking was un t i l  recent ly p le n t i f u l  in Lan Sak in the 
form o f  charcoal. Even a f te r  deforesta t ion,  tree stumps burnt in the 
f i e ld s  provided a source o f  wood. In Ban Dong, many fam i l ies  (41 per 
cent) now need to buy a l l  or some o f  th e i r  requirements. In Ban Mai, 
wood is also becoming increasing ly scarce, as a re s u l t  o f  which forest 
reserve land nearby is  encroached upon with severe environmental 
consequences. 80 per cent o f households s t i l l  manage without having to
purchase charcoal,  but t h i s  number can be expected to decrease rap id ly .  
Charcoal in Ban Dong is purchased mainly from v i l la g es  to the north,
which were sett led more recent ly  and s t i l l  have a supply o f  wood and
stumps. Charcoal is sold here for 30 to 35 baht per sack. In Ban
Dong the pr ice can reach as much as 50 to 60 baht. The reason fo r
th is  d i f f e r e n t i a l  is not ju s t  the cost o f  t ranspor t  per se . More
important is  the r i s k  involved, since transport ing charcoal is  i l l e g a l  
and heavy f ines can be imposed. In Ban Mai, such a d i f f e r e n t ia l  is 
absent, since charcoal i s  avai lable on the fr inges o f  the v i l l a g e .
However, some traders (Ban Mai pickup owners) buy charcoal for 30 to 40 
baht per sack in Ban Mai, mostly from landless or near-landless
fam i l ies ,  and se l l  i t  at Mong Chang market fo r  double the pr ice. This
is  r i s ky  fo r  those not in with the po l ice ,  as the " f in e "  referred to in 
footnote 9 o f  the previous chapter demonstrates. In Ban Dong, a few 
wealthy households have begun to fo l low the trend elsewhere in the 
Central Plains o f  switching to cooking on gas stoves.
Motive power for ploughing and transport is increasing ly 
dependent on petrol  or diesel engines, as indicated above. Draught 
animals are s t i l l  used widely fo r  ploughing r ice  f i e ld s ,  but r e la t i v e l y  
ra re ly  are they now used fo r  drawing car ts as in the past. The
exceptions are in car t ing home the r ice  harvest from d is tan t  f i e ld s  and
in ( i l l e g a l )  t ranspor t o f  logs, usual ly at n igh t ,  from v i l la g es  nearby 
Ban Dong into the v i l l a g e .
Therefore, whereas fuel was un t i l  recent ly  an abundant resource 
over which control  was universa l,  i t  is  now in short supply and
increasingly secured within  the monetized economy. One side o f  th i s
monetized fuel economy is  covert ,  since the law proscribes manufacture 
of charcoal fo r  other than own consumption.
V>2^v i  Knowledge
" I  am master o f  [ t h i s ]  col lege;
. . .what I don' t  know i s n ' t  knowledge!"
- Epigram on Benjamin Jowett
" I  am nat ive o f  th i s  v i l l a g e ;  
how can what /  know be knowledge?"
- P.H.
Long term residents o f  Ban Dong and Ban Mai have an int imate
knowledge o f  the fo res t  environment. Early se t t le rs  in both communities
quick ly  adapted to the exigencies o f  subsistence production and yaang 
o i l  tapping by acquir ing an extensive knowledge o f  f l o ra  and fauna, 
so i ls  and water resources. Settlement was governed by use o f  natural  
resources, p a r t i c u la r ly  water courses. Tradit ional land preparat ion, 
ploughing, se lect ion o f  seed, harvest ing, and threshing techniques were 
adapted to the constra in ts  o f the environment and l o c a l l y  avai lable 
resources. Knowledge was acquired through d i re c t  experience, learning 
from neighbours - by observation and communication - and by passing on 
from one generation to the next. Of course, such knowledge was not 
perceived of as such {khwaamruu} , fo r  khwaamruu is something that
one gets at school or from o f f i c i a l  t ra in ing .  Rather, such knowledge
was part o f  a "p rac t ica l  consciousness" (see Giddens 1984 : x x i i i ,  xxx, 
41 - 45).
As long as the production regime remained the same with in  a not 
g rea t ly  altered environment, possession o f  such knowledge gave Ban Dong 
and Ban Mai s e t t le rs  an advantage over outsiders in terms o f  control  
over production. However, several changes have taken place to undermine 
th i s  con tro l .  Loss o f  the fo res t  environment has meant a rapid 
disappearance o f  many elements fundamental to the subsistence production
regime. Large and small w i l d l i f e ,  assured ra in f a l l  and f l u v ia l  water 
sources, fo res t  shrubs and herbs, yaang t rees,  and a replenished soil  
were a l l  part o f  the disappearing system. The re su l t  has been 
uncerta in ty ,  where t ra d i t io n a l  knowledge is i n s u f f i c i e n t  to cope with 
the pace o f  environmental change. Change to market-oriented production 
has meant in t roduct ion  of new crops, new methods, and new inputs which 
require a new stock of knowledge for successful production.
Despite rapid adaptation and adoption of new methods, Ban Dong 
and Ban Mai farmers do not maintain the same advantage as they did with
indigenous production in a less al tered system. From the o f f i c i a l ' s
point o f  view, the basic obstacle to v i l l a g e rs '  improvement in th e i r  
circumstances is  tha t  they "khaad khwaamruu : lack knowledge".
V i l lagers  themselves je s t  to an outsider that "phuak rao ngoo; mai m i i  
khwaamruui 4 i  : vie're stupid; we don ' t  possess knowledge.. ." .  The old 
khon to in Thung Khaa says o f  outside events tha t  are known to a f fec t  
farmers such as the 1984 devaluation of the baht tha t  i t  is  not worth 
t r y ing  to explain them over the radio : "Meuan s i i  so1 hai khwaai
fang : I t ' s  l i k e  playing the v i o l i n  to a bu f fa lo " .
What has been lo s t  is  not the essence o f  the knowledge i t s e l f .  
Rather, i t  is  f i r s t  the relevance o f  tha t  knowledge in a changed 
s i tu a t io n ,  and second, even where indigenous knowledge maintains i t s  
relevance or has been adapted or supplemented so as to su i t  the new 
s i tu a t io n ,  the status o f  indigenous knowledge has diminished. As
mentioned above, "khwaamruu" is used to apply only to formal ly 
recognized information, s k i l l s ,  or techniques that have been passed on 
in a s i tua t ion  of DAE o f f i c i a l ,  schoolteacher, or other outsider 
conveying "knowledge" to an ignorant peasantry. I t  is thus by
d e f in i t i o n  that "V i l lagers  are without knowledge : chao baan khaad 
khwaamruu", fo r  what they know is  not knowledge as defined by the
L L L
dominant discourse.
Access to land, water, c a p i t a l ,  labour,  f u e l ,  and knowledge has 
been described as the means to control  over key resources fo r  production 
in Ban Dong and Ban Mai. Before moving on to a closer examination o f  
production i t s e l f  in the study v i l l a g e s ,  four aspects o f  control over 
these resources need to be re i te ra ted :
1. The trend toward decl in ing local control  and
concomitant increase in control by external forces or 
through external connections.
2. The commercial monetized economy as a key element in 
f a c i l i t a t i n g  th is  re o r ie n ta t io n .
3. Within each community, d i f f e r e n t ia l  assumption or 
re l inquish ing of control by d i f f e re n t  groups.
V.3 Production in the Study Vi l lages
The pr inc ipa l  parameters o f  production in the agr icu l tu ra l  
economy of Lan Sak have been described. This was followed by an account 
o f  the means by which ind iv idual households gain control over 
production v ia  resources and in s t i t u t i o n s  governing access to them. The 
emphasis has been on change and the ways in which i t  has affected 
contro l .  These points are now i l l u s t ra te d  by reference to production in 
the two study v i l l a g e s .  For each v i l l a g e  there is a descr ip t ion o f  the 
ag r icu l tu ra l  production cyc le , and th is  is fol lowed by a b r ie f  
comparative sect ion.
V>3ai Production in Ban Dong
Ban Dong is p r im ar i ly  a r i ce  growing v i l l a g e ,  but most farmers 
also grow f i e ld  crops. Ban Dong farmers consider and re fer  to 
themselves as chaonaa, or r ice  farmers. This is  despite the fact 
tha t  non-rice production may be a larger por t ion of some farmers' 
a g r icu l tu ra l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  measured in time spent, area planted, or income 
derived. Overal l ,  r i ce  accounted fo r  80 per cent o f  crop production 
by va lu e d  and 66 per cent o f  to ta l  area planted in the 1984 main crop 
season, while secondary crops grown on r ice land made up 57 and 51 per 
cent o f production and area respect ive ly .  Considered a l t e rn a t i v e ly ,  60 
per cent o f Ban Dong v i l la g e rs  who cu l t iva ted  crops in 1984 produced 
mainly r i c e ,  and 69 per cent planted mainly r ice land.  Table 5.9 shows 
the re la t i v e  importance o f  the various crops planted in Ban Dong.
Table 5.9 Ban Dong cropping
% households % area Yielc1
pi anting pi anted per ra i
Ricel 70 47.3 32.4 tang
Rice2 4 0 . 8 37.5 tang
Rice3 1 0 . 1 25.0 tang
Maizel 47 24.3 13.0 tang
c Mai ze2 3 1.3 3.8 tang
R Hai ze3 1 0 . 1 15.0 ' 0 0  cobs
0 Mung 1 26 8 . 0 4.3 tang
P Mung 2 33 13.5 4.6 tang
S Cassava 0 0 . 0 -
Soya 0 0 . 0 -
Cotton 3 0.5 208.3 kilogrammes
Sorghum 7 3.5 12.3 tang
Cowpea 3 0.7 1.7 tang
Castor 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 0
Note : fo r  explanations o f  crops see Table 5.,6
As is  clear from the preceding section, control  over land, water,
c m
and household labour are the key factors  in r ice  production. Average 
land ownership in Ban Dong is 24 r a i , or 33 ra i  i f  land owned
outside the v i l l a g e  is included, and ranges from none to 139 ra i  , or 
180 inc luding land owned elsewhere. Most o f  the non-local land is 
fo res t  reserve or preparatory fo res t  reserve land owned elsewhere in the 
d i s t r i c t ,  and much o f  i t  has yet to be cleared and put under permanent 
c u l t i v a t io n .  One in f i ve  v i l l a g e rs  is landless, whi le another 17 per 
cent own less than 5 ra i  in the v i l l a g e .  Of those farming, less than 
one-quarter have mainly i r r ig a te d  or semi- ir r igated f i e l d s ,  but 37 per 
cent gain at least some benef i t  of  i r r i g a t i o n  water from the meuang. 
Technical ly ,  most o f  the r iceland in Ban Dong is  at least
s e m i - i r r ig a b le , but various factors  to be discussed in Chapter VII leave 
large areas, including almost the whole of Bung Khiew, to re ly  on 
r a i n f a l l .  Household labour is s t i l l  mostly l o c a l l y  employed, although 
nearly one in three households had at least one member absent for part 
o f  1984. Of these, many were only away fo r  the dry season.
Rice is  planted from June onward. Timing o f  plant ing depends 
both on the rains in any one year and on the s i tua t ion  o f  pa r t icu la r  
f ie ld s  with regard to water. Fields are ploughed once the soi l  has been
softened by the f i r s t  ra ins .  I f  possible, r ice  is sown in nursery beds
and transplanted. This is  more labour intensive than broadcasting, but 
i t  gives higher y ie lds  and f a c i l i t a t e s  harvest ing.35 j n 53 per cen|- 
o f  cases, only family labour was used. Of the non-household labour used
for t ransp lan t ing,  one th i rd  was hired labour and two th i rds  reciprocal
labour. In 1984 the drought was such that Ban Dong farmers could not 
inundate rainfed f i e ld s ,  so that they had to resort  to broadcasting, 
using family labour.
Between planting and harvest ing, there is l i t t l e  to attend to in
Ban Dong r ice  farming. Those with upland (51 per cent) manage to
intersperse maize and secondary crops^G. Approximately ten days 
before harvest ing, local va r ie t ie s  o f  r ice  are d e l ib e ra te ly  toppled 
(naab) so as to f a l l  neat ly in one d i rec t ion  and ease harvesting. A 
few days before the day o f  the harvest, labour (khaek : l i t .  guests) 
is summoned for that p a r t i cu la r  day. Host o f  these come under 
reciprocal labour agreements, but some may be h ired. The harvest is 
usual ly completed with in  one or two days, those with larger f ie ld s  
in v i t i n g  more khaek.
Threshing and winnowing of r i ce  is done in any one o f  a number of 
ways. Those with bu f fa lo  often maintain the t r a d i t i o n a l  pract ice o f  
stamping (yiabyam) , the grain being laid out on an earth threshing
f loo r  and bu f fa lo  dr iven around a stake planted in the middle.
Winnowing is then done using trays. This process may be mechanized
p a r t i a l l y  by d r iv ing  a small t ra c to r  or power t i l l e r  over the grain in
place of a bu f fa lo .  Full mechanization in the form of threshing 
machines is  becoming more popular, however, at a charge of 1 baht per 
tang. These machines are owned by wealthy v i l l a g e rs .
Most (60 per cent) o f Ban Dong v i l l a g e rs  have small granaries, 
but surplus r i c e  is nevertheless usual ly sold w ith in  a short time a f te r  
threshing and winnowing are completed. This is  due to the immediate 
need fo r  cash, both for consumption and for paying o f f  debt. Rice is 
sold e i th e r  d i r e c t l y  to Uthaithani or Nong Chang middlemen, who come 
with a l o r r y  to the farmstead, to the Lan Sak r i c e  m i l l ,  or to v i l l a g e  
brokers, o f  whom two get most o f the trade. Many have to sel l  through 
the l a t t e r  due to debt o b l iga t ion .  Middlemen are seen as e xp lo i ta t ive  
not so much in the low pr ice they o f fe r  as in the discounts they claim 
for broken r i ce  and the cheating they pract ice with the s c a l e s . 37
Paddy is  sold unmil led, but r ice  for home consumption is mi l led
mechanically. Unt i l  1985, r i ce  in Ban Dong was mi l led at the small 
m i l l s  o f  one o f  the two v i l l a g e  m i l le rs  or at the larger Lan Sak r ice  
m i l l  under the standard terms described in section V ^ IJ  above. In 
1985 a small m i l l  was constructed at Bung Khiew by a wealthy Ban Dong 
famil y.
The dry season mung bean crop is  planted immediately fo l lowing 
the r ice  harvest. Planting is  broadcast and c u l t i v a t io n  is  not as 
intensive as i t  is in the North o f  Thailand. Lack o f  water control  is a 
major uncertainty.  Intensive spraying of pest ic ides is  necessary to 
protect against c a t e r p i l 1a rs . The harvest is  normal ly during March or 
A p r i l ,  using hired labour for those with larger areas under c u l t i v a t io n .  
Husking can be carr ied out using t r a d i t io n a l  r ice threshing methods or 
by machine.
To describe a g r icu l tu ra l  production such is  to r i s k  presenting an 
overs impl i f ied p ic ture  o f  the ag r icu l tu ra l  community as a homogeneous 
production system with minor var ia t ions  due to varying preferences or 
micro-environmental constra in ts .  To do so would be misleading, for the 
p o s s ib i l i t i e s  and a c tu a l i t i e s  facing indiv idual households (the basic 
production un it )  are var ied, dependent to a large degree on control over 
resources fo r  production and the re la t ions  governing such con tro l .  As 
we saw in the preceding sect ion, such control  is  changing as access to 
resources for production is increasing ly  monetized, concentrated, and 
subject to external inf luences. The e f fe c t  o f  t h i s  is  i l l u s t ra te d  and 
discussed in the fol lowing chapter.
V>3J1 Production in Ban Mai
In contrast to Ban Dong, Ban Mai is p r imar i ly  an upland, or f i e ld  
cropping, v i l l a g e .  Ban Mai farmers speak of themselves as chaorai , or 
non-rice farmers. Wherever possible by v i r tu e  o f  the micro-environment, 
Ban Mai farmers w i l l  grow r i c e ,  but opportun it ies are so l im i ted  that on 
local land f i e ld  cropping is  the overwhelmingly predominant a c t i v i t y .  
Only 7 per cent o f  land owned by Ban Mai v i l la g e rs  is  suited to r ice  
farming, and much o f  t h i s  is  non-local land. Rice only accounts fo r  8 
per cent o f  the area cu l t iva ted  and 7 per cent o f  the cash-equivalent 
value of Ban Mai crops during the main plant ing season.
Ban Mai is  heavi ly commercialized. Aside from tha t  which is  kept 
over for seed or fo r animal feed, a l l  produce is  sold. Moreover, inputs 
of purchased seed, herbic ides,  insec t ic ides ,  and l a t t e r l y  o f  f e r t i l i z e r ,  
require c a p i t a l ,  as does h ire  o f  machinery for ploughing and husking and 
h ire  of labour for p lant ing, weeding, and harvest ing. To t re a t  the 
household in cash ca lcu la t ions  merely as a production un i t  does not 
conform with the material  r e a l i t i e s  o f  Ban Mai fam i l ies '  s i tu a t ion .  
Cash is needed also to purchase most food for sustenance and by 
extension for continued use of household labour for production. 
Moreover, commercialization and e le c t r i f i c a t i o n  o f  the v i l l a g e  increase 
fu r the r  the need fo r  cash.
The range o f  f i e ld  crops grown in Ban Mai is  considerable. The 
standard double cropping regime followed by 72 per cent o f  farmers is  o f  
maize followed by mung beans. Up to f ive  crops are planted by 
ind iv idual farmers, but most grow two or three. A second crop o f  maize, 
m i l l e t ,  and black cowpea are a l te rna t ive  second cropping f i e ld  crops. 
Cassava is  an extensive a l te rna t ive  to double cropping, whi le cotton is 
an intensive a l te rna t ive  on small plots (Table 5.10).
Table 5.10 Ban Mai cropping
% households % area Yield
planting pi anted per ra i
Ricel 24 4.8 22.7 tang
Rice2 0 0 . 0 -
Rice3 0 0 . 0 -
Mai zel 87 53.3 24.6 tang
c Maize2 7 3.6 7.3 tang
R Mai ze3 0 0 . 0 -
0 Mungl 72 30.7 3.4 tang
P Mung2 1 0 . 1 9.0 tang
S Cassava 4 1.5 8.4 tonnes
Soya 1 0.6 15.8 tang
Cotton 4 0.4 208.3 kilogrammes
Sorghum 11 4.1 4.1 tang
Co wpe a 1 0 . 8 1 . 6  tang
Castor 0 0 . 0 -
Note : For explanation of crops see Table 5.6
Land preparation fo r a l l  forms o f  f i e ld  cropping begins in March 
or Apr i l  with the clearing and burning of weeds. This is usual ly done 
using household labour. During th is  period, f i r e  is a serious hazard to 
straw(Maa)-roofed houses. In the v/inds o f  the hot season i t  can 
cross roadways, and in 1985 i t  spread to the main v i l l a g e  settlement.  
Not only houses are at r i s k .  Of the few attempts at t ree cropping 
(mainly bananas and mangoes), most have been destroyed by f i r e .  This 
danger i s  a major obstacle to establishment o f perennials,  p a r t i c u la r l y  
since most farmers l i v e  at some distance from th e i r  f i e ld s .
Ploughing commences in A p r i l .  There are e ight t rac to rs  in Ban 
Mai, and these plough most o f  the area. Each p lo t  needs to be ploughed
over twice. Some use power t i l l e r s ,  and those with newly cleared h i l l
land use ju s t  a hoe, but otherwise dependence on t rac to rs  i s  the norm. 
Timing of plant ing i s  important for two main reasons. For the f i r s t
crop, i t  is  important to take advantage of the ear ly  part  o f  the
monsoon, since there is  often a tapering o f f  in July and August, and 
late ploughing can mean drought at a c r i t i c a l  stage o f  growth. Double 
cropping also means tha t  i f  the f i r s t  crop is  harvested la te ,  the second
is suscept ible to drought i f  the monsoon f in ishes ea r ly .  At the same
time, premature plant ing o f  the f i r s t  crop can lead to i t s  fa i lu re  in
the event o f  a false s ta r t  to the monsoon. In 1984, the ear ly  planters 
did we l l ,  whereas the reverse was true in 1985. Because o f  th is  
uncerta in ty ,  the ploughing and plant ing period is a tense time of year. 
This tension can turn to exasperation or anger at the t ra c to r  owners on 
whom v i l la g e rs  are dependent i f  they do not plough at the time promised. 
Few have sanction over the t ra c to r  owners, however, since many are also 
cred i to rs  and the ploughing operation is an expensive part o f  f i e ld  
cropping (Table 5 .6 c ) .
Planting of maize usual ly takes place in May. Those with 
s u f f i c i e n t  cap ita l  h ire  labour. Large farmers sometimes br ing in labour 
from nearby r i ce  farming v i l l a g e s .  Those without cap ita l  make use o f
rec iprocal labour in teams o f  15 to 20, s u f f i c i e n t  to plant a 24 ra i
p lo t  in one or two days. Rodenticide is  mixed in with the seed. While 
the maize is s t i l l  shor t ,  herbicide is usual ly sprayed. A l te rna t ive ly  
or a d d i t io n a l l y ,  manual weeding is carr ied out once or twice. Spraying 
usual ly uses household labour, although a machine sprayer may need to be 
h ired,  and weeding involves rec ip roca l ,  h ired,  and household labour 
(Table 5.7).
Harvesting of maize is by hand. Mostly t h i s  requires h i r ing  of 
labour, but some use reciprocal arrangements. Either way, labour is 
rewarded by piecework: 10 baht per sack or one sack's labour debt. 
Husking is mostly by machine, at a standard rate o f  7 baht per sack o f  
husked maize. Transport o f  maize from f ie ld  to homestead is  an extra 
expense fo r  many because o f  the distance they have to l i v e  from the i r  
f i e ld s .
Immediately fo l lowing the maize harvest in August, t ra c to rs  are
in action again for the second crop, having been employed on 
neighbouring v i l la g e s '  and d i s t r i c t s '  r icelands in the intervening
period. A single ploughing su f f ices .  Hung beans and sorghum are
broadcast almost exclusive ly with household labour, usual ly taking no 
more than one day. Insect ic ide is the major input for mung beans to 
protect against c a te rp i l l a r s .  Spraying machines sometimes have to be 
h ired,  but most use manual sprayers. Harvesting mung beans involves 
hired labour on piecework, paid by the basket.
Cassava d i f f e r s  from maize and mung beans in that i t  takes almost 
a f u l l  year to mature and can be l e f t  in the ground without i l l  e f fe c t .  
Plant ing, harvest ing, and s l ic ing  require hired labour, but fo r  the rest 
o f  the year l i t t l e  a t ten t ion  is  required. I t  is thus favoured by two 
main groups. Large scale farmers who wish to minimize supervision f ind 
cassava a t t r a c t i v e ,  and debt-r idden farmers with o f f - fa rm  employment 
combine cassava with urban wage labouring. This is despite the 
awareness o f  the destruct ive impact on the s o i l ,  for in the former
instance i t  usual ly involves rented land with l i t t l e  concern for
long-term f e r t i l i t y ,  while in the l a t t e r  pressures o f  debt do not allow 
long-term considerations to carry much weight.
An in te res t ing  feature o f  production in Ban Mai tha t  is 
d i s t in c t i v e  o f  a recent ly  sett led community is  the importance o f  kinship 
t ie s  in maintaining d iv e rs i f ie d  production. Several Ban Mai famil ies 
spend part  o f  the year working on re la t ive s '  land at some distance from 
the v i l l a g e .  This is  reciprocated e i ther  in labour during periods o f  
peak a c t i v i t y  in Ban Mai's upland cropping or in r i c e ,  but since the 
exchange is usual ly between close re la t ives  i t  is  normally not on a 
calculated basis. The family  o f  Tu, fo r  example, l i ve s  fo r  part o f  the 
year at Thung Naa where they rent r ice land ,  and labour i s  shared between 
the two s i tes .  Another fami ly ,  th a t  o f  Pik, helps out on parents'
r iceland at Pradahak in exchange fo r  an unspecified amount o f  r i c e ,  and 
they work some o f  a r e la t i v e ' s  i r r iga ted  r iceland during the dry season 
in exchange fo r  l e t t i n g  the same re la t i v e  work some upland in Ban Mai. 
Khao works land in Ban Mai with the help o f  re la t ive s  from Nam Phu and 
Nong Chang, and in turn Khao helps out in the i r  r i c e f i e l d s  in an 
uncalculated labour exchange; machinery is  also shared between the 
famil i e s .
As in the case o f  Ban Dong, Ban Mai is a heterogeneous community. 
However, the basis for Ban Mai's heterogeneity is  more stark than in Ban 
Dong. This is  la rge ly  to do with the inf luence o f  cap ita l  in mediating 
production re la t io n s .  And as in Ban Dong, the va r ie ty  o f  s i tua t ions 
faced by and stra teg ies open to Ban Mai v i l l a g e rs  is  i l l u s t r a te d  in 
Chapter V II .
V ^ 3 i i  i  i  Comparison
Comparison of two communities is  usual ly an ou ts ider 's
indulgence. However, in the case of Ban Dong and Ban Mai certa in  
in teract ions enable us at least to s ta r t  o f f  with a v i l l a g e r ' s
perspect ive. Many chaorai (upland farmers) of Ban Mai have been
chaonaa ( r i ce  farmers) in the past. For many of them, f i e l d  cropping 
seems in re trospect a hazardous and strenuous occupation. "At least you 
have r ice  to eat (yaang noi m i i  khaao k in ) "  i f  you are a chaonaa. 
" I f  I had r i c e  [no matter how much my debt] no c red i to r  would dare take 
sacks o f  r i c e  from my house : mai m i i  jao n i l  t h i i  nai j a  kl aa kheun
baan yeud khaao". With cash or other assets i t  is  a d i f f e re n t  matter.
This is  a representat ive re f le c t io n  of a former chaonaa who sold his 
r iceland with the express purpose of s t r ik ing  i t  r i c h  as a chaorai.
The hardiness required of chaorai is expressed in the common
comparison, "Rice farmers have to work in the ra in ,  but [we] upland 
farmers have to work under the blazing sun : chao naa to '  ng taak ton;  
chao r a i  t o 1 ng taak daed".
Several fam i l ies  have d i re c t  experience o f  both communities. Two 
Ban Dong fa m i l ie s ,  both Lao kin o f  one of Ban Dong's oldest fam i l ies ,
have returned to Ban Dong a f te r  a period in Ban Mai. One is the family
forced out by th rea t  (see section V>2J above). The other could not
stand the pressures of Ban Mai l i f e  and speaks with b i t te rness o f  the 
v i l la g e  leaders (hua naa muubaan), the fact ional ism (kaan Ten 
phak 1en phuak) , and the "oppressive fee l ing  : khabkhaenjai". 
She says that in Ban Mai "there is no freedom at a l l  : mai m i i  isara
sak yaang'\  fo r  example in having to pay a br ibe o f  5000 baht to the
Vi l lage Committee ju s t  to sel l  your land. She sums things up as "ruai
baeb n i i  yuu mai m i  : This kind of wealth I can ' t  l i v e  w i th" .  This
family has l e f t  land in Ban Mai and the husband has gone to Malaysia as
a construct ion worker fo r  two years. On the other hand, some Ban Dong
v i l la g e rs  who have v is i ted  Ban Mai38 speak o f  Baan Tua Yaang (Model
V i l lage)  as i t  is known lo c a l l y  as "jaroen : prosperous, c i v i l i z e d "  
due to i t s  provision with roads, e l e c t r i c i t y ,  large concrete school, and 
other material  evidence o f  government a t ten t ion .
On the production side, the main contrast between r ice  farming
and f i e ld  cropping is the re la t i v e  s ignif icance o f  land and cap i ta l .
This is  re f lec ted  in Ban Dong and Ban Mai, where the s ign i f i ca n t  
var iables in control  over production are respect ive ly  land ownership and 
access to short and long term c a p i ta l .  Average cash inputs in Ban Mai 
are three times those in Ban Dong. Although in Ban Dong capital  is 
becoming more important,  mainly as a means o f  gaining access to hired
labour with the decl ine o f  reciprocal labour, subsistence farming is
s t i l l  p ract icab le  with l i t t l e  capital  input and not undue opportunity 
costs incurred by domestic production. In Ban Mai, on the other hand, 
land ownership is supposedly equal. Even were the ideal conformed to 
( in fac t  over 37 per cent of Ban Mai v i l la g e rs  f a i l  to conform with ALRO 
land rules on tenure grounds alone),  land tenure is i t s e l f  no guarantee 
o f  control  over production. Without capita l  for annual production,
f i e ld  cropping is not feas ib le .  Control over production is concentrated 
in the hands o f  those with such c a p i ta l ,  more p a r t i c u la r l y  those with
the machinery fo r  ploughing, husking, and transport .  This control is
expressed even by v i l l a g e rs  who farm th e i r  own plo ts  but depend on other 
v i l la g e rs  fo r  ploughing of t h e i r  f i e ld s ,  husking and sale o f th e i r
produce, and capita l  inputs: "We are l ike  th e i r  employees : rao meuan
luuk jaang khao"\ or even, "We ju s t  become the i r  low-down slaves :
rao tok pan k h i i  khaa khao". A discussion of th i s  subjective
a l ienat ion  is presented in section V I I I below. In many cases,
Ban Mai v i l l a g e rs  do in fac t  become wage labourers, having rented out
t h e i r  land to those with s u f f i c i e n t  capita l  to work i t .  The point here
is  to show tha t  the subject ive experience of p ro le ta r ian iza t ion  as an 
a l iena t ion  from control  over the means of production commences before
th is  point is  reached, i f  in fac t  i t  is  reached a t  a l l .
Conclusion
To recap i tu la te ,  land is o f primary importance in Ban Dong 
production re la t io n s ,  in i t s  own r i g h t  and inasmuch as i t  is  the key to 
control  over the secondary fac to r  of product ion, namely ca p i ta l .  In Ban 
Mai, capital  is the key var iab le ,  and i t  is  th i s  tha t  is the key to die 
facto  control over land. Thus "ownership" is d i s t i n c t  from 
"con t ro l " .  In the words of Khao (sect ion V>3>1i above), land " i s  in
the name o f  the poor but in the hands of the r ich  : yuu nai naam kho' ng 
khon jon tae yuu nai meu kho1ng khon r u a i " . In order to determine 
control over a p a r t icu la r  fac to r  o f  production, i t s  place in the ent i re  
production process must be established. In Ban Dong, var ia t ions in 
ownership of land is  considerable, but ownership o f  a large amount o f  
land does not in i t s e l f  estab l ish control over production o f  those with 
less. With a subsistence crop, i t  is feasible for a household to 
produce more or less independently o f  the wider system. In Ban Mai, no 
such option exis ts for the ma jo r i ty  o f  farmers. For a commercial crop, 
capita l  secures control not only over one's own product ion, but also 
over one's cap ita l  short neighbour 's, i r respect ive  o f  the re la t i v e  size 
of land p lo ts .
The impl icat ions o f  these changes in control  over production for 
development o f  the community are many. We are most concerned here 
with the dual re la t ionsh ip  between production and development with which 
we started th is  chapter, namely the way in which production affects  
social re la t io n s  in the community and i t s  place in mobi l izat ion of 
resources. The fo l lowing chapter examines these two issues in terms o f  
d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  o f  the community and resu l t ing  heterogeneity o f  
in te re s t ,  on the one hand, and responses by those who lose out in the i r  
attempt to re ta in  control  over product ion, on the other.
Notes
1. The extent to which social organization is or is not determined by 
re la t ions  o f  product ion, i . e .  the economic "base", is  a subject of 
controversy in the Marxist debate on economism. Lenin (1902) attacked 
the de term in is t ic  concept p r im ar i ly  as stunting o f  p o l i t i c a l  action 
through i t s  "worship o f spontaneity" (p .93) and i t s  "downgrading o f ]  
.the conscious element in social  l i f e "  (Bottomore 1983 : 143). While the 
argument should be considered in order to avoid the p i t f a l l s  o f  a crude 
determinism, i t  is  also important to bear in mind the p o l i t i c a l  context 
and purpose underlying these attacks, namely a crusade against s tra ins 
of reformism with in  social  democratic p o l i t i c s .  Production re la t ions  
are to be seen fo r  present purposes as l im i t i n g  rather than determining 
in any absolute manner, but wherever possible the way in which changing 
production re la t ions  a f fe c t  social  re la t ions  (or are affected by them) 
w i l l  be pointed out.
2. "Resource" is used here in the wide sense of " tha t  which is 
necessary for achieving an end", the end in t h i s  case being production. 
A l te rn a t iv e ly ,  resources may be seen as our factors  o f  product ion.
3. Cohen (1969 : 217) notes the d is t in c t io n  between "economic process" 
as in te ract ions between people and scarce resources, and "economic 
re la t ions "  as in te rac t ions  between people themselves. He suggests that 
social anthropology has t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been concerned with the l a t t e r  
[and human geography with the former? - P.H.] and goes on to suggest how 
the economic merges into the p o l i t i c a l .
4. See Ruttan and Hayami (1984) for a discussion o f  the change in 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangements concerning terms of control  over various 
factors  o f  production in the context o f scarc i ty  in England under the 
enclosures, Japan under the l i e i j i  refoms, Thailand with 
commercialization of the r i ce  economy, and in a more deta i led 
discussion, the Phi l ippines in the context o f  the Green Revolution and 
associated technological innovat ion.
5. A th i rd  dichotomy o f  resources for production concerns the 
d is t in c t io n  between control  o f  resources by ind iv idua ls  and control  by 
the community. This issue is discussed in Chapter V I I .
6. I t  is  beyond the scope o f  th i s  study to give a deta i led account of 
long term production potent ial  o f  various Lan Sak s o i l s  for various 
types o f  cropping. However, a number o f  ind icat ions should su f f ice  to 
demonstrate the i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  the present regime. These include the 
near universal reports o f  drops in y ie lds ,  increase in frequency of 
symptoms normal ly associated with soi l  exhaustion, increased inputs that 
are necessary, the progression from maize to cassava to sugar cane that 
is observable, and expressed uncertainty from farmers themselves as to 
the s u s ta in a b i l i t y  o f  the regime. In addi t ion , a Land Development 
Department study o f  Ban Mai so i ls  shows that large parts o f the area 
presently under f i e l d  cropping is  only suited to tree crops or extensive 
c a t t l e  rearing in the long run (LDD 1984). Moreover, even those 
areas suited in p r inc ip le  to f i e l d  crops are only sustainable with 
inputs o f  f e r t i l i z e r  and land improvements tha t  are uneconomic given 
condi t ions of production and current crop pr ices.
7. This observed superimposition of "non- ra t iona l " determinants on a 
supposedly ra t iona l  production system as part  o f  the dynamic o f  
development has already been referred to in the in t roduct ion as a
point ing to a fa l la cy  in the model of ra t iona l  production. The
d u a l i s t i c  assumptions underlying th i s  model are not res t r ic te d  to 
m a te r ia l i s t  explanat ions. Joel Kahn (1985) also reviews debates
concerning the i n e v i t a b i l i t y ,  nature, modes, and d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  th i s  
"modernization o f  the peasantry" in the ideological sphere. He points 
out the inherent pa ra l le l  between Marxist assumptions o f  class 
consciousness with p ro le ta r ian iza t ion  and l ibe ra l  assumptions of 
" r a t i o n a l i t y "  as innate or produced by modernization. This leads both 
groups to regard mil 1enarianism, syncretism, and re l ig io u s  theology as 
regressive. The a l te rna t ive  approach to peasant ideology is  in fac t  to 
see such movements as adaptive rather  than a ta v is t i c  through a "h is to ry  
from below", i . e .  to recognize a peasant mode o f  act ion tha t  is
independent o f  both forms o f  determinism. The explanations o f  why such 
forms o f  struggle are adopted are, presumably, not to be found in 
some inherent ly  a ta v is t i c  peasant ideology, but ra ther  l i e  in 
in te rac t ion  with the wider social formation that maintains them in a 
subjugated ro le .  More s p e c i f i c a l l y  concerning development, Hickey 
(1985) welcomes the new paradigm that escapes the stranglehold of
dualism, deplor ing the "dichotomization [ t h a t ]  has had baleful  e f fec ts  
on the conceptual izat ion and implementation o f  development in Asian 
developing countr ies" .
8 . Lan Sak DAE Off ice 1985. DAE s ta t i s t i c s  are only rough estimates, 
based on assessments by the tambon level extension workers. These
workers do not have the resources for surveying.
9. There is a deta i led account in Chapter VII o f  attempts by v i l la g e rs  
in Bung Khiew to overcome th i s .
10. I r r igated r iceland se l ls  in 1985 fo r  6,000 to 7,000 baht per 
r a i . Rainfed r iceland se l ls  fo r  about 2,000 bah t , whi le upland
se l l s  from anything from 100 to 2000 baht , depending on land qua l i ty
and t i t l e .  Chayanov (1926) noted the overcap i ta l iza t ion  o f  subsistence 
farmers due to th e i r  valuat ion o f  land suited to subsistence crops at 
above an economically rentable pr ice.
11. 90 per cent o f  Thai maize is exported, mostly to Japan and Taiwan
for t h e i r  l ives tock  industr ies .  The domestic market i s  growing, a lb e i t
s lowly, with the involvement o f  agribusiness in intensive l ivestock
rearing. Only small amounts o f maize are used l o c a l l y ,  for household
pig- and duck-ra is ing.
12. Already one large landowner has begun to acquire large amounts o f  
land in Lan Sak from indebted farmers. This he d iv ides between a large 
sugar estate and buffa lo  rearing on several thousand ra i  o f  land.
13. The customary pract ice o f  inheri tance in most of Thailand is  equal 
d iv is ion  among a l l  the ch i ld ren.  An exception to th is  is  when a son 
moves to clear new land, in which case land is  divided up among those 
remaining at home. The homestead and house usual ly go to the youngest 
daughter. Moerman (1968) suggests that t h i s  is  not so much a case o f  
formal ul t imogeniture as a matter of circumstance, since the youngest 
usual ly stays at home to take care o f  the parents u n t i l  they d ie , by 
which time other s ib l ings w i l l  have married and established separate 
households. This is  borne out by inheri tance patterns in Lan Sak, among 
both Lao and Thai v i l l a g e rs .
14. The issue o f  decap i ta l iza t ion  is an important one concerning 
development. I t  is  a prominent part o f  the process o f  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  
that is discussed in the fol lowing chapter.
15. The 1985 harvest was much better  than tha t  of 1984, but the price
o f  r ice  f e l l  sharply. Farmers received from 1700 to 2200 baht per 
kwien , compared with 2900 baht a year e a r l i e r .
16. Scott (1976 : Chapter 1) gives a detai led analysis o f  the e f fe c t  of 
a change from sharecropping to f ixed payments on d is t r ib u t i o n  of r isks 
between tenant and landlord. Clearly sharecropping minimizes r isks  for 
the tenant,  whereas f ixed payments assure the landlord a predictable 
income. There is  some evidence in Ban Dong that t h i s  is  taken into 
account in the re la t i v e  terms of r e n ta l ,  i . e .  tha t  over the long run 
sharecroppers would pay a higher rental  in exchange for increased 
secur i ty .  This would in turn help explain why farmers not on the 
borderl ine o f  subsistence prefer f ixed payments, although there is  no 
evidence that th i s  plays a conscious part in th e i r  preference.
17. This leads to an in te res t ing  divergence in subject ive assessment of 
these two types o f  process by "developers" and "developed", fo r  what is 
comprehensible from the perspective o f  the outsider  and thus v i s ib le  may 
be d i f f e r e n t  from the stark experience o f  v i l l a g e rs  affected by covert 
processes. Chambers* (1983) concept o f  " v i s i b i l i t y "  as applied to 
rura l  development shows tha t  there is a dynamic in rural  processes and 
the way in which ru ra l  development administrators view them that leads 
to bias through overs ight,  as is  the s i tua t ion  in Ban Mai's hidden 
transact ions. On the other hand, piecemeal change that f i t s  more 
re a d i l y  in to  conventional analyses of land a l ienat ion  impinge less 
fo r c e fu l l y  on the consciousness o f  those affected (Scott 1986 : 13), as 
i s  the case in Ban Dong. I t  should be added tha t  the sharper experience 
of Ban Mai v i l l a g e rs  conforms more closely with r e a l i t y  than tha t  o f  the 
admin is t ra to rs , since processes o f  a l ienat ion  are in fac t  more rapid and 
extreme than in Ban Dong as we shal l  see in the fo l lowing chapter.
18. The way in which ca p i ta l -sh o r t  v i l l a g e rs  would invest is by
d e f in i t i o n  a hypothet ical  issue, but i t  does indicate asp ira t ions within 
the monetized economy. Such a hypothet ical  circumstance was appraised 
by asking what informants would do were they to win the l o t t e r y .  Since 
most v i l l a g e rs  gamble on e i ther  state or underground lo t t e r i e s ,  
responses were not e n t i r e l y  out o f  the realms o f  p o ss ib l i t y .
19. The discussion on adaptation o f  r ice  ag r icu l tu re  in section V^l Ai 
above is  an example o f  control through knowledge o f  the 
microenvironment. Many s im i la r  adaptations are noted elsewhere, such as 
" f lo a t in g  r ice "  tha t  can grow f i v e  centimetres per day in areas
suscept ible to f looding and sa l ine - res is tan t  va r ie t ie s  in brackish 
coastal areas (Feeny 1982 : 38). Meanwhile, Panayotou conceptualizes
in f ras t ruc tu ra l  development on a broader level as being a compensatory 
programme for the environmental degradation caused above a l l  by 
de fo resta t ion. In p a r t i c u la r ,  he questions the s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  o f  
natural  watersheds by i r r i g a t i o n :
I n i t i a l l y  intended as complementary to watershed 
protect ion to provide addit ional con t ro l ,  g rav i ty  
and storage capacity,  fo r capturing and 
d is t r ib u t i n g  the ru n o f f  from the watersheds, 
i r r i g a t i o n  has increasingly  become a man-made 
subst i tu te  for the funct ion o f  the natural  
watersheds...  Moreover, the use of i r r i g a t i o n  
structures as subst i tu tes for watershed protect ion 
resu l ts  in accumulation of sediment in the water 
bodies, increased f looding and s a l i n i t y  and a 
shortening of the economic l i f e  o f  the i r r i g a t i o n  
system i t s e l f  (Panayotou 1983 : 17 - 18).
20. One sales method is to allow the purchaser a t r i a l  period without
obl igat ion  to buy, but t r a d i t i o n a l  deference (k re n g ja i ) does not allow 
the v i l l a g e r  to return the item. The Singer company is  p a r t i c u la r ly  
successful with i t s  f l e e t  o f  t r a v e l l i n g  salesmen and commissioned 
company agents in many v i l la g es .
21. I t  would appear that th is  is ac tua l ly  in breach o f  BAAC po l icy .  
When I raised the issue at BAAC headquarters in Bangkok, i t  was 
suggested that th is  was a case o f  local o f f i ce rs  ge t t ing  carried away 
with the idea o f  delegated re s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  and I was assured tha t  an 
urgent note was to be sent to the Uthaithani o f f i c e  ordering compliance 
with Bank po l icy .
22. BAAC o f f i c e r s  in Lan Sak ra t iona l ized  the i r  action by saying that 
c ro ss -po l l ina t ion  o f  loca l va r ie t ie s  with improved seed leads to reduced 
y ie lds ,  and that the i r  po l icy  was thus to compel a l l  farmers in the area 
to use BAAC seed. Only when th is  was adopted un iversa l ly  would they 
relax the s t ip u la t io n .
23. In Ban Mai, 95 per cent o f  BAAC debtors take addit ional  loans from 
other sources; in Ban Dong, the corresponding f igure is 42 per cent. 
The impl icat ion o f  dual loans is serious for BAAC ob ject ives.  Since 
BAAC loan amounts are f ixed while informal loans are f l e x ib l e ,  the 
marginal rate o f  in te res t  on capita l  is more l i k e l y  to be calculated by 
the debtor as that which the middleman or v i l la g e  trader charges rather 
than the BAAC ra te .  As the BAAC object ive in lending to small farmers 
is  to allow them to in te ns i fy  agr icu l tu re  through c a p i ta l i z a t io n  on the 
basis o f  cheap loans, t h i s  ob ject ive is la rge ly  n u l l i f i e d  by the 
ir relevance o f  the BAAC rate in the farmer's ca lcu la t ion  o f  the marginal 
cost o f  c a p i t a l .
24. In Ban Mai, fo r  example, Khruu Cherd, a local schoolteacher who 
farms and raises pigs and whose wife is  a machinery contractor and who 
are one o f  the wealthiest fami l ies in the v i l l a g e ,  gets paid in kind by 
poorer neighbours. The son o f  a local debtor helps out in ra is ing pigs 
by co l lec t ing  r ice  water from nearby houses of those "who sometimes 
receive favours from Khruu Cherd". The daughter o f  another debtor is 
a l i v e - i n  help. Sometimes someone w i l l  bring a monitor l iza rd  or other 
del icacy back from a hunting t r i p .
25. The o r ig in  o f  the term "yaa khommunit : l i t .  communist grass" is 
unclear, but two local explanations are given. One is  that i t  springs 
up everywhere no matter how much e f f o r t  goes into suppressing i t .  The 
other re la tes  to i t s  reddish colour.
26. Fish disease has occurred on a national scale since the 1982 
outbreak in 21 provinces. Despite a great deal o f  s c i e n t i f i c  research 
into the causes o f  t h i s ,  no f i rm conclusions have been reached. 
However, a recent report  published by the Department of Fisheries 
suggests that pest ic ides have a ro le  in lowering the resistance to 
disease. Of p a r t i c u la r  concern are the chemicals D ie ldr in  and E ld r in ,  
commonly used in insect ic ides (see also Wattana e t . a l .  1985).
27. I witnessed several cases of unconsciousness as a delayed react ion 
a f te r  a day's spraying. Many regu la r ly  complain of stomache ache and 
"heart f l u t t e r s  : j a i  san" soon a f te r  spraying or maize planting when 
rodent ic ide is used (see the case o f  Phad in section VI^2Jv  below). 
Eckholm in a chapter e n t i t l e d  "Who pays for production?" suggests that 
the health cost borne by producers is  greater than normal ly accounted 
fo r ,  and he s p e c i f i c a l l y  mentions pest icide use in developing countr ies 
(1977 : 154 - 155). According to a WHO survey in several countr ies, 40 
per cent o f  sprayers show symptoms of poisoning ( i b id .  : 165). A report 
based on detai led surveys in each o f  Thai land's regions shows widespread
health problems related to pest ic ide use (Supot 1982).
28. Farmers in Wat Singh d i s t r i c t  in Chainat have found that a short 
period o f  increased yields with use o f  chemical f e r t i l i z e r s  on rainfed
f i e ld s  is  qu ick ly  fol lowed by a period of steady or decl in ing y ie lds
despite increasing appl icat ions o f  f e r t i l i z e r  ( information from NGO 
worker Reuang Suksawat, o f Nong Noi p ro jec t ,  Wat Singh). In Khon Kaen 
in the Northeast, farmers report  s im i la r  problems. One farmer I spoke 
to described how the y ie lds had declined a f te r  a sharp increase in the 
f i r s t  year o f use. By the th i rd  year the soil  was almost too hard too 
plough by b u f fa lo ,  and th is  farmer reckons tha t  he stopped ju s t  in time 
to avoid the soi l  being ruined (din si  a) . Apichaat Thongyuu, a
prominent t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  development worker and w r i te r  on rural
development issues, speaks of a " f e r t i l i z e r  ideology" leading to a 
psychological dependence i r respect ive  o f  the physical e f fe c t  on the 
s o i l .  I t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to obtain ob ject ive data on long term effects  o f  
f e r t i l i z e r  on d i f f e re n t  types of so i ls  in rainfed areas. Local DAE 
o f f i c i a l s  i n s i s t  tha t  i f  there are i l l  e f fects  i t  is  e i ther  because 
farmers are not applying the f e r t i l i z e r  co r rec t ly  or because they do not 
use i t  in combination with compost and other organic f e r t i l i z e r .  
Although such a combination would appear to be the idea l ,  i t  is hardly 
r e a l i s t i c  to expect such high inputs o f  both capita l  and labour as would 
be required in a high r i s k  environment l ike  Lan Sak. Meanwhile, Ban Mai 
farmers being forced to buy BAAC f e r t i l i z e r  express fears tha t  "din j a  
khoei : the so i l  w i l l  get used to" f e r t i l i z e r .
29. Household labour as the basis for production is  o ften ci ted as one 
of the primary c r i t e r i a  in the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  "peasant" as d i s t i n c t  from 
"farmer" (e.g. Johnston 1981 : 250). Wolf (1966 : 2) points out that
the peasant runs a household, rather  than a business concern. He quotes 
Chayanov to show tha t  the peasant w i l l  u t i l i s e  labour d i f f e r e n t l y  from a 
c a p i t a l i s t i c  enterpr ise: i f  land is lo c a l l y  abundant, i t  w i l l  be farmed 
less in tens ive ly  than under c a p i t a l i s t  ente rpr ise , whi le land scarc i ty  
w i l l  lead to more intensive use, a low imputed wage, and high valuat ion 
o f  rented or purchased land in order to make use o f  surplus (household) 
labour (pp. 14 - 15). Meanwhile, Foster (1967) stresses the st ructura l  
and re la t io n a l  aspects o f  peasant l ive l ihood  as o f  more d e f i n i t i v e  
sign if icance than the occupational, and primary among these former 
aspects are the peasant's use o f  labour and re la t io n s  o f  exchange 
deriv ing therefrom.
30. Part o f  Chayanov's analysis was to show how peasant households tend 
to work with decreasing returns to labour as land scarc i ty  increases in 
order to maintain a subsistence l ive l ihood .  An important factor  
a f fec t ing  the welfare o f  the peasant household at any one time is  the 
ra t io  o f  productive to non-productive workers in the household (see 
Harrison 1982; Scarborough 1985 : 30 - 33).
31. Even Moerman (1968) in Ban Ping noted th i s  process o f
in d iv idu a l iza t io n  o f  production at the expense o f  the household as a 
un itary  production u n i t .  In the case o f  Ban Ping farmers, i t  was the 
opportun it ies presented by commercial r ice  production afforded by 
t rac to rs  at Thunglor that offered young people the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  a cash 
income p a r t l y  independent o f  the larger household, whereas in Lan Sak i t  
tends to be the non-farm economy tha t  presents such oppor tun i t ies . 
Uhl ig (1984 : 164) notes the breakup o f  the extended family  un it  in
spontaneous land clearance, as a re su l t  o f  which fam i l ies  have less 
access to household labour and depend on hired labour as a consequence, 
thereby increasing the cost o f  dryland cropping.
32. Moerman (1968 : 129) maintains that social re la t io n s  are as
important a resource fo r  production as are material  goods, p a r t i c u la r l y
in the case o f  mobi l iz ing labour.
33. A tang o f  paddy could be sold for 28 or 29 baht in 1984. 100 
kilograms o f  mi l led r ice  cost at least 500 baht.  At 15 kilograms per 
tang,  th is  amounts to 75 baht per tang of mi l led r i ce .  At the 
usual volume conversion rate of 42 per cent,  the mi l led equivalent o f  
one tang o f  paddy y ie lds r i ce  worth at least 31.5 baht.  Since the 
standard d a i l y  harvest ing wage is 30 baht , both employer and 
r i c e - d e f i c ie n t  employee thus bene f i t  by payment in paddy.
34. The value of r i ce  not sold is calculated at 29 baht per tang. 
See Chapter VI,  footnote 3 below.
35. See Johnston (1975 : 200 - 202) and Hanks (1972 : 23 - 68) fo r
comparison o f  broadcasting and transp lant ing. Ananya (1985 : 238 - 239) 
documents a switch from transplant ing to broadcasting by larger  farmers 
as a means o f  reducing labour costs, assisted by new techniques made 
possible by improved water con tro l .
36. Field cropping w i l l  be described in de ta i l  in the section 
on Ban Mai. Certain spec if ica t ions  d i f f e r ,  but the production 
process is b a s ica l ly  the same for the same crops in the two 
v i l 1 ages.
37. I t  is genera l ly  appreciated by farmers that farmgate pr ices o f  
paddy are f a i r l y  standard. The low pr ice is  blamed on the government, 
since the l a t t e r  f a i l s  to support i t s  guaranteed pr ice . Farmers protest 
each year, and the January 1986 protests in Bangkok involved large 
delegations from Uthaithani (The Nation 5/1/86; Far Eastern Economic 
Review 17/1/86).
38. Some Ban Dong v i l l a g e rs  own land behind Ban Kai. Others have been 
to see re la t ions  in the v i l l a g e  or passed through on hunting t r i p s .
CHAPTER VI
DIFFERENTIATION, DEARTH, AMD DEVELOPMENT
Changes that are a product o f  development were out l ined in 
Chapter IV. Chapter V examined the consequences o f  such changes fo r  
control  over production for Lan Sak farmers. The in te rac t ion  o f  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  and environmental change was shown to be important. A 
growing heterogeneity o f socio-economic posit ion was iden t i f ied  with in  
the two communities under study, and th is  was seen to be bound up with 
the processes o f  change. The present chapter examines more s p e c i f i c a l l y  
the forces shaping th i s  heterogeneity and the consequences fo r  those who 
lose control  over production.
The discussion begins with a theoret ica l  background to the issue 
o f  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  in the context o f  agrarian change. Aspects o f  t h i s  
theoret ica l  approach are then applied to the s i tua t ion  o f  producers in 
Ban Dong and Ban Mai, with i l l u s t r a t i o n  in the form o f  case studies o f  
ind iv idua ls .  I t  is shown that the response to resource shortage is 
oriented to re ta in ing  control over production fo r  reproduction of the 
family  social  u n i t , 1 and th is  has consequences regarding fur ther  
d i f f e re n t ia t io n  and environmental change. F in a l l y ,  impl icat ions for 
development are drawn in order to set the scene fo r  the fol lowing two 
chapters, which look more d i r e c t l y  at development i n i t i a t i v e s .
V . l  D i f fe re n t ia t io n
Ban Dong and Ban Mai are heterogeneous communities tha t  are
undergoing fu r the r  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .  The focus in the preceding chapter 
was on the concentrat ion o f  control  over production. I t  was intimated 
tha t  such control is not determined so le ly  by ownership o f  isolated 
means o f  production. Power re la t io n s  at a broader le v e l ,  including 
those o f  the s ta te ,  are involved, and these are discussed fu r ther  in 
Chapter V I I I .  The fo l lowing discussion, meanwhile, l im i t s  i t s e l f  to a 
conventional considerat ion o f  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  as concentration of 
control  over land, labour, and ca p i ta l .
V, l t i  Theoret ical  aspects
The issue o f  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  o f  the peasantry as a product o f  
agrarian change was brought into prominence by Lenin. Rejecting the
Narodnik doctr ine o f  the "community" v i l l a g e ,  Lenin maintained not only 
tha t  the log ic  o f  capital ism as i t  spread to rura l  areas was to polarize 
the rural  population into landowning and labouring classes, but also 
that th is  process had reached an advanced stage in ear ly  twent ie th  
century Russia. Describing d i f fe re n t ia t io n  as "the sum to ta l  of a l l  the 
economic contrad ic t ions among the peasantry", Lenin held that the
process created new types o f  rura l  inhabitants and was referred to as 
"depeasantizing" in peasant discourse. The new classes o f  agrarian
bourgeoisie (comprising less than one f i f t h  o f  the rura l  population) and 
rura l  p ro le ta r ia t  (more than ha l f )  were character ized above a l l  by 
p a r t i c ip a t io n  in the commodotized, monetized economy. This was in 
contrast to the middle peasants, who s t i l l  worked t h e i r  own land using 
family  labour. However, agrar ian condit ions were such as to make the 
continued existence of t h i s  l a t t e r  group precarious, since they could 
only make ends meet in good years and re l ied  increas ing ly  on the new 
"masters o f  the contemporary countryside" fo r  loans and labouring
oppor tun i t ies . Migrat ion to the c i t i e s  was highest among th is  group, 
who according to Lenin were rap id ly  being "swept away" as a class (Lenin 
1899 in Harriss 1982).
An a l te rna t ive  in te rp re ta t ion  of d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  o f  the peasantry 
at t h i s  time was tha t  o f  the popul is t  Chayanov. Rather than seeing 
r i s in g  and f a l l i n g  fortunes o f  d i f f e r e n t  members o f  the agrarian 
community as a un i l inear  po la r iza t ion ,  Chayanov emphasized the cyc l ica l  
nature o f  peasant l ive l ihoods .  He suggested that at d i f f e r e n t  stages in 
the l i f e  cycle peasant households are subject to varying 
labourer-dependent ra t io s  and have access to d i f f e r e n t  amounts o f  land 
with in  a b a s ica l ly  homogeneous community. Rather than working within a 
c a p i t a l i s t  p ro f i t -o r ie n te d  framework, the peasant maximizes u t i l i t y  by 
means o f  a t ra d e -o f f  between to ta l  factor income and le isu re .  Even 
though involved with in  a wider economy, the peasant fami ly  remains the 
basic un it  o f  production, d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  and exchange. The impl icat ion 
i s  tha t peasants cont inua l ly  adapt to changes in fac to rs  o f  production 
by re l iance on domestic resources, sometimes in a " s e l f - e x p lo i t a t i v e "  
way, but in a way that preserves th e i r  existence against the apparent 
log ic  of c a p i t a l i s t  re la t ions  o f  production (see Chayanov 1926; Harrison 
1982; Scarborough 1985).
More recent analysis o f  agrarian change in peasant soc iet ies has 
drawn widely on these early  debates. The empirical  problem facing a 
Lenin ist  analysis is  the apparent persistence in most agrar ian societ ies 
(some would argue even in Western Europe) o f  smallholders who in cer ta in  
aspects of production resemble Lenin's supposedly doomed middle 
peasantry. In suggesting ways out o f  empirical  subject ion to theory, 
White (1987) argues against r i g id  adherence to models developed in a 
spec if ic  h is to r ic a l  and p o l i t i c a l  con tex t ,2 since:
There is  no universal or all -purpose 'agrar ian
quest ion'  awaiting inves t iga t ion ,  nor is there any
universal form o f  'agrar ian d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ' .
This is  not to re jec t  e n t i r e l y  the relevance o f  c lass ica l  analyses to 
current s i tua t ions .  Such a relevance i s ,  however, to be explored rather 
than assumed or imposed, fo r  as White points out Lenin himself  
dist inguished between underlying trends and spec i f ic  s i tua t ions ,  
recognizing the incompleteness o f  "p ro le ta r ia n iza t io n " .  Even the 
Chayanovian and Lenin is t  models are not e n t i r e l y  incompatible, and for 
White a key task is  to disentangle cyc l ica l  and long-term trends. He 
goes on:
D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . . . involves a cumulative and 
permanent ( i . e .  n o n -cyc l ica l , which is  not to say 
tha t  i t  is never revers ib le)  process o f  change in 
the ways in which d i f f e r e n t  groups in rura l  
society - and some outside i t  - gain access to the 
products o f  t h e i r  own or others'  labour, based on 
th e i r  d i f f e r e n t ia l  control  over the means o f  
production and o f ten ,  but not always, on 
increasing inequa l i t ies  in access to land ( i b i d . ) .
"Pumping out" o f  surplus labour is a key common denominator, but beyond
th i s  concrete forms o f  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  are varied and complex. What is
needed in place o f  the dichotomous focus e i ther  on polar extremes ( i . e .
landlord / labourer  classes) or on small peasant households is  explanation
of the coexistence o f  the two forms.
Another recent departure in the analysis o f  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  has 
been to consider the p o l i t i c a l  and ideological as well as the economic. 
Hart (1987) considers the s ta te ’ s ro le  in rura l  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  in 
pa r t icu la r  the creat ion of state supported e l i t e s  which f u l f i l  a 
pol ic ing ro le  fo r  the state and in turn receive state patronage such as 
in the form o f  control  over development programmes. However, the 
re la t ionsh ip  between sta tes, rura l  e l i t e s ,  and poorer v i l l a g e rs  varies 
according to spec i f ic  aspects o f  the p o l i t y  and social  formation. Hart 
contrasts Thailand with Indonesia, fo r  example, and shows tha t  whereas 
in the l a t t e r  a high ly central ized and exclusive state apparatus 
(Golkar) means tha t  local e l i t e s  invest in soc ia l iz ing  with government
o f f i c i a l s  in order to gain o f f i c i a l  standing themselves at a local
le v e l ,  in Thailand a less powerful or centra l ized state resu l ts  in
" local powers" having more independent au tho r i ty  and seeking
const i tuencies not only among senior o f f i c i a l s  and representat ives o f
ca p i ta l ,  but also among v i l l a g e  populations. Turton (1987) focuses on
these local powers, emphasizing tha t  they are to be found among v i l l a g e
e l i t e s  ( t y p i c a l l y  f i v e  per cent) as well as among d i s t r i c t  level
o f f i c i a l s  and traders. The s t ruc tu ra l  pos it ion o f  these e l i t e s  is
enhanced by th e i r  " l inkage" ro le ,
above a l l  through re la t ions  which enable them to 
accumulate (or be the f i r s t  stage in the
accumulation of)  v i l la g e  surplus through wages, 
commodity deal ing, r e t a i l  pr ices, re n t ,  and 
in te res t  ( i b i d . ) .
However, po la r iza t ion  in the ideological sphere is not as c lea rcu t ,  
pa r t ly  due to con t inu i ty  in control  over ce r ta in  basic means of
production. Thus despite being drawn increasing ly  into commodity 
currents in the sphere o f  exchange and being in a mater ial  sense "wage 
labour equiva lent" ,  peasants seem to re ta in  control  over land and
labour. The v i l l a g e  community i s  maintained in part  also by m i t iga t ion  
of contrad ic t ions by v i l la g e  e l i t e s ,  who use th e i r  new posit ion in 
social and re l ig io u s  patronage to "benef i t  from associat ion with more 
t ra d i t i o n a l  and v i l l a g e  forms o f  re la t ionsh ip  and legi t imacy" ( i b i d . ) .
Nevertheless, the new re la t ionsh ips  enta i led in th i s  spec i f ic  
var ian t  o f  rura l  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  enta i l  transformations not only in 
s t ruc tu ra l  or material  pos it ion but also in the ideological sphere. 
Turton has demonstrated elsewhere (1984b) how peasant discourse reveals 
emergent forms o f  consciousness. Anan (1984; 1987) shows how rapid
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in a northern Thai v i l la g e  leads to new a l l iances and 
cleavages despite the only p a r t i a l l y  developed nature o f  markets in 
land, labour, inputs, and products and constra ints  on c a p i t a l i s t  
development such as e f fo r t s  by poorer v i l l a g e rs  to hold on to small
plots  fo r  subsistence product ion. I f  we are to fo l low  Hart (1987) in 
seeing change as a d ia le c t i c a l  rather  than a l inear  process, i t  is  
essent ial  to focus on these spec i f ic  contexts and draw patterns from 
r e a l i t y  rather  than vice versa. The r e a l i t y  here is  studied in terms o f  
control  over production in an integrated sense ( i . e .  not j u s t  isolated 
factors such as land) and subject ive react ion to changes in such 
c o n t ro l .
V ^ l j i  Factors o f  production and surplus accumulation in the 
study v i l  1 ages
In the recent ly  sett led communities o f  Lan Sak we face the 
complication o f  dual s ta r t ing  points for analysis o f  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n .  
The f i r s t  is  the indigenous community, which was marked by a homogeneity 
o f  economic funct ion (subsistence production supported by trade in 
forest products),  even though access to land was a var iab le determining 
scale o f  production. The second is  the s i tua t ion  o f  recent s e t t l e r s ,  
most o f whom came in search o f  land due to loss o f  t h i s  basic factor  o f 
production in a d i f fe re n t ia te d  home community.
The process o f  sett lement i t s e l f  led to res t ruc tu r ing  of the 
v i l la g e  economy. While new s e t t le rs  regained control  over land, e a r l ie r  
residents who had previously been land-r ich  but pursued s im i la r  forms o f  
production to those with less land now made quick p ro f i t s  from land 
sales and fo re s t ry .  The way in which these have been put to use varies 
depending on the production regime in each newly set t led  community. The 
resu l t ing  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  varies accordingly,  and th is  is  now 
i l l u s t ra te d  with reference to the present s i tua t ion  in Ban Dong and Ban 
Mai.
In Ban Dong, control  over production is secured f i r s t  and 
foremost by control  over r ice land.  With s u f f i c i e n t  r ice land ,  i t  is  
with in  the means o f  most households to secure addit ional  resources for 
subsistence production. The most important o f  these are water, bu f fa lo ,  
and household labour. In Ban Mai, on the other hand, land is secondary 
to cap i ta l  in securing control  over production. Capital  i s  important 
both in the form of machinery and as more " l i q u id "  seasonal production 
investment.
Table 6.1 shows the d is t r ib u t i o n  o f  local and non-local land in 
Ban Dong and Ban Mai. Average land ownership is  the same, but Ban Dong 
land is much less evenly d is t r ib u te d .  More than one in three Ban Dong 
v i l l a g e rs  have l i t t l e  or no local land, compared with less than one in 
twelve fo r  Ban Mai. In the l a t t e r  v i l l a g e ,  more than f o u r - f i f t h s  are 
w ith in  the medium range o f  land ownership, with th ree-quarters owning 
the standard ALRO 25 r a i  . I f  land owned outside the v i l l a g e  is taken 
into account, the average land ownership for the two v i l la g es  remains 
s im i la r ,  but the d is t r ib u t i o n  o f  land among Ban Mai residents becomes 
markedly less evenly d is t r ib u te d .
Table 6.1 Land d is t r i b u t i o n  in Ban Dong and Ban Mai
None 1 - 5  6 - 15 16 - 30 31 - 50 51+ Mean
r a i  r a i  r a i  r a i  r a i  sd
Ban Dong 20.5 16.5 8.2 26.0 20.6 8.2 24.1
26 3
(15.1) (10.9) (8.2) (28.8) (19.2) (17.8)(33^5)
{35.8)
Ban Mai 2.7 5.3 2.7 81.3 8.0 0.0 24.1
9 4
(0.0) (2.7) (2.6) (70.7) (14.7) (9 .3 )(33.1)"
{23.5)
Notes : f igures in brackets include non-local land; 
a l l  f igures are percentages; 
sd = standard devia t ion.
The low va r ia t ion  in local land ownership in Ban Mai is due to 
i t s  status as a land reform v i l l a g e .  In f a c t ,  the 37 per cent o f  
households who do not conform to ALRO rules on tenure
grounds and the many more who in f r inge  on grounds o f  tenancy are the 
s ig n i f i c a n t  phenomenon, in demonstrating the persistence o f  a l te rna t ive  
sources o f  control  over land. In Ban Dong, d i f f e r e n t i a l  access to land 
is  a product both o f  h is to r ica l  processes and of dynamics o f  current 
production re la t io n s .  H is to r i c a l l y ,  access to land depended upon
a b i l i t y  to lay claim to a t r a c t ,  which in turn required au thor i ty .
L a t te r ly ,  cap ita l  or t r u s t  has been more important for the acquis i t ion 
o f  land. Trust (kaan wai ja i  kan) was important in the case of
landless se t t le rs  who would buy on c red i t  from e a r l i e r  se t t le rs .  Loss 
of land by those who once held i t  is  usual ly due to debt,  which ar ises 
e i the r  by unsuccessful involvement in the commercial economy or through 
other expenses, often unavoidable such as in the case o f  i l l n e s s .  As 
was shown in section V.2. i  9 t h i s  is  often an intergenerat ional 
process, and as such i t  is  less immediate and hence less sa l ien t  than 
stark  foreclosure.
Capital in the form of implements necessary fo r  production is 
heavi ly  concentrated in Ban Mai, less so in Ban Dong (Table 6.2).  
Overa l l ,  56 and 19 per cent o f  farmers in Ban Dong and Ban Mai
respect ive ly  own some form o f  ploughing implement. Only one Ban Mai
v i l l a g e r  in twenty owns a t r a c to r ,  but these account for roughly h a l f  o f  
a l l  cash investments in f i e ld  cropping (Table 5.6).  Although ploughing 
also accounts fo r  ha l f  the cash investment cost o f  r i c e  p lant ing, t h i s  
is  h a l f  o f  a much smaller amount, and non-cash inputs (household and 
reciprocal labour,  household resources) are considerably more important. 
Overal l ,  inputs as measured in cash equivalent are lower for r ice  in 
proport ion to the value o f  o u tp u t ,3 and th is  i s  re f lec ted in the
premium on r iceland expressed both in voiced preference and in re la t i v e  
prices on the land marke t.  ^ Hence the greater sign if icance in Ban
Dong o f  land ownership as a variable  inf luencing control  over 
product ion.
Table 6.2 Control over t i l l a g e  in Ban Dong and Ban Mai
% o f  households owning
Tractors Power T i l l e r s  Buffalo
Ban Dong 5.5 24.7 24.7
Ban Mai 5.3 12.0 0.0
Accumulation through surplus appropration is  generated in three 
main ways in Ban Dong and Ban Mai : moneylending, t ra d ing ,  and renting 
out o f  fac to rs  o f  production. Moneylending is  an important means o f
surplus accumulation in both communities. I t  is also an e f fe c t ive  means 
o f  d ecap i ta l isa t ion ,  or a l ienat ion from control over means of 
product ion, o f  debtors. This is  p a r t i c u la r l y  so in the case o f
condit ional  c r e d i t ,  for example the s t ip u la t io n  to use a c re d i to r 's  
t ra c to r  and se l l  produce to a v i l l a g e  merchant or to buy inputs from
BAAC.5
The second pr inc ipa l  means o f  surplus appropria t ion that leads to 
d i f fe re n t ia t io n  with in  the v i l la g e  is  trade. In the past,  trade was 
mainly carr ied out by non-local middlemen. Now 52 per cent o f  r i ce  is 
sold to v i l la g e  traders, 14 per cent o f maize, and 13 per cent o f  mung 
beans. This is  p a r t i c u la r ly  important in Ban Dong, where the 
percentages are 55, 51, and 70 respect ive ly .  In Ban Mai, no r i c e  and
only 9 and 2 per cent respect ive ly  o f  maize and mung beans are sold to
v i l la g e  traders. Dominance by v i l l a g e  traders does not necessari ly
re f l e c t  an absence of opportun i t ies fo r  v i l l a g e rs .  What they lose in 
lower pr ices given by v i l la g e  traders is made up in part by lower
t ranspor t costs and f l e x i b i l i t y  in timing of sales. I t  does, however, 
enhance in t r a - v i l l a g e  d i f f e re n t ia t io n  and dependency re la t ionsh ips  that 
r e s u l t .  In tu rn ,  t h i s  is  detr imental  to the v i l l a g e  as a community o f  
i n te re s t ,  inasmuch as t h i s  ever ex isted, and i t  bo ls ters  the posit ion o f  
those who are increasingly  id e n t i f ie d  with state and outside commercial 
in te res ts .  This i s  in part  due also to th e i r  ro le  as v i l l a g e  level 
mediators o f  state led rural  development, as fo r  example in the cases o f  
v i l l a g e  committee members Maen and Ad (cases 6 and 12) below (c f .  Ananya 
1985 : 169; 205).
Surplus appropr iat ion by rent ing out o f  fac to rs  o f  production 
varies between Ban Dong and Ban Mai. Renting out o f  land is  most 
important in Ban Dong, with 29 per cent o f  farmers rent ing in ,  
accounting for 17 per cent o f  cu l t i va b le  land. As we observed in Table 
5.2, these are mostly land-short  farmers. In Ban Mai, on the other 
hand, rent ing in helps generate surplus for weal thier farmers since they 
employ wage labour (often including the nominal owner o f the land 
rented).  Renting out o f  t rac to rs  i s  the pr inc ipa l  form o f  re n t ie r  
surplus in Ban Mai, and as we have seen from Table 5.6c, t h i s  accounts 
for an important part  o f  the Ban Mai economy. I t  should be noted that 
money lenders, t raders, and t ra c to r  owners are the same few people in 
Ban Mai. In Ban Dong, moneylending is  combined with trad ing ,  but t h i s  
is  not coincident with large scale land ownership. Less conventional 
means o f  surplus appropriat ion include running or serving as agent to 
i l l e g a l  l o t t e r i e s  {huai t a i  d i n ) ,  as in the case o f  the kamnan' s 
wife in Ban Dong and the v i l la g e  head in Ban Mai. In add i t ion ,  use of 
p o l i t i c a l  o f f i c e  fo r personal gain, such as by charging a "fee" for 
r e g is t ra t io n  o f  b i r th s  and deaths and pocketing port ions o f  development 
pro ject  a l lo ca t ion s ,  i s  r i f e  in both communities.
V l ^ l j ' i i  D i f fe re n t ia t io n  in Ban Dong
Before discussing d i f f e re n t ia t io n  in Ban Dong, i t  should be 
pointed out that production based on a subsistence crop with an as yet 
low level o f c a p i t a l i z a t io n  does in fac t  lead to a more homogeneous 
community than where commercialization is  more advanced. But th is
homogeneity is  only r e la t i v e .  The key fac to rs  o f  production are
unequally d is t r ibu ted  with in  the community. To i l l u s t r a t e  the e f fe c t  
t h i s  has on household product ion, the cases o f  six not untypical Ban 
Dong households are presented below. Each household is  referred to by a 
pseudonym of the reported household head, and th is  is used also to 
re fe r  to the en t i re  household. Although i t  usual ly re fe rs  to a male, 
th is  is  not to imply that the male head of household is the dominant 
ind iv idual regarding household production, fo r example in land ownership 
or labour input.
1. Mid, landless labourer . Nid has never owned land. Before 
coming to Ban Dong, Nid's family  rented land in Nong Chang, but the land 
was poor and the fami ly moved to Lad Yao in Nakorn Sawan in the hope o f  
being able to buy cheap land. They were unsuccessful , and moved to Ban 
Dong in 1974. In some years they rent 23 ra i  o f  rain fed r ice land, 
but in 1984 they did not plant because o f  drought. Since they pay rent
under baeng suan (sharecropping) contract ,  the owner agreed not to
take any rent.
There are f i v e  people in Nid's household. Two o f  the daughters, 
aged 17 and 12, have f in ished school. The youngest is  about to s ta r t
school. Noi, Nid's w i fe ,  complains about the cost o f  sending children
to school. In p a r t i c u la r ,  she resents the cost o f  sweets at the v i l la g e
shop. In the past, ch i ldren would ask fo r  a baht fo r  sweets once a
week or once a fo r tn ig h t  fo r  home-made sweets wrapped in banana leaves. 
Now i t  is  two or three baht per ch i ld  per day fo r  p las t ic  wrapped 
sweets with no n u t r i t i o n a l  value. I f  the ch i ld ren do not get the same 
as th e i r  schoolmates, they complain that they are "ashamed : aai 
khao" .
Although two chi ld ren have now f in ished school and can contr ibute 
to the fam i ly 's  labour, Nid himself  is  unable to work in most jobs
fol lowing a p i l l i o n  motorcycle accident which l e f t  him permanently 
c r ipp led.  In 1984, the en t i re  family income o f  about 9,000 baht came 
from local a g r icu l tu ra l  wage labouring. Half o f  t h i s  was required ju s t  
for purchase o f  r i ce  and charcoal. They are also in debt to a neighbour 
fo r  3,000 baht,  on which they pay 1,800 baht per year in in te res t .
Only a small proportion of Nid’ s consumption needs can be 
s a t is f ie d  by use o f  local resources. Without land, access to r ice  and 
other necessit ies requires cash. They grow some vegetables for home 
consumption, but not a l l  year round. They managed to make some o f  th e i r  
own charcoal on wasteland, but not enough to las t  year round. A few 
chickens provide an occasional source o f  food. Other than the small
thatched bamboo and timber shack they l i v e  in on a s i s t e r ' s  land, t h e i r
only other main possession is a b icyc le .  Given a w in d fa l l ,  the f i r s t  
p r i o r i t y  would be to pay o f f  debt,  then to buy a small amount o f
r iceland and bu f fa lo .
2. Nai, tenant farmer. Nai has also never had land of his  own. 
He l ive s  in Bung Khiew on his b ro ther 's  land and rents poor qua l i ty  land 
from one o f  Ban Dong's larger  landowners, who is a member o f  the 
v i l l a g e  committee. Nai moved to Ban Dong with his parents in 1974. 
They had been affected by drought on the i r  rainfed r iceland in Lad Yao, 
so moved to Lan Sak. Nai 's parents and s is te rs  work a small p lo t  of
land on the edge o f  the v i l l a g e .  Since Nai now has a fami ly  o f  his own, 
he and Lad, his w i fe ,  have b u i l t  t h e i r  own t i n y  house. They have a 
seven year old son.
In 1984, Nai rented 30 ra i  , but because of drought only planted 
13 ra i  on a baeng suan (sharecropping) basis. In 1983, he had los t 
part o f  the crop because o f  f looding. Apart from c u l t iv a t in g  5 ra i  o f  
the local va r ie ty  7uang prathaan r i c e ,  Nai also planted 8 ra i  o f  
maize, followed by a second crop o f  sorghum. Nai uses household labour 
or reciprocal labour wherever possible. However, fo r  harvesting the 
f i e ld  crops, i t  was necessary to h ire  labour. I t  is  notable tha t  for 
the r i ce  crop no hired labour was used at a l l ,  whereas fo r  cash crops i t  
accounted for approximately three-quarters o f  non-household labour.
Nai had to rent two bu f fa lo  at 50 tang o f  r i c e  each. In th is  
way, he could use his  own labour for ploughing, threshing, and winnowing 
the r ice  crop. For the cash crops, however, he re l ied  on h i r ing  a
t ra c to r  to plough the f i e ld s  and a machine for husking the maize and
sorghum. He also had to use chemical pest ic ides fo r  the maize and
m i l l e t  and h ire  a sprayer to apply them. For a l l  these cash inputs, Nai
re l ied  on family wage labour and a small loan from a v i l l a g e  t rader ,  to
whom he was obliged to se l l  his crop.
In a good year, Nai could expect to harvest up to six kwien 
(600 tang) of paddy. However, in 1984 he only managed two kwien. 
Half o f  th is  went on bu f fa lo  re n t ,  and another quarter on land rent.  
The land rent was reduced by the landlord because o f  the poor crop, as
is  common in baeng suan arrangements, making them less r i s ky  fo r  the
tenant than ka ( f ixed r ice  payment) or cash. The remaining 50 tang 
is  not enough to see two adults and a ch i ld  through the year. The 
previous year Mai had had to purchase three sacks o f  r ice  at 600
baht each because o f  crop loss from f looding. Cash for purchase o f  
r i ce  is  obtained in part from p r o f i t  from f i e ld  cropping, which in 1984 
yielded ju s t  under 5,000 baht net. This would have been reduced by 
h a l f  had Nai had to pay in te res t  on debt incurred by borrowing for 
inputs.
Nai raises a few chickens and plants vegetables fo r  home 
consumption. He hopes to make some supplementary income by ra is ing  
bu ffa lo  fo r  a wealthy v i l l a g e r .  However, Nai does not see a long term 
future in Ban Dong. Even off-season work or a c t i v i t y  such as sawing 
wood and house construct ion is  now scarce. Nai spends periods during 
the dry season hunting with his fa ther  in the mountains beyond Ban Mai. 
One such t r i p  has taken him to Thong Laang, where he has met Karens on 
an ALRO/mili tary scheme to se t t le  h i l l  people in permanent ag r icu l tu re .
However, since th i s  c o n f l i c t s  with t ra d i t i o n a l  Karenni s h i f t in g
c u l t i v a t io n  ( in Mai's words, "kariang mai cho‘ b t h i i  t ier)  : Karens
don ' t  l i k e  cleared land'1) ,  the Karen are secre t ly  se l l in g  o f f  the forest 
reserve land al located to them by ALRO to lowland Thais at 300 baht 
per ra i  and Nai expects to move there soon. Nai believes tha t  study 
beyond the compulsory six years is  out o f  the question fo r  chi ld ren of 
someone o f  his means and he expects them to be farmers, which is one 
reason he would l i k e  to obtain his own land.
3. Norm, part  tenant . Norm moved to Ban Dong as a ch i ld  from
Wat Singh in Chainat province in 1966. His parents were among the f i r s t  
s e t t l e r s  in Bung Khiew. They had l i t t l e  land in Wat Singh and used the
proceeds from se l l ing  tha t  to buy a larger area from e a r l ie r  Lao
s e t t le r s .  However, Norm's father has been unable to give his land to 
his married ch i ld ren ,  as would be customary, because o f  debt. Instead,
he has sold them each a p lo t  o f  10 ra i  fo r h a l f  the going pr ice. Norm
now farms th i s  land but also rents 15 ra i  from a weal thier neighbour
Th i ip ,  fo r  whom Norm used to work as a mahout u n t i l  Th i ip 's  work 
elephant died in 1983. Norm and his wife Sao l i v e  with th e i r  two young 
chi ld ren in a small hut next to th e i r  f i e ld s .
In 1984, Norm planted 15 ra i  o f  the hardy local khaao leuang 
r i c e ,  a drought and disease res is ta n t  s tra in  tha t  nevertheless commands 
a poor pr ice . He also planted small areas o f  maize and mung beans, two 
crops o f  the l a t t e r .  Like Nai, Norm rented two bu f fa lo  and used mostly 
household or reciprocal labour fo r  the r ice  crop, whereas the f i e ld  
crops required cash inputs. However, Norm started working in late 1984 
as an "Or Jo r " , or (abbreviated) Provincial  Volunteer,  under a 
m i l i t a r y  programme re c ru i t i n g  v i l l a g e rs  to help in the "psychological 
warfare" v i l la g e  development scheme in Ban Rai. This takes Norm away 
from Ban Dong for 15 to 20 days per month, but i t  also provides a steady 
income of 1500 baht per month. As a r e s u l t ,  labour was hired for the 
r ice  harvest and the paddy was machine threshed. On the other hand,
the small y ie lds  o f  mung beans were husked using household labour, since 
th i s  could be done by Sao at home. Sao is  now l e f t  to cope with most o f  
the domestic and ag r icu l tu ra l  work.
In 1984, Norm's f i e ld s  yielded 450 tang of  paddy. Of t h i s ,  250
tang had to be sold immediately in order to raise cash to pay his
parents fo r  land. The remainder was not enough even to cover land and 
bu f fa lo  rent and in te res t  on a cash loan paid in r i c e ,  which means tha t  
he has to buy r i ce  u n t i l  the next harvest. The maize and second mung 
bean crops were severely affected by drought, and Norm made a loss on 
both, not even taking into account labour expended. Again not taking
into account labour, these losses were barely made up by a small p r o f i t
on the f i r s t  mung bean crop. I f  in te res t  on the loan required for
inputs fo r  the f i e ld  crops is  also taken into account (37.5 tang of
r i ce  on a 1,500 baht loan from a v i l l a g e  trader) , i t  turns out tha t  in
e f fe c t  Norm's r i c e  crop subsidised losses on his cash crops.
Norm is moving rap id ly  toward cash oriented production despite 
the seeming economic i r r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  such a move in l i g h t  o f  the above. 
His salary (ngoen deuan) makes i t  both possible and necessary to hire 
labour .6 Whereas previously he would have expressly avoided debt to 
outs iders , even BAAC, he is now paying o f f  a 600 baht per month 
h a l f -yea r ly  hire-purchase loan for a te lev is ion  set,  run by a car 
bat te ry .  The incongruous sight o f  a te lev is ion  aer ia l  r i s in g  out o f 
Norm's t i n y  hut in the middle o f  r ice  paddies t e s t i f i e s  to the 
consumerist inf luences brought to bear by connection with the outside 
world. Nevertheless, given enough cash, Norm idea l ly  would prefer to 
buy r iceland nearby and improve his house. He is also adamant that he 
would l i ke  his  ch i ld ren to study.
4. Sud, s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . Sud l ives with his wife and two 
chi ld ren in Nong Sung, where he himself  was born. Nong Sung is  another 
small out ly ing community o f  Ban Dong. Sud's father moved there from Ban 
Dong when i t  was s t i l l  dense fo res t .  S t i l l  a r e l a t i v e l y  isolated 
community, Nong Sung is connected to the outside via Ban Dong only by a 
footpath. However, i t  has been cleared o f  forest for some t ime, the 
main in f lu x  according to Sud being when "people came from 'down below : 
khaang laang'  [ i . e .  to the East] when the pr ice o f  maize rose [ i n  
the early 1970s]".
Sud owns 28 ra i  o f  land in Nong Sung, o f  which 15 ra i  are 
semi- i r r igated r iceland and 11 r a i  upland. He bought th is  land in 
1978 fo r  an average o f  2,500 baht per ra i  from a v i l l a g e r  who had 
staked i t  out.  In ear ly  1984, Sud spent 11,000 baht on le v e l l in g  his 
r ice land ,  part  o f  which he i r r ig a te s  by means o f  a pump powered by the 
engine o f  his power t i l l e r ,  fo r  which he also has a t r a i l e r  attachment.
Sud uses his t i l l e r  on his own and his mother's land but does not
receive a cash income from i t .
In 1984 Sud planted 15 ra i  o f  r ice land,  using the new var ie ty
RD7, and 8 ra i  o f  maize. Secondary crops o f  mung beans were planted
on 14 ra i  fol lowing the maize and r ice  harvests. Sud used his power 
t i l l e r  to do a l l  his own ploughing, threshing and husking o f  mung beans
and r i c e ,  and transpor t ing produce from the f i e ld s .  The only machinery
he needed to hire was for husking maize. Planting was done using family 
labour, and reciprocal labour in the case o f  r i c e  t ransp lant ing. Family 
labour was used for weeding in the case o f  maize and for spraying 
insect ic ide to protect mung beans. The r ice  harvest used household and 
reciprocal labour,  the maize harvest only household labour. The only 
labour hired was fo r  harvesting mung beans. Cash inputs were l im i ted  to 
p e t ro l ,  maize and mung bean seed, and insec t ic ide .  These were obtained 
on a 2,000 baht BAAC loan, using Sud's fa th e r 's  membership.
The r ice  harvest yielded 6 kwien , o f  which 5 were sold. 70
tang each o f  maize and mung beans were obtained; o v e ra l l ,  Sud's crops 
yielded a net cash income of j u s t  over 20,000 baht , a f te r  deducting 
inputs and in te res t  on Sud's loan, and enough r i ce  for annual 
consumption needs.
Other than cropping, Sud derives a small income from occasional 
labouring fo r  neighbours. F ru i t  t rees also y ie ld  a small income, and 
duck eggs provide small but steady cash earnings. Chickens are raised 
for home consumption. To date, Sud has never had to purchase charcoal,
but the supply o f  wood is nearly exhausted.
Sud is  an example, then, o f  a more or less s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  
farmer. He has control  over most o f  the basic means o f  product ion,
s u f f i c i e n t  fo r  but not surplus to his own household needs. Capital is 
used mainly for improving on-farm production, such as by le v e l l in g  land 
and pumping i r r i g a t i o n  water. Involvement in the wage labour economy is 
minor, despite the fac t  tha t  most of Sud's crops are produced for the 
market. Sud wou1d l ike  his ch i ld ren to study i f  they are up to i t  
( " thaa hua d i i  : l i t .  i f  [ they have] good heads"), otherwise he
expects them to be r ice  farmers. In the l a t t e r  case, Sud would seek to 
purchase addit ional  r ice land.
5. T h i i ,  extensive farmer. Thi i  was born in Ban Rai and moved 
to Ban Dong in 1953 when he married J a i ,  the then kamnan' s daughter. 
Both Thi i  and Jai are Lao, Jai from one o f  the old Ban Dong fami l ies .  
They s t i l l  farm with three o f  t h e i r  ch i ldren and son-in- law (temporar i ly
away on m i l i t a r y  conscr ip t ion ) ,  and also have l i v i n g  at home one ch i ld
studying at secondary school and one in fant  grandchi ld.
Thi i  is  a large landowner, with 139 ra i  o f  land in Ban Dong.
Of t h i s ,  80 ra i  is r iceland and 55 ra i  upland. Nearly h a l f  o f
T h i i ' s  land was staked out by his father in law during the 1930s, while 
the remainder was bought cheaply by Thi i  in 1964. Thi i  has a small 
t ra c to r  which he uses exc lus ive ly  on his own and his ch i ld re n 's  land.
In 1984, Thi i  l e t  his chi ldren work 40 ra i  o f  his land. An
addit ional 25 ra i  were l e t  to a re la t i v e  for 180 tang on a ka
contrac t.  Of the remainder, 50 ra i  were planted to 1uang prathaan 
r i c e ,  20 ra i  each to maize, sorghum, and mung beans, the l a t t e r  two 
intercropped. T h i i ' s  ch i ld ren who s t i l l  l i v e  at home planted mung beans
on r iceland a f te r  the harvest,  but separately from the main household in
which they are included otherwise.
Thi i  r e l i e s  heavi ly on cash inputs. In 1984 h is  t ra c to r  had
mechanical t roub le ,  and he had to hire a large t ra c to r  fo r  ploughing. 
No rec iprocal  labour is used, even in r i c e  c u l t i v a t io n .  Rice is 
broadcast, as are m i l l e t  and mung beans. Other than household labour, 
hired labour is used fo r  maize p lan t ing ,  weeding, spraying herbicide, 
and harvesting for a l l  crops. Herbicides and insect ic ides are 
purchased, and r i c e  and maize are threshed and husked by machine. These 
are financed in part by a 10,000 baht BAAC loan. Th i i  also borrowed 
1500 baht from Maen, a v i l la g e  t rader ,  with no in te res t  but an 
ob l igat ion  to se l l  his maize crop to him. The small t ra c to r  is  used 
to yiabyam (thresh by trampl ing) the sorghum and mung bean crops.
Drought affected the r i ce  and maize crops, b irds  and c a te rp i l l a r s  
the sorghum and mung beans. Of the 5 kwien o f  r i ce  harvested, two 
were to be kept for home consumption. Overal l ,  each o f  the cash crops 
made Thi i  a small p r o f i t ,  with a net income o f  j u s t  under 10,000 baht , 
al lowing for in te res t  on the BAAC loan. In add i t ion ,  the r ice  harvest 
yielded a 2,000 baht p r o f i t  and enough r i ce  for annual home 
consumption.
Other than th e i r  own crop c u l t i v a t io n ,  T h i i ' s  ch i ldren work as 
occasional wage labourers. Otherwise, Thi i  raises chickens and ducks 
for home consumption. Charcoal is produced for own use.
Thus T h i i ,  despite being one o f  the largest  landowners in the 
v i l la g e  and having r e la t i v e l y  easy access to c a p i t a l ,  chooses to farm 
extensively.  He is  a large net employer o f  labour. Water shortage is 
a b a r r ie r  to crop i n te n s i f i c a t i o n ,  but only a j o i n t  pro ject with 
other farmers would secure Thi i  i r r ig a t i o n  water for his r iceland 
(see section 1 below).
6. Maen, v i l l a g e  t r a d e r . Maen moved to Ban Dong from Sawang
Arom d i s t r i c t  in 1970. The family had been farmers, but drought was 
such that they decided to sel l  up and fo l low re la t i v e s  to Ban Dong. 
They opened a small shop, and th is  has become one o f  Ban Dong's three 
main general goods suppl iers . Their two chi ld ren study at secondary 
school, one in Lan Sak and the other in Uthaithani.  Maen is a member o f 
the Vi l lage Committee, and Aa, his w ife, is  vice president o f  the 
government i n i t i a t e d  Housewives' Group.
Maen owns 8 ra i  o f  land, which he bought from a re la t i v e  in 
1974. Part o f  his land has a s tra teg ic  road frontage locat ion. In 
1984, Maen planted 5 ra i  o f  maize, using hired labour fo r  p lant ing, 
weeding, and harvest ing. A t ra c to r  and husking machine were hired for 
ploughing and husking, and seed was purchased from BAAC. Maen made a 
small p r o f i t  on t h i s  crop, despite drought.
Maen's pr inc ipa l  a c t i v i t y  is  trade. Apart from running a general 
goods s tore, which Aa looks a f te r  fo r  most o f  the t ime, Maen is  one o f  
two main v i l l a g e  traders in r ice  and f i e ld  crops. He lends cash, 
usual ly charging in te res t  in r i ce  and maize, but sometimes in cash at 5 
per cent. He obtained 12,000 baht c re d i t  himself  from BAAC in 1984, 
but most o f  the cash he lends out i s  e i ther  his own or is  obtained from 
urban wholesalers. Maen owns a pickup and also makes about 6,000 baht 
per year d r iv ing  a lo r r y .  Apart from a few chickens, Maen produces 
l i t t l e  d i r e c t l y  fo r  subsistence. Rice and charcoal are bought.
Maen faces two main problems with his trade. The f i r s t  is  that 
r e t a i l  trade has gone down with improvement o f  roads, since mobile 
traders now come into the v i l l a g e  and i t  is  easier fo r  v i l l a g e rs  to shop 
at Paak Meuang or even Nong Chang and Uthaithani.  Although Maen does 
not mention i t ,  the improved communications do, however, benef i t  Maen in 
encouraging cash crop production and thereby increasing the volume o f
a g r icu l tu ra l  t rade. As was observed in the previous chapter,  outside 
middlemen have not made large inroads. The second problem is  t h e f t ,  
with a loss o f  5,000 baht in 1984. This is the only thing that might 
cause Maen to move elsewhere, i f  i t  gets worse. Maen would l i ke  his 
chi ld ren to study and become government o f f i c i a l s .  One d i f f i c u l t y  is 
having to buy expensive clothes for t h e i r  son who studies in Uthaithani,  
otherwise he too ( l i k e  Nid's chi ld ren : case 1) is "aai khao" . Even 
Maen, whose current  income derives mainly from trade rather than d i re c t  
a g r icu l tu ra l  production and who does not expect his chi ld ren to farm, 
fee ls  a desire to acquire r iceland as a securi ty ( nyaak dai kho' ng pen 
1ak wai i t i  : I ' d  l i ke  to get something as a nest-egg for the
f u t u r e . . . " ) .
These six cases demonstrate the very d i f f e r e n t  measures of 
control  over production achieved by various Ban Dong fam i l ies ,  and the 
impl icat ions t h i s  has fo r  reproduct ion of the household production u n i t .  
Unequal control  over land as the key fac tor  o f  subsistence production is 
compounded by d i f f e r e n t  capac it ies to secure labour, water, and motive 
power. The re s u l t  is  g reat ly  d i f f e r i n g  surpluses. Transfer o f surplus 
is  mainly through re n t ,  t rade, and in te res t ,  ra ther  than in d i re c t  
contro l  over fac to rs  o f  production.
Of p a r t icu la r  note is the propensity to h ire  labour with 
increasing scale o f  operat ion. Whereas Nid is  so le ly  a labourer and 
Thi i  almost so le ly  an employer of labour, Nai and Norm are net 
suppl iers o f  labour ( in  the case of Norm an external wage income may 
make him a net employer at the local leve l )  and Sud marginal ly  a net 
employer, a lb e i t  a t  a very low leve l .  This is para l le led by a tendency 
fo r  those at e i the r  extreme to engage re la t i v e l y  more in wage labour
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arrangements compared with those in between, who maintain reciprocal 
arrangements where possible and have control over the necessary factors  
o f  production to u t i l i s e  th e i r  own labour more f u l l y .
F in a l l y ,  i t  must be stressed that production in Ban Dong
continues to change, and trends in re la t ions  determining control  over 
factors of production can be summarized as fo l lows. Ploughing and 
threshing are slowly becoming mechanized even though those with bu f fa lo  
re ta in  the means for t h e i r  reproduction. This is  due to three main 
pressures: d e cap i ta l iza t io n ,  since debt is fo rc ing some farmers to
se l l  bu f fa lo ;  l im i ted  natural  resources in the form o f  space fo r
grazing and water ing; and social fac to rs ,  notably the r ise  in bu ffa lo  
t h e f t  ( c f .  Ananya 1984 : 187 - 188). A m inor i ty  o f  fam i l ies  are able to
afford power t i l l e r s .  In 1984, 44 per cent o f  Ban Dong farmers had no
implements for ploughing or threshing/husking.
Land shortage and consequent landlessness w i l l  increase fo r
several reasons. Most fami l ies have more than two ch i ld ren ,  which means 
tha t  subdivision or unequal inheri tance o f  holdings is  inev i tab le .  Land 
prices are r i s i n g ,  and outsiders are buying up land. Debt is  forcing 
sale o f  land. Slowly decl in ing f e r t i l i t y  and r a in f a l l  takes small 
subsistence farmers below subsistence leve l .
Labour is s t i l l  mostly employed lo c a l l y .  Use o f  reciprocal
labour i s  on the decl ine. While t h i s  is replaced by hired labour in 
most cases, the opportun i t ies  fo r  off-season employment are decl in ing 
as t ra d i t i o n a l  non-agricu l tu ra l  subsistence occupations such as house 
construct ion, sawing wood, and charcoal burning are l im i ted by the 
resource s i tu a t io n .  Meanwhile, mechanization decreases to ta l  labour 
requirements in seasonal cropping, a lb e i t  to a l im i ted  extent as of
1985.
V I ^ l J v  D i f fe re n t ia t io n  in Ban Mai
With i t s  commercialized cropping system and the importance of 
cap ita l  in the v i l l a g e  economy, Ban Mai might be expected to conform 
more neat ly with the c lassic d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  model. However, a number 
o f  factors  complicate the p ic tu re .  One is  land reform, which gives a 
nominally ega l i ta r ia n  and f ixed pattern of land ownership. This means 
that control  over production is  secured in other ways than 
stra ight forward land a l ienat ion through foreclosure on land t i t l e  such 
as in Theparaj (Ananya 1985 : 126 - 127) , and aspects o f  power beyond
the ra t io na l - le g a l  framework are important determinants o f  such con tro l .  
This leads to a s i tua t ion  of starker d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  than found in Ban 
Dong, as i l l u s t r a te d  by s ix  case studies, whose production schedules are 
presented in Table 6.4.
7. Phad, Landless labourer . Phad moved to Ban Mai with his 
wife Nuai and three chi ld ren from Nong Kha Yang in 1980. Phad had never 
owned any land and had worked in Bangkok and elsewhere as an i t in e ra n t  
labourer.  Land reform att racted Phad as his f i r s t  opportunity to 
acquire land, since ALRO provided loans and was supposed to f a c i l i t a t e  
purchase o f  land at a low st ipulated pr ice o f  210 baht per 
r a i .  The 24 ra i  o f  land Phad was supposed to get was a h i l l y  p lo t  
on the edge o f  the land reform area, and i t  was at the corners o f  land 
owned by three e a r l i e r  s e t t l e r s .  Phad obtained an ALRO loan s u f f i c ie n t  
to buy the p lo t  at the pr ice s t ipu la ted ,  but the owners would not sell  
at th is  p r ice .  Phad used the loan to put a down payment on a 9 rai  
section o f  the land belonging to Raeng, who wanted nearly four times the
ALRO price per r a i . Phad hoped to raise the remaining cash by
labouring but to date has been unable to do so. Raeng has been
renting out the land in contravent ion o f  the ALRO ru le s ,  but Phad is 
a f ra id  of him ( "Khao ying ao : he shoots1') and does not dare to bring
the matter into the open. Raeng l e t  Phad work the land for a single
crop o f  mung beans in 1982, but the crop fa i led  because o f  drought and 
Phad only has an 8,000 baht BAAC debt with accumulated in te res t  to 
show fo r  i t .  He has also been unable to repay the ALRO loan and has 
accumulated small debts elsewhere.
In e f fe c t ,  Phad is s t i l l  landless apart from the one r a i  house 
p lo t  owned in the v i l l a g e .  Unt i l  1984, the family had been re ly ing  on 
local wage labour, mostly ag r icu l tu ra l  labouring at the standard 30 
baht per day. During the dry season, Phad occasional ly works as a 
labourer for his carpenter neighbour Wan (case 11), mainly planing wood 
fo r  house construct ion. In May 1984, Phad and his two teenage chi ldren 
went to Bangkok fo r  construct ion and welding work with a Chinese f i rm 
subcontract ing to a Japanese company in Rangsit. After  receiving two 
weeks' pay, Phad and his son worked fo r  a fu r ther  three months without 
gett ing paid, and in August the subcontractor went bankrupt without 
paying outstanding wage b i l l s .  Meanwhile M i i ,  Phad's daughter, 
worked in a small t e x t i l e s  fac to ry .  They came back to Ban Mai empty 
handed, and the family is  again labouring lo c a l l y  except for M i i ,  who is 
working at a shop in Thung Naa fo r  400 baht per month. Their existence 
once again conforms c lose ly  to the local idiom of "haa chao kin kham : 
l i t .  look fo r  [ food] in the morning, eat in the evening". During the 
1986 plant ing season, Phad was hospita l ized a f te r  su ffer ing a react ion 
from the rodent ic ide mixed in with the hand planted maize seed, 
threatening the fami ly  with fu r the r  debt.
Khiang, Phad's son, has received periods o f  t ra in in g  at the NG0
youth t ra in in g  centres near Uthaithani.  These centres emphasize 
integrated farming, p a r t i c u la r l y  based around pig rear ing. L a t te r l y ,  
cooperative t ra in ing  has been emphasized. As of ye t ,  Khiang has not 
been able to put the t ra in ing  into e f fe c t  to help the family s i tu a t ion ,  
but the course is seen as a source o f  employment and the foundation and 
associated pig ra isers '  cooperative as a t h i i  pheung (patron : see 
section V > 2 J i i ) .  Phad and Khiang ta l k  o f  ra is ing  chickens in the 
fu tu re ,  but lack o f  cap ita l  is  a major obstacle.
8. Porn, dispossessed farmer. Porn moved to Ban Mai in 1977 
from Kamphaengphet, where he had been rent ing upland. On land reform, 
he bought 25 ra i  from a Thung Khaa landowner at s l i g h t l y  higher than 
the ALRO s t ipu la ted pr ice ,  and he is s t i l l  in debt to ALRO. For the 
f i r s t  few years, Porn managed to farm his p lo t ,  but de te r io ra t ion  of the 
so i l  ( in  Porn's words, "din man khaeng : the s o i l ' s  hardened") and 
uncertain r a i n f a l l  ( " khoei piuuk khaao phood deuan s i i ; t o ‘ n n i i  t o ‘ ng 
ro ' deuan hok : you used to be able to plant maize in the fourth 
month [March]; now you have to wait for the s ix th  month [M a y ] . . . " ) .  
Porn could continue c u l t i v a t in g  only by gett ing into debt to the v i l l a g e  
head, who charges 5 per cent per month in te re s t ,  and BAAC. The debt 
was compounded by hospital  b i l l s  fo r  treatment o f  malar ia,  and by 
amenities o f  the "model v i l l a g e " ,  namely e l e c t r i c i t y  connection and 
purchase o f  a te lev is ion  set.  Porn and Mai, h is  w i fe ,  have two teenage 
ch i ld ren ,  two chi ld ren s t i l l  at school, and one in fan t  son.
By 1984, debt had accumulated such tha t  Porn was unable to raise 
the cap ita l  necessary fo r  c u l t i v a t i o n ,  and the land was rented out to 
th e i r  v i l l a g e  c re d i to r ,  namely the v i l l a g e  head. The rent they received 
(100 baht per r a i )  was about h a l f  the amount they pay in in terest 
alone on the v i l la g e  head's loan. Porn and his two teenage children 
went to Bangkok fo r  construct ion work, whi le Mai stayed to look a f te r
the ch i ld ren.  Nine months in Bangkok provided Porn with a much higher 
gross income than could be expected in Ban Mai, but costs o f  l i v i n g  are 
so high there that they barely managed to save enough for subsistence
needs. Porn is  vague as to being able to plant his land again.
Porn has not been dispossessed in a legal sense, but de facto  
control o f  the land has gone to the v i l lage  head. Meanwhile, Porn 
expects to go on working as a labourer for the time being. In the
longer run, he is  considering moving on to clear more land i f  things do 
not improve, since he expects his chi ldren to be farmers.
9. Som, subsistence farmer. Som moved to Lan Sak from Nong
Chang in 1976, where she and her husband had been labourers. I n i t i a l l y  
they moved to a mainly r i c e  growing v i l la g e  the other side of Thung
Khaa, but on land reform Ad (case 12), a Ban Mai landowner a f ra id  o f
being dispossessed, asked Som i f  she would come and take over her land 
in name, whi le se l l ing  only 8 ra i  fo r nearly four times the ALRO
pr ice .  Ad maintains control over another 9 ra i  o f  the 24 ra i  p lo t ,
while a th i r d  owner Tuk s t i l l  owns the res t .
In 1983, Som's husband l e f t  her but has been back since and
beaten her severely. Som and her common law husband now l i v e  with her
teenage daughter, two schoolage ch i ld ren ,  and in fan t  daughter in a t i n y  
shack on her land. Som also maintains a token residence in the v i l lage  
in compliance with ALRO regula t ions. ALRO s t ipu la ted that a l l  v i l l a g e  
residences were to have zinc roofs ,  and Som's only f inanc ia l  debt is  an 
outstanding ALRO loan for purchase o f  roof ing. In 1984 she also 
incurred a r i c e  debt,  on which 10 tang in te res t  was paid on a
loan o f  25 tang.  Som had to purchase 4 sacks o f  r i ce  in 1984, but 
managed to produce a l l  her own charcoal. She ra ises chickens and 
ducks for home consumption, but in 1984 they were a l l  k i l l e d  by a
Z D /
neighbour 's dog.
Som would desperately l i k e  to purchase the remainder o f the p lo t  
and to th i s  end is  sending her teenage daughter to work as a housemaid 
in Nong Chang in order to be able to borrow 6,000 baht from her 
daughter 's employer as a down payment on Tuk's six ra i  of
r ice land.  This r ice land i s  ra in fed ,  but cooperation between neighbours 
in digging an i r r i g a t i o n  channel from a nearby stream could p a r t i a l l y  
i r r i g a te  the f i e ld s .  Som cannot obtain c red i t  from BAAC, since she 
would require her husband's signature as j o i n t  owner o f  the land and he 
refuses to divorce her.
Som farms her 2 ra i  o f  r iceland and 6 ra i  o f  upland
in tens ive ly ,  using household labour for the most par t .  In 1984 she 
planted r i c e ,  maize, and mung beans, and the only non-household labour 
used was reciproca l labour for the r ice  harvest and weeding the maize 
crop. A bu f fa lo  was rented and used for ploughing the r iceland and for 
the mung bean crop, and i t  was also used to yiabyam {thresh by 
trampling) the r i c e .  The only mechanical inputs were a t ra c to r  for 
maize c u l t i v a t io n  and husking machines fo r  the maize and mung beans. 
Herbicide was used for the maize crop, but household labour was also
used fo r  weeding. Mung bean seed and insect ic ide had to be purchased
for the mung bean crop. Thus with low cash inputs, Som managed to 
maximize on use o f  household resources and obtained a r i c e  y ie ld  of over 
a kwien, whi le making a p r o f i t  o f  about 1,350 baht on the f i e ld  
crops. Of the r i c e ,  j u s t  over h a l f  went in rent for the buffa lo  and 
paying back the r ice  loan, which means having to take out another small 
r i c e  loan to survive the year.
Som's common law husband now supplements the family  income by 
doing a bicycle ice cream round. He cycles over a rough track from the
homestead four ki lometres into Paak Meuang each day to pick up the ice
cream and cycles the six ki lometres back to Ban Mai to sel l  to 
v i l l a g e rs .  Som occasional ly supplements her income by se l l ing  home
grown bananas and wi ld vegetables in Paak Meuang. The three working
members o f  the family  also derive a small cash income from occasional 
wage labouring. U l t imate ly ,  though, she sees her fu tu re  in acquiring 
and working the remainder of her p lo t  o f  land and having her chi ldren 
provide for her in her old age. Her husband had wanted her to accept an 
o f fe r  o f  17,000 baht fo r  th e i r  land, arguing that the chi ld ren w i l l  go 
t h e i r  own way and having cash in hand now is  the safest course o f  
act ion:  th i s  was one o f  the main points o f  content ion that led to th e i r  
separat ion.
10. Lak, debt-ridden small farmer. Lak moved to Ban Mai with 
his wife Rat and four chi ldren from Chainat in 1978. They had been
landless, and when they came in the year of land reform, they bought 30 
r a i  o f  land on the edge o f  the v i l l a g e  from a local landowner. Of 
t h i s ,  6 ra i  are outside the ALRO area. They l i v e  in the v i l l a g e .  
Since 1978 they have been c u l t i v a t in g  maize and mung beans, but Rat 
complains tha t  the so i l  has been hardening s tead i ly .
Other than t h e i r  land, house p lo t ,  and zinc roofed house, Lak 
owns nothing of s ig n i f i c a n t  value. They are dependent on a Paak Meuang 
t ra c to r  owner working through a v i l l a g e  hua naa (middleman's agent : 
see section V ^ J i i  above) as c re d i to r ,  t i l l e r  of t h e i r  land, and as 
purchaser o f  t h e i r  produce. In 1984, Lak was promised tha t  t h e i r  land 
would be ploughed by la te  Apri l  in time fo r  optimum p lant ing, but the 
t ra c to r  owner kept on putt ing  o f f  the ploughing since the t rac to r  was 
busy on other f i e ld s  and Lak had no option but to f r e t  and wait fo r  the 
land to be t i l l e d .  I t  was June by the time the land was f i n a l l y  ready 
fo r  c u l t i v a t io n ,  and by t h i s  time the prospects fo r maize were too r isky
zoy
to re ly  on th is  crop alone, and in any case i t  was going to be too la te  
to plant a second crop. Therefore Lak planted only 20 ra i  o f  maize 
and put the remaining 10 ra i  to cassava, using l e f t  over stems given 
by a neighbour.
In the event, the maize crop fa i led  because of the late 
ploughing. Although Lak maximized use of household and reciprocal 
labour,  the need fo r  cash inputs o f  seed, h i r ing  the t r a c to r ,  herb ic ide, 
t ranspor t ,  and husking meant that the en t i re  y ie ld  of 100 tang only
o f f s e t  the in te res t  on the 5,000 baht loan required fo r  investment in 
c u l t i v a t io n .  For the cassava p lan t ing ,  weeding, and s l i c i n g ,  household 
and reciprocal labour su f f iced ,  but labour was hired fo r  the harvest. 
Other cash inputs included ploughing and transport from the f i e ld s .  
Proximity to the edge o f  the forest led to the crop being ravaged by
wild boar?, but a 3 tonne y ie ld  was nevertheless obtained. In 1984
the price o f  cassava was only h a l f  the pr ice o f  the previous year, at 
850 baht per tonne, and Lak only broke even on the crop, not even 
taking into account household labour input.
Not su rp r is in g ly ,  there fo re ,  Lak is  heavi ly debt r idden. 18,000
baht is owed to the Paak Meuang middleman, and another 14,000 baht 
i s  owed to a v i l l a g e  trader who charges in te res t  in maize. The whole
family  engages in occasional wage labour, but t h i s  is  only s u f f i c i e n t
fo r  subsistence, since r ice  and other commodities have to be purchased 
and only charcoal can be home produced. The prospect fo r  clearing debts 
is  thus remote, and the v i l l a g e  c red i to r  is  threatening to sue. Lak is 
considering se l l ing  up and moving back to Chainat, where at least  they 
have re la t iv e s .  There is  an obstacle to t h i s ,  in th a t  i f  they went they 
would want to dismantle and move (ret/)8 th e i r  house with them, and 
to do th i s  they would have to obtain permission from the provinc ia l  
a u tho r i t ies  via the v i l l a g e  head. He w i l l  not help out without a 3,000
baht b r ibe ,  with which he would agree to turn a b l ind eye and avoid 
the need fo r  o f f i c i a l  permission al together.
11. Wan, fa rm er /a r t isan . Wan moved to Ban Mai in 1976
from Ban Rai, where he had owned only a small p lo t  o f  land. He
purchased 25 ra i  o f  land cheaply from the kamnan , who was at that
time s ta r t ing  to se l l  o f f  his large holdings in an t ic ip a t io n  o f  land
reform. Wan l i ve s  in the v i l l a g e  with his w i fe ,  two teenage daughters, 
and schoolage son, although during the c u l t i v a t io n  season he spends long 
periods in the shelter on his land, which is  about two ki lometres from 
the v i l l a g e .
Wan is a se l f - taugh t  carpenter and l a t t e r l y  has made a modest 
income from house construct ion. The dry season i s  the busiest t ime, but 
work is  avai lable  throughout the year in "even [ lu n a r ]  months : deuan 
khuun , which are the auspicious months for house bu i ld ing .  He owns an 
e le c t r i c  plane and in th is  way has benef ited economically from 
e le c t r i f i c a t i o n  o f  the v i l l a g e ,  although even in surrounding v i l lages  a 
generator is  sometimes set up such are the time savings. Wan 
sometimes employs Phad (case 7) and another v i l l a g e r  on the same soi 
( lane, o ften now used to specify where in the v i l l a g e  one l i v e s ) .
Far from carpentry reducing farming as part  o f  Wan's ente rpr ise , 
the income o f  approximately 30,000 baht ac tua l ly  enables him to extend 
c u l t i v a t io n .  In 1984, Wan rented 19 ra i  o f  upland from a poorer 
v i l l a g e r ,  which he planted in addit ion to his own 22 ra i  o f  upland and 
2 ra i  o f  r ice land .  On the upland area, Wan planted 41 r a i  o f  maize 
and followed th i s  with mung beans and sorghum. His cash inputs were 
high, including having to purchase seed for a l l  the f i e l d  crops, h i re  a 
t ra c to r  for the ploughing, h ire  labour fo r  maize plant ing and harvesting 
and fo r  sorghum harvest ing, purchase pest ic ides fo r  maize and mung
beans, h ire  a machine fo r  husking the f i e ld  crops, and transport maize, 
sorghum and r ice  from the f i e ld s  to his home p lo t  in the v i l l a g e .  
Otherwise mainly household labour was used, although reciprocal labour 
was used fo r  maize plant ing and weeding. In addi t ion to obtaining 50 
tang of  r i ce  to cover part o f  subsistence needs, Wan made a large
p r o f i t  on the maize crop, so th a t  despite a small loss on the sorghum
and a minor p r o f i t  on the mung beans, he s t i l l  cleared nearly 20,000 
baht net a f te r  rent on land and in te rest  on loans had been paid.
Wan borrowed 6,000 baht at  5 per cent per month from
v i l l a g e  c red i to r  Ad (see below), to whom he had to se l l  his crop, and
8,000 baht from BAAC. He is head of a BAAC group and also works fo r
the BAAC "welfare fund" at Paak Meuang, fo r  which he receives a par 
diem. His wife and daughters take on occasional ag r icu l tu ra l  wage 
labour, and in 1985 his eldest daughter went to work in a t e x t i l e  
factory in Bangkok. Wan's main expenses are purchase o f  r ice  and other 
necess i t ies , and in 1984-85 he extended his own house. Wan s t i l l  
manages to produce charcoal s u f f i c i e n t  for home use.
12. Ad, t r a c to r  owner/t rader. Ad moved to Ban Hai in 1972 from 
Nong Chang. Before th a t ,  her husband Jon had been a monk in Phitsanulok 
province fo r  ten years. Ad bought land from a previous res iden t ,  at  a 
time when i t  was s t i l l  la rge ly  forested. On land reform, Ad sold a l l  
but a single p lo t ,  though as the case (9) of Som shows, she actua l ly  
retained control  over a larger area than the mandatory 24 ra i  plus 
house p lo t .
L a t te r l y ,  d i re c t  ag r icu l tu ra l  production has become less 
important to Ad than other a c t i v i t i e s .  She runs one o f  the larger 
general stores and ag r icu l tu ra l  suppl iers in Ban Mai, and l i ke  Maen
(case 6) in Ban Dong she uses t h i s  as the basis for trade in grain and
associated money!ending. Ad has become wealthy as a consequence and in 
1985 bought a Ford 5000 t r a c to r ,  which w i l l  be the basis fo r  an even 
larger accumulation.
Nevertheless, Ad and Oon continue to farm th e i r  land and in 1985 
expanded production by rent ing another p lo t .  They r e ly  mostly on hired 
labour, although household labour and even reciprocal labour is also 
used. In 1984, the 19 ra i  o f  upland were planted with two crops o f  
maize, and the 5 ra i  o f  r iceland were planted to 1uang prathaan 
r i c e .  Overall they made a p r o f i t  o f  nearly 14,000 baht on the maize, 
despite having to invest cash in every stage o f  the production process. 
Labour was hired fo r  most o f  the r i ce  c u l t i v a t i o n ,  and the kwien plus 
that was harvested is  plenty to see the fami ly o f  three through the 
year.
Ad is a member o f  the v i l la g e  committee. She is seen as one of
the "hua naa muubaan : v i l l a g e  bosses" who run a f fa i r s  in the v i l l a g e .
She is  very re t i c e n t  about her own economic s i tu a t io n .  Neighbours,
debtors, and others t a l k  o f  her and other shopowners in ind i rec t  but
b i t t e r  tones.
The above cases i l l u s t r a t e  the parameters a f fe c t in g  control  over 
production in Ban Mai. The most immediate and in te res t ing  points,  which 
are in te r re la te d ,  can be summed up as fol lows. F i r s t ,  legal control  
over land does not in i t s e l f  assure or l i m i t  contro l  over production. 
In the case of Porn and Lak, fo r  example, control  is  almost e n t i r e l y  in 
the hands o f  moneylenders and t ra c to r  owners. In the l a t t e r  case, 
c ruc ia l  control  over t iming o f  ploughing and plant ing is  l o s t ,  and th is  
in turn means loss o f  control  even over crop choice. In the former
case, control  over land for ag r icu l tu ra l  production has been los t  
in d e f i n i t e l y .  The second point is  the degree to which control over 
labour has moved away from the household. This has allowed those with 
capita l  to expand ag r icu l tu ra l  production by means o f  securing control  
over land and labour through both monetary and other means, as the 
examples o f  both Wan and Ad demonstrate. The th i rd  point is  the 
increasing ly  dominant ro le  o f  capita l  in determining production 
re la t ions  in th is  commercialized v i l l a g e  economy, where key means o f  
production are beyond the control  o f  a l l  but a few ind iv idua ls .  The 
fourth  po in t ,  s ig n i f i c a n t  fo r  the p o l i t i c a l  economy o f  the v i l l a g e ,  is  
the way in which other aspects o f  power than legal guarantee and 
" ra t iona l "  economic re la t ions  determine control over production. 
This means on the one hand, that Phad, Porn, and Som lose control  over 
land that is le g a l l y  th e i r s .  On the other,  the a l te rna t ive  o f  
withdrawal and maximal use o f  household resources for subsistence 
production as evidenced by Som's case involves s e l f -e x p lo i ta t io n  
(Chayanov 1926) in the form o f  labour inputs and va luat ion o f  land tha t  
bear no re la t io n  to opportuni ty costs o f  these two domestic factors o f
product ion.9
The mechanisms tha t  determine trends in control over production 
in Ban Mai can be summarized in terms o f  three in te r - re la ted  
processes. F i r s t  is  the increasing indebtedness o f  the less w e l l - o f f  
farmers. Second is  capita l  accumulation by a few traders-cum-tractor 
owners. Third is the decl ining f e r t i l i t y  o f  the soi l  and other 
environmental change. The f i r s t  and th i rd  factors  make i t  increasingly 
d i f f i c u l t  fo r  farmers to work th e i r  own land, since they su ffer  
dec l in ing access to cap ita l  at a time when required inputs are ever 
greater .  Fu l ly  81 per cent o f  Ban Mai farmers lack control  over 
ploughing implements. This i s  taken advantage o f  by wealthier  farmers, 
who rent in land at low cost ,  often securing control  fo r  three years.
This they can manage due to the enlarged pool of wage labour, th e i r  
access to c a p i t a l ,  and t h e i r  control  over key means o f  production, 
namely t r a c to rs .  They can also minimize on so i l  conservation such as by 
planting cassava and neglecting contour ploughing, since they have 
l i t t l e  long-term in te res t  in land qua l i ty  on rented land and even less 
on land on which th e i r  t rac to rs  are hired for ploughing.
V I . 2 Response to Resource Shortage
The problems o f  the rura l  poor are a product both of factors 
concerning resource endowment and o f  social re la t io n s  o f  production. As 
agr icu l tu re  moves away from subsistence oriented production based on use 
o f  local resources toward linkage with the wider economy, so access to 
resources i s  less bound or guaranteed by the local resource s i tua t ion .  
Therefore, resource shortage cannot be calcu lated merely in terms of 
such indices as person to land ra t io s .  They must also take into account
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  aspects o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  control over resources such as
those discussed in Chapter V and i l l u s t ra te d  in the previous sect ion.
Furthermore, commercialization i t s e l f  a f fec ts  the local resource
s i tu a t ion  in such a way as to a f fec t  subsistence production. In 
considering resource shortage and responses to i t ,  then, we must take
into account these supra-local inf luences.
Chapter IV revealed rapid changes in the natural  resource
s i tua t ion  in Lan Sak over the past ten years. These have resulted in
re s t r i c te d  oppor tun i t ies  for subsistence production. At the same time, 
cash cropping has become more marginal. The need for cash is  greater 
now both fo r  consumption and production, inasmuch as these can be 
del imited in peasant a g r icu l tu re .  Response to resource shortage thus
consists o f  attempts to secure control  both over t ra d i t io n a l
subsistence resources and over the exchange economy v ia  cash. This dual 
strategy is  a product o f  the dual element in resource shortage described 
above ( i . e .  natural  resource shortage and shortage resu l t ing  from 
re la t ions  o f  product ion).  I t  can be character ized as attempts to deal
with the larger  system by avoidance and by engagement. Although the
strategy is  presented here in dichotomous terms, the two types o f  option
are by no means mutually exclusive to ind iv idual households.
Four types o f  response to resource shortage are presented below. 
Each contains elements o f  both types o f  strategy out l ined above.
VI>2J  Local resources
A number of t ra d i t i o n a l  responses to resource shortage are 
avai lable to Ban Dong and Ban Mai v i l l a g e rs ,  a lb e i t  in an al tered form. 
Shortage o f  land and shortage o f  draught animals can both be overcome by 
rent ing in ,  a strategy followed by both Nai (case 2) and Norm (case 3).  
Riceland is rented by baeng suan , ka , and cash contracts. Upland 
is  rented only fo r  cash, but rent ing in Ban Mai does not represent a 
response to resource shortage so much as a way of taking advantage o f  
others'  shortage o f  cap ita l  by weal thier farmers and moneylenders such 
as Ad (case 12). Buffalo are s t i l l  rented mainly fo r  r i c e .  In 1984, 22 
per cent of Ban Dong v i l l a g e rs  rented b u f fa lo ,  most o f  them rent ing a 
pair in order to be able to harrow. Rent is  paid in r i c e ,  40 or 50 
tang per animal being standard rents.
In the event o f  s h o r t fa l l  in r ice  in Ban Dong, r ice  can be 
borrowed from re la t io n s  i f  they have a surplus. Otherwise, as in the
case o f  Som in Ban Mai (case 9 ) ,  r i ce  must be borrowed from wealthier 
v i l la g e rs  at high in te res t  ra tes ,  usual ly 40 to 50 per cent payable on 
the fo l lowing r ice  harvest. The pract ice o f  se l l ing  "green r ice  ( khaao 
khiew)" ,  which involves se l l ing  part o f  the fu tu re  harvest at well
below the expected pr ice , is  not as common in Ban Dong as i t  is
elsewhere in Thai land, p a r t i c u la r l y  in the North (e.g. Moerman 1968 : 
74).
Unt i l  recent ly  in Ban Dong, and s t i l l  in Ban Mai, a strategy fo r 
the landless has been to make use o f  the local fo res t  resources. One
way is  to burn charcoal fo r  sale. I t  is not only the landless who are
responsible for the fo res t  encroachment fo r  charcoal, Lak (case 10) for 
example using th is  publ ic resource, but i t  is only they who make a 
s ig n i f i c a n t  proport ion o f  t h e i r  cash income from i t .  A second way is  to 
farm steep forest  land. Even some Ban Dong v i l l a g e rs  now farm land on 
Khao Manora behind Ban Mai, having los t  t h e i r  renta l  contracts in Ban 
Dong. The fo rest resource is also a supplementary source o f  protein 
(sk ink, wi ld boar, monkeys, bear, monitor l i z a rd ,  and other wi ld animals 
are hunted), f r u i t  (w i ld  bananas, mafai )  , o f  bamboo and more permanent 
bu i ld ing  mater ia ls ,  and o f  herbs used in t r a d i t i o n a l  medicines. Nai o f 
Ban Dong (case 2) and Phad of Ban Mai (case 6) both spend time hunting 
during the dry season, and in Ban Mai forest products provide a 
potent ia l  source o f  cash income i f  sold to wealthy v i l la g e rs  or 
government o f f i c i a l s  at Paak Meuang.
There are many other means o f  survival based on use o f  local 
resources. One is  to se l l  assets th a t  are or would once have been 
redeemable from the local environment. A common strategy is  to se l l  a 
house, since th i s  i s  a means o f  se l l ing  timber qu ite  openly; wood can 
then be cut to bu i ld  a new house. Norm's (case 3) fa ther  has done th is  
tw ice, but with the near complete clearance o f  the fo res t  in Ban Dong
and increasing survei l lance by the Forestry Department in Ban Mai, t h i s  
opt ion is  now severely l im i ted .  Buffalo can also be sold, as can land, 
but these l a t t e r  are harder to redeem, p a r t i c u la r l y  as pr ices r ise  
faste r  than cash income from se l l ing  ag r icu l tu ra l  produce.
With closure o f  t ra d i t i o n a l  ou t le ts ,  more desperate means are 
sometimes resorted to .  Buffalo t h e f t  has always existed, but i t  has 
increased g rea t ly  over the past few years. Long term Ban Dong residents 
speak o f  the time they used to leave buffa lo  to graze unattended for
several days. Now few farmers l e t  buf fa lo  out o f  t h e i r  s ight even
during the daytime, and at night they are shut in pens adjoining the 
owners' houses. The switch to power t i l l e r s  is  p a r t l y  due to the ease 
o f  locking up a machine compared with keeping an eye on bu f fa lo .  In Ban 
Mai, petty  t h e f t  is  rampant. V i l lagers  complain tha t  you cannot leave 
too ls unlocked, you cannot ra ise  chickens or grow vegetables in the
v i l la g e  unless there is someone at home a l l  day, which is  d i f f i c u l t  to 
guarantee as wage labouring becomes necessary for su rv iva l .  Several 
v io len t  incidents occurred due to th e f t  or suspected th e f t  whi le I was 
in Ban Mai. I t  is  general ly  reported that t h e f t  is  p a r t i c u la r l y  common 
l o c a l l y  in bad ag r icu l tu ra l  years, in other words i t  is d i r e c t l y  
associated with shortage.10
A f in a l  way o f  responding to resource shortage by revert ing to
use o f  l o c a l l y  ava i lable  resources is  one tha t  is  a ta v i s t i c  by most
" ra t io n a l "  economic considerat ions but character ised by i t s  own peasant 
log ic .  That i s  to respond to shortage o f  cap ita l  in a cap ita l  oriented
agr icu l tu ra l  regime such as tha t  o f  Ban Mai by withdrawal from the
monetized system and pursual o f  a labour intensive subs is tence - f i rs t  
stra tegy. This may be termed the " s e l f - e x p lo i ta t i v e "  option a f te r  
Chayanov (1926), as i t  involves h igh ly  labour intensive c u l t i v a t io n  in 
place o f  modern inputs (see footnote 8).  Such an option is taken in
d i f fe re n t  forms and to varying degrees, from those who re lu c ta n t ly  use 
reciprocal labour in place o f  a now more standard wage labour {see 
section V l l ^ l j i i )  to Som (case 9) and a few others l i k e  her (usual ly  
women coping on t h e i r  own) who work toward an ideal o f  s e l f - s u f f i c ie n c y  
o f  th i  s type .
VI ^ 2 J i  Local cash economy
Need fo r  capital  for production and cash fo r  consumption is 
increased due to changes in the ag r icu l tu ra l  regime and the absence of 
oppor tun i t ies  fo r  subsistence production, p a r t i c u la r l y  in Ban Mai. 
Consumerism as part  o f  development also increases the desire fo r cash. 
The need fo r  cash is  now most read i ly  f u l f i l l e d  by local wage labour. 
In Ban Mai a g r icu l tu re ,  wage labour predominates, and i t  is  becoming 
more prevalent in Ban Dong. However, the low wage (30 baht per day) 
and the seasonal nature o f  production l im i t s  t h i s  opt ion as a survival  
strategy. Households such as Phad in Ban Mai (case 7) who re ly  e n t i r e l y  
on local wage labour are among the poorest in both v i l la g e s .
On the other hand, d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  increases potent ial  fo r cash 
income through spec ia l iza t ion .  The example of Wan in Ban Mai (case 11) 
shows tha t  an ar t isanry  s k i l l  can be a v i t a l  supplementary source of 
income. The local cash economy is put to use by 15 Ban Mai v i l la g e rs  
who now engage in petty t rade, mostly in combination with ag r icu l tu ra l  
production. Other forms o f  cash earnings are on the decl ine or becoming 
more r i s k y ,  notably logging.
V I ^2 si  i  i  Cash borrowing
Although borrowing is by no means a novel response to shortage, 
the scale and form i t  has taken in both Ban Dong and Ban Mai d i f f e r  from 
t ra d i t i o n a l  borrowing. The change from borrowing in kind to borrowing 
in cash, and from borrowing fo r  urgent consumption needs to borrowing 
fo r  production inputs has al tered the nature o f  borrower-lender 
re la t ionsh ips .  In te res t  is  calculated on a l l  but short  term loans to 
immediate k in .  Since a cash debt is un iversal,  precise, and can be 
allowed to accumulate i n d e f i n i t e l y ,  i t  tends to undermine t ra d i t io n a l  
forms o f  reciprocable assistance and re d is t r ib u t io n  within  the 
community. New dependency re la t ionsh ips  are established by th i s  form o f  
debt, whereby debtors surrender pa r t ia l  control  over production to the 
c red i to r  who determines when and by whom land should be ploughed, crops 
processed and transported from the farmstead, and what pr ice should be 
given for them. For most, debt is  an inescapable response to seasonal
or longer term resource shortage, but i t  is not surpr is ing that many t r y
to avoid i t .  When in debt,  "you can ' t  sleep, you ca n ' t  eat properly : 
no1n ko‘ mai lab kin ko‘ mai l ong" .  On the other hand, debt can
become habi tua l .  One medium scale farmer reports  being so used to
(khoeitua) borrowing tha t  he borrows even in years when i t  is not 
absolute ly necessary. I t  is  commonly seen and expressed as a fa i l u re  o f  
s e l f - d is c ip l i n e  or resolu t ion (mai m i i  maana) to f a l l  into debt and as 
such is  a demoral izing response to shortage.
VI>2Jv Migrat ion
Migrat ion has long been a common response to resource shortage in 
Southeast Asia and elsewhere. In Lan Sak, most o f  the present
inhabitants  have quite recent ly  taken th is  opt ion; i f  they had not, Lan 
Sak would s t i l l  be sparsely populated. Of these migrants, many have 
moved more than once. While i t  would be wrong to overstate the 
i t i n e ra n t  nature of the population, the youth o f  the communities
nevertheless reduces cu l tu ra l  ba r r ie rs  to migrat ion tha t  exist  
elsewhere.
Ban Dong and Ban Mai v i l l a g e rs  possess two types o f  migration 
opt ion. The f i r s t  i s  the t ra d i t i o n a l  opt ion of seeking out new land in 
fo rest areas. This opportuni ty is  res t r ic ted  by the v i r t u a l l y  complete 
occupation o f  land well suited to ag r icu l tu re ,  but pockets o f  unoccupied 
land s t i l l  ex is t .  Nevertheless, farmers making such a move are usual ly 
on the l im i t s  o f  subsistence, and long term potent ia l  o f  the land is 
secondary to subsistence needs. This renders large areas o f  steep
forest land suscept ible to encroachment, often f a c i l i t a t e d  by 
in f lu e n t ia l  timber traders who o f fe r  land in exchange for help in 
logging. One Ban Mai informant estimates tha t  a t least twenty fami l ies 
have moved on to se t t le  new fo res t  land in the past two years.
Permanent movement from Ban Dong is  less rap id ,  but a number o f  famil ies 
have moved to Bung Waeng and other newly cleared areas to the north. In 
1984-85, many fami l ies in both communities were considering moving to 
new fo res t  areas, mostly as a way out o f  debt or landlessness, others as 
a form o f  insurance for t h e i r  ch i ld ren.  Two areas are p a r t i c u la r l y  
popular: Thong Lang in Ban Rai (see the case of Nai o f  Bung Khiew [case 
2] above) and the area past Thanon Sud ( l i t .  "the end of the
[uncompleted Nong Chang - Umphang] road") ,  into Nakorn Sawan, 
Kamphaengphet, and even Tak Provinces (Fig. 4 .3) .
A decision to move to a f r o n t ie r  area cannot be taken l i g h t l y .  
The hardships o f  f r o n t i e r  l i f e  have been described in Chapter IV. 
Insecur i ty  is  increased by the Forestry Department po l icy of
occasional ly clear ing se t t le rs  o f f  forest reserve la n d .H  Thus 
permanent migrat ion o f  t h i s  type may be seen as a l a s t  resor t  strategy 
to gain control  over the basic means o f  subsistence production, namely 
1 and.
The a l te rna t ive  means o f  securing a l ive l ihood  by migration from 
the v i l l a g e  is urban employment. Opportunities for waged employment are 
made more accessible by roads and d a i l y  transport between Lan Sak and 
Bangkok via Uthaithani.  Several Ban Mai fami l ies have moved to Bangkok, 
e i ther  through having los t  t h e i r  land e n t i r e l y  or having mortgaged i t  to 
loca l moneylenders.
Nevertheless, permanent migration is a la s t  reso r t  response, and 
temporary migrat ion is  more common both in the case o f  use o f  the forest 
resource and in urban migration (ra id ing the natural  environment or 
" ra id ing the cash economy" [Scott  1976 : 2 1 2 f f . ] ) .  Moreover, temporary
migration almost always precedes a permanent move. The case of Dam in 
Ban Mai (see section above) is an example of how a perhaps
temporary loss o f  control over means o f  product ion, in t h i s  case land, 
is  overcome by the use o f  fo rest resources. Urban migrants from Ban Mai 
who rent out t h e i r  land by the year due to lack o f  cap i ta l  but maintain 
a house in the v i l l a g e  whi le they move to the c i t y  as construct ion 
workers (such as Porn [case 8]) pursue an a l te rna t ive  form o f  temporary 
migration as a survival  strategy.
Not only is  migration often not permanent; i t  is also not 
necessari ly a un itary  strategy. Some members o f  the household may 
remain to make use o f  local opportunit ies  whi le others supplement the 
household income by temporary wage employment elsewhere. In Ban Mai 
th is  is  common and oriented mainly to other Central Plains towns and 
Bangkok (e.g. Phad [case 6 ] ) ,  but the Middle East is  also a sought-after
d e s t in a t io n . *2 In Ban Dong such migration is less prevalent but is 
s t i l l  common and ranges from d r iv ing  a t ra c to r  on newly cleared land in 
Tak Province to construct ion work in Malaysia.
V I .3 Impl icat ions fo r  development
The purpose o f  th i s  short section is to raise issues concerning
development o f  the local community and to suggest how such development
re la tes  to changes in and in tegra t ion with the wider system. I t  is
clear from the foregoing account tha t  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  does not only or 
necessari ly lead to what is commonly termed "p ro le ta r ia n iz a t io n 1 in Ban 
Dong and Ban Mai. Rather, i t  leads to marginal izat ion with in  the local 
community.13 "Rational" commoditization o f  land and labour is far 
from universal in the two local communities. Nevertheless, a l ienat ion 
through loss o f  control  over production a ffec ts  a large number of 
households, who take corresponding courses o f  action to re ta in  some form 
o f  control  so as to maintain family  subsistence.
These processes pose several questions v i s -a - v i s  development. To 
what extent are the processes and responses described above the 
consequence o f  s t ra teg ies ,  programmes, and phenomena normally regarded 
as "developmental"? What are the e f fec ts  o f  these processes and 
responses regarding development o f  the local and wider communities? 
What are the impl icat ions fo r  res t ruc tu r ing  development i n i t i a t i v e s ?  
The l a t t e r  question i s  our p r inc ipa l  concern in t h i s  sect ion,  but the 
former two must f i r s t  be attended to b r i e f l y .
Resource shortage th a t  resu l ts  in the va r ie ty  o f  responses 
out l ined above may be represented a l t e rn a t iv e ly  as d e f ic ie n t  access to
factors  o f  product ion. This in turn is caused by d i f f e re n t ia t io n
processes tha t  alienate people from control over production together 
with a ra p id ly  changing local resource s i tu a t ion .  Both of these are 
consequences o f  development s tra tegy, a lb e i t  not expressly intended as 
such. D i f fe re n t ia t io n  has been shown to re su l t  from in tegra t ion  o f  the 
local economy into the wider market as part o f  the incorporat ive 
development strategy o f  moving away from isolated subsistence production 
and increasing cash income. The transformation o f  the physical 
environment resu l ts  from the opening up o f  the area's resources through 
fo res t ry  concessions, the impact o f  a g r icu l tu ra l  inputs on the 
ecosystem, the rapid commercial exp lo i ta t ion  o f  fo rest  and so i l  that is 
f a c i l i t a t e d  by road construct ion, and the in f lu x  o f  s e t t le rs  tha t  can be 
explained in part  by upheavals caused in established communities by 
e a r l i e r  processes o f  change tha t  development has had a part in 
e f fe c t in g .  This in f lu x  is a lso, as suggested in section IV .1, p a r t l y  a 
consequence o f  crop d iv e r s i f i c a t io n  strategy.
The e f fec ts  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and responses to resource shortage 
that i t  has a part  in causing are manifold regarding development o f  the 
local and wider communities, and a few points are summarized here. 
Social equi ty  is  c lea r ly  not enhanced by the divergence o f  economic 
fortunes enta i led in d i f f e r e n t ia t io n .  A community o f  in te res t  becomes 
more d i f f i c u l t  to estab l ish for fu tu re  j o i n t  development i n i t i a t i v e s  as 
e xp lo i ta t ive  re la t ions  become internal to the community. 
D i f fe re n t ia t io n  encourages short term uses o f  local resources th a t  lead 
to medium or long term de te r io ra t ion .  On the part o f  wealthier farmers 
in Ban Mai, t h i s  includes "mining" o f so i ls  on land rented in from 
debtors. On the part o f  the poorer, marginalized farmers, i t  includes a 
range o f  short term responses for survival  and debt clearance, including 
a s im i la r  mining of so i ls  on th e i r  own land, e xp lo i ta t io n  of fo res t ry  
resources for fuel wood and cash income, deplet ion o f  f i sh  and
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w i l d l i f e ,14 and u nde ru t i l iza t ion  of farmland due to lack o f  capita l  
inputs. Resource shortage is  associated with social  tension re f lec ted 
in th e f t  and violence. At a broader le v e l ,  external e f fec ts  unaccounted 
fo r  l o c a l l y  are of relevance to wider issues o f  development. Further 
fo rest clearance leads to 1 dov/n stream" problems o f  f looding and 
s i l t a t i o n  and possible "downwind" problems o f  drought, drawing more and 
more into the vic ious c i r c le  o f  migrat ion, environmental d e te r io ra t io n , 
poverty,  and fu r the r  m ig ra t ion .15 Migration in the opposite d i rec t ion  
is  associated with social  problems in urban areas : slums, p ro s t i t u t io n ,  
low wages due to competit ion fo r  jobs,  a l ie n a t io n ,  and drug addic t ion.
Vie are thus faced with the s i tua t ion  of past and current 
development strategy playing a part  in causing the upheavals associated 
with d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  and resource shortage, and these upheavals leading 
to responses tha t  contravene most conceptions o f  a desirable path o f  
development. I t  is  my contention tha t  movement along such a path can 
only be achieved by a reo r ien ta t ion  toward the rura l  poor in a way tha t  
addresses the question o f  control over resources fo r  production. Some 
impl icat ions o f  t h i s  fo r  development i n i t i a t i v e s  are set out below, and 
the fo l lowing two chapters take up these themes.
The local ag r icu l tu ra l  economy in a marginal environment such as 
Lan Sak has a l im i ted  productive p o te n t i a l . 15 Moreover, in the case 
o f  marginal upland cropping, th is  potent ia l  may be decl in ing over time 
with environmental de te r io ra t ion .  This means tha t  as far as the 
ag r icu l tu ra l  economy is  concerned, improvement in control  over 
production and i t s  f r u i t s  by the poorer sections o f  the community 
depends to some extent on re l inqu ish ing  o f  control  by the 
b e t t e r - o f f . 1  ^ This is  not to suggest tha t  mob i l iza t ion of resources 
(notably water) is  not a s ig n i f i c a n t  opt ion, but rather  that under 
present condit ions and social re la t ions  o f  production in s t i t u t io n a l
aspects o f  control and res t ruc tu r ing  of production are more pert inent 
than attempts to increase to ta l  output.
Given that th i s  is the case, local i n i t i a t i v e s  need to be 
directed by and on behalf  o f  the rural  poor. Under ex is t ing  power 
s t ruc tures,  the rura l  poor are in d iv id u a l ly  a t  a social  and p o l i t i c a l  
disadvantage to the better  o f f  members o f  the community. This leads to 
a need fo r  considerat ion o f  the place o f  j o i n t  i n i t i a t i v e s  fo r  control  
over production on behalf  o f  the poor. Chapter VI I  addresses th is  
i s s ue.
I f  marginal izat ion is at least pa r t ly  responsible for the 
soc ia l ly  and environmental ly harmful aspects o f  development mentioned 
above, then th is  problem must be attacked more genera l ly .  The obverse 
to overcoming marginal izat ion i s  increasing p a r t i c ip a t io n .  The 
discussion in Chapter V I I I  shows that the form that p a r t ic ip a t io n  takes 
l o c a l l y  depends on what approach to development is  taken more general ly ,  
since p a r t i c ip a t io n  is u l t ima te ly  a struggle over "terms o f  
inco rpo ra t ion " .
Conclusion
In summary, control  over resources for production is not evenly 
d is t r ibu ted  within the two communities under study. Control is 
determined both by the natural  resource s i tua t ion  and by in s t i t u t i o n a l  
s tructures inf luencing production re la t ions .  In Ban Dong, ownership o f  
r iceland is the most important va r iab le ,  whi le in Ban Mai control over 
cap ita l  i s  more important. Neither o f  these can be seen in i s o la t io n ,  
and each in te rac ts  with other factors  in production and exchange
re la t ionsh ips  to lead to new forces o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .  In response to 
resource shortage, i . e .  lack or loss o f  control  over factors  o f  
product ion, both t ra d i t i o n a l  and new stra teg ies are followed by 
ind iv idual households in the two communities.
Responses to resource shortage provide us with two ins t ruc t ive  
ind icat ions concerning development. F i r s t ,  they show how ind ividual 
households deal with loss o f  control  over resources and what adaptations 
are made to changes in the local resource s i tua t ion  and in production 
re la t ions  resu l t ing  from external inf luences in attempts to reestabl ish 
control  f i r s t  and foremost for subsistence (immediate reproduct ion o f  
the household un it)  and secondly fo r continued production (sustained 
reproduct ion o f  the household u n i t ) .  Second, they i l luminate  the
consequences o f  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  fo r  indiv idual households and the
e x te rn a l i t ie s  tha t  are a part  o f  short term struggles for su rv iva l .  
These e x te rn a l i t i e s  include social tension, resource dep le t ion ,  and on 
a wider scale the costs of urban squalor and environmental
d e te r io ra t ion .  In both these ways, the p r i o r i t i e s  fo r  a development 
strategy or iented toward less powerful sections o f  the community become 
c le a re r .
L i  t
Notes
1. For a f u l l e r  treatment o f  the peasant "subsistence e th ic " ,  see Scott 
1976, Chapter 1. The explanation for the emphasis on social
reproduction in peasant concerns can be seen in the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the 
peasant household as "the soc ia l ly  in s t i t u t io n a l iz e d  convergence o f  an 
a g r icu l tu ra l  un it  o f  production, consumption, and human reproduction" 
(Bryceson 1986 : 3) .
2. White (1987) reminds us tha t  the Lenin/Chayanov debate was not a 
purely academic confrontat ion, but rather  one between the Bolshevik 
( s o c ia l i s t )  and Narodnik (popul is t )  points o f  view in a concrete 
s i t u a t i o n .
3. I t  is  u n rea l is t ic  to measure the value o f  a subsistence crop purely 
in cash terms, since th i s  ca lcu la t ion  is  not made by those producing the 
crop. However, fo r  purposes o f  comparison th is  is  the nearest
approximation o f  value possible.
4. See Chapter V, footnote 10.
5. See Bharadwaj 1985 on in te r l inked markets in land, labour, and
c re d i t .  Bharadwaj maintains that the resource posit ion o f  a small
farmer determines not only the sca le , but also the type o f  exchange
re la t io n s  entered in to ,  so tha t  " i t  is  the production re la t ions  which 
so c ia l ly  i n te r re la te  both the part ies to the transact ion that inf luence 
the form o f  the exchange re la t io n "  ( p .12).
6. Ngoen deuan ( l i t .  "monthly money") is a prized source o f
secur i ty .  V i l lagers  commonly d i f fe re n t ia te  themselves who l i v e  "taam 
duang : according to fate [ l i t .  ' the s ta rs1] "  from those who have
ngoen deuan. Advice given by o f f i c i a l s  such as DAE o f f i c e r s  may be
derided because "they have a sa lary , so they can do i t  [w i thout r i s k ]  : 
khao m i l  ngoen deuan kin l oei  tham d a i " .
7. I f  Lak's family were able to l i v e  closer to t h e i r  f i e ld s ,  there
might at least  be some compensation in the form of hunt ing, as there is 
for those who l i v e  in the fo res t  behind Ban Mai. As i t  i s ,  Lak has to 
travel more than two ki lometres each day to the f i e ld  p lo t .  Since the 
boar come at n igh t ,  Lak cannot l i e  in wait .
8. A normal v i l l a g e  house is quite mobile. Consisting bas ica l ly  o f
posts, planks, and roofing panels (zinc or tha tch) ,  dismantl ing and 
transpor t (reu ) is not only easy but also common. Thus farmers w i l l  
often l i t e r a l l y  "move house" when they change t h e i r  locat ion o f  
residence. I t  is also common pract ice to sel l  a l l  or part o f  a house 
fo r  cash in case o f  emergency and bu i ld  a new one or reextend the old 
one l i t t l e  by l i t t l e  with hand-sawn planks.
9. Scott (1976 : 14 - 15) shows that Chayanovian s e l f - e x p lo i t a t io n  can 
be explained in terms o f  neoclassical microeconomic theory as a ra t ional 
use of factors of production in the absence o f  opportunity  costs. In 
one sense, these opportunity costs do exist  in Ban Mai ( local and 
non-local wage labouring, rental  pr ice o f  land) and prevent many people 
from taking a course o f  action such as that o f  Som. A neoclassical 
economist would thus take issue with the r a t i o n a l i t y  of Som's decisions, 
and Chayanov would c i te  her as an example o f  the divergence o f  peasant 
menta l i ty from neoclassic r a t i o n a l i t y .  However, understood sub jec t ive ly  
from the point o f  view of the farmer involved, the uncertainty and loss 
o f  control over production associated with these new "opportun it ies"  
must be included in the equat ion, in which case opportuni ty costs o f  the
"safety f i r s t "  course are correspondingly diminished and the 
microeconomic r a t i o n a l i t y  o f the peasant remains in ta c t .  A less 
theoret ica l  object ion to economists' consideration o f  household labour 
in terms of "imputed wages" is  put forward elsewhere:
Since fami ly members have not made an economic 
decision when they work for th e i r  household, there 
is l i t t l e  theoret ica l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  for imputing a 
'wage' to them. Assigning cash value to a l l  the 
factors  in r ice  farming would be misleading 
soc ia l ly  and offensive moral ly to the v i l l a g e rs  
who do not l i v e  in a world where everything and 
everyone has a price (Moerman 1968 : 159).
10. Johnston (1975 : 152) notes the inverse re la t ionsh ip  between rural  
crime and v i l l a g e  welfare ear ly  in the century, for example re la t ing  
outbreaks o f  crime to crop fa i lu re s .
11. For "secur i ty  reasons" there is a reluctance to antagonize i l l e g a l  
squatters on fo res t  land by ev ic t ing  them. This reluctance has declined
since about 1981 with diminished concerns about the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f 
v i l l a g e rs  going over to "the other side : f aai  trong khaam" ( i . e .  
CRT), and the Forestry Department has become more aggressive in i t s  
ev ic t ions .  According to the long time manager o f  TPC in Uthaithani,  
in f lu e n t ia l  i l l e g a l  timber traders would encourage landless farmers to 
se t t le  on forest reserve land in exchange fo r  help in logging
operations, assuring them that the government would not dare al ienate
them by d r iv ing  them o f f  the land for fear they would jo in  the
Communi s t s .
12. Employment in the Middle East is  high ly pr ized, but a large amount 
o f  capita l  is  necessary to pay the agent's and other fees in order to be 
able to go. I t  is  also a notor ious ly  r isky  investment, as stor ies 
abound of people gett ing cheated out o f  large sums by agents. At least
30,000 baht is requi red, and re la t ives  are often called upon to 
provide th e i r  NS3 land t i t l e  deeds as securi ty in order to raise the 
loan from a commercial bank. Some Middle East workers spend a year or 
more o f  t h e i r  two year contract jus t  paying o f f  the debt incurred in 
gett ing there.
13. Scott (1986 : 12) draws the d is t in c t io n  between p ro le ta r ian iza t ion  
and marginal izat ion as fol lows. Pro le tar ian iza t ion  i s  the process by 
which labour is alienated from control  over the means o f  production and 
becomes a commodity, such as peasant producers becoming wage labourers 
on land that was once th e i r  own. Marginal izat ion is the process by 
which labour becomes redundant. Although th is  would normally be 
preceded by p ro le ta r ian iza t ion  and effected by replacement by machinery 
( in  Scott 's  case the combine harvester) ,  i t  may also be independent of 
th is  process. In our case, fo r  example, Ban Mai producers are alienated 
from control  by having to rent out th e i r  land in l ie u  o f  debt, and 
redundancy occurs as a re su l t  o f  two main processes : the large number 
of people facing the same s i tu a t ion ,  resu l t ing  in an oversupply o f wage 
labour; and the ex tens i f ica t ion  o f  production such as by cassava 
plant ing which resu l ts  in a decl ine in seasonal demand fo r  labour.
14. In addi t ion to suffer ing from pest ic ides,  f i sh  populations have 
declined due to f ish ing  techniques that lead to rapid deplet ion o f  
stocks. In p a r t i c u la r ,  " cho' t  piaa : f ish  e lec t rocut ion"  using car 
ba t te r ies  or even bicyc le  dynamos and "yaabeua : poisoning" k i l l  large 
and small f i s h  a l i ke ,  unl ike the more selective t r a d i t i o n a l  methods o f  
waan hae (casting nets) and wid (blocking a stream and manually 
emptying water out o f  a sect ion) .  This is  a class ic  " tragedy of the
commons" s i tua t ion  and cannot be a t t r ibu ted  so le ly  to poverty : I was 
to ld  by one wealthy Ban Mai i l l e g a l  timber trader who had ju s t  returned 
with a 5 kilogramme catch tha t  "we poor have to make ends meet somehow"; 
he had used his car battery  to electrocute the f i sh  in a nearby stream, 
showing that the technology o f  aff luence can ac tua l ly  exacerbate the 
s i tua t ion !
15. See Panayotou (1983 : 68) fo r  a diagrammatic representat ion o f  th is  
process of poverty, migrat ion, and environmental d e te r io ra t io n .
16. Rigg (1985) comes to s im i la r  conclusions fo r  the Northeast, showing 
that u l t im a te ly  ag r icu l tu ra l  production i s  constrained by environmental 
factors and that in the context o f  a closed land f r o n t i e r ,  growth in the 
rural  economy must increasingly be sought outside the ag r icu l tu ra l  
sector.
17. I t  is  beyond the scope o f  th i s  study to discuss in de ta i l  the ro le  
o f  rura l  i n d u s t r ia l i z a t io n  in providing a l te rna t ive  productive potent ial  
in a s i tua t ion  o f  marginal ag r icu l tu re .  Suff ice i t  to say that 
peripheral communities such as those of Lan Sak suf fer  numerous 
disadvantages fo r  such production, which has had very l im ited 
development to date even in more accessible communities in the Central 
Region. See IBRD 1983 fo r  an analysis o f non-agricul  tura l  growth 
potent ia l  in ru ra l  areas.
18. An a l te rna t ive  production regime is envisaged by NKYFRD, which 
emphasises integrated farming. While i t  is  beyond the scope of th is  
study to invest igate th is  a l te rna t ive  in d e ta i l ,  the main features are 
as fol lows. Integrated farming involves the household in a wide var ie ty  
o f  a c t i v i t i e s .  I t s  ra t iona le  is f i r s t ,  to maximize use o f  on-farm 
resources in an eco log ica l ly  e f f i c i e n t  way, for example by allowing pigs 
to feed on home-produced feeds tu f fs ,  chickens to feed on pig manure, 
chicken manure to feed f i s h ,  biogas production, and intensive kitchen 
gardening. Second, integrated farming is based on t ra d i t io n a l  peasant 
production in producing most o f  the goods required for home consumption 
with in  the household economy. Thi rd,  inputs to th is  type o f  ag r icu l tu re  
are minimized, and i t  is  therefore in p r inc ip le  o f  p a r t icu la r  relevance 
to c a p i ta l -  and land-short  poorer fam i l ies .  In p rac t ice ,  the dozen or 
so Ban Mai youths who have trained in integrated farming at NKYFRD have 
faced numerous d i f f i c u l t i e s  in putt ing the i r  t ra in ing  into pract ice, 
large ly  due to problems o f  debt w ithin  th e i r  fami l ies and the consequent 
need fo r  immediate cash that can only be obtained by wage labouring. 
More fundamental ly, the extent to which a v i l la g e  economy already geared 
to commercial production can revert  to a more subsistence oriented 
regime is quest ionable.
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CHAPTER VII 
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
"Rea l i ty  had taught them the value o f  j o i n t  act ion during
peaceful t imes, such as during long khaek (reciproca l labour sharing)
for transplant ing and harvest ing. Large jobs got done with the strength 
o f  the many who joined as one. These lessons enabled them to jo in
together to get at the roots o f  the in jus t ices  tha t  oppressed them."
(Seni Saowapong, Pi sat [ d e v i l ]  p. 253; my t rans la t ion )
"In the past we used to help each o ther ;  now we step on one
another to get ahead. I t ' s  everyone fo r  themselves".
- Ban Dong v i l l a g e r  returned from Ban Mai
"Just imagine i f  next year farmers agreed not to se l l  any r i c e .
I f  only we (s ic )  chaonaa could s t ick  together."
- Ban Dong kamnan ruminating
"Working on your own you're l i ke  single f ingers  on a hand; work 
as a group and you're l i k e  a f i s t . "
- NGO worker ta lk ing  to v i l l a g e rs
"The trouble with us Thais is  that we don 't  work 
together.  Groups are what is  needed for v i l l a g e  development."
- D is t r i c t  o f f i c i a l  at a publ ic meeting
The ethos o f  development in Thailand is imbued with the need for 
cooperation. Concern over lack o f  farmer bargaining power, 
fragmentation o f  v i l l a g e  communities, decl ine o f  t ra d i t io n a l  
cooperation, and the admin is tra t ive d i f f i c u l t i e s  associated with the 
" t h i 7 khrai t h i i  man : each fo r  him/herself"  a t t i tu d e  a l l  contr ibute
to a discourse, ideology, and new structures that stress cooperative 
endeavour. At the same t ime, processes are at work th a t  place the 
emphasis on the ind iv idua l .  Ind iv idua l iza t ion  o f  production, 
d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  o f  the v i l l a g e  community, increased importance o f  
monetized re la t ions  w ith in  communities as described in the previous 
chapter a l l  work against cooperation as an ideal or a p r a c t i c a l i t y .  
This fundamental contradic t ion is  the subject o f  the present chapter.
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Neither t r a d i t i o n a l l y  nor formal ly established cooperation are 
new concepts on the Thai scene. As is  detai led below, t ra d i t io n a l  
v i l la g e  st ructures contain many cooperative elements, despite cer ta in  
prevai l ing o f f i c i a l  myths to the contrary. Formal cooperatives were 
established as long ago as 1916, although they have ra re ly  moved beyond 
a c re d i t  funct ion and a notor ious ly  unsuccessful one at t h a t . l  What 
i s  more recent is  the associat ion o f  cooperative a c t i v i t y  at a l l  levels 
with rura l  development, and the associated p r o l i f e ra t i o n  o f  groups 
[klum) .
In examining the contrad ic t ion  inherent in pursuing cooperative 
forms within  an in d i v id u a l i s t i c  ethos, theories and a c tu a l i t i e s  o f  
peasant economy and associated structures are f i r s t  taken into account. 
This is followed by a considerat ion o f  the ra t iona le  o f  cooperation or 
otherwise, p a r t i c u la r l y  as i t  appl ies to production in Ban Dong and Ban 
Mai. Development as in s t i t u t i o n a l  innovation is  examined in i t s  
divergent form with respect to the co o p e ra t ive / ind iv idu a l is t ic  
dichotomy, and consideration is given to the concept o f  klum as i t  
appl ies to the ideology of s ta te , NGO, and v i l l a g e rs .  Specif ic
instances o f  cooperative development are described, with pa r t icu la r
emphasis on one pro ject tha t  spans indigenous i n i t i a t i v e ,  NGO, and state
rura l  development structures and with which the w r i te r  was d i r e c t l y
involved. F in a l l y ,  potent ia l  areas fo r  cooperation are examined with 
reference to Ban Dong and Ban Mai production, and obstacles to the i r  
achievement are id e n t i f ie d .
V I I . 1 Peasant economy and v i l l a g e  structure : c o l l e c t i v i s t  or 
ind iv idu a l is t?
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The c o l l e c t i v i s t  versus i n d iv id u a l i s t  debate has taken on many 
forms. U lt imate ly  i t  is  l inked to the basic communal and " ra t io n a l "  
sel f-maximizing p r inc ip les  underlying s o c ia l i s t  and c a p i t a l i s t  social 
and economic systems respect ive ly .  In terms o f  peasant systems the main 
debate has been around the moral versus p o l i t i c a l  economy arguments. 
Underpinning these arguments are c o n f l i c t in g  accounts o f  v i l lage  
s t ructure from d i f f e re n t  parts o f  the world at d i f f e r e n t  conjunctures in 
h is to ry ,  but much o f  the recent debate has drawn on evidence from 
Southeast Asia in the context o f  co lonia l  and c a p i t a l i s t  change. The 
present section ou t l ines  the essent ial  points o f  the debate and extends 
i t  beyond academic theor iz ing into popular notions o f  t ra d i t io n a l  
v i l la g e  structure in Thailand as re f lec ted  in var ious discourses. This 
is fol lowed by an analysis o f indigenous production arrangements as 
evidenced in Chapter V to show tha t  ne ither corporate nor in d iv id u a l i s t  
notions explain in iso la t ion  what arrangements are arr ived at.  F in a l l y ,  
the debate is  considered in the context o f  the rapid change in 
production re la t io n s  occurring in Lan Sak. I t  is suggested that a major 
omission in the moral versus p o l i t i c a l  economy debate is  tha t  o f  the 
r e f l e x i v i t y  o f  change on peasant social  s t ruc tu re ,  where the l a t t e r  is 
a l l  too often taken as a given and response or react ion to change used 
to prove the nature o f  t h i s  given.
V I I T h e o r i e s  o f  peasant economy and v i l l a g e  s t ruc tu re
The pr inc ipal  opposing theor ies o f  v i l la g e  structure as 
interpreted through peasant economy are James Sco t t 's  (1976) moral 
economy approach and Samuel Popkin's (1979) p o l i t i c a l  economy 
approach. Scott uses evidence from Burma and Vietnam to suggest a
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moral ly based world view of peasants based on the p r inc ip les  of 
re c ip ro c i ty  and assured subsistence. Popkin counters with evidence from 
Vietnam to suggest that Scott 's  asc r ip t ion  o f  atavism to peasants is 
u n ju s t i f i e d ,  and that peasants are in fac t  forward looking, 
sel f-maximizing ind iv idua ls  with a un ive rsa l i s t i c  investment log ic .
Scott develops his argument by f i r s t  considering the basis fo r  
the "subsistence e th ic"  as he terms i t .  The peasant household
enterpr ise as consumption as well as production un i t  places assured 
subsistence before long term income maximization. This leads to norms 
o f  re c ip ro c i ty  and exchange re la t ionsh ips  that may appear exp lo i ta t ive  
but form the moral basis for peasant society.  What peasants sac r i f ice  
to th e i r  v i l l a g e  'b e t te rs '  in status and long term income, they gain by 
way o f  insurance against s ta rvat ion. This is  mediated by
c o l le c t i v e  v i l l a g e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  pa tron-c l ien tage, expectations o f  
be t te r  o f f  members o f  the community, and re c ip ro c i ty  that keep peasants 
in moral debt fo r  most o f  the time but able to ca l l  on a wealthy fe l low  
v i l l a g e r  or community resources in time o f  need. These norms were 
infr inged by the claims o f  the colonial  economy and s ta te ,  which shif ted
r i s k  onto the peasantry so that in times o f  shortage they paid
proport ionate ly  more rather  than less in order to s ta b i l i ze  colonial  
revenues. I t  was t h i s  infringement tha t  led to peasant rebe l l ions  even 
against enormous odds. Rebellions are, however, ra re ,  and Scott shows 
tha t  the moral economy more often leads to re d is t r i b u t i v e  and se l f -he lp  
solut ions tha t  are concerned above a l l  with assuring subsistence o f  the 
household. A number o f  a l te rna t ives  to o u t r igh t  rebe l l ion  are suggested 
as ind ica to rs  o f  whether the moral economy has been infr inged in 
concrete s i tua t ions .
Popkin re jec ts  the moral economy analysis on four main grounds. 
F i r s t ,  while acknowledging that peasants are concerned with short term
284
su rv iva l ,  he suggests tha t  the "safety f i r s t "  emphasis takes 
i n s u f f i c ie n t  account o f  investments and even gambles made by peasants 
when oppor tun i t ies  present themselves. Second, he questions the 
e f f i c ie n c y  o f  v i l la g e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  in guaranteeing subsistence through 
r e d i s t r i b u t i o n , maintaining that needs are normative and norms are 
f l e x ib le  and therefore subject to uncertainty.  Th i rd , the potent ial  o f  
v i l l a g e rs  to act c o l l e c t i v e ly  is  thrown into question by the problem of 
free r id e rs .  F in a l l y ,  patron-cl ientage is  seen by Popkin as cont inua l ly  
open to change depending on the re la t i v e  bargaining power of the sides 
involved, and such re la t io n s  are governed by endogenous circumstances 
rather  than by a c u l t u r a l l y  determined, f ixed eth ic o f r e c ip ro c i ty .  
Popkin supports his argument by showing tha t  t r a d i t i o n a l  v i l lages  were 
far from harmonious, tha t  ind iv idual maximization preceded v i l l a g e  level 
s t ra teg ies ,  and tha t  e l i t e s  appropriated community resources fo r  
themselves. Rebel lion is shown to be a response to opportunt ies in the 
spec i f ic  context o f  strong leadership rather  than a r e t r e a t i s t  attempt 
at regaining a los t  harmony.
The two theories thus d i f f e r  fundamentally on the issue o f  what 
causes peasants to act,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  in response to changes a f fec t ing  
the v i l l a g e  influenced by outside events. Scott 's  peasants react to 
change in a negative way when the moral premises o f  subsistence 
guarantees are threatened or ac tua l ly  in f r inged.  Popkin's peasants are 
astute respondents to opportun i t ies presented by change. At one leve l ,  
Scott 's  cu t te rs  o f  losses and Popkin's maximizers o f  gains are the same 
peasants cast on swings and roundabouts. More fundamental ly, however, 
i m p l i c i t  and e x p l i c i t  assumptions about v i l l a g e  structures underly the 
two pr incipal  arguments.
Whereas Scott uses as his s ta r t ing  point the c o l le c t i v e ly  
organized and harmonious v i l l a g e ,  Popkin questions the v a l i d i t y  o f  both
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of these character izat ions o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  v i l l a g e  s t ruc ture .  On the one 
hand, he questions v i l l a g e  communality by showing tha t  co l le c t i ve
in s t i t u t i o n s  are d i f f i c u l t  to establ ish and that peasants are motivated 
p r imar i ly  by an i n d i v id u a l i s t i c  investment log ic .  On the other ,  he 
raises numerous examples o f  exclusion of segments o f  the v i l la g e
population from involvement in v i l l a g e  a f f a i r s  and infringement o f  
community i n s t i t u t i o n s  by v i l l a g e  e l i t e s .  The impl icat ions o f  these 
disagreements over peasant motivat ions and v i l la g e  st ructures range from 
response o f  peasants to market opportun it ies through constra ints  on 
community development to potent ial  fo r revolu t ionary act ion.
On the Thai scene, popular, popu l is t ,  and other non-academic 
versions o f  h is to ry  contain t h e i r  own discourses on the nature o f  the 
" t r a d i t i o n a l "  Thai v i l l a g e  and i t s  inhabitants.  The urbanite conception 
i s  o f  the v i l la g e  as containing the source o f  the true "Thai" character.
Vi l lages are places where the chaobaan2 are poor but content,  where
people help each o ther ,  where poverty is shared, where honesty and 
s im p l ic i t y  border on s tu p id i t y  (hence the dual connotation of the word 
set/, meaning both "honest" and "naive to the point o f  ignorance"). 
Among those with more int imate acquaintance with the r e a l i t i e s  of 
v i l la g e  l i f e ,  there is a range o f  theoriz ing about the true nature o f  
the v i l l a g e ,  and t h i s  is  complicated by the r e a l i t i e s  o f  change and 
substant ial  va r ia t io n  between regions. Among NGOs, fo r  example, there 
i s  a tendency for workers in the North and Northeast to work according 
to an und i f fe rent ia ted model o f v i l l a g e  s t ruc tu re ,  a re jec t ion  of 
concepts o f  c lass, and a consensual approach to decision making. Those 
working in the more "developed" Central Region, and th is  includes 
U tha i than i , work to a model o f  d i f fe re n t ia te d  v i l la g es  in which 
id e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  " ta rge t  groups" (despite much consternat ion over th is  
term) is  necessary. Among o f f i c i a l s ,  inasmuch as they can be seen as 
d i s t i n c t  from the general urbanite population, the v i l l a g e  is
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d i f fe re n t ia ted  not so much in economic terms as in the qua l i ty  o f  i t s  
inhabitants in th e i r  responding, acquiescing, or react ing in other ways 
to o f f i c i a l  contact (see Section V I I . 3 . i below). Meanwhile, there is an 
o f f i c i a l  exasperation at the perceived i n a b i l i t y  o f  v i l l a g e rs  to work 
together on o f f i c i a l  p ro jects . The pr inc ipal  oppos i t ion is t  element in 
Thai soc ie ty ,  the CPT, s p l i t  ser iously over i t s  own conceptual izat ion o f  
the Thai social formation, including v i l l a g e  s truc tu res, as e i ther  
semi-feudal/semi-colonial  or semi-colonial /  sem i-cap i ta l is t .
Academic analyses o f  the s tructure o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  Thai v i l la g e  
society are manifold, and there i s  only room to provide a b r i e f  guide to 
them here. Scholarship was fo r  long dist racted by the debate on the 
supposed "loose structure"  o f Thai society,  based on Embree's (1950) 
observations (see Evers 1969 for aspects o f  th is  debate). Potter 's  
(1976) study attempted to re fu te  the loose structure paradigm. 
Meanwhile, Thai p o l i t i c a l  economists take a more dynamic approach, 
focussing on the impact o f state and capital  in spec if ic  h is to r ic  
contexts rather  than t ry ing  to ide n t i fy  the nature o f  a primaeval 
v i l la g e  society (see e.g. Chatthip and Suthy 1981; Chatthip e t . a l .  
1981). S p e c i f i ca l ly  in the f r o n t i e r  v i l l a g e  context, Johnston (1975 : 
152f f . )  makes the in terest ing observation that r e d is t r i b u t i v e  mechanisms 
existed within  a v i l la g e  society whose inhabitants perceived a " l im i ted  
good" (a la  Foster) and thus saw loss and gain in terms o f  the community 
rather  than spec i f ic  ind iv idua ls .
V l l ^ l j i  Peasant economy and v i l l a g e  s t ruc tu re  in Lan Sak
Just as no amount o f  theo r iz ing ,  academic or otherwise, w i l l  
a r r ive  at a d e f i n i t i v e  formulat ion o f  the nature o f  v i l l a g e  st ructure or
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peasant economy, so no isolated case study can provide proof or 
v ind icat ion for a p a r t icu la r  theory. However, theor ies tha t  have been 
b u i l t  upon experience elsewhere can help in the in te rp re ta t ion  of 
s t ruc tu res,  processes, and contradict ions phenomenologically observed, 
and at the same time empirical  studies do shed l i g h t  on the 
appropriateness or otherwise o f  assumptions underlying more general 
theor i  z ing.
The pract ica l  and ideological discourse o f  peasants is  evidenced 
in v i l la g e  level i n s t i t u t i o n s .  I t  must be reca l led that Lan Sak 
v i l lages  are r e la t i v e l y  young. As a r e s u l t ,  i n s t i t u t i o n s  are to be seen 
as a combination o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  arrangements that were carr ied over from 
s e t t l e r s '  home v i l la g es  on the one hand, and on the o ther ,  adaptations 
that were made to s u i t  the demands o f  a new type o f  environment, novel 
production constra in ts  and oppor tun i t ies ,  the p e c u l ia r i t i e s  of f r o n t ie r  
l i f e ,  and as w i l l  be discussed in the fol lowing sect ion, rapid changes 
in a l l  of the above. The current section deals f i r s t  with what are 
termed " t r a d i t i o n a l "  Lan Sak s t ruc tu res ,  even though i t  is  acknowledged 
that in a newly sett led  area the only s p e c i f i c i t i e s  are l i k e l y  to be 
ones o f  adaptat ion.
What is the evidence concerning co l lec t iv ism versus ind iv idual ism 
during early  Lan Sak settlement? Data is  now presented from Ban Dong 
and Ban Mai (and the l a t t e r ' s  parent settlement at Thung Khaa) to show 
th a t  elements o f  both are strong, and i t  is  held tha t  the predominance 
o f  one or the other in peasant actions and establishment o f  v i l l a g e  
in s t i t u t i o n s  is  governed by local and h is to r ica l  circumstance. This 
f l u i d i t y  subsequently helps explain the rapid s h i f t s  th a t  are apparent 
with changes resu l t ing  from external events.
Cooperation in early  Lan Sak settlements was essent ial  fo r
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su rv iva l .  Construct ion o f  the sett lement involved cooperative e f f o r t  in 
many tasks. Housebuilding, cu t t ing  of paths and la te r  o f  t racks,  
construct ion o f  temples and in the case o f  Thung Khaa also o f  the 
v i l lage  school, were a l l  indigenously organized cooperative 
a c t i v i t i t i e s .  Labour could be summoned from each house in the community 
during the ag r icu l tu ra l  off-season : such cooperative e f f o r t  i s  referred 
to as "khon la mai khon la meu : l i t .  a piece o f  wood each, a hand 
each". Natural and human hazards encouraged a s p i r i t  and settlement 
patterns th a t  diverged from s e t t l e r s '  previous experience. In the case 
of Bung Khiew, for example, ear ly  se t t le rs  from d i f f e r e n t  loca t ions,  
even from d i f f e re n t  provinces, established a concentrated settlement in 
order to guard against natural  and supernatural dangers o f  the fo res t .  
Communities re l ied  on mutual protect ion, and outsiders were 
d is t rus ted .  Yet t ru s t  with in  the community was strong. In Ban Dong 
long term Lao se t t le rs  speak o f  having been able to leave buf fa lo  out to 
graze fo r  days on end. In Ban Mai, ear ly  fo rest s e t t l e r s  ta lk  o f  the 
time when a house would remain unguarded; i f  neighbours arr ived and 
nobody was at home, the neighbours could help themselves to "enough r ice  
for a meal and charcoal to cook i t  : khao pho' k in thaan pho' hung". 
Al l  o f  th i s  produced a cohesion tha t  i s  ra re ly  associated with f r o n t ie r  
l i f e  in the minds o f  outs iders.
Meanwhile, a c t i v i t i e s  more d i r e c t l y  concerned with production 
involved several important elements o f  cooperation. The most ubiquitous 
and the one least spec if ic  to the l o c a l i t y  is  tha t  o f  reciprocal labour 
( ao raeng) . In the past many tasks had involved mutual help on an 
uncalculated basis (usual ly  termed simply " chuai kan : l i t .  help each 
other" [ c f .  co j  in Moerman 1968 : 116 - 117]),  and among these some
survive such as moving a house and preparing food for a household feast.  
However, ao raeng is on a s t r i c t l y  calculated basis,  whereby one day's 
labour is  returned in kind, almost always for the same task. As is
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evident from Chapter IV, ao raeng is more prevalent in some
agr icu l tu ra l  tasks than in others. In Ban Dong, ao raeng is most
commonly used in r ice  harvest ing, while in Ban Mai i t  is  used mainly for 
maize p lant ing. In the past, Ban Dong farmers would use th is
arrangement fo r  other ag r icu l tu ra l  tasks that involved a large number o f 
people, notably transp lan t ing.
Ao raeng labour is summoned ("bo 'k  : l i t .  to ld " }  a few days 
in advance by the "host" household ( jaophaap) .  On the day, most 
labourers ( " khaek : l i t .  guests") are in the f i e ld s  by about 8, but 
some may a r r ive  a l i t t l e  la te .  Several members o f  the host household 
remain at home to prepare the midday meal fo r  as many as 50 or more 
people, but at leas t  one member w i l l  work in the f i e ld s  and supervise 
the work. Short ly before noon, the khaek stop work and in the 
case o f  Ban Dong go to the jaophaap' s house, where lunch is wai t ing. 
I t  i s  a matter o f  pride tha t  a meal above the usual standard should be 
provided, with several dishes and plenty o f  meat. Khaek are exhorted 
to eat t h e i r  f i l l ,  and the bowls o f  curry tha t  are set in the middle o f  
each c i r c le  o f  r i c e  bowls are constant ly r e f i l l e d  from large tureens. 
In the case o f  Ban Mai, t h i s  important social aspect o f  ao raeng is 
l o s t ,  since f ie ld s  are usual ly too fa r  from the jaophaap's house to go 
back fo r  lunch, and the meal provided at the f i e l d  shelter (haang) is 
more modest. Work resumes at 2, although some may arr ive  s l i g h t l y  late 
i f  they have been home a f te r  lunch to attend to household tasks. 
Halfway through the afternoon, there is a short break cal led "phak noi  
: l i t .  l i t t l e  r e s t " ,  at which homemade r ice  s p i r i t  is  usual ly served; 
th i s  is  one o f  the few occasions when homemade s p i r i t s  are consumed 
openly and l i b e r a l l y ,  by women as well as men. The remainder o f  the 
afternoon's work is  often boisterous in the case o f  the r ice  harvest,
with much singing and jok ing.
290
Despite the social importance o f  ao raeng to the cooperative 
s p i r i t  o f  the community and the enjoyable aspect i t  br ings to what is  
otherwise hard t o i l ,  i t s  o p e ra b i l i t y  depends on a number o f key 
condi t ions. Since ao raeng depends above a l l  on rec ip roca t ion ,  i t  is 
important tha t  a s u f f i c i e n t  number o f  members o f  the community continue 
to use i t .  Although cooperating households do not have to have 
ident ica l  labour requirements, i t  would c lea r ly  be impossible for a 
fami ly with a large number of f ie ld s  to f u l f i l  i t s  reciprocal 
ob l igat ions were i t  to u t i l i z e  ao raeng labour. By the same token, i t  
would be point less fo r  a family with few f i e ld s  to engage more ao 
raeng workers than i t  could employ, and i t  is  e n t i r e l y  i r re le va n t  to 
the landless. Thus ao raeng requires a moderately e ga l i ta r ian  scale 
of production between p a r t ic ipa t ing  households. I t  i s  also important 
that the tasks fo r  which ao raeng is used are f l e x ib le  at least  to 
some degree in t h e i r  t im ing, otherwise a l l  w i l l  attend to th e i r  own 
f ie ld s  or employ hired labour at the optimum times. A th i rd  condit ion 
fo r  successful ao raeng arrangements is  the r e la t i v e  social cohesion 
o f  the community or section o f  the community p a r t i c ip a t in g ,  since the 
social element is  s t i l l  a strong one and there is a t least  some degree 
o f  t r u s t  involved in expecting obl igat ions to be f u l f i l l e d  in an only 
pa r t ly  mensurable way. Ao raeng is adaptable to a l im i ted  amount o f 
change in these condit ions, as w i l l  be shown in the fo l lowing sect ion.
Apart from cooperative arrangements in early  establishment o f  the 
community and in ag r icu l tu ra l  tasks, indigenous cooperation is also 
evident in the mobi l iza t ion o f  an important fac tor  o f  production in Ban 
Dong, namely water. From the time when farmers f i r s t  practised sett led
r ice  farming on any scale in Lan Sak, in the 1960s, they have dug
i r r i g a t i o n  channels and constructed weirs on the Tap Salao River. Ban 
Dong f i e ld s  are p a r t i a l l y  i r r ig a te d  by water diverted at Paak Meuang
(whose name means ‘'head [mouth] of the i r r i g a t i o n  channel") via a
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channel that also makes use o f  natural  streams and another small weir at 
Khong Chai (see Fig. 4.6).  This channel was dug by hand under the 
cooperative e f f o r t  o f  Ban Dong residents when much o f  i t s  course was 
s t i l l  fo res t  or scrub. Since i t s  incept ion, t h i s  m in i - i r r i g a t i o n  system 
(meuang fa a i  : l i t .  channel and weir) has been administered by an
indigenous i r r i g a t i o n  committee akin to the type o f  arrangement more 
commonly found in the North o f  Thailand. This committee is elected
annual ly, with ind iv idua ls  putt ing out tenders to the members ( i . e .
bene f ic ia r ies  o f  the system) and mustering th e i r  own team i f  elected
head [hua naa f a a i ) .  In exchange fo r  constant control  o f  the water
level by adjustments to the bamboo and log weir and d is t r ib u t i o n  o f
water f a i r l y  among the hundred or so members in Ban Dong and fur ther  
downstream, the committee receives an agreed r ice  payment o f  two tang 
of r i ce  for every three ra i  of  land harvested. The committee
general ly  have l i t t l e  land o f  t h e i r  own, since most o f  th e i r  time is
taken up by administer ing the system. During the ag r icu l tu ra l
off-season, the committee summons labour from the member households, who 
each have to provide an agreed amount o f  mater ials in the form of bamboo 
and timber.
F in a l l y ,  the household as a cooperative un it  should be mentioned, 
since i t  is  so often taken fo r  granted as being such without 
consideration o f  i t s  potent ial  d i v i s i b i l i t y .  T ra d i t io n a l l y  the 
household funct ions as a corporate u n i t ,  with l i t t l e  or no 
d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  o f  rewards accruing to i t s  const i tuent members according 
to the amount o f  labour they perform in i t s  name. D i f fe re n t ia t io n  o f  
tasks there is :  in t ra d i t i o n a l  r ice  a g r icu l tu re ,  men are responsible for 
the "heavy" tasks, notably ploughing, while women perform most o f  the 
" f i d d l y "  tasks, notably t ransp lan t ing .  Both men and women take part in 
the harvest. In f a c t ,  t h i s  d iv is io n  o f  labour is  not s t r i c t ,  and i t  is  
common to see women ploughing and men transplant ing i f  there is a
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shortage o f  male or female labour in a p a r t icu la r  household. The 
household i t s e l f  is  often defined by "those who eat from the same pot : 
khon kin ruam mo' diew kan" and the word for family is 
1 khro' bkhrua : l i t .  those sharing a ki tchen" ; in the v i l l a g e ,  i t  is 
more often referred to as a " langkhaa baan" , or those l i v i n g  under 
the same roo f ,  or simply 11baan" ,  or house (see section 1.5 above). I f  
ch i ld ren or other members o f  the household work fo r  a wage elsewhere, 
they are expected to pool th e i r  earnings in the family  k i t t y .
The above are the main indigenous aspects o f  cooperation in the
f i e l d  o f  production to be found in Lan Sak v i l la g es .  In counterbalance,
i t  i s  necessary also to mention some i n d i v id u a l i s t i c  aspects of 
t ra d i t io n a l  l i f e .  To begin w ith , the decision to migrate is i t s e l f  an 
ind iv idual one, and despite the fac t  tha t  many choose to se t t le  near 
fr iends or re la t ive s  who have made the move before them, the uprooting 
of whole v i l l a g es  or large parts o f  them is  the exception rather  than 
the ru le .  Thus Ban Dong and even more so Ban Mai are inhabited by 
se t t le rs  from a diverse range o f  loca t ions,  and v i l l a g e  cohesion 
tha t  has developed over generations in established v i l lages  has only 
had a short period to develop in Lan Sak v i l la g e s .  The common 
perception o f  f r o n t i e r  l i f e  as i n d i v id u a l i s t i c  and ruled by the law of 
the gun is  d is to r te d ,  but there is  an element o f  t ru th  inasmuch as 
boundaries are as yet poorly def ined, leadership up fo r  grabs, and 
social and legal controls  weakly established.
Another aspect o f  ind iv idual ism is the preferred residence 
pattern of Thai s e t t le rs .  Living close to one's land is  p a r t ly  a matter
o f  convenience, since many economic a c t i v i t i e s  are only possible in
proximity to the homestead and farmers prefer not to have to walk long 
distances to th e i r  f ie ld s  each day. Hov/ever, such a preference is also 
ideo log ica l ly  expressed, and lowland Thais see themselves as d i f fe re n t
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from Lao in th is  respect,  since the l a t t e r  prefer to se t t le  in a 
clustered community. When forced to se t t le  in such a community as in 
the case o f  Ban Mai, many v i l l a g e rs  complain not only o f  the material  
inconvenience o f  having to spend up to two hours t r a v e l l i n g  to and from 
th e i r  land and o f  not being able to raise ducks and chickens or plant 
f r u i t  t rees, but also express fee l ings o f  d iscomfor t ,  unease, fee l ing 
pestered or annoyed in the common p la in ts  o f "mai sabaai jai  : 
uncomfortable", " j u k j i k j a i : bothered", "thuuk ramkhaan : annoyed".
A fu r the r  aspect o f  indiv idual ism is  the importance o f  the 
household, however loosely  defined, as the basic production un it  and the 
basis fo r  ca lcu la t ion .  Whereas the household i s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  as pure a 
corporate i n s t i t u t i o n  as is  found anywhere in Thai and most other 
soc ie t ies ,  the c o ro l la ry  i s  a lack o f  any such cohesion at a level above 
tha t  o f  the household. Ao raeng ca lcu la t ions are made on the basis o f  
the household, land is  held and r i ce  i s  stored at the household and not 
the community le v e l ,  and the household serves as the most common basis 
fo r  ca lcu la t ion  o f  in te res ts .
The seemingly contrad ic to ry  notions o f  sel f-perceived 
individual ism as a Thai t r a i t  and the normative ideal o f  cooperation is  
expressed ideo log ica l ly  in a number of ways. The most powerful element 
in the discourse o f  v i l l a g e rs  on ind iv idual ism in everyday l i f e  is  the
phrasal p a t t e r n   k h r a i  man. Thus t h i i  khrai  t h i i  man (each
to h is /her  own), baan khraai baan man (each house[hold] for i t s e l f ) ,  
reuang khrai  reuang man (each person's a f f a i r  is t h e i r  own concern), 
and so on. The Buddhist concept o f  kama (karma) holds tha t  each 
ind iv idual is  responsible for his or her own fa te .  On the other hand, 
one often hears the need to ruam meu ( l i t .  j o in  hands), and ao raeng 
is  seen as much as a way o f  helping neighbours as a matter o f  se l f  
i n te res t .  The d i s t in c t io n  between se lf -percept ion and the ideal is
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apparent in the frequent admiring comments made by Thais about other 
ethnic groups. On the Lao (Isaan) in a neighbouring v i l l a g e ,  fo r  
example, is  often heard the comment that they ruam meu kan d i i  
(cooperate well together) .  Despite resentment o f  the Chinese traders in 
Paak Meuang and elsewhere, th e i r  success is  admired and put down not 
only to hard work but also to the fac t  tha t " jek  chuai kan euafeua 
kan mai biadbian kan meuan khon Thai : the [pe jo ra t ive  term fo r ]
Chinese help and support each o ther ,  they don ' t  e xp lo i t  each other l i k e  
[us] Thais".
V I I ^ I J H  Cooperation and change
I t  was suggested above that at no point in time can v i l lages  or 
v i l l a g e rs  be character ized as exclus ively  c o l le c t i v e  or i n d i v id u a l i s t ,  
but rather  tha t elements o f each are manifested according to the 
per ta in ing material s i tu a t ion .  I t  is  to be expected, there fore ,  that 
changes in th is  s i tua t ion  are accompanied by both d is rupt ions in the 
ra t iona le  for t r a d i t i o n a l  cooperation and emergence o f  new forms in 
response to change. Since cooperative practices requi re  ru les ,  mutual 
expectat ions, and even moral codes (these being the basis fo r  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  : see section I I . 2),  they take time to get establ ished. At 
the same t ime, infringement o f  these ru les ,  expectat ions, and codes can 
quick ly  undermine established forms, and i t  is therefore unsurprising 
tha t  cooperative endeavour suf fers  in the context o f  rapid change.
In Lan Sak, a number of changes have resulted in a decline in 
t ra d i t i o n a l  cooperation. One is  the dispersal o f  communities away from 
v i l la g e  c lus ters  with more complete deforesta t ion  and decl ine in the 
dangers that produced cooperation through safety in numbers. Another is
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the large size o f  most v i l l a g e s ,  making cooperation based on kinship or 
a f f i n i t y  d i f f i c u l t  to estab l ish  on a v i l lage-w ide basis.  However, more 
fundamental changes have been due to external inf luences, in pa r t icu la r  
the state and the market economy.
As was noted above, an important form of cooperation in early Lan 
Sak settlements was the j o i n t  construct ion o f  in f ra s t ru c tu ra l  projects 
such as roads, i r r i g a t i o n ,  and even schools. Since the state has 
started to provide resources for such pro jects , the need fo r  community 
cooperation has declined and only the temple is s t i l l  e n t i re ly  a j o i n t  
v i l l a g e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .  The state also impinges on the i r r i g a t i o n  
admin is tra t ion, v i l l a g e  leadership in general, and other spheres o f  
v i l l a g e  l i f e ,  and t h i s  issue is  discussed fu r the r  in section V I I . 5 
below.
Economically, monetization, debt, and d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  produce a 
change in production re la t ions  tha t  makes t r a d i t i o n a l  cooperation 
d i f f i c u l t  to sustain. In p a r t i c u la r ,  the decl ine o f  ao raeng can be 
a t t r ibu ted  to these facto rs . Ao raeng depends on the more or less 
equal valuat ion o f  a day's labour by pa r t ic ipa t ing  households, otherwise 
households with more ready cash w i l l  be more l i k e l y  to h ire  labour so as 
to avoid having to f u l f i l  what are seen as tedious reciprocal 
ob l iga t ions .  D i f fe re n t ia t io n  in control over land makes i t  un l ike ly  
th a t  those at e i the r  end of the spectrum w i l l  engage in ao raeng and 
a f te r  a point the pool o f par t ic ipants  is  too small fo r  continued 
v i a b i l i t y  o f  the system (c f .  Anan 1984 : 461; Ananya 1985 : 92,164).
In te n s i f i ca t io n  o f  c u l t i v a t io n  by double cropping makes fo r  more 
c r i t i c a l  peaks o f  labour demand, which in turn makes i t  more d i f f i c u l t  
fo r  ao raeng fo r  a pa r t icu la r  task to be spread over two or more 
weeks, and labour is  hired in preference. These periods have become 
known as times o f  yaeng khaek , or f igh t ing  over [h i re d ]  labour, and
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the wage rate r ises  temporar i ly to 35 baht or even more in exceptional 
c i rcumstances.
Ao raeng carr ies on in part due to i t s  a d ap tab i l i t y  to changed 
circumstances. In Ban Dong and Ban Mai i t  is  not uncommon to f ind 
reciprocal and hired labourers (khaek raeng and khaek jaang
respect ive ly) working alongside each other.  In th i s  case the khaek 
jaang have to provide th e i r  own lunch or have a small amount (usual ly  5 
baht) deducted from th e i r  day's wage. Monetary re la t io n s  also help 
introduce an element o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  into the reciprocal re la t ionsh ip  by 
al lowing a household unable to f u l f i l  i t s  ob l iga t ions  to h ire  labour 
from a th i rd  household to work on the day in quest ion. A l te rn a t ive ly ,  
any outstanding ob l igat ions are cleared in cash i f  not reciprocated by 
the end o f  the season.
A combination o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  monetization, and natural 
resource scarc i ty  also e f fec ts  changes in the administra t ion o f
t ra d i t io n a l  v i l l a g e  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  A case in point is  the i r r ig a t i o n  
administrat ion in Ban Dong. Unt i l  1984, the committee was paid in r ice  
and members contr ibuted labour and materials fo r  the upkeep o f  the weir 
and channels. In 1985 fo r  the f i r s t  t ime, i t  was decided at the annual 
meeting to contract out the administrat ion to the lowest bidder,  
dispensing with the need fo r  labour and material  inputs from the 
members. The former is  increasingly  d i f f i c u l t  to organize as wealthier 
farmers place a higher valuat ion on th e i r  t ime, and bamboo and timber is 
d i f f i c u l t  to f in d .  As a r e s u l t ,  these inputs are now to be replaced by 
equal cash contr ibu t ions from the members, which is o f  course regressive 
in i t s  e f fe c t  on landholders o f  d i f f e re n t  sizes. Rice is  s t i l l  paid to 
the i r r i g a t i o n  committee for admin is tra t ion, but t h i s  could eventual ly 
also be replaced by a cash payment.
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In Ban Mai, the in d iv idu a l iza t io n  o f  production has even undercut 
the household. Young people who seek employment in Bangkok and
elsewhere, and even some who work l o c a l l y ,  keep most or a l l  of  t h e i r  
wages for themselves. This is  influenced in large part  by the
consumerist cu l tu re  that has developed in the competi t ive environment o f  
the v i l l a g e ,  which means that young people value the independent income
that wage labour gives them fo r  purchase o f  mater ial  goods such as
western s ty le  clothes,  radios and cassette players, and motorcycles. 
Even between husband and w ife , pooling of resources cannot always be 
taken fo r  granted, as in the case o f  a Ban Mai woman whose husband w i l l  
not send home any o f  his savings from the Middle East where he is 
working for fear tha t  she w i l l  run o f f  with another man and the money to 
boot.
The response o f  v i l l a g e rs  to the changed production re la t ions  
brought about by these trends can be summarized by a b r i e f  comparison o f  
ao raeng as seen by Ban Dong and Ban Mai v i l l a g e rs .  As was noted 
above, ao raeng s t i l l  f u l f i l s  an important cooperative social  funct ion 
in Ban Dong, whereas in Ban Mai some o f  the t r a d i t i o n a l  and enjoyable 
aspects tha t  d is t ingu ish  rec iprocal  from hired labour in a q u a l i ta t i ve  
way have been l o s t .  The fol lowing two paraphrased statements of Ban 
Dong and Ban Mai v i l l a g e rs  respect ive ly  comparing ao raeng with
jaang speak fo r  themselves. In one Ban Dong v i l l a g e r ' s  words, 
"Given the choice, I ' d  rather work under ao raeng any day. I f  
you're a b i t  la te  i t  doesn't  matter. You don 't  feel  you have to be at 
i t  every minute o f  the day, and you can ta lk  and joke as you work. 
There's the fun o f  the midday meal and the phak n o i ; general ly 
i t ' s  more fun, and you don ' t  have to have cash." In contras t ,  a Ban Mai 
v i l l a g e r  complains, " I  wish I had the cash l ike  some to hire labour. 
Khaek raeng turn up la te  and horse around instead of putt ing in a 
proper day's work l i ke  khaek jaang. Ao raeng is only fo r  us poor
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lo t  who haven't the cash to ja ang , "
F in a l l y ,  in response to changed condit ions and outside 
inf luences, new forms o f  cooperation can be detected as emerging. Most 
o f  these are discussed below under the heading of development
i n i t i a t i v e s  since they are s p e c i f i c a l l y  associated as such, but three 
new forms o f  cooperative endeavour are spontaneous enough to be 
considered p r im ar i ly  as indigenous responses. The f i r s t  is the pooling 
o f  cash fo r  j o i n t  in f ra s t ru c tu ra l  projects tha t  are urgent ly desired but 
which the D is t r i c t  au th o r i t ie s  have not budgeted fo r .  Examples are road 
improvement and an attempt at i r r i g a t i o n  channel construct ion by Bung 
Khiew v i l l a g e r s ,  both o f  which were carr ied out using machinery o f
pr ivate contractors hired using funds col lected s p e c i f i c a l l y  for the 
purpose; in the past, j o i n t  labour would have been used in the 
ag r icu l tu ra l  o f f  season to perform the same tasks. The second is  the 
spontaneous mob i l iza t ion o f  v i l l a g e rs  fo r  an appeal to government 
a u tho r i t ies  when an issue too urgent to be l e f t  to formal v i l la g e  
leadership ar ises. In September 1984, one such issue arose in Ban
Mai, when ALRO brought in machinery to remove tree stumps from f ie ld s
tha t  had already been planted with mung beans. About 50 Ban Mai 
v i l la g e rs  whose crops were threatened went to the ALRO o f f i c e  60 
ki lometres d is ta n t  in Uthaithani to p e t i t io n  the prov inc ia l  a u th o r i t ie s ,  
and they were successful in having the work put o f f  un t i l  a f te r  the 
harvest. In May 1985, Bung Khiew v i l la g e rs  angered by substandard work 
on a community granary constructed by a contractor commissioned by the 
provincial  DAE o f f i c e  appealed through a local leader over the head of 
local o f f i c i a l s  to have the work inspected. Eventually they not only 
got a new granary but also persuaded the provincial  DAE o f f i c e r  to award 
the reconstruct ion contract to a team o f  f ive  Bung Khiew v i l l a g e rs .  A 
th i rd  example o f  indigenous cooperation in response to change also comes 
from Bung Khiew, in the donation o f  land by several v i l l a g e rs  for
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community p ro jec ts .  This w i l l  be detai led in section V I I . 5 below, and 
some o f  the factors  perta in ing in Bung Khiew th a t  make fo r  cooperation 
are suggested in the fo l lowing chapter.
V I I . 2 Rationale fo r  cooperation in production
I t  was suggested in the previous section that the ra t iona le  for 
cooperative or individual endeavour changes with changes in production 
re la t ions  and other inf luences on the production regime. The present 
section examines the ra t iona le  fo r  cooperation or otherwise under 
ex is t ing  condit ions in Ban Dong and Ban Mai as detai led in Chapter V. 
The ra t iona le  is  th a t  o f  an outsider with detailed knowledge o f  the two 
communities, but wherever possible reference is made to considerations 
o f  v i l l a g e rs  themselves.
As monetary re la t io n s  become more pervasive, the scope for
individual production independent o f  the re s t  o f  the community
increases. Under t r a d i t io n a l  arrangements, the scale o f  production was 
l im i ted  la rge ly  by a b i l i t y  to summon labour, which in turn depended on 
the amount o f  household labour avai lable both for domestic production 
and for partaking in labour sharing arrangements. Monetization gives 
larger  farmers access to a p o te n t ia l l y  unlimited pool o f labour with in  
and even outside the community. Meanwhile, v i l l a g e rs  at the other end 
o f  the spectrum with few or none o f  the other resources necessary fo r  
production depend on h i r ing  themselves out as wage labourers rather  than 
engaging in reciprocal arrangements. Thus the ra t iona le  fo r  th is  form 
o f  cooperation is  reduced, and in the case o f  the Ban Mai farmer quoted 
above i t  is  relegated to a re luc tan t  response to resource shortage,
where ind iv idual cash h i r ing  would be preferred.
Another evident aspect o f  monetization is tha t  o f  debt. On the 
one hand, t h i s  leads farmers to take ind iv idual short term measures, 
often re ly ing  on resources external to the community, and th is  is 
detrimental  to prospects fo r  longer term cooperation based on indigenous 
resources. D i f fe re n t ia t io n  not only reduces the scope fo r  cooperation 
in a mater ial  sense; i t  is  also dest ruct ive  o f  the v i l l a g e  as a
community o f  i n te re s t .  The commonest complaint re fe r r in g  to lack o f  
social cohesion in Ban Mai and to a lesser extent in Ban Dong is  that 
"khon ichaa kan : l i t .  people envy each o ther" ,  and th is  is  often 
used in explanation of why cooperative projects f a i l .  Some even claim 
to have had the i r  crops tampered with in the event o f  doing better than 
a neighbour.
However, new forms o f  production and changes in production
re la t io n s  do also open up potent ia l  avenues fo r  cooperation. Some o f  
these have been followed with varying degrees o f  success under
development schemes and w i l l  be discussed below. Others remain ideas or 
ideals in the minds o f  v i l l a g e rs .  Most o f  these ideas are based on
f ind ing ways to avoid the pr inc ipa l  means o f  surplus extract ion in the 
two communities and would thus be re d is t r i b u t i v e  in th e i r  e f fe c t .  One 
idea is  to reduce the loss o f  resources in the form o f  in te res t  on
debt from the community or the i r  concentrat ion in the hands o f
ind iv idua ls  by estab l ish ing community based lending in s t i t u t i o n s .  A 
second attempt to recoup surplus by cooperative action would be to 
control t rade, both in j o i n t  purchase o f  a g r icu l tu ra l  inputs and in 
j o i n t  marketing of produce. A th i r d  method would be fo r  small farmers 
to gain control  over "lumpy" factors  o f  product ion, i . e .  those which are 
general ly too expensive for an ind iv idual to purchase and use to the 
f u l l  on his or her own farm. In p a r t i cu la r ,  ploughing implements i f  
cooperat ively owned would increase farmers' control  over production and
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decrease the surplus accruing to t ra c to r  owners and buffa lo  ren t ie rs .  
Even d iv i s i b le  factors  such as bu f fa lo  can be obtained more cheaply i f  
bought in bulk at the large market a t Tab Tan, and th is  requires 
cooperation. Other ideas concern mobi l iza t ion o f  resources by 
cooperative e f f o r t ,  notably water.
V I I . 3 Development as in s t i t u t i o n a l  innovation : ind iv idual or
cooperative?
Development as i n s t i t u t i o n a l  innovation was discussed in Chapter 
I I .  Insofar as i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangements for the mob i l iza t ion ,  
d i s t r ib u t i o n ,  and exchange o f  resources can be ind iv idu a l ly  or 
cooperat ively organized, the a l te rna t ives fo r  development can also be 
categorized as such. This conceptual izat ion is not out o f  l ine  with 
v i l l a g e  categories. In local discourse, you can e i ther  do things baan 
khraai baan man (each to him/herself)  or you can do them ruam kan 
( j o i n t l y ) .
With regard to development, however, we f ind a b la tan t  
con trad ic t ion  between an ethos that places increasing emphasis on the 
individual as the primary agent for development and spec if ic  programmes 
that involve cooperative e f f o r t .  The ethos is  inherent in the 
background ideology, discourse, and structures involved in promoting 
c a p i t a l i s t  development o f  the countryside. Specif ic programmes are 
those in i t i a te d  by state and NGO developers. This section examines the 
contradic t ion with reference to "development" as observed in Lan Sak.
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VII ^3J  Ind 7 v idua 7 i  st i c e  tho s
The ideology o f  c a p i t a l i s t  development places stress on 
indiv idual advancement. C a p i ta l i s t ,  monetized re la t io n s  o f  production 
free individual producers from the social constra in ts  imposed by 
t ra d i t i o n a l  re la t ionsh ips  fo r  mobi l izat ion o f  labour and other factors 
of production. Commoditization o f  labour turns ind iv idua ls  in to  
marketable fac to rs  o f  production, control  over which (whom) is  
p o te n t ia l l y  unlimited with cash as the sole cons t ra in t .  Thus the 
underlying national strategy o f  c a p i t a l i s t  development o f  the 
countryside i t s e l f  is  a powerful ideological instrument toward 
ind iv idu a l iza t io n .  I t  is  evidenced in Lan Sak above a l l  in the decline 
o f  ao raeng in favour o f  jaang as the means fo r  securing control  
over labour and by the concentration o f  control over a key fac tor  o f  
production, namely t r a c to rs ,  in the case o f  Ban Mai.
In addit ion to the i n d i v id u a l i s t i c  log ic  o f  c a p i t a l i s t  re la t ions  
o f  product ion, a number o f  other e ffec ts  o f national development 
strategy favour ind iv idual advancement. Most powerful o f  a l l  is  the 
consumerist cu l tu re  that is  produced by a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  goods, 
conspicuous consumption by v i l l a g e  e l i t e s ,  associat ion o f  mater ial  goods 
with social s tatus,  and the embarrassment o f those unable to keep up 
with the consumption standards o f  t h e i r  neighbours. Int roduct ion of 
e l e c t r i c i t y  in to  the v i l l a g e  such as in Ban Mai is a major stimulus to 
promulgation o f  such a cu l tu re .  On the heels o f  e le c t r i f i c a t i o n  fo l low 
vans o f  t r a v e l l i n g  salesmen from the Singer and other companies, and 
many o f  these have commissioned agents within  the v i l l a g e .  This is  the 
most sharply f e l t  aspect o f  the ideology o f  competi t ion, whereby 
ind iv idua ls  are not only released from social constra in ts  over gett ing 
ahead independently o f  th e i r  neighbours, but ac tua l ly  see gett ing ahead 
in mater ial terms as th e i r  goal. In Ban Mai only h a l f  have paid
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e l e c t r i c i t y  connection costs despite not having to pay anything toward 
v i l la g e  connection costs and only paying for ind iv idual household 
connection o f  e l e c t r i c i t y ,  yet many even o f  these have incurred debt by 
connecting and spending beyond t h e i r  means.
The competit ive approach is  promoted by state rura l  developers as 
a key incentive fo r  v i l l a g e  development. V i l lage competit ions are held 
at the d i s t r i c t ,  p ro v in c ia l ,  reg iona l,  and national leve ls .  Within the 
v i l l a g e ,  competit ions are held fo r  best kept households. The emphasis 
is on outdoing others and feel ing ashamed at being outdone. Another 
aspect o f  such competi t ions, tha t  o f  power and t h e i r  use by o f f i c i a l s  to 
impose the i r  own standards on v i l l a g e  l i f e  and v i l l a g e  development and 
to coopt local leaders is  discussed in the fo l lowing chapter.
As was suggested in section VII  above, o f f i c i a l s  often have 
a d i f fe re n t ia te d  view o f  the v i l l a g e  based on the moral character o f  i t s  
c i t i ze n s .  This i s  imparted in d i s t r i c t  development t ra in ing  programmes. 
An example is the nationwide programme Phaen din thamu Phaen din 
tho'ng described in Chapter I I  above. This places emphasis on the 
moral f i b re  o f  v i l l a g e r s ,  and the vices condemned in Buddhist discourse 
{abayamuk), notably gambling and d r ink ing ,  are held up as the greatest 
obstacles to development. By impl ica t ion ,  development is  above a l l  an 
ind iv idual path. A sign placed at Ban Dong temple in 1985 read : 
"Obstacles to development : se l f ishness,  b icker ing, laz iness, s tup id i ty  
and bragging, and v ice" .  The concept o f  s p i r i t u a l  development 
(phatthana j i t j a i )  as o r i g i n a l l y  coined by NGO workers in opposit ion 
to the e x p lo i ta t i v e ,  se l f -o r ien ted  mores associated with c a p i t a l i s t  
development, has been taken by state developers to mean an individual 
path o f  development through abstent ion ( lod la 1oek) . The dominant 
discourse t ie s  nat ional salvat ion {kaan yuuro 'd  kho1 ng chaat) to 
personal sa lvat ion through ind iv idual  d i s c i p l i n e . ^
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An elaborat ion on t h i s  general emphasis was made during a
t ra in ing  programme fo r  v i l l a g e  heads in Lan Sak in Apr i l  1985. There 
are, i t  was explained by the D is t r i c t  DAE o f f i c e r ,  six types of people. 
The f i r s t  is  hua wai j a i  suu ( l i t .  quick wit ted and r e s i l i e n t ) .  These
are always looking fo r  new ideas. The second is ro '  duu t h i i  thaa
(wait  and see). These are w i l l i n g  to l i s te n  but are not act ive seekers.
Third are those who boeng taa langlee ( l i t .  look on h e s i ta n t ly ) .  They
s i t  on the s ide l ines and are slow to  get involved in new ideas. Type 
four is hanhee hua deu ( l i t .  stubborn). I t  is d i f f i c u l t  fo r  anything 
to get through to them. F i f t h  are those who ngo' meu jabjao  ( l i t .  s i t  
hugging th e i r  knees). They are almost beyond help. The la s t  group mai 
ao nai loe i  ( [a re ]  good fo r  nothing).  The f i r s t  three groups are 
c la ss i f ie d  as bua phon naam ( l i t .  lotuses above water),  which in 
popular Buddhist terms means enlightened. The lower three types, on the 
other hand, are bua t a i  naam ( l i t .  lotuses under water),  or those with 
the potent ia l  fo r  enlightenment but not yet ready.4 This is  an 
example o f  popular Buddhist terminology used ( inaccura te ly  as i t  turns 
out - see fn . )  to d i f f e re n t ia t e  people in the i r  w i l l ingness to accept
new ideas, where most o f  these are concerned with "modernity"; coming
from the d i s t r i c t  a g r icu l tu ra l  o f f i c e r ,  t h i s  implies f e r t i l i z e r ,
pest ic ides,  and other aspects o f  capital  intensive farming. The 
impl icat ion is tha t  the bua phon naam are those deserving of help,
whereas the bua t a i  naam are not worth bothering with .
The i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ,  competit ive ethos is  evident in several
aspects o f  v i l l a g e  discourse. Ban Dong returnees from Ban Mai complain 
that they d is l i k e  the competit ive s p i r i t  (khaeng kan) and the currying 
of favour in order to get ahead (ao naa) in the l a t t e r  v i l l a g e .  Shame 
at i n a b i l i t y  to keep up in consumption standards i s  commonly expressed 
in the phrase "aai khaou (see case 1, sect ion V l ^ l j i i ) ,
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D i f fe re n t ia t io n  is accompanied by mutual resentment between d i f f e r e n t  
social  s t ra ta  in the v i l l a g e .  In Ban Mai, one o f  the v i l la g e  traders
who is also a t r a c to r  owner and in f lu e n t ia l  v i l l a g e  committee member
"exp lo i ts  the poor [ o f  the v i l l a g e ]  : khuud r i i d  khon j o n ' \  fo r
example by the low wages he pays fo r  menial work l i k e  humping sacks o f  
grain onto his l o r r y .  He in turn says o f  the major i ty  o f  v i l l a g e rs  tha t  
they "are not serious : mai ao j i n g "  about farming; his wife puts 
down the problems o f  the v i l l a g e  to the fac t  tha t  "people are not 
w i l l i n g  to l i s t e n  to the [ v i l l a g e ]  leaders : khon mai yo' m cheua
c
fang phuu nam". Mutual interdependence between the better  o f f  and 
poorer v i l l a g e rs  has lo s t  i t s  rec ip rocat ive  social  content,  and as such 
the (not necessari ly ega l i ta r ian )  corporate elements o f  v i l la g e  
social re la t ions  have given over to in d i v id u a l i s t i c  p r i o r i t i e s  and 
opportun i t ies fo r  gain.
V I I>3J i  Cooperative programmes
Despite the emphasis on the individual and the divergence o f  
ind iv idual fortunes that is  inherent in c a p i t a l i s t  development and 
evident in associated discourse, the actual programmes tha t  come under 
the aegis o f  ru ra l  development are s p e c i f i c a l l y  cooperative in 
o r ie n ta t io n .  The emphasis on farmer cooperation in small groups 
or ig inated in Thailand with the NGO movement in the 1970s. The problems 
o f  farmers were interpreted as being due to lack o f  bargaining power 
v is -a -v is  moneylenders, t raders ,  and the state. Col lect ive  act ion by 
formation o f  groups was seen as the basis for increasing the power of 
small farmers to act with in  a p o l i t i c a l  economy tha t  stacked the odds 
against them. Such groups were a sensit ive p o l i t i c a l  issue at the local 
l e v e l ,  and NGO workers who t r ie d  to set up cooperative schemes at the
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v i l la g e  level were often accused of t ry ing  to "pluk radom : l i t ,
mobi l ize" ,  or s t i r  up trouble.
However, with the government's rura l  development programme and 
poverty a l le v ia t io n  scheme under the 1982 - 86 Five Year Plan, the idea
o f  sett ing up groups at the v i l la g e  level has been taken up. 
"Development : kaanphattana" is now associated close ly  with "groups 
klum" , such tha t  fo r  a v i l l a g e  to be entered fo r  a competit ion i t  is 
mandatory tha t  groups are set up as evidence o f  the developed state o f  
the v i l l a g e .  These include housewives' groups, young farmers' groups, 
youth groups, v i l l a g e  scouts, and others set up by various branches of 
the D i s t r i c t  admin is t ra t ion .  In add i t ion ,  other state agencies u t i l i s e  
groups in th e i r  programme s t ra teg ies at the v i l l a g e  le v e l ,  such as the 
BAAC j o i n t  l i a b i l i t y  groups and m i l i t a r y  reserves. NGOs s t i l l  place 
emphasis on cooperative act ion, with r i c e  bank and bu f fa lo  bank projects 
examples o f  NGO in i t i a te d  groups to be found in Ban Dong. The only 
indigenous group o f  any permanence to be found in e i th e r  o f  the two 
v i l lages  is  the Ban Dong water users' group described above.
VI 1 .4 The Concept o f  Kl um
The previous section discussed the contrad ic t ion  between the 
underlying ethos o f  ind iv idual ism in c a p i t a l i s t  development and the 
cooperative emphasis in most pro jects labeled as "development". Before 
going on to examine spec i f ic  projects in Ban Dong and Ban Mai, i t  is  
necessary to consider the p r inc ip le  o f  cooperation as seen by the 
various actors on the development stage. To t h i s  end, the concept o f  
klum (group) is considered from the viewpoint o f  state developers, NGO 
workers, and v i l l a g e rs  affected by klum. The conceptual izat ions
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presented below are culled from observation of spec i f ic  programmes at 
the v i l l a g e  level and discussions with the people involved rather  than 
from formal interviewing or abstract questioning along the l ines of 
"what do you understand by ' kl um
V I I>4J  State concepts
State developers attach importance to the formal establishment 
o f  development groups {klum phattanaa) at the v i l l a g e  leve l .  The 
stated object ive o f  such groups is  to encourage s e l f -h e lp ,  using the 
group as a forum. Varying degrees o f  pressure are put on v i l l a g e rs  at 
monthly v i l l a g e  meetings to jo in  the group. For the o f f i c i a l  involved, 
the establishment o f  groups is an object ive in i t s e l f ,  since meri t 
points (khv/aamdii khwaamcho' b) are gained within each department at 
the d i s t r i c t  level by sett ing up formal groups. Each department in turn 
vies fo r  inf luence at the v i l l a g e  level in order to secure increased 
budget a l loca t ions .  Each group has a name tha t  de l im i ts  i t s  membership 
and i t s  funct ion to some extent,  but there is overlap o f  both. Thus i t  
is  possible to be a member of several groups and at the same time 
a c t i v i t i e s  may be s im i la r  in each o f  these.
In f a c t ,  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  most o f  these groups are l im i ted to 
t ra in in g  sessions often las t ing  several days, at which withayakorn 
( ins t ruc to rs )  from d i f f e r e n t  government departments, from the Buddhist 
c lergy, from the m i l i t a r y ,  and even from NGOs are inv i ted to speak. 
Most o f  the time is  spent teaching c i v ic  v i r tu e s ,  explaining government 
po l icy  on various issues, speaking on the need fo r  secu r i ty ,  the need 
fo r  v ig i lance ,  and on the threat posed by Vietnam.6 Training on some 
programmes includes subject ion to hum i l ia t ion ,  using psychological
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methods to incur a sense o f  un ity  and loya l ty  to the group in a s imi la r
way to tha t  used in the V i l lage Scout movement.?
The funct ion o f  these "development groups", then, is  f i r s t  and 
foremost to give d i s t r i c t  o f f i c i a l s  a forum fo r  access to the v i l l a g e
population. By e lec t ing v i l l a g e rs  as president and committee members,
groups have a semblance o f  independence. In fa c t ,  both group o f f i c i a l s
and government o f f i c i a l s  claim tha t  the primary use o f  groups is  to
"ease administra t ion : tham hai kaan pok khro' ng ngaai khao".
Communicating with v i l l a g e rs  v ia  groups means having only to contact the 
head of the group. In an important sense, there fo re , klum in the
s ta te 's  terms is  a means o f  extending the pyramidal hierarchy down to
the v i l l a g e  l e v e l ,  br inging with i t  the features o f  d u p l i c a t io n , 
top-downward o r ie n ta t io n ,  lack o f  coordinat ion, and stress on formal 
ru les ( rab iab ) .
V I I J J i  NGO concepts
As described in section V I I33 J i  above, c o l le c t i v e  action by 
farmers is  the basic philosophy o f  non-governmental organizat ions in 
increasing bargaining power v i s -a -v is  e xp lo i ta t i ve  outside forces. Like 
state i n i t i a t e d  schemes, NGO groups are characterized as se lf -he lp  
organizat ions. Unlike state i n i t i a te d  groups, NGOs are concerned that 
group members themselves i n i t i a t e  these new i n s t i t u t i o n s  from the design 
stage, and membership is  voluntary or by peer pressure rather  than by 
pressure from an external au tho r i ty .  The problems faced by NGOs in 
establ ish ing groups at the v i l l a g e  level are precise ly  those concerned 
with g iv ing v i l l a g e rs  a sense o f  propr ie torsh ip  over the groups.
Unt i l  approximately 1981, H60s working at the v i l l a g e  level had 
to proceed extremely caut iously with the sett ing up o f  farmers' groups. 
At the local le v e l ,  genuine bargaining power in the hands o f  farmers 
threatened loca l  monopoly in te res ts .  On a wider scale, the government 
regarded many such groups as Communist f ron t  organizat ions. As a 
r e s u l t ,  groups were open to accusation and where they did operate i t  was 
within  a p o l i t i c a l l y  sens it ive  context.  Consequently, farmers' groups 
were not d i r e c t l y  c o n f ro n ta t io n is t , they re l ie d  mainly on indigenous 
resources, and th e i r  discourse was as p o l i t i c a l l y  neutral  as was 
possible given th e i r  fu n c t io n .8
Following state in te res t  in sett ing up groups, the concept o f  
klum has acquired a new leg i t imacy, and the scope fo r  NGO action has 
to t h i s  extent been enhanced. Indeed, much o f  the s t a t i s t  rhe to r ic  on 
development and kl um is borrowed from NGO discourse. However, the NGO 
concept o f  kl um as a power instrument in the hands o f  v i l l a g e rs  
d i f f e r s  fundamentally from that o f  state developers' notion o f  kl um as 
an instrument o f  administrat ion and disseminat ion o f  o f f i c i a l  po l icy .
V I IA4 J i i  Indigenous concepts
The concept o f kl um is not e n t i r e l y  a l ien  to the indigenous 
community. The i r r i g a t i o n  group (klum meuang fa a i)  described above is 
an indigenous community i n s t i t u t i o n .  The hua naa fa a i  (group head) 
and his team are not very d i f fe re n t  from the group "presidents : 
prathaan" and "committees : kamakaan" of ex te rna l ly  i n i t i a te d
groups. Thus when co l le c t i ve  e f f o r t  is  required to secure control  over 
a basic fac to r  o f  product ion, in th is  case water, cooperative pract ice
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i s  the norm. I t  is recognized that an authori ty  is  required both to 
summon the resources (labour and materia ls ,  l a t t e r l y  cash) to maintain 
the system and to adjudicate in a l loca t ion  o f  resources, in th is  case 
the protect ion o f  those whose f ie ld s  are downstream ( " thaai naam :
l i t .  at the end o f  the water") from those upstream with pr io r  access
{"hua naam : l i t .  a t  the head of the water") .  This au tho r i ty  is  
leg i t imated by annual select ion from within  the ranks o f  the group.
Also not e n t i r e l y  a l ien  to indigenous experience are c o l le c t i v e  
involvement in ideological a c t i v i t i e s  and instances o f  co l le c t i ve  
bargaining with outside a u th o r i t ie s .  In the f i r s t  case, the v i l la g e  
temple is  administered by a temple committee, t r a d i t i o n a l l y  selected 
from among elders o f  the v i l l a g e ,  fo r  administrat ion of what is the 
v i l l a g e rs '  p r inc ipa l  ideological i n s t i t u t i o n .  In the second case, 
pe t i t ion ing  of state a u tho r i t ies  is  not unknown. An example in Ban Dong 
is the successful unseating in the 1960s o f  a kamnan who had been 
appropr iat ing re g is t ra t io n  fees instead of sending them on to the 
D is t r i c t  a u th o r i t ie s  at Ban Rai. In Thung Khaa in the 1970s, the khon 
to bargained hard with the au tho r i t ies  on a number of issues,
including provision o f  a schoolteacher and the terms o f  land reform. 
This l a t t e r  d i f f e r s ,  however, in the permanence suggested (though not 
always demonstrated) by klum.
Klum tha t ex is t  as channels fo r  disseminat ion o f  s t a t i s t
ideology are, however, a l ien . So are multipurpose or vague groups based 
on membership ra ther than funct ion ,  such as housewives' or youth groups. 
In bargaining with outside in te res ts ,  local leadership i s  called on to 
deal with spec i f ic  issues as they a r ise ,  and permanent funct ional groups 
to th i s  purpose are superf luous in the t ra d i t i o n a l  close kn i t  community. 
The a l iena t ion  of most v i l la g e rs  in Ban Dong and Ban Mai is evidenced in 
a number o f  aspects o f  t h e i r  discourse, most simply by use o f  the th i rd
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person pronoun khao in re fe r r ing  to the groups. Al ienat ion is also
shown in the confusion over the p ro l i t e ra t io n  o f  klum and th e i r  
associated acronyms.^
V I I . 5 Cooperative development in Lan Sak
In the preceding sect ions, cooperation has been discussed in 
terms o f  theories and a c tu a l i t i e s  o f  v i l la g e  s tructures and in terms of 
i t s  ra t iona le  v is -a -v i s  production in the two study v i l la g e s .  The issue 
o f  development as i n s t i t u t i o n a l  innovation within a contradic tory  
context o f  an in d i v id u a l i s t i c  ethos into which cooperative structures 
are to be incorporated was considered, and the spec i f ic  concept o f  
klum was presented in i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  the d i f f e r e n t  in te rpre ta t ions  o f  
cooperative action or structures th a t  are made by various actors on the 
development stage. The present section draws together these issues by 
means o f  empir ical  examination o f  spec i f ic  pro jects in Ban Dong and Ban 
Mai. State, NGO, and indigenous schemes are described in tu rn , and the 
section is  concluded by an extended account o f  one (u l t im a te ly  
unsuccessful) p ro ject that incorporates a l l  three sectors.
V II>5J  State schemes
The p ro l i t e ra t i o n  o f  state schemes at the v i l l a g e  level has been 
indicated above, and Table 7.1 l i s t s  the various groups that have been 
established in the two study v i l la g es .  Two o f  these are examined here 
in order to i l l u s t r a t e  the way in which groups are set up, run, and led.
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Table 7.1 Permanent groups in Ban Dong and Ban Mai
State i n i t i a te d  NGO in i t i a te d  Indigenous
Housewives group Rice bank Water users' group
BAAC groups Buffalo bank Temple committee
Farmers' associat ion 
Young farmers' group 
Cooperative branch 
Funeral associat ion 
Vi l lage scouts 
National defense 
vol unteer s 
Reserve volunteers 
Development groups
Housewives1 groups. Housewives' groups (klum mae baan) 
were set up in Ban Dong and Ban Mai by the Community Development 
Department (CDD). This department was established in the 1960s, and fo r  
much o f  i t s  l i f e  i t  has been concerned with rura l  pac i f ica t ion  through 
social programmes. Housewives' groups were conceived o f  ostensib ly  to 
give women a ro le  in community development. They provide a forum for 
t ra in ing  programmes in domestic s k i l l s  and hygiene and in handicrafts 
such as crochet.
The Housewives' Groups are started in the fo l lowing manner. The 
d i s t r i c t  CDD o f f i c e r  (phathanaakaan amphoe) speaks at a monthly 
v i l la g e  meeting, announcing tha t  a group is  to be set up and a t ra in ing  
programme (kaan obrom) is to be held at the v i l l a g e  temple on such and 
such a date. A member o f  every household is supposed to attend, and i t  
is  said by the phatthanaakaan to be a matter o f  shame for the v i l l a g e
i f  attendance is  less than tha t  avowedly achieved in surrounding
v i l la g e s .  This is  an extra incent ive for the v i l l a g e  head to exhort
v i l la g e rs  to attend the t r a in in g ,  and responses vary from those who see 
such occasions as fun to those who feel pressured into attending despite 
urgent tasks at home. At the t ra in ing  session, " ins t ruc to rs  :
withayaakorn" speak on various matters o f  government po l icy and on the
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importance o f  un ity and loya l ty  to the group. Group o f f i c i a l s  are 
elected by a vote, candidates often having been suggested by the 
o f f i c i a l s  present or by the v i l l a g e  head; ra re ly  is  there more than one 
candidate for a post.
In Ban Dong, the president o f  the Housewives' Group is  the wife 
o f  one of the v i l l a g e  traders who is also the kamnan's ass is tant 
{sarawat kamnan) . The vice president is wife o f  Maen, the v i l la g e  
trader and V i l lage  Committee member mentioned in section V l ^ l j i i  
(case 6) above. In Ban Mai, the president o f  the Housewives' Group is  
wife o f  the v i l l a g e  head, the vice president is wife o f  a v i l la g e  trader 
and member o f  the Vi l lage Committee, and the treasurer is  wife o f  the 
tambon doctor,  who is also V i l lage Committee and e x -o f f i c io  tambon 
counci l  member, wealthy t rader ,  and l o r r y  and t ra c to r  owner.
In the case the Ban Dong group, a c t i v i t i e s  since t ra in ing  in 1982 
have mostly consisted o f  providing support fo r  o f f i c i a l  t ra in in g  
programmes at the v i l l a g e  and d i s t r i c t  leve ls .  Housewives groups are 
expected to provide the food and clean up afterward at such events. In 
Apri l  1985, housewives' groups from the four tambons o f  Lan Sak had to 
provide food at the f ive  day t ra in in g  session o f  v i l la g e  heads for the 
Phaen din tham Phaen din tho1ng programme. This labour has to be 
provided free o f  charge, and in the case o f  the Ban Dong group there was 
exasperation at the fac t  tha t  they had to contr ibute out o f  th e i r  own 
pockets since the money (200 baht) allocated to feed 50 people for 
three meals was not enough, and pride meant tha t  a decent meal had to be 
provided. The Ban Mai group was set up in 1983, and since the i n i t i a l  
t ra in ing  the only a c t i v i t i e s  have involved members o f  the group 
committee, who have been sent on t ra in ing  courses at which they are 
provided with a per diem tha t exceeds the normal d a i l y  wage.
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Another funct ion of the housewives' groups is  to establ ish 
savings groups, whereby members save ten to twenty baht each per month 
which is  paid into a common fund, to be used for a communal purpose at a 
la te r  date. To date, the Ban Dong fund has not been used, whi le in Ban 
Mai small in te res t  free loans are made. The treasurer is  adamant tha t  
such loans go only to those who in her judgement w i l l  be able to repay, 
and t h i s  e f fe c t i v e l y  r e s t r i c t s  membership o f  the savings group. In any
case, the amounts o f  money involved are i n s ig n i f i c a n t ,  and from the
point o f  view o f  the CDD i t  is  more to "feuk n i sa i  : get [people] into 
the habit "  o f  saving rather than to accumulate any large fund o f  major 
benef i t  to the community.
We see, then, th a t  the Housewives' Groups are instruments o f  the
state in three main ways. F i r s t ,  they give access to a section o f  the
community who tend otherwise to have less contact with o f f i c i a l s  than 
t h e i r  male counterparts.  Second, they serve ( l i t e r a l l y )  as useful 
resources fo r  the state in organizing events at the v i l l a g e  leve l .  
Thi rd, they provide a forum fo r  dissemination o f  o f f i c i a l  ideology in 
the form of encouraging espousal of c iv ic  v i r tues .  Some o f  these are 
conservative urbanite conceptions concerning the ro le  of women as 
providers o f  domestic service, occupat ional ly most p ro f i c ie n t  in l i g h t  
cottage industry  rather than ag r icu l tu ra l  or other heavy work, and 
supportive o f  men in the " rea l"  work o f  admin is tra t ion or ag r icu l tu ra l  
production. Others are more general aspects o f  c a p i t a l i s t  production 
ideology, p a r t i c u la r l y  the need fo r cash savings in place o f  [ the common 
o f f i c i a l  notion o f ]  p ro f l iga te  spending.
BAAC groups. BAAC groups {klum thor kor s o r ) have mushroomed 
throughout Lan Sak in recent years. This is  a re s u l t  both o f  the 
increased demand fo r  c re d i t  with the move into commercialized 
ag r icu l tu ra l  production and also o f  the increased amount o f  c re d i t
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provided by the Bank.^® BAAC operates quite separately from the 
d i s t r i c t  admin is tra t ion. I t  maintains an o f f i c e  at Paak Meuang, at some 
distance from the D is t r i c t  o f f i c e s .  I t  arranges i t s  own meetings with 
v i l l a g e rs ,  separate from the monthly v i l l a g e  meetings. BAAC f ie ld  
o f f i ce rs  operate independently from D is t r i c t  o f f i c i a l s  such as DAE
extension o f f i c e r s . ^  Nevertheless, BAAC is  a state i n s t i t u t i o n  and
is perceived as such by v i l la g e rs  : t h i s  is  ev ident,  for example, in 
th e i r  u n fu l f i l l e d  expectations o f  BAAC in f i e ld s  such as marketing
(thus, " I f  the government guarantees the r ice  pr ice at 3300 baht per
kwien , why doesn't BAAC set up a scheme to buy i t  at that 
p r ice?" ) . ^
BAAC groups are set up on the i n i t i a t i v e  of ind iv idua l  v i l l a g e rs .  
BAAC c re d i t  is well enough known in i t s  a v a i l a b i l i t y  and low cost that 
i t  does not have to be very a c t i ve ly  promoted. A group o f  neighbours 
usual ly appoint one among th e i r  number to obtain appl icat ion forms from 
the o f f i c e  at Paak Meuang. Once at least six ind iv idual  appl icat ions
have been made to set up a group, a BAAC f i e l d  o f f i c e r  w i l l  come around 
to in terv iew each o f  the appl icants. These o f f i c e r s  are informal in 
th e i r  manner when compared with d i s t r i c t  o f f i c i a l s ,  and they have a 
s t r i c t  code o f  conduct in deal ing with v i l l a g e rs .  For example, they are 
not supposed to accept food or dr ink or any other form of deferent ia l  
h o s p i ta l i t y ,  and although th i s  goes against t r a d i t i o n a l  in te rac t ion  
between v i l la g e rs  and outs iders, I f requent ly  heard i t  mentioned by 
v i l l a g e rs  in a pos it ive  l i g h t  and observed i t s  ve rac i ty .  This i s  in 
stark contrast to senior d i s t r i c t  o f f i c i a l s ,  fo r  whom considerable 
preparations have to be made, otherwise i t  is  considered naak lia t  
( despicable). ^
In p r in c ip le ,  any group o f  six or more honest, able bodied 
farmers over the age o f  twenty are e l i g ib le  for BAAC c re d i t  through a
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j o i n t  l i a b i l i t y  group. In fa c t ,  several factors  tend to prevent the 
poorest farmers from jo in ing  such a group. One is the reluctance or 
refusal o f  local BAAC o f f i c e r s  to accept appl icat ions from those without 
individual co l la te ra l  in the form of land or a house. This suggests 
tha t  the j o i n t  l i a b i l t y  p r inc ip le  f a i l s  in local o f f i c i a l s '  eyes to 
provide an e f fe c t ive  mutual guarantee, and th is  is  borne out by the 
r a r i t y  o f  groups being cal led on to pay up for a defau lt ing  fe l low 
member; the exception seems to be when such a de fau lter  ac tua l ly  
disappears and cannot be accounted fo r .  This br ings in another fa c to r ,  
which is  tha t  the j o i n t  l i a b i l i t y  is  real enough to make farmers 
re luc tan t  to accept as a fe l low  member someone with in s u f f i c ie n t  
personal c o l l a t e r a l ,  who would thereby make i t  more l i k e l y  th a t  fe l low 
group members would have to pay up in the event o f  de fau l t .  A f ina l  
facto r  is the reluctance o f  many o f  the poorest v i l l a g e rs  to enterta in 
the idea o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  debt, preferr ing e i the r  to avoid borrowing 
a l together  or to maintain the f l e x i b i l t y  afforded by v i l l a g e  c red i to rs .
Credit  given via the group rather  than in d iv id u a l ly  makes sense 
to BAAC and the members involved in a number o f  ways. In addit ion to 
the p o te n t ia l l y  reduced need for ind ividual c o l la te ra l  tha t  j o i n t  
l i a b i l i t y  a f fo rds ,  a group with a responsible leader provides the peer 
pressure on the one hand, and a convenient point o f  contact on the 
other ,  fo r  eased admin istra t ion by BAAC o f f i c e r s .  At the same time, 
small group act ion gives members a certa in s o l i d a r i t y ,  and t h i s  is  not 
only u t i l i z e d  in deference to BAAC ru les .  Quite the contrary was the 
case, fo r  example, in Ban Mai as described in section V ^ J i i  above, 
where the BAAC group was used to acquire c red i t  from a v i l l a g e  trader in 
order to pay o f f  BAAC, and where the BAAC group was a forum for 
comparing notes on the best way to get r i d  of unwanted BAAC f e r t i l i z e r !
The irony o f  BAAC groups is  tha t  they represent the most
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enthusiast ic  cooperative action by farmers under the aegis o f  state led 
ru ra l  development, whi le at the same time having a key ro le  in the 
processes leading to the ind iv idu a l iza t io n  o f  production as described in 
Chapter V. Farmers jo in  BAAC groups to obtain c re d i t  for themselves or 
th e i r  household production u n i t ,  not in an e f f o r t  to raise the 
p roduc t iv i ty  o f  the group as a whole. Group s o l i d a r i t y  is  l im i ted 
s t r i c t l y  to the funct ions d i r e c t l y  served by BAAC operations; 
production, market ing, and non-BAAC inputs are s t i l l  arranged 
ind iv idual 1y.
VII b 5 j ' i  NGO sc hemes
The pr inc ipa l  local NGO operating in Lan Sak is  the Uthaithani 
based Nong Kha Yang Foundation for Rural Development (NKYFRD), whose 
a c t i v i t i e s  are described more f u l l y  in Appendix 7. Two v i l lages  based 
schemes are described below. Both are based in Bung Khiew, the Ban Dong 
subcommunity o f  approximately 45 households described in Section 
I V above.
In la te  1983, workers o f  the NKYFRD spent a few days in Bung 
Khiew speaking with farmers about t h e i r  debt and production problems. 
Bung Khiew was chosen as a v i l l a g e  o f  in te res t  fo r  two main reasons. 
One was the precariousness of production and consequent poverty in th is  
rainfed area. The other was the ro le  o f  Boi, a Bung Khiew v i l l a g e r  who 
is  also a volunteer who helps coordinate the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  NKYFRD in Lan 
Sak and even fu r ther  a f ie ld .  Three pr inc ipal and immediate problems 
emerged from ta lk ing  with v i l l a g e rs  : the uncertainty o f  r i ce  production 
that leads to v i l l a g e rs  having to borrow r i c e  or cash with which to buy 
i t  at high in te res t  ra tes ;  lack o f  means o f  t i l l a g e ,  which means that
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farmers must ren t  bu f fa lo  and surrender a s ig n i f i c a n t  por t ion of th e i r  
r i c e  crop in re tu rn ;  and lack o f  an assured water supply for r i c e  
c u l t i v a t i o n .
Rice Bank. The f i r s t  o f  these problems has two deleter ious 
e f fe c t s ,  one at the level o f  the household and the other at the level o f  
the community. At the household leve l ,  having to borrow r ice  and pay 
in te res t  in kind of 50 per cent over the space o f  an ag r icu l tu ra l  season 
means a loss o f  surplus to the c re d i to r  and the continual cycle o f  debt 
and dependence tha t  re su l ts .  Since most o f  the c red i to rs  are from 
outside Bung Khiew, mainly from Ban Dong, t h i s  loss o f  surplus also 
represents a loss o f  resources to the community, even though the 
community as a whole may not face a r i ce  d e f i c i t .  In reponse to th is  
problem, i t  was suggested to Boi and other v i l l a g e rs  th a t  a meeting be 
cal led to propose the sett ing up o f  a r i ce  bank.
The purpose o f  a r i c e  bank is  to estab l ish a community store of 
r i ce  from which members can borrow in times o f  shortage. The advantage 
to ind iv idua l  members is  tha t  the in te res t  paid i s  low, at a rate agreed 
on by the members themselves. At the community l e v e l ,  the advantage is 
that th is  surplus remains within  the community, to increase the stock 
avai lable  fo r  lending, to pay out as dividends to members, or to use fo r  
some other  community purpose. The funct ioning o f  the Bank re l i e s  on an 
i n i t i a l  stock o f  r i c e ,  and th is  can be secured by voluntary donat ions, 
purchase o f  shares in r i c e ,  or i n s t i t u t i o n a l  support.
Bung Khiew Rice Bank was started a f te r  a meeting in March 1984 at 
Bo i 's homestead, a common meeting place for Bung Khiew v i l l a g e rs .  A 
worker from NKYFRD came to ta lk  about the p r inc ip les  o f  cooperation and 
in p a r t icu la r  the way in which a r i c e  bank might work. Detai ls were 
discussed by v i l l a g e rs  themselves, and representat ives o f  most
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households were present. This discussion included whether contr ibut ions 
should be equal and calculated or dependent on ind iv idual  households' 
capacity to con tr ibu te ,  what in te res t  rate should be charged, and what 
provision for payment o f  dividends should be made. A group president 
and committee were elected; Boi declined e lec t ion ,  since he is keen to 
get other v i l l a g e rs  involved in re s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  community a f f a i r s .  
I t  was decided to make provision both fo r  donations and shareholding, 
the l a t t e r  l im i ted  to group members. The in te res t  rate was set at 20 
per cent, which is ac tua l ly  higher than the NGO workers had in mind. 
Two weeks l a t e r ,  r i c e  was deposited in shares o f  f i ve  tang each.
Lending is  decided by the r i c e  bank committee, which i t  was 
decided to put up fo r  e lect ion every two years. Some even suggested 
annual e lec t ions ,  and t h i s  element o f  leadership accoun tab i l i ty  is  seen 
as important.  This is  also evidenced in the annual elect ions held for 
the Ban Dong i r r i g a t i o n  committee (which does not involve any Bung Khiew 
v i l  1 agers) .
In 1984, the stock o f  r i ce  was s t i l l  small ,  with an i n i t i a l  
deposit o f  f i ve  tang each from 29 households. As a r e s u l t ,  only the 
poorest could borrow, and these a borrowed a maximum of 25 tang per 
household. Because the 1984/85 harvest was so severely affected by
drought, some o f  these were unable to repay in r i ce  the fol lowing year, 
and those who planted mung beans were allowed to repay in t h i s  crop to a 
sale value equivalent to the amount o f  r i ce  owed. Others had to carry
t h e i r  debts over to 1986, but even with in te res t  accruing th i s  s t i l l
amounted to less than they would have had to pay in in te res t  for a 
single year to a pr ivate  c re d i to r .  The 1985/86 harvest was a good one, 
and with a l l  debts being cleared and new deposits made, v i l la g e rs  have 
accumulated a to ta l  of fourteen kwien , h a l f  o f  which is  held in
indiv idual shares, the res t  consist ing o f  donations and in s t i t u t io n a l
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support. In January 1986, v i s i t i n g  NGO workers from neighbouring 
Nakorn Sawan province were impressed to see r i c e  bank members depositing 
th e i r  shares on a t ru s t  basis, and both NKYFRD and v i l l a g e rs  themselves 
hold i t  as a matter o f  pride that the r i ce  bank should be based on 
mutual t ru s t  ( cheua kan : l i t .  bel ieve [ i n ]  each o ther ;  or seusat t o ' 
kart 1 ae kart : l i t .  honest toward each o ther) .
I n i t i a l l y ,  the Rice Bank re l ied  on support from NKYFRD since
there was no community granary. The r ice  was transported to ,  stored,
and mi l led at the integrated agr icu l tu ra l  t ra in in g  centre at Nong 
Kha Yang 50 ki lometres d is tan t  (see Appendix 7).  In 1985, Boi requested 
that the DAE in Lan Sak provide funds and the standard f ive  kwien 
paddy grant for a community granary, which was to be b u i l t  on land 
donated by three v i l l a g e rs .  DAE agreed, and a commercial tender was put 
out fo r  construct ion. V i l lagers suggested tha t  they carry out the 
construct ion themselves, but DAE maintained tha t  only l icenced
contractors could put in a bid. Furthermore, the granary had to be 
b u i l t  according to o f f i c i a l  spec i f ica t ions ,  which con f l ic ted  with the 
requirements o f  the v i l l a g e rs  in size (the 10 kwien capacity allowed 
for is  too small for the r i c e  bank s to re ) ,  shape, and alignment o f  the 
roo f .  In the event, the contract went to an in f lu e n t ia l  provincial  
assembly member (sor j o r ) , who is known to have [co r rup t ]  connections 
[sen) with cer ta in  senior provinc ia l  o f f i c i a l s .  The amount o f  the bid 
(40,000 baht) was at least four times as high as the v i l l a g e rs  would 
have charged. A team o f  labourers from neighbouring Chainat province 
was sent in by the contrac to r ,  having been hired on a contract basis
[mao} for 5,000 baht. They had to wait three days before the
materials  (wood, z inc, and concrete p i les)  arr ived. By t h i s  t ime, Boi
had l e f t  fo r  a two day t ra in ing  course in Phitsanulok, but other 
v i l l a g e rs  noticed tha t  the wood was in fe r io r  q u a l i t y  softwood that would 
not las t  more than a year; the materials were estimated to have cost
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the contractor  a maximum of 5000 baht . The workmen were asked to wait 
un t i l  the spec i f ica t ions  could be checked, but by t h i s  time they were 
impatient to get s ta r ted, so the concrete p i les  were set in and 
construct ion o f  the granary was well under way when Boi returned. On 
seeing the wood, some o f  which was worm-eaten, he used his pos it ion as 
v i l la g e  committee member to radio the provincia l  o f f i c e  from the local 
DAE o f f i c e ,  and the workmen agreed to stop work u n t i l  an inspection
could be made. The fo l lowing day, the deputy provinc ia l  DAE o f f i c e r ,  
who had approved the contract in the f i r s t  place, arr ived while Boi was 
away on his rounds as family  planning v o lu n te e r , ^  and to ld  the 
workmen "not to l i s te n  to any da f t  old v i l l a g e r  who pokes his nose in " .  
The granary was thus completed using the substandard materials and with 
the roof in alignment contrary to v i l l a g e  pract ice [taam tawan : West 
- East instead of khwaang tawan : North - South). Within two weeks
the roof had blown o f f  ( th is  was due to the fact tha t  the workmen had 
had to supply n a i ls  out o f  t h e i r  own pockets and had therefore used 
na i ls  tha t  were too sho r t ) ,  fo r tunate ly  before any r ice  had been
deposited. Boi and Bung Khiew v i l la g e rs  had an unexpected success,
however, since the widely respected and down to earth provincial  DAE 
o f f i c e r  made a v i s i t  a f te r  a chance meeting with Boi, and on inspecting 
the granary immediately ordered tha t  i t  should be dismantled and 
reconstructed by contracted Bung Khiew v i l la g e rs  using new materia ls .
The r i c e  bank is  thus an exte rnal ly  i n i t i a te d  pro ject based on 
l o c a l l y  expressed needs and re ly ing in the f i r s t  instance on endogenous 
resources. Of key importance in i t s  funct ioning are broad pa r t ic ipa t ion  
of the community from the s ta r t ,  not in jo in ing  an exogenous pro ject but 
in sett ing the ru les  and estab l ish ing a strong but accountable
leadership. This depends in turn on the structure o f  the community
i t s e l f  and the nature o f  the leadership, issues tha t  are discussed in 
Section V I I . 6 below and in the fol lowing chapter.
322
Buffalo Bank. The second production problem faced by Bung 
Khiew v i l la g e rs  mentioned above is  t i l l a g e .  Many have to rent buffa lo  
at 50 tang o f  r i c e  per season. Since a l l  of  these are rented from 
outs iders, t h i s  also represents a loss to the community.
In la te  1983, during negot iat ions with a small in ternat ional  aid 
agency (Mennonite Central Committee) for a larger  p ro jec t ,  NKYFRD also 
successful ly requested assistance in sett ing up a bu f fa lo  bank at Bung 
Khiew. Ten animals were purchased, and a committee was elected among 
sixteen group members to a l locate the animals based on need.
The Buffalo Bank works on the fol lowing p r inc ip les .  The buf fa lo  
remain the common property o f  the Bank, which is  a community 
i n s t i t u t i o n .  Al l  the i n i t i a l  buffa lo  purchased were cows in c a l f .  
After  weaning the f i r s t  c a l f  is  returned to the Bank fo r  rea l lo ca t io n ,  
although i t  is not useable fo r  work u n t i l  i t  is three years o ld .  Male 
calves are sold in exchange for females, pr ices being roughly equal. 
The second c a l f  becomes the property o f the member rent ing the cow, the 
t h i r d  goes back to the bank, and the fourth c a l f  goes to the member, the 
cow at th i s  stage being returned to the Bank. In th i s  way, each member 
idea l ly  ends up with a team o f  two bu f fa lo ,  and the stock o f  buffa lo  in 
the Bank is  b u i l t  up.
I n i t i a l l y ,  Bung Khiew Buffalo Bank members elected to charge a 
renta l  of  10 tang of  paddy per year. However, i t  was then f e l t  that 
t h i s  would antagonize those who normally rented out buffa lo  to Bung 
Khiew v i l l a g e rs ,  based on experience elsewhere recounted by MKYFRD 
workers o f  buffa lo  tha t  had been poisoned by those who stood to lose 
out. I t  was decided instead to take 40 tang,  only 10 tang less than 
the pr ivate ra te .  However, 30 of the 40 tang are deposited in the
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Rice Bank (to which a l l  Buffalo Bank members belong), and th is  can be 
reclaimed a f te r  three years. This also helps to bu i ld  up the stocks o f  
the Rice Bank.
Bung Khiew Buffalo Bank has been faced with a number of problems. 
One is  the long time i t  takes for such a pro ject to become a f u l l  
community i n s t i t u t i o n ,  since the gestat ion period o f  bu f fa lo  is long 
(fourteen months) and animals are not f e r t i l e  or ready for work u n t i l  
th e i r  four th  year. This has been compounded in Bung Khiew by the death 
o f  several o f  the Bank bu f fa lo ,  so tha t  by 1986 a f te r  two years of 
operation there are s t i l l  only 20 cows and calves from the o r ig ina l  10 
pregnant cows. This has led to a certa in  amount o f  gossip tha t  "people 
don 't  look a f te r  a 'p ro je c t '  ( l i t .  roya l ,  based on the ro ya l l y  donated 
buffa lo) l ike  they'd look a f te r  th e i r  own : khon mai dai l i ang kwhaai
1uang meuan khwaai tua eng." There is no evidence to suggest tha t  the 
bu ffa lo  died due to any form o f  neglect,  but t h i s  shows the jealousies 
that can be generated by such a scheme. In the cases where buffa lo  
died, NKYFRD were consulted immediately, since they are s t i l l  considered 
to be the owners o f  the bu f fa lo .
The Buffalo Bank, l i k e  the Rice Bank, is  a group in i t i a te d  
externa l ly  but based on local pa r t ic ipa t ion  and re s p o n s ib i l i t y .  I t  
d i f f e r s  in the key respects tha t  i t  was founded with external resources 
and in that i t  w i l l  take many years before the whole community can 
become involved in i t s  benef i ts .
V l l ^ S J i i  Indigenous schemes
In discussing indigenous cooperation, a problem arises as to what
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i s  to be discussed as "development" and what to be treated as indigenous 
work pract ices. The state and NGO schemes described above come under 
"development : kaanphathanaa" in the discourses o f  v i l l a g e rs  and
outsiders a l ike .  Since t h i s  is  a category exogenous to the community, 
but since cer ta in  aspects o f  indigenous cooperation are now often termed 
" kaanphathanaa" ,  we can fo l low the local discourse as a guide to what 
is  and what is  not "development" for present purposes.
Indigenous aspects o f  change and th e i r  re t rospect ive  connotation 
as development have been discussed in section IV„4t 1 i i  . High on the 
l i s t  o f  concrete examples o f  development as l o c a l l y  defined come roads. 
Although these are commonly a state re s p o n s ib i l i t y  and state emphasis, 
road bui ld ing is  also undertaken in some circumstances by v i l la g e rs  
without any d i re c t  involvement o f  the government. I t  may be recal led 
that the o r ig in a l  communications into Lan Sak were constructed e n t i r e l y  
by v i l l a g e r s ,  although some more recent ly  establ ished communities had 
more assistance than e a r l i e r  ones in road construct ion.
A comparison o f  road construct ion into Bung Khiew^ with 
tha t  into Ban Mai reveals some in terest ing features o f  indigenous 
cooperation fo r  development. As was described in Chapter IV above, Bung 
Khiew v i l la g e rs  were connected to the outside world only by footpath via  
Ban Dong u n t i l  1978. In th is  year, v i l l a g e rs  cooperated by giving land 
and labour for the construct ion o f  a dry season ca r t  t rack into Bung 
Khiew, and th is  track was la te r  extended to v i l lages  to the North. 
During the dry season the track was rough, but during the ra ins  i t  was 
impassable. Moreover, i t  entered Bung Khiew via a precarious log bridge 
over the meuang ( i r r i g a t i o n  channel), which under no circumstances was 
passable by anything larger  than a pickup. In ear ly  1984, Bung Khiew 
v i l la g e rs  got together to improve the road by leve l ing ,  with the promise 
tha t  gravel would be la id  at the D is t r i c t  a u th o r i t ie s '  expense. This
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t ime, a bul ldozer was hired instead of using manual labour,  with each 
household contr ibu t ing an hour 's vehicle time (600 baht) in cash, 
although those who could not a fford the cost were exempted and some 
households paid more.16 i t  was also agreed to bu i ld  a proper br idge, 
passable by vehicles of up to six tonnes. This involved three days' 
labour from each household in Bung Khiew. Mater ials were obtained in 
the form o f  planks from the br idge over the Tap Salao River into Ban 
Dong that had been washed away in the previous year 's f loods. This wood 
had o r ig i n a l l y  been donated by v i l l a g e rs  in the v i l l a g e  adjoining Bung 
Khiew to the North since the road also provided th e i r  only access, and 
i t  had been transported using the free services of Th i ip 's  work elephant 
(see section VI>l t i i i 9 case 3).
Once the leve l ing  and bridge bu i ld ing were complete, in Apri l  
1984, v i l la g e rs  were anxious to have the gravel la id  before the onset o f  
the ra ins .  They had to wait  a fu r ther  month for the tambon council to 
arrange the lay ing ,  using a Nong Chang contractor.  In the event, the 
"gravel" laid was soft  l a t e r i t e ,  and i t  was said tha t  h a l f  o f  the money 
made avai lable had gone into the pockets of the kamnan and other 
counci l members. After  much complaint, the road was re la id  with f i rm 
g ra ve l .
This local i n i t i a t i v e  contrasts sharply with the s i tua t ion  in Ban 
Mai. The o r ig ina l  tracks in to  th is  area had been cleared by yaang o i l  
tappers, but the f i r s t  roads passable by motorized vehicles were the 
logging roads constructed by TPC contractors. The major road 
construct ion was carr ied out by ALRO, which provided a dense gr id  o f  
roads inside the v i l l a g e ,  l in k in g  the ag r icu l tu ra l  p lo ts ,  and l ink ing 
the v i l la g e  to the outside (Fig. 4.7).
The e f fe c t  o f  t h i s  state provision has been to make roads fo r  Ban
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Mg i v i l l a g e rs  kho‘ ng 1uang ( l i t .  o f  the King, i . e .  state 
p ro p e r ty / re s p o n s ib i l i t y ) . In 1983 f loods destroyed or cut many o f  the 
roads and br idges, both inside and outside the v i l l a g e ,  including the 
bridge across the Tap Salao River l ink ing  Ban Mai with Paak Meuang. The 
o f f i c e r  in charge o f  the ALRO Tap Salao pro jec t ,  whose headquarters is  
h a l f  a ki lometre outside Ban Mai, complains tha t  v i l l a g e rs  are not 
interested in maintaining the roads, even those d i r e c t l y  in f ron t  o f  
t h e i r  own houses. He made a point o f  only repa ir ing  the "ag r icu l tu ra l  
roads" so tha t  the roads with in  the v i l la g e  remained unrepaired two 
years a f te r  the f loods. V i l lage rs ,  on the other hand, complain that 
ALRO does not maintain i t s  roads, and the khon to  who was opposed to
t h e i r  construct ion in the f i r s t  place c i tes  t h i s  as an example o f
o f f i c i a l  i r r e s p o n s ib i l i t y . The bridge across the Tap Salao River was 
repaired p a r t l y  using v i l l a g e rs '  con tr ibu t ions ,  but only on an 
i n i t i a t i v e  from a neighbouring v i l l a g e ,  and i t  is  notable that th is
bridge is  outside the ALRO area.
Indigenous cooperative i n i t i a t i v e ,  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  and commitment 
to pa r t icu la r  pro jects thus depends on the degree to which communal 
"ownership : khwaampen jaokho'ng"  is establ ished. Other factors
re la t in g  to the community i t s e l f  are also important,  and these are 
discussed in Section V I I . 6 below.
VI I >5j v  Bung Khiew I r r i g a t i o n  Channel
As is  apparent from the above cases, s ta te ,  NGO, and indigenous 
schemes are not mutually exclusive. Each re l i e s  to some extent on the 
o ther ,  and in an a l te rna t ive  sense the very term "cooperative 
development" has been taken to mean cooperation between these various
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sectors ra ther than with in  them.17 The saga o f  Bung Khiew I r r i g a t io n  
Channel is  recounted below as an example o f  the problems encountered in 
in te r -  and in t ra -sec to r  cooperation for development.
Meuang Bung Khiew, as the pro ject  came to be known, has a 
h is to ry  going back to the late  1970s. As described above, Bung Khiew 
r i c e f i e l d s  are ra in fed ,  as are those in v i l la g es  “ upstream" and 
"downstream" at a s im i la r  distance from the Tap Salao River. Unrel iable 
r a in f a l l  is increasing ly  a problem, and in 1976 money from the 
tambon revolving fund scheme (ngern phanJ1^ was used to dig a 
channel from the channel serving Ban Dong ju s t  below Paak Meuang through 
Bung Khiew and on to v i l lages  lower down, using both hired labour and 
digging equipment. However, the course had not been surveyed, and when 
the section across the grani te  r ise  at Khao Din was traversed, the depth 
required o f  the channel was greater than the depth o f  l a t e r i t e  before 
bedrock was struck. The cost o f  b last ing that would have been required 
fa r  exceeded the funds ava i lab le ,  and the project was abandoned despite 
the fac t  that a seven ki lometre long channel had been dug over 
two years and the obstruct ion was less than 200 metres long.
In 1981, Bung Khiew v i l l a g e rs  decided to make another attempt at 
securing i r r i g a t i o n  water. In order to avoid the obstacle of Khao Din, 
i t  was decided to d iv e r t  water lower down the Ban Dong channel, and to 
dig a short 500 metre l i n k  to the lower end o f  the channel that had been 
dug in 1976. This would serve most o f  Bung Khiew and v i l lages  below i t ,  
but several v i l l a g e rs  would not be able to get water via th is  channel. 
The 30 households who expected to get water agreed to contr ibute 1700 
baht per household, a considerable sum in v i l l a g e  terms, to h ire  a 
mechanical digger for the job. Again there was no means o f  surveying, 
and the pro jec t fa i led  due to unstable soil  over part o f  the section to 
be dug and unexpectedly hard rock over a short por t ion. Since the
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digger was paid by the hour, a l l  the r i s k  was placed on the shoulders o f  
the v i l l a g e r s ,  who say tha t  they were quite aware o f  the gamble 
involved.
By 1984, Bung Khiew v i l la g e rs  were once again ta lk ing  of rev iv ing 
the meuang p ro jec t .  At the same t ime, NKYFRD had become involved in 
the v i l la g e  through the Rice and Buffalo Banks and was aware o f  the 
uncer ta in t ies o f  rainfed c u l t i v a t io n .  In May 1984, a f te r  two months'
residence in the v i l l a g e ,  I was asked by Sompong, the NKYFRD d i re c to r ,
what issue most concerned Bung Khiew v i l la g e rs  in terms o f  short and 
long term development. Consultation with Boi and other  v i l la g e rs
unanimously confirmed my answer that i r r i g a t i o n  water was the pressing 
need, and Sompong suggested that i f  v i l l a g e rs  were prepared to put in 
resources o f  t h e i r  own, external help might be avai lable via NKYFRD.
The v i l la g e rs  h a s t i l y  cal led a meeting to discuss what could be proposed 
and how much each household could be cal led on to contr ibute . A 
contr ibu t ion  o f  1000 baht per household was agreed on, and i n i t i a l l y  
i t  was decided to opt for the l i n k  channel, since i t  was not thought 
that s u f f i c i e n t  resources would be avai lable fo r  the larger p ro jec t ,  
despite the fac t  tha t  the l a t t e r  was favoured in terms o f  the 
r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  water and number of bene f ic ia r ies .  From the information 
and suggestions put forward, a short proposal was w r i t ten  in Thai and 
English (the l a t t e r  fo r  appl icat ion to foreign aid agencies) by Boi and 
myself. This was discussed with Sompong in the chance presence o f  the 
Canadian MCC representa t ive , who took an immediate in terest an 
p rov is iona l ly  agreed to fund the pro ject provided a technical survey was 
carr ied out in advance.
Two weeks l a t e r ,  Sompong and other NKYFRD workers came to inspect 
the opt ions. The nature o f  the s o i l ,  the lack o f  gradient over the 
l i n k ,  and the fac t  tha t  more resources appeared to be avai lable than was
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f i r s t  thought led him to examine the Khao Din option as we l l .  V i l lagers 
were enthusiast ic  at th is  p o s s ib i l i t y ,  and a day was spent by 
Sompong, Boi and other Bung Khiew v i l l a g e rs ,  and myself ta lk ing  with 
v i l l a g e rs  near Khao Din. Two p o s s ib i l i t i e s  were put forward, one being 
to use explosives to deepen the ex is t ing  channel and the other to 
circumvent Khao Din by digging a new section o f  approximately two 
ki lometres to the North. I t  was decided to leave i t  to surveyors from 
the Royal I r r i g a t io n  Department to recommend the f e a s i b i l i t y  or
otherwise o f  the various opt ions.
The Khao Din options posed a number o f  potent ia l  problems over 
and above the te c h n ic a l i t ie s  mentioned above. Since the channel had
o r i g i n a l l y  been dug, a f ish e r ie s  pro ject  had been establ ished at Bung 
Lorn, and i t  would be necessary to cross th i s .  I t  was not known whether
the kamnan o f  tambon Lan Sak, in whose area Bung Lorn l i e s ,  would
agree, or whether permission would be required from the Fisheries 
Department, since a f i sh  grate would have to be ins ta l led  and there was 
a r i s k  o f  s i l t a t i o n .  I f  Khao Din was to be circumvented, the owners of 
the land would have to give th e i r  permission, although th is  was not 
thought to be a major obstacle since they would benef i t  from the
i r r i g a t i o n  water and money could be made avai lable fo r  compensation 
i f  necessary; i t  was decided to leave th is  u n t i l  other problems had
been cleared. Another task was to obtain permission from the Royal
I r r i g a t io n  Department for extension o f  the ag r icu l tu ra l  area i r r ig a b le  
from Paak Meuang weir ,  since in the o r ig ina l  Tap Salao pro ject only 3000 
ra i  was al located and th i s  was already taken up in Ban Dong. MCC had 
also not confirmed the amount o f  money avai lable. The pro ject thus 
involved v i l l a g e rs ,  NGO, s ta te ,  and in ternat ional  aid s ta f f .
Despite the uncerta in t ies and complexity o f  the pro ject,
v i l l a g e rs  were keen to go ahead. The f i r s t  step was fo r  Sompong to use
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his inf luence and connections as president o f  the Uthaithani branch of 
the Kasetsart Universi ty  Alumni Association to arrange for Porn, the 
ch ie f  engineer o f the Tab Salao pro jec t,  to make a prel iminary 
assessment o f  the pro ject and then to approach the ch ie f  o f  the regional 
Small Projects Div is ion at Chainat. Porn rejected the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  
b last ing as too expensive, but he suggested that RID surveyors from the 
Tap Salao pro ject could be made avai lable  to establ ish the f e a s i b i l i t y  
o f  the circumventing route and measure the amount o f  earth to be moved. 
Following t h i s ,  Sompong, another NKYFRD worker, Porn, and I arranged a 
meeting at the Small Projects D iv is ion, and the regional manager was 
enthusiast ic at the combination o f  v i l l a g e r  i n i t i a t i v e  and NGO/foreign 
in te res t .  I t  was agreed to waive the 3000 ra i  l i m i t  provided no 
formal request was made, and surveyors were to be put at the disposal o f 
the p ro jec t .  I t  was then confirmed with the Lan Sak kamnan and the 
Fisheries Department tha t  no object ion would be ra ised ,  since s i l t  
content was not in fac t  great and the f ishe r ies  project had not 
mater ia l ized. MCC agreed to the revised pro ject  and confirmed tha t  at 
least 90,000 and up to 120,000 baht would be made ava i lab le . Several 
delays in surveying and est imating the amount o f  earth to be moved 
ensued due to the surveyors not turning up as appointed; th i s  
disappointed the Bung Khiew v i l l a g e r s ,  who had prepared food, having 
provided manual help and advice based on local knowledge fo r the 
outsiders involved at each stage. Conversation for several months 
centred on the progress o f  the meuang. Another i n t i t i a t i v e  was to 
approach v i l l a g e rs  upstream and downstream to secure a commitment to 
help top up the MCC funds, and enthusiasm was extended to neighbouring 
communities.
I t  was not u n t i l  February 1985 tha t  the technical f e a s i b i l i t y  had 
been confirmed by the surveyors and the scale o f  the job calculated. At 
commercial ra tes, i t  would have been beyond the combined resources o f
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the v i l l a g e rs  and MCC. The tambon council was in the process o f  
deciding on how the Rural Employment Generation Programme funds were to 
be spent tha t  year, and the kamnan, in whose area the benef i t  from the 
channel was to be o b t a i n e d , ^  pressed fo r  part o f  the money to be 
spent on the channel. However, the technical advisors from the D is t r i c t  
had another pro ject in mind and used various means to get th is
o n
through. The apparent shortage o f  funds was overcome when Sompong 
persuaded a committee member of NKYFRD who is  an equipment contractor to 
give an estimate fo r  digging the channel on a n on -p ro f i t  basis as a 
con tr ibu t ion  to the Foundation, and he agreed a contract  [mao) f igure  
o f  80,000 baht , well within the resources ava i lab le .
Owners o f  the land to be crossed by the channel had been 
consulted in formal ly  by Boi and other v i l l a g e rs  at an early  stage, but 
before the route , f e a s i b i l t y ,  and resources avai lable were known no 
d e f in i te  arrangement could be established. Altogether six farmers' land 
was to be crossed. Four o f these l ived permanently near the i r  land, 
while two were large landowning brothers in Ban Dong; one o f  these is 
T h i i ,  (case 5 in section Al l six had expressed a
wi l l ingness to make land avai lable for the channel, and those l i v in g  
lo c a l l y  were enthusiast ic at the prospects o f  gett ing  i r r i g a t i o n  water 
themselves.
A meeting was cal led in March 1.984 at which the owner o f  the 
digger that was to carry out the work came for a f i n a l  inspection before 
the work was to begin two days l a te r .  Quite unexpectedly, T h i i ' s  wife 
Jai and th e i r  nephew raised an object ion to the channel crossing th e i r  
land where i t  had been surveyed, asking that i t  fo l low the land 
boundaries on e i ther  side. Technical ly ,  t h i s  is  impossible, since the 
northern boundary is  too low ly ing fo r  a diverted channel to re jo in  the 
old one, while the southern boundary is  so high as to mean tha t  any new
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digging would have to go almost as deep as tha t  which caused the 
o r ig ina l  channel to be abandoned. Thi i  and his brother Lek were 
concerned that the channel would phaa t h i i  (d iv ide [ t h e i r ]  
land) ,  despite the fac t  tha t  each stood to benef i t  from the i r r i g a t i o n
water.
There followed a long period of escalat ing negot iat ion and 
c o n f l i c t ,  backed by an urgency due to the l im i ted time for which the 
digger could be made avai lable at cost and the impending rains that 
would make work impossible. A delegat ion of Thi i  and Lek's closest
associates in Bung Khiew went to see each o f  them in tu rn ,  negot iat ing 
and o f fe r ing  compensation for any land lo s t  to the channel. Af ter
several v i s i t s ,  pos it ions only seemed to be fu r the r  entrenched, and N i i ,  
a Bung Khiew v i l l a g e r  and long time fr iend of Lek decided on an 
a l te rn a t iv e ,  con f ron ta t ion is t  course o f  act ion. Unt i l  then, Lek had 
only been able to get his  t ra c to r  to his land by means o f  crossing N i i ' s  
land. Now Nii blocked the track with posts and organized the other two 
Bung Khiew v i l la g e rs  with access tracks to Lek’ s land to do the same, 
and he received help in th i s  from other Bung Khiew v i l l a g e rs .  The only 
a l te rna t ive  access involved a diversion o f  several k i lometres. They le t  
i t  be known that the posts would only be removed when Lek and Thi i 
agreed to l e t  the channel cross t h e i r  land: " I f  he crosses our land, why 
shouldn' t  we be able to cross his?" was the reasoning. This only 
hardened Lek's resolve and reduced the p o s s ib i l i t i e s  fo r  compromise. 
The next step was fo r  v i l la g e rs  to urge Boi and myself to ta lk  with the 
brothers,  and a meeting was arranged at T h i i ' s  house at which the temple
abbot, kamnan, Boi, Nii and I spent an evening, the abbot and kamnan
doing most o f  the ta lk in g .  Thi i  said l i t t l e  except tha t  his wife and 
children were the ones who objected more than he d id ,  and they were not
present. Lek refused to speak even to the kamnan or abbot about i t ,
and a Vi l lage Committee meeting was cal led to which Lek's wife was
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summoned. Four o f  the nine Committee members are from Bung Khiew, so 
there was considerable in te re s t ,  but the kamnan did not turn up and 
t h i s  reduced the au tho r i ty  present. I t  was threatened tha t  the matter 
would be taken to the D is t r i c t  a u th o r i t ie s ,  but no progress was made.
By th i s  stage, many o f  the v i l la g e rs  were suggesting that the 
channel be dug to e i ther  side o f  the approximately 300 metre stretch 
crossing Th i i  and Lek's land in order to pressure them in to  giving in.
Sompong and Boi were re luc tan t  to raise the level of c o n f l i c t  yet
fu r th e r ,  and th e i r  fears were j u s t i f i e d  by the words o f  some v i l la g e rs
who, asked what might happen i f  they s t i l l  refused access once the
channel was dug, said "someone might get k i l l e d  : khon aaj t a a i " .
The la s t  resor t  was to take the matter to the D is t r i c t  Of f ice, 
but at th i s  stage both Sompong and I agreed that we had no ro le  in 
taking sides with one group o f  v i l l a g e rs  against another in deal ing with
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the au t hor i t i es . Boi served as' in termediary, and a f te r  several 
t r i p s  the Deputy D is t r i c t  Of f icer  {Pal ad Awusoo) agreed to speak to
Lek and T h i i .  On his next t r i p ,  Boi was to ld  tha t  they had agreed to
l e t  the channel cross th e i r  land provided compensation was provided. 
Bel ieving tha t  a l l  was set,  Boi and several v i l l a g e rs  arranged with Lek
and Thi i  to point out the d e f in i te  route and discuss terms o f
compensation*, by now i t  was the l a s t  opportunity to s ta r t  work before 
the ra ins . On the day appointed, Lek and Thi i  were at th e i r  land and 
said tha t  they had decided once again only to al low the channel to
fo l low  the boundaries.
The pro ject was abandoned.
A compensation for Bung Khiew v i l la g e rs  was tha t  MCC agreed to
allow the money al located to be spent on another community pro ject.  A
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v i l lage  meeting decided to construct two large v i l l a g e  fishponds on land 
donated by seven v i l l a g e rs .  The water in these ponds is  in s u f f i c ie n t  
for f u l l  i r r i g a t i o n ,  but some supplementary i r r i g a t i o n  can be provided 
to nearby f i e ld s  using a pump. Fish spry were suppl ied by the Fisheries 
Department in 1985. In fa c t ,  v i l l a g e rs  would have preferred to have dug 
individual f ishponds, but MCC was ins is te n t  tha t th is  must be a 
community p ro jec t.
The lessons to be gained from the above pro jec t are many, 
involving aspects o f  v i l l a g e r  cooperation, cooperation and coordination 
between v i l l a g e r s ,  NGOs, state a u th o r i t ie s ,  and in ternat ional  aid, 
various means o f  c o n f l i c t  reso lu t ion ,  and p a r t i c ip a t io n  o f  v i l la g e rs  in 
concrete development projects fo r  communal mob i l iza t ion  o f  production 
resources. Impl icat ions are discussed in the fo l lowing section and in 
Chapter V I I I .
V I I . 6 Potent ia ls  and obstacles fo r  cooperation
Neither cooperation nor c o n f l i c t  are new to Ban Dong or Ban Mai. 
The parameters a f fec t ing  potent ial  fo r cooperation change as new 
opportun i t ies present themselves and as new obstacles are placed in the 
way o f  cooperative endeavour, as the above accounts demonstrate. Lack 
o f  cooperation does not in i t s e l f  imply c o n f l i c t ,  j u s t  as projects 
involving cooperation themselves can heighten the potent ial  for 
c o n f l i c t .  Peasants in Ban Dong and Ban Mai av id ly  seek out new 
opportun it ies in both ind iv idual  and co l le c t ive  ways; yet peasants in 
both communities place a high p r i o r i t y  on securing control  over the 
resources necessary to assure subsistence product ion, be they 
c o l l e c t i v e ly  or ind iv idu a l ly  mobil ized. Moral norms do not e n t i r e l y
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overcome the problem of free r id e rs ,  but at the same time 
non-contr ibutors are accommodated where th e i r  incapacity to contr ibute 
is accepted by the remainder o f  the community. Moral and ra t io n a l ,  
c o l l e c t i v i s t  and i n d i v id u a l i s t ,  are determined by l o c a l l y  and 
h i s t o r i c a l l y  spec i f ic  circumstances.
I f  i t  is  accepted that these circumstances provide the key 
parameters, i t  should be possible to make cer ta in  statements about the 
basis fo r  cooperation or otherwise from the concrete s i tuat ions 
described above. Star t ing with the ra t ionale fo r  cooperation, we saw in 
Section V I . 2 above that changes in production re la t ions  have diminished 
the extent to which indiv idual producers are constrained by reciproca l 
arrangements with the advent o f  monetization and d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  the 
respect ive communities. On the other hand, d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  as expressed 
in the a l iena t ion  o f  ind iv idual  producers from the means o f  production 
and concentrat ion o f  these means in the hands o f  others can provide new 
scope fo r  cooperation. This is  p a r t i c u la r l y  true in the case o f  "lumpy" 
items o f  technology. While I was in Ban Mai and Ban Dong, I heard 
farmers discussing the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  j o i n t  ownership o f  power t i l l e r s  
and trac to rs ,22  ancj fu r ther  conversation revealed some i l lum ina t ing  
fac tors  concerning cooperation in production. Both o f  these items of 
machinery are beyond the means o f  most ind iv idual farmers, p a r t i c u la r l y  
t r a c to rs ,  and both i f  put to f u l l  use would be superfluous to the needs 
o f  most indiv idual farms, again p a r t i c u la r l y  so in the case o f  t ra c to rs .  
Why then was there not a single case o f  cooperative purchase?
I t  should perhaps f i r s t  be mentioned that power t i l l e r s  are often 
used on more than one farm, not so often on a renta l  arrangement as in 
helping out close k in ,  often an e lde r ly  parent. However, t h i s  is  quite 
d i f fe re n t  from j o i n t  ownership. In the case o f  power t i l l e r s ,  two 
factors were raised as obstacles to cooperation. The f i r s t  is the
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problem of maintenance and repairs .  I f  the machine were to break down, 
i t  is  considered inev i tab le  that quar re l l ing  would ar ise over 
re s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  f i x in g  i t .  The second obstacle is the issue of 
a l loca t ing  usage, since ploughing even with a power t i l l e r  can take 
several days and, as described above, i n te n s i f i c a t io n  o f  production
l im i t s  f l e x i b i l i t y  in t iming. The maintenance problem arises also in
the case o f  t r a c to r  sharing, and with such an expensive item of 
machinery the stakes are much higher. Timing is  not so great a problem, 
since a single day is  s u f f i c i e n t  fo r ploughing most farmers' land using 
a Ford 5000. A much more considerable problem is  raised by the schedule 
o f  t r a c to r  usage described in Chapter V above. In order to be used to 
the f u l l ,  a t r a c to r  must be able to plough f ie ld s  in neighbouring 
d i s t r i c t s  and provinces or even fur ther  a f ie ld  outside the periods of
local peak demand. This is  accomplished by wealthy t r a c to r  owners with 
outside connections, means o f  co l le c t in g  payment, and time to put into 
the considerable managerial task involved. Such a task is  beyond the 
indiv idual and cooperative c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  small farmers in Ban Dong and 
Ban Mai.
Other than the ra t iona le  for cooperation as del imited by material  
aspects of production re la t io n s ,  a number o f  other factors present 
potent ia ls  and obstacles. In te ract ion  with outs iders , s p e c i f i c a l l y  with 
"developers" i s  one such fac to r .  As is  apparent from the ideology of 
NGQs and the experience, fo r  example, o f  Bung Khiew Rice Bank, the 
stimulus o f  ideas and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  support provided from the outside 
can enhance cooperative development. On the other hand, other aspects 
o f  exogenous ideology and structures can work against cooperative 
e f f o r t .  Some o f  the factors determining the e f fe c t  o f  external 
involvement are set out below.
In terms o f  in te ra c t io n ,  the method of approach that is made by
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external agents a f fec ts  the degree to which cooperation is promoted or 
otherwise. Three pr inc ipal  types o f  approach can be ide n t i f ie d  from the 
examples raised above. The f i r s t  is  what can be termed the "cadre" 
approach, whereby outsiders spend time among the v i l la g e rs  and 
d i f ferences in status are minimized. This has the benef i ts  o f  enhancing 
communication, increasing the outs iders '  understanding o f  the problems 
of the community, and minimizing the power d i f fe rence between the actors 
involved. The second approach can be termed the " f r i e n d ly  technocrat" 
approach, whereby an ex te rna l ly  determined po l icy tha t  requires set 
patterns o f  v i l l a g e r  cooperation is put into e f fe c t  by f ieldworkers who 
t r y  to reduce the gap between themselves and v i l l a g e rs .  BAAC 
approximates t h i s  type o f  approach. I t  is successful in ensuring 
cooperation with in  the l im i t s  o f  i t s  ob jec t ives, but as was suggested i t  
involves a contrad ic t ion  in a wider sense in th a t  i t  is  part o f  the
promotion o f  change in production re la t ions  tha t  is ac tua l ly  
ind iv idua l iz ing  production. The th i rd  approach suggested here is  the 
"hegemonic technocrat" approach, which is  used to implement state po l icy 
at the v i l l a g e  level in the name o f  cooperation and bene f i t  to the 
community tha t  is  to arise therefrom, but with l i t t l e  or no diminution 
o f  the power or status gap between "developer" and "developed". This 
issue o f  power is dwelt on at greater length in the fo l lowing chapter.
A second issue o f  outsider influence is  the extent to which
overinvolvement o f  outsiders and consequent demands made on v i l l a g e rs '  
time and other resources can sap la ten t  cooperative po ten t ia l .  As was 
seen in Section VII above, state schemes are often overlapping and 
mutually compet i t ive, with v i l l a g e rs  being pressed in to  jo in ing  many 
d i f fe re n t  groups each. There is often a minimal understanding of the 
purpose o f  these groups, apart from vague ideas tha t  they are to promote
"un i ty  : saamakhii kan" Moreover, use o f  NGO discourse as part
o f  the state rh e to r ic  leads to confusion over v/hat are often already
338
al ien terms to v i l l a g e  discourse. I t  thus becomes i r o n i c a l l y  more 
d i f f i c u l t  for NGOs or others to involve the community despite the 
apparently l ib e ra l i ze d  p o l i t i c a l  environment, as connotat ions s h i f t  and 
confusion reigns. I t  must be recal led that fo r  v i l l a g e r s ,  i t  takes time 
fo r  the cadre approach o f  NGO workers to d is t ingu ish  them from state 
o f f i c i a l s ,  given the t r a d i t i o n a l  d u a l i s t i c  class d is t in c t io n  as 
postulated in section I I . 3 .2  ^ O f f i c ia l  schemes may thus inse r t  an 
intended or unintended " s ta t i c "  tha t  i n h ib i t s  the emergence o f  
indigenously organized groups, e i the r  out o f  sheer overwhelming by the 
p r o l i t e r a t io n  of klum or by usurping p o te n t ia l l y  useful discourses 
necessary in the establishment o f  independent forms.26
A th i r d  aspect o f  re la t ions  with outside "developers" and the 
impl icat ions fo r  cooperation concerns the d i re c t io n  o f  communication. 
I f  cooperation is  to make use o f  external resources in a way tha t  gives 
pa r t ic ipan ts  a sense o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  through common "ownership", the 
i n i t i a t i v e  must come from below as in the case of Bung Khiew I r r ig a t io n  
Channel. In th is  case, a l i t e r a t e  v i l l a g e r  with outside connections was 
able to make the necessary l in k  such tha t  v i l la g e rs  were able 
cooperat ively to ca l l  on external resources. An advance in enhancing 
th is  potent ia l  more widely was made with the foundation o f  the Local 
Development Assistance Programme (LDAP) by CIDA (the main Canadian 
government development agency working in Thai land),  which seeks short 
proposals in Thai from v i l la g e rs  themselves, although the NGO network is 
a t present used for most a p p l i ca t io n s .26 (in 1985, Boi applied fo r  
funding for a community woodplot from LDAP). The government has 
fol lowed th is  idea by establ ish ing a V i l lage Development Fund under the 
Sixth National Economic and Social Development Plan, but the fact  tha t  
proposals w i l l  have to be channelled through v i l l a g e  committees and 
tambon councils poses potent ial  problems to be discussed in the 
fol lowing chapter.
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A f in a l  pair o f  factors inf luencing cooperation is tha t related 
to the community i t s e l f .  F i r s t ,  the size o f  the community can have a 
key inf luence on the p r a c t i c a b i l i t y  o f  cooperative arrangements. As was 
seen in the case of Bung Khiew Rice Bank, t ru s t  plays an important part 
in the success o f  such a scheme. Bung Khiew's cohesion, p a r t l y  based on 
kinship t i e s ,  has been discussed in Chapter IV. I t  is un l ike ly  tha t  any 
such scheme could be established on the same basis in a v i l l a g e  as large 
as the Ban Dong or Ban Mai admin is tra t ive v i l la g es .  Simi lar problems 
have been described in achieving v i l l a g e r  cooperation in la rge, recent ly  
se t t led  v i l l a g e s  in Sri Lanka (Harriss 1982b : 328), and while no set 
f igure  can be placed on size, larger  communities are c le a r l y  more easi ly  
f rac t iona l ized  than are small ones bound to a considerable degree by 
kinship. Here NGOs show a f l e x i b i l i t y  tha t  is d i f f i c u l t  to achieve 
within the r i g id  structures o f  the s ta te ,  where admin is tra t ive  
boundaries precede natural  communities fo r  most considerat ions. One 
attempt was made by the Ban Dong kamnan to overcome the size problem, 
when he ordered that "development groups : klum phathanaa" be set up 
to ease admin is tra t ion , in pa r t icu la r  for the compulsory fence bui ld ing 
programme. ^
The other fac tor  concerning the community is  the extent to which 
i t  is  ac tua l ly  a community o f  in te res t .  D i f fe re n t ia t io n  of the 
community cl ear ly reduces the commonality o f  in te res t  as economic 
fortunes diverge, systems o f  production vary from one household to 
another, and c o n f l i c t s  o f  in te res t  ar ise . Thus i t  is  un l ike ly  tha t  a 
v i l lage  trader who is  also a moneylender and buf fa lo  r e n t i e r  or t rac to r  
owner is going to support cooperative marketing, indigenous cooperative 
c r e d i t ,  or buf fa lo  banks. The fac t  tha t  no Bung Khiew v i l la g e rs  are 
major r ice  lenders or bu f fa lo  ren t ie rs  meant that there was not the 
c o n f l i c t  o f  in te res t  that would have arisen in a Ban Dong wide scheme.
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Increasing the power of v i l l a g e rs  through cooperative action is bound to 
involve c o n f l i c t s  o f  i n te re s t ,  but the key aspect o f  t h i s  is  whether or 
not th is  c o n f l i c t  is in terna l or external to the cooperative 
i n s t i t u t i o n .  A common external adversary can enhance as much as 
threaten group s o l i d a r i t y . ^ 8
Conclusion
The parameters a f fec t ing  cooperation for development are complex 
and contextua l ly  bound. The NGO analysis as discussed in section
I I a3 J i  s t i l l  perta ins,  and i t  is  expressed succ inct ly  in the quote at
the head o f  t h i s  chapter. However, without a recogni t ion o f  the l im i t s  
to ,  constra in ts  on, and lack o f  inherent "sanc t i ty "  of cooperative in 
preference to ind iv idual act ion, neither state nor NGO development 
e f fo r t s  a t encouraging cooperation can succeed. Ult imate ly  "the answers 
l i e  in the v i l l a g e " ,  but t h i s  s t i l l  covers a l o t  o f  ground f i g u ra t i v e ly  
as well as physiographical ly in the scattered, d i f fe re n t ia te d  v i l lages  
of Lan Sak. I t  can be held tha t  for small , powerless farmers, 
cooperation is necessary i f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in co n t ro l l in g  factors
a f fec t ing  one's l i f e  i s  to be achieved, but t h i s  cannot be drawn
independently o f  wider issues o f  power associated with the various 
cooperative forms th a t  come under the aegis o f  "development". I t  is  to 
these issues tha t  the next chapter is addressed.
/
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Notes
1. Even e a r l i e r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  means fo r  cooperation had been suggested 
by the Assistant Minis ter  for Agr icu l ture Chaophraya Wongsanupraphat in 
1905. He suggested the formation of "farming associat ions" (samakhom 
thamnaa) as vehicles fo r  government promotion of technical 
improvements, such as use o f  f e r t i l i z e r s  and improved seed (Johnston 
1975 : 356). However, no action was taken on t h i s ,  and act ion fo l lowing 
the establishment o f  formal cooperatives was s im i la r l y  sluggish : by 
1926 there were only 1,414 cooperative members in the country ( i b id .  : 
399).
2. "Chaobaan" used by an urbanite is a d i s t i n c t i v e  category tha t  
re fe rs  to a d i f f e r e n t ,  lesser educated sort o f  people. I t  can be used 
to mean "the common people" even i f  they l i v e  in town. Used ( less 
frequently)  by a v i l l a g e r ,  chaobaan re fe rs  to people o f  the speaker's 
v i l l a g e  or a v i l la g e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  mentioned.
3. The i n d i v id u a l i s t i c  emphasis on moral character overlaps into  state 
discourse on cooperation. The Uthaithani ALRO head a t t r i b u te s  problems 
in Ban Mai to the fac t  tha t  v i l la g e rs  "mai hai khwaam ruam meu : 
l i t .  don ' t  give cooperation" [ to  ALRO], and there is  thus a need to
"phattana j i t j a i  : develop the [cooperat ive] s p i r i t "  o f  v i l l a g e rs .
4. The popular Buddhist c la s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  people is as fo l lows. Bua 
phon naam ( lotuses above the water) have reached enlightenment, 
although not o f  course in the s t r i c t  Buddhist sense. Bua prim naam 
( lotuses on the surface) are prime for enlightenment and j u s t  need some 
help in gett ing  there. Bua t a i  naam ( lotuses under water) are not 
yet ready, but they have the potent ial  for enlightenment. Bua t i d  tom
( lotuses stuck in the mud at the bottom) have no hope o f  a t ta in ing
enlightenment. S t r i c t l y  speaking, only the f i r s t ,  fou r th ,  and f i f t h  
categories were c lass i f ied  according to t h i s  by the DAE o f f i c e r .  The 
second and th i rd  categories should have come under bua prim naam, and 
the la s t  under bua t i d  tom.
5. The word " fang : l i t .  l i s te n "  contains a connotat ion o f  obeisance 
( c f .  Turton 1984b : 46).
6. I rv ine (1982) discusses a t  length the way in which Communism is
posed as a threat to the developing, modernizing Thai nat ion. Since 
Irv ine did his f ie ldwork ,  the s i tua t ion  has changed somewhat, in that 
the " in te rn a l "  ( i . e .  CPT) th rea t  has decl ined, and in compensation the 
"external" ( i . e .  Vietnamese) th reat has increased in the rhe to r ic  with 
the occupation of Kampuchea and increased presence in Laos. Even in a 
province as fa r  from these borders as Uthaithani,  the Vietnamese are 
con t inua l ly  posed as a th re a t ,  and o f f i c i a l  myths such as the poisoning 
of coffee that supposedly led to the "shrinking penis syndrome" (see 
Irv ine : Chapter 8) are s t i l l  purveyed.
7. Muecke (1979) gives a deta i led and in terest ing account o f  Vi l lage 
Scout t ra in in g .
8. This s i tu a t ion  re fe rs  to the period subsequent to the 1976 coup. 
Prior to t h i s ,  farmers' organization was more open and p o l i t i c a l ,  
notably in the case o f  the Farmers' Federation o f  Thailand (see Kanoksak 
and Kanjana Kaewthep 1985; Turton 1984b : 58). The example o f  th is  
organizat ion, 30 of whose leaders were assassinated by r i g h t  wing 
elements in 1975, shows the dangers for farmers o f  overt p o l i t i c a l
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organizat ion even during a na t ion a l ly  l ib e ra l  period.
9. At a development t ra in ing  meeting, the DAE o f f i c e r  opened the meeting 
by ins t ruc t ing  th a t  "the most important thing to learn fo r  development 
is the meaning of acronyms". Use o f  acronyms rather  than more d i re c t  
descr ip t ion o f  pro ject a c t i v i t i e s  has a number o f  in terest ing  
impl icat ions. I t  gives programmes an o f f i c i a l  r ing to them, implying a 
status d is t in c t io n  from independent i n i t i a t i v e s .  I t  serves to take the 
emphasis o f f  the name o f  the programme which contains the o r ig ina l  
in ten t ion ,  so that fo r  example "Kaan saang ngaan nai chonabot : Rural 
Employment Generation Programme" has become associated with 
in f ra s t ru c tu ra l  pro jects rather than employment generation. I t  adds to 
the special ized vocabulary o f  development discourse tha t  is used at 
meetings and serves to l i m i t  p a r t ic ip a t io n  of those not adept at use o f  
o f f i c i a l  language.
10. BAAC c re d i t  increased at more than 6 per cent per year in real terms 
between 1976 and 1980 (L igh t foo t  and Fox 1983 : 11).
11. In 1984, BAAC set up an experimental pro ject in 28 v i l lages  in 
several provinces, involv ing cooperation with DAE o f f i c e r s ,  in an 
attempt to l i n k  c re d i t  with extension advice. A study based on these 
v i l la g es  and 14 contro l  v i l la g es  is  forthcoming, but ea r ly  ind icat ions 
are that the a c t i v i t i e s  were mainly oriented to increasing use of 
commercial f e r t i l i z e r .
12. In November 1985, the government attempted to support i t s  
guaranteed r ice  pr ice o f  3000 baht per tonne by se t t ing  aside a fund 
to be administered through r i c e  m i l l s .  Despite having been warned in 
advance that the scheme was unworkable (Far Eastern Economic Review 
January 17, 1986), the scheme went ahead, but fa i le d  due to the immense 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  supervising such d is t r ib u t i o n  o f  funds through over 
20,000 r i c e  m i l l s .  Uncertainty combined with other fac to rs  to depress 
the pr ice to i t s  lowest point fo r  several years, 2200 baht per tonne.
13. The word "naak l ia t  : despicable, hate fu l"  is commonly used to 
describe fa i l u re  to l i v e  up to ob l igat ions o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  re c ip ro c i ty  or 
respect.  In response to a question regarding what sanction a household 
has fo r  "repayment" of labour ob l igat ions engendered under ao raeng , 
i t  is said to be naak l ia t  not to f u l f i l  such customary ob l iga t ion .  In 
quite a d i f f e re n t  context,  the D is t r i c t  m i l i t a r y  conscr ip t ion o f f i c e r  in 
preparing v i l l a g e rs  fo r  receiving senior o f f i c i a l s  at a m i l i t a r y  run 
development t ra in in g  programme in Ban Dong in 1985 declared at a meeting 
that i t  would be naak l ia t  not to lay on some sort  o f  special welcome.
14. Boi 's ro le  as volunteer coordinator for the Meechai organizat ion in 
Lan Sak takes him to every v i l l a g e  in the D i s t r i c t  once a month. This 
has allowed him to make external connections and to make frequent stops 
at the amphoe o f f i c e s ,  which have in turn proved important in making 
the connections necessary fo r  coordination o f  pro jects in Bung Khiew 
tha t  re ly  on external resources.
15. Ban Dong is l inked to the outside by the main Highways Department 
road.
16. This is  an example o f  where the "free r id e r "  problem posed by 
Popkin is  overcome by v i l la g e  s o l i d a r i t y  in a community bound by strong 
social  t ie s  p a r t l y  based on kinship and pa r t ly  based on re la t i v e  lack o f  
d i f f e re n t ia t io n  when compared with the larger community (see Chapter 
IV). In such as s i tu a t io n ,  norms o f  mutual assistance do apply, and 
they are operable for four main reasons:
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- The community is t i g h t l y  kn i t  enough that those 
receiving assistance at the expense o f  others are i d e n t i f i a b le ,  
as i s  t h e i r  material  s i tu a t io n ,  making i t  d i f f i c u l t  for anyone 
to become an anonymous free r i d e r ;
- Affectual re la t ions  with in  the community are strong, 
based on kinship and neighbourl iness;
- New in s t i t u t i o n s  o f  mutual assistance overlap with 
t ra d i t i o n a l  forms;
- I t  is  clear to the majo r i ty  tha t  i f  they do not 
include some element o f  subsidy to the less well o f f  the pro ject 
w i l l  not come o f f  at a l l ,  and consensus as to who is to
contr ibute what is  r e la t i v e l y  eas i ly  achieved when the scale is  
1im i ted .
On the other hand, a case from the same community is  i l l u s t r a t i v e  of 
awareness o f  potent ial  free r id e r  problems. In helping surveyors on the 
Bung Khiew I r r i g a t io n  Channel (see fo l lowing sect ion) ,  i t  was decided to 
send a member from every household, so as to "mai lamiang kan : not 
create b ias" ,  even though fewer helpers would have su f f iced .
17. "Cooperative development", l i ke  other aspects o f  development
discourse, is  subject to a va r ie ty  o f in te rp re ta t ions .  As in Engl ish, 
the Thai word fo r  cooperate, ruam meu, has d i f f e r e n t  connotations
depending on grammatical and s i tua t iona l  context. Cooperation as j o i n t  
act ion or as obedience to a higher authori ty  provides an ambiguity tha t  
is extended to cooperative development. The e f fe c t  is  to blur the 
boundary between cooperation and cooptation. This is  determined by 
power re la t ionsh ips  tha t  are discussed more f u l l y  in the fol lowing 
chapter; they can be seen phenomenologically a t two leve ls .  At the 
local le v e l ,  "cooperat ion" is most often expressed by o f f i c i a l s  as "hai 
khwaam ruam meu : l i t .  to give cooperat ion",  i m p l i c i t l y  with o f f i c i a l
po l icy ,  o f f i c i a l  groups, o f f i c i a l  announcements, and so on. I t  thus 
involves obedience to those in a pos it ion of power. At the broader 
le v e l ,  "cooperat ion" between NGOs and state developers has been catered 
for in the Sixth National Plan by the establishment o f  the 
coordinating bodies mentioned in Chapter 2, footnote 26.
18. The Rural Employment Generation Programme (REGP, lo c a l l y  known as 
" kor sor chor" a f te r  i t s  Thai i n i t i a l s )  is a cont inuat ion of the 
ngoen phan ( l i t .  revolving money) programme in i t i a te d  by Prime 
Minister  Kukr i t  Pramote in 1975. This programme divided 2500 m i l l i o n  
baht equal ly among tambons fo r  local in f ras t ruc tu ra l  programmes tha t  
were in p r inc ip le  designed to create local employment during the 
a g r icu l tu ra l  off-season. Although numerous local roads have been 
constructed under these programmes, employment e f fec ts  have been l im i ted 
in part  by the use o f  heavy machinery in place o f  labour,  and th is  has 
gone hand in hand with a high level o f  corrupt ion in connection with 
these funds since the a l loca t ion  o f  funds is  decided on by kamnans who 
may have d i re c t  or ind i re c t  in te res ts  in heavy machinery contract ing. 
This has led such schemes to be r id icu led  lo c a l l y  as at best 
i r re levan t  to the poor and at worst instrumental in foste r ing  corrupt ion 
and what many re fe r  to as a detr imental  "wage habit"  tha t  detracts from 
community s p i r i t  in j o i n t  pro jects (see also section V I I I ^4J i ) .
19. Decision making by the tambon council and other local bodies may 
be adversely affected by a parochialism o f  in te res t  th a t  is  exacerbated 
by r i g i d  structures. An example is tha t  o f  the weir serving Ban Dong, 
Faai Paak Meuang. Because the weir is located in the adjoining 
tambon but serves mainly Ban Dong f i e ld s ,  i t  has proven impossible to
344
raise funds fo r  improvement o f  the weir since i t  is  outside the remit o f  
the Ban Dong tambon counc i l ,  and the adjacent tambon council has no 
in te res t  in a l loca t ing  funds to a pro ject from which i t  w i l l  not 
b e n e f i t .
20. In 1985, the Ban Dong tambon council was presented with two major 
projects on which to spend i t s  annual a l loca t ion  under REGP. The 
kamnan and several other v i l la g e  headman were in favour of supporting 
the Bung Khiew i r r i g a t i o n  channel, while the “ technical advisors" from 
the Amphoe had decided to press fo r  a water j a r  construct ion pro jec t.  
The kamnan and others claimed that the i r r i g a t i o n  channel would give 
by far the greater bene f i t .  However, health o f f i c i a l s ,  despite not 
being allowed in p r inc ip le  to speak other than to give technical advice, 
made an impassioned case for the water j a r  p ro jec t ,  stressing tha t  a l l  
v i l lages  would be able to share in the benef i ts .  Since only f i v e  of the 
tambon1 s fourteen v i l lages  stood to benef i t  from the i r r i g a t i o n  
channel, most headmen were in favour o f  the water j a rs .  In the event, 
the council voted two th i rds  o f  the funds to the water ja rs  and one 
th i rd  to the channel; however, the Amphoe subsequently d isqua l i f ied  
the l a t t e r ,  since i t  was claimed that only one pro ject was to be allowed 
(despite precedents fo r  mult ip le  projects elsewhere). In the event, no 
local employment was created since contractors were brought in from 
another province to construct the ja rs .  This i l l u s t r a t e s  the 
considerable bureaucratic control  over supposedly p a r t ic ip a to ry  bodies 
such as the tambon counci l .
21. This br ings back into  considerat ion the ro le  o f  the researcher in 
the community (see section 1.4). The example noted here shows the 
de l ica te  nature o f  any involvement in community a f f a i r s ,  in pa r t icu la r  
where potent ia l  c o n f l i c t s  o f  in te res t  may ar ise ,  even as in t h i s  case 
where they might not be foreseen. On the other hand, a refusal to get 
involved and reciprocate h o s p i ta l i t y  given by the community is  equally 
to be ruled out on eth ical  grounds. In th is  case, the involvement o f  
v i l l a g e rs  in the pro ject  and the l im i ted  ro le  o f  the researcher as an 
intermediary a t once maximized use o f  the resource most valuable to the 
v i l l a g e rs  ( i . e .  means o f  outside contact) and reduced the involvement o f  
the outsider  in the taking of sides in internal aspects o f  the c o n f l i c t .  
Nevertheless, a l i m i t  had to be drawn when i t  came to representing one 
group o f  v i l l a g e rs  against another in appealing to d i s t r i c t  a u th o r i t ie s .
22. Cf. Moerman (1958 : 69 - 70) on why Ban Ping v i l l a g e rs  did not buy a 
t r a c to r  cooperat ive ly.  "The natural  environment o f  Thunglor requires 
the t r a c to r ;  the social  environment of Ban Ping prevents v i l la g e rs  from 
owning one". This is  because no individual is wealthy enough to 
purchase a t r a c to r ,  whi le no social i n s t i t u t i o n  exists fo r  j o i n t  
ownership. I t  was envisaged, ju s t  as the fo l lowing account shows fo r  
Ban Dong and Ban Mai, tha t  j o i n t  ownership would lead to bickering over 
maintenance and ploughing schedules. Where the s i tu a t ion  o f  Lan Sak in 
1985 d i f f e r s  s ig n i f i c a n t l y  from Ban Ping a quar ter o f  a century 
e a r l i e r ,  then, is  in the a b i l i t y  o f ind iv idual  s with in  the 
v i l l a g e  to purchase such a large item of machinery.
23. The word saamakhii is used ambiguously in the sense of implying 
un ity  a l te rn a t i v e ly  as s o l i d a r i t y  and of p roh ib i t ing  dissent ing voices. 
This is  another example o f  the importance o f  context in in te rp re t ing  the 
discourse o f  development.
24. See the instance of v i l l a g e r  react ion to v i s i t i n g  NGO workers in 
section V I I I 33 j ' i  i .
25. Maurice Bloch discusses "exercise of power through formal isat ion"  
(1975 : 10) in Merina socie ty,  as a re s u l t  o f  r e s t r i c t i v e  formal
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discourses e f fe c t i v e l y  pre-empting a l te rna t ive  or counterva i l ing speech. 
The r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  choice as to what can be said enta i led in 
fo rmal isa t ion ( p .17) extends in to  what can be done, and in th is  way 
fo rmal isa t ion  o f  kl urn can be seen as a pre-emptive exercise o f  power. 
On the other hand, Bloch notes cer ta in  l im i ta t io n s  to the power of 
fo rma l isa t ion ,  namely th a t  i t  is must be re s t r i c te d  through s k i l l s  
necessary for formal a r t i c u la t io n  or by a r e s t r i c t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  
s i tu a t ion .  The impl icat ion is tha t  given a more l ib e ra l  p o l i t i c a l  
environment, i t  is  possible for ind iv iduals  such as Boi to acquire the 
fo rm a l is t ic  s k i l l s  necessary fo r  exercise o f  counterva i l ing power.
26. The coordinator o f  LDAP would idea l ly  l ike  to make d i re c t  contact 
with v i l l a g e  groups, but in the f i r s t  period o f  operat ion regards i t  as 
necessary to work through local NGOs. He envisages a second stage 
developing with more d i re c t  funding o f  v i l l a g e  groups.
27. A recent emphasis in super f ic ia l  development programmes has been on 
fence bu i ld ing as part  o f  a " t idy ing  up" o f  the v i l l a g e  and an easing o f  
admin is tra t ion for v i l l a g e  and Amphoe o f f i c i a l s .  In 1985, the Ban 
Dong kamnan set up eight "development groups : kl um phatthanaa", 
appointing a v i l l a g e r  in each group with the task o f  disseminating 
ins t ruc t ions  to [assigned] members. Most o f  the groups' a c t i v i t i e s  
concerned the passing on o f  Amphoe ins t ruc t ions via the kamnan to 
re luc tan t  group "heads". The s ign if icance o f  t h i s  i n i t i a t i v e  is  
discussed in the fo l lowing chapter.
28. An in te rest ing  p o l i t i c a l  use o f  the "common adversary" is detectable 
in the Ban Dong kamnan' s frequent outbursts against Chinese traders,  
o f f i c i a l s  (espec ia l ly  schoolteachers), BAAC and other banks, and 
p o l i t i c i a n s .  Despite not having been d i r e c t l y  involved in ag r icu l tu ra l  
production fo r some time, he frequently  speaks o f  "rao chaonaa : us 
farmers" (see the quote at the head o f  t h i s  chapter).
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CHAPTER V I I I  
PARTICIPATION AND POWER IN DEVELOPMENT
"[Us] poor have no r i g h t  to speak, no r i g h t  to voice opinions"
- Ban Mai v i l l a g e r
"Now i t  is  the people who are the regu la to rs ."
- Lan Sak D i s t r i c t  Of f icer
The recent emphasis on pa r t ic ipa t ion  in development is  based on 
the premise that " taking part"  is something new fo r  v i l l a g e rs .  In the 
past, i t  i s  reasoned, v i l la g e rs  were excluded (from what, for the 
moment, being a moot po in t ) .  Development programmes th a t  came from the 
outside were i n i t i a t e d  and run by, and often f o r ,  outsiders. The 
pr inc ipal issue fo r  development thus became how to involve local people 
in these schemes.
This emphasis has gone hand in hand with the l ink ing  of the 
v i l la g e  to the wider p o l i t i c a l  and economic systems. As the v i l la g e  
p o l i t y  has become integrated into the nation state and as the v i l l a g e  
economy has become l inked increasing ly  to the nat ional and internat ional  
c a p i t a l i s t  systems, so inf luences o f  these wider systems have affected 
v i l l a g e rs  to an increasing extent. At one le v e l ,  there fo re ,  
p a r t i c ip a t io n  in the wider system has already been established by 
means o f  the general incorporat ive ru ra l  development s trategy.  However, 
the passive and dependent nature o f  t h i s  incorporat ion places most 
v i l l a g e rs  at a disadvantage in terms o f  p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
bargaining power.
The i n i t i a l  premise stated above needs to be examined more 
closely .  In the past, i t  is  t rue ,  v i l l a g e rs  did not "take par t"  in the 
wider system to any s ig n i f i c a n t  extent,  but at the same time decisions
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taken at a supra-v i l lage level had only a l im i ted e f fe c t  on v i l la g e  l i f e  
and production. Meanwhile, v i l l a g e rs  did have an act ive part in the 
decisions a f fec t ing  community a f f a i r s  and household production, i . e .  in 
the a f f a i r s  tha t  most d i r e c t l y  affected them. These l a t t e r  were based 
not on formal committee decisions but rather  on local cu l tu ra l  norms and 
informal re la t ionsh ips  in which kinship and social ob l iga t ion  played an 
important par t .  Local leadership was established by acceptance and 
respect rather than by formal e lec t ion .  The main funct ion of the local 
leader was to manage or a rb i t ra te  a f fa i r s  within  the community, whi le 
contact with external au tho r i t ies  played only a secondary ro le .  I t  is 
only l a t t e r l y ,  p a r t i c u la r l y  in the case o f  recent ly  sett led forest 
communities, tha t  deal ings with the wider system have raised the issue 
o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n .  As w i l l  become apparent from the discussion in the 
present chapter,  these very l inkages now pose questions concerning 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  internal  to the v i l l a g e  community.
This chapter deals with the pr inc ipal contrad ic t ion  ide n t i f ie d  in 
Chapter I I .  B r ie f l y  recap i tu la ted ,  t h i s  is  the process whereby 
incorporat ion into the wider p o l i t i c a l  and economic systems through 
ru ra l  development leads to a lessening o f  the control  tha t  most 
ind iv idua ls  have over factors  inf luencing th e i r  own l i v e s ,  in pa r t icu la r  
resources necessary for production and reproduct ion. The argument 
s ta r ts  with an examination o f  various conceptual izat ions o f  
p a r t ic ip a to ry  development. The concept o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  i s  then revised 
to show how i t  needs to be considered in terms o f  control and power, 
i l l u s t r a te d  by reference to ag r icu l tu ra l  production in Lan Sak. This is 
fol lowed by an examination o f  spec if ic  issues o f  control  a f fec t ing 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in Lan Sak, and these are then re lated to the wider issue 
o f  power. F in a l l y ,  rura l  development programmes in Ban Dong and Ban Mai 
are considered in a revised perspective.
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V I I I . 1 Par t ic ipa t ion  and development
The d i f f i c u l t y  o f  discussing a concept such as "pa r t i c ip a t io n "  
stems from the very looseness with which the term is used and the 
resu l t ing  ambiguity i t  takes on. Indeed, i t  is t h i s  ambiguity tha t  
underl ies the contrad ic t ions to be expanded on present ly. Like 
"democracy", everyone must be fo r  "pa r t ic ip a t io n "  : p rec ise ly  because o f  
t h i s  vagueness, there is everything to play fo r  (Turton 1984b).^ The 
value o f  examining the concept thus l i e s  not in achieving any universal 
measure o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  that can be used to determine the re la t i v e  
pa r t ic ip a to ry  meri ts o f  spec i f ic  ru ra l  development schemes, but 
ra ther in a contextual i d e n t i f i c a t io n  o f  the term with in  various 
discourses. Meanwhile, i t  is  i n s u f f i c ie n t  to l i s t  a va r ie ty  o f  
d e f in i t i o n s  and then select the one we deem best suited to our own 
purposes without having f i r s t  out l ined d iscursive evolut ion o f  the term.
The l i t e r a t u r e  on p a r t ic ipa t ion  is vast,  and here I propose 
simply to summarize in te rp re ta t ions  tha t  have been used both im p l i c i t l y  
and e x p l i c i t l y .  As w i l l  become apparent, any meaningful use o f  the 
terms under considerat ion is  highly context bound ( id e o lo g ic a l l y ,  
h i s t o r i c a l l y ,  and s p a t i a l l y ) ,  and I therefore intend to t re a t  at 
somewhat greater length the contextual approach o f  the United Nations 
Research In s t i tu te  fo r  Social Development (UNRISD) and the specif ic  
manipulations o f  "p a r t i c ip a to ry  development" in the Thai context.  Four 
main sources are used fo r  the l a t t e r  case, represent ing the pr inc ipa l  
strands o f  discourse on p a r t ic ipa t ion  inf luencing current debates. 
These are, respect ive ly :  World Bank conceptual izat ions; the Thai section 
o f  the UNRISD pro jec t on popular p a r t i c ip a t io n ;  a conference o f  
prominent Thai academics, c i v i l  servants, and development workers; and
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local level discourse as witnessed in Lan Sak during 1984 - 1985.
V I I I  al J  Conceptual izat ions o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  : general
Early postwar discourse on development contained l i t t l e  tha t  
deal t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  with issues o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n .  The pa r t ic ipa to ry  ro le  
o f  the masses in development was seen as one o f  taking part in economic 
development as producers by provis ion o f  cheap labour and, in the longer 
run through " t r i c k l e  down" e f fe c t s ,  as consumers o f  the enlarged 
national products tha t  development would bring about (S t ie fe l  and Wolfe 
1984). Decisions on the d i re c t io n  o f  development were to be l e f t  to the 
technocrats, since such de l ibera t ions  were seen as b a s ica l ly  management 
decisions to be made by experts concerning the best way to move along 
the unitary  path o f  growth, i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  and increased 
p roduc t iv i ty .  In the Thai context,  t h i s  was epitomized by S a r i t ' s  
doctr ine o f  concentrat ing on economic development while s t i f l i n g  a l l  
forms o f  popular p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in the ear ly  1960s (Morel! and 
Chai-anan 1981 : 5 - 6; Chai-anan 1984 : 34 - 35).
However, i t  soon became apparent that two sets o f  factors were 
in h ib i t in g  development o f  the kind the technocrats had envisaged. The 
f i r s t  had to do with the unequal d is t r ib u t io n  o f  the benef i ts  o f  growth, 
with e l i t e s  adopting western l i f e s t y le s  at the expense o f  the 
impoverished masses, leading to "apathy" and "unresponsiveness". The 
la t t e r  term i t s e l f  indicates the way in which p a r t i c ip a t io n  o f  the rural  
population was seen as the fol lowing of d i rec t ions  set by po l icy  makers 
at a higher leve l .  The second in h ib i t in g  element was what is  sometimes 
summed up as "cu l tu ra l  i n e r t i a " ,  which may be translated as a fa i l u re  to 
recognize the benef i ts  o f  accumulation via p a r t i c ip a t io n  in the
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c a p i t a l i s t  economy. The answer to th is  was "modernization", requi r ing
new a t t i tu d e s ,  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  and a cu ltu re  o f  consumerism and
e f f i c ie n cy ,  such tha t :
Popular p a r t i c ip a t io n  . . .  was a form of therapy, 
the purpose o f  which was to transform 'backward' ,
' t r a d i t i o n a l 1, 'unresponsive' populations into  
'modern, responsive' c i t i ze n s  ready to assume 
th e i r  dut ies and obl igat ions in a predetermined 
development process (S t ie fe l  and Wolfe 1984 : 10).
This led to the establishment o f  channels and super f ic ia l  mechanisms fo r
p a r t i c ip a t io n  based on western models, but l e f t  unchanged t ra d i t i o n a l
structures o f  e xp lo i ta t io n  and inequa l i ty .
Conceptual izations o f  p a r t ic ipa t ion  have changed along with other 
strands o f  thought in the wider development debate. The re jec t ion  o f  
modernization theory and the emergence o f  models o f  dependency, modes o f  
production, and the consequent p o l i t i c a l  economic emphasis tha t  was 
th rus t  into the debate, led to p o l i t i c a l  formulat ions tha t  approached 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  from the point o f  view o f  the poor, the powerless, and 
above a l l  the "excluded". Exclusion o f  the rura l  poor from the f r u i t s  
o f  c a p i t a l i s t  development led to a set o f  analyses concerning the 
fa i l u r e  o f  " t r i c k l e  down" mechanisms. These ranged from urban bias 
(Lipton 1977), imperfect fac tor  markets ( G r i f f i n  1979), s u p e r f i c i a l i t y  
o f understanding by nat ional planners (Chambers 1983) to world system 
models o f  dependency (Frank 1967), modes o f  production (Hindness and 
H irs t  1974), unequal exchange (Amin 1976).
As to how these mechanisms ac tua l ly  affected the rural  poor, 
these biases, imperfect ions, and in jus t ices  were a r t icu la ted  i n i t i a l l y  
in terms o f  problems o f  "access", defined by Bui js (1982) as the a b i l i t y  
to obtain resources through i n s t i t u t i o n s .  According to Bu i js ,  the poor 
general ly have least access as a re s u l t  o f  four primary fac to rs :  
inadequate coverage o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s ;  high r e la t i v e  cost o f  services; 
cu l tu ra l  reasons; and low q u a l i ty  o f  funct ionar ies ,  p a r t i c u la r l y  those
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who deal d i r e c t l y  with the poor. The inadequacy o f  western type 
le g is la t io n  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  in ensuring access is suggested by another 
group o f  authors in a d is t in c t io n  between formal and factual dimensions 
o f  access:
FACTUAL
DIMEN­
SION
FORMAL DIMENSION 
Right to access No r ig h t  to access
Access Incorporation Corruption
No access Den ial Exclusion
Figure 8.1 : Access to i n s t i t u t io n s  
Source: Shad id e t a l . 1982
Denial is the ce l l  tha t planners frequently  f a i l  to take account o f ,  and
Bui js (1979) uses a distance model to show how access may be denied
fo l lowing a funct ion o f  geographical, f i n a n c ia l ,  and social  distance.
Whether access is  defined general ly as " inc lud ing the excluded" 
(Palmer 1975 : 1) or more s p e c i f i c a l l y  as "the re la t io n  between the
adminis tra t ive a l loca t ion  o f  goods and services and the people who need 
them, and fo r  whom they are intended" (Shaffer 1975 : 3 ),  i t  c lea r ly
places people as passive objects rather  than act ive subjects v is -a -v is  
in s t i t u t i o n s .
The search fo r  a more act ive way o f  involv ing the rura l  poor in 
development led to increasing reference to the need for p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  
not only as passive rec ip ien ts  but as formulators, planners, doers, and 
bene f ic ia r ies  o f  various programmes. Nevertheless, despite the fac t  
that the debate had stepped back from the "how" of p a r t i c ip a t io n  in a 
mechanical sense to consider the "why", many s t i l l  saw pa r t ic ip a t io n  as 
pr im ar i ly  a means to achieve predefined object ives and only secondari ly 
an end in i t s e l f .  Kent (1981) sees the advantages o f  pa r t ic ipa t ion  in 
three main dimensions: con tex tua l ly ,  local people know th e i r  own social 
and physical environment and can be expected to use th is  knowledge to
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increase the effect iveness o f  decision making;^ p r a c t i c a l l y ,  
p a r t ic ipa t ion  in planning and decision making enhances the p robab i l i ty  
o f  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in implementation, where imposed programmes may be 
ignored or avoided; moral ly ,  people have a r i g h t  to take part  in making 
decisions tha t  a f fe c t  th e i r  own l i ve s .
A common aspect o f  the w r i t ing  on p a r t ic ip a t io n  has been what may 
be termed a "programme o r ie n ta t io n " ,  i . e .  a focus on what makes 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  id e n t i f ie d  development programmes more or less e f fe c t iv e .  
While t h i s  i s  o f  in te res t  to development workers involved on such 
programmes, p a r t i c ip a t io n  seen from the perspective o f  the rura l  poor 
involves a range o f  soc ia l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  and economic processes tha t  are 
included in many s t ruc tu ra l  analyses o f  development but ignored or taken 
as givens by those concerned with spec i f ic  development programmes. I t  
is the recognit ion o f  the importance o f  these processes as fundamental 
to the issue o f  pa r t ic ipa t ion  tha t  makes the UNRISD popular 
p a r t i c ip a t io n  programme a novel departure.
The UNRISD programme stressed from the s ta r t  the irrelevance o f  
se lect ing sp e c i f ic  "experimental" p a r t ic ipa to ry  programmes in iso la t ion  
as objects o f  study, since these are marginal to the experience o f  most 
t h i rd  world ru ra l  producers. Likewise, i t  was stressed tha t  the object 
was not to u t i l i s e  or devise any body o f  " p a r t i c ip a t io n  theory".  
Rather, such areas as social change, class, power, hierarchy, ideology 
would provide the theoret ica l  background to an analysis o f  the 
constra in ts  and openings for pa r t ic ipa t ion  in a va r ie ty  o f social 
s i tua t ions .  Moreover, p a r t i c ip a t io n  was seen not as a way o f  a l te r ing  
backward soc iet ies so as to emulate more pa r t ic ip a to ry  systems that had 
developed in the West o r ,  a l t e rn a t i v e ly ,  the s o c ia l i s t  bloc. I t  was 
specif ied from the s ta r t  tha t the b a t t le  against domination and s t i f l i n g  
o f  creat ive powers is  a universal one, a lb e i t  fought in many ways. Thus
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in the West democracy and trade union r igh ts  have been won, yet 
indus t r ia l  society s t i l l  faces growing a l ienat ion from re s p o n s ib i l i t y  
and c r e a t i v i t y .  In soc iet ies where formal class s tructures have been 
abol ished, bureaucracies and p o l i t i c a l  power monopolies have taken 
choice away from the mass o f  in d iv id u a ls .3 And in the th i rd  world new 
forms o f  oppression are con t inua l ly  taking shape (Pearse and St ie fe l  
1979). As such, forms, emphases, and even d e f in i t i o n s  o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  
are necessari ly h ighly  context bound, hence the commitment to avoiding 
universal i s t i c  prescr ip t ions (S t ie fe l  and Wolfe 1984).
A primary tenet o f  the UNRISD approach is  tha t  pa r t ic ip a t io n  is  a
basic element in reversing the trend toward dependence and
marginal izat ion o f  the masses, and so "the centra l  issue of popular
p a r t i c ip a t io n  has to do with power" (Pearse and S t ie fe l  1979 : 5).
Early on, p a r t i c ip a t io n  was seen as
act ive  and meaningful involvement o f  the masses o f  
people at d i f f e r e n t  leve ls :  (a) in the decision 
making process fo r the determination o f  societal  
goals and the a l loca t ion  o f  resources to achieve
them and (b) in the execution o f  resu l t ing
programmes and pro jects (UNRISD 1978 : 2).
A d is t in c t io n  was thus made between act ive and passive p a r t i c ip a t io n ,
the l a t t e r  being the provision o f  cheap or free labour to community
development programmes and rejected in the above terms.
In i t s  e f f o r t  to estab l ish  "outer obstacles" (s tructures of
a n t i - p a r t i c ip a t io n )  and " inner l im i t s "  (contrad ic t ions between central
and local a u th o r i t y ) ,  UNRISD was committing i t s e l f  to a p o l i t i c a l
economic approach. More s p e c i f i c a l l y :
The study of poverty and the p o l i t i c a l  economy of 
the production o f  wealth during the las t  few 
decades has shown convincingly tha t  the generation 
of poverty is  a funct ion o f  the concentrat ion o f  
power and the monopolization o f  resources, which 
puts the cheap and obedient labour o f the poor at 
the disposal o f  the monopolizers, thereby 
increasing th e i r  power. I t  must be accepted, 
the re fo re ,  tha t  the struggle for people's
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p a r t i c ip a t io n  impl ies an attempted re d is t r ib u t io n  
o f  both control o f  resources and power in favour 
o f  those who l i v e  by th e i r  own productive labour 
(Pearse and S t ie fe l  1979 : 5).
This commitment to get to gr ips with issues o f  control  and
u l t ima te ly  o f power represents a departure from previous work in two
main respects. F i r s t ,  i t  l inks  what is commonly regarded as a
"programme re la ted"  issue, v iz .  p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  with underlying
s truc tu ra l  phenomena, enhancing the understanding of issues with in
mainstream development debates. Second, i t  tack les head on the
associat ion o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  with issues o f  ex is t ing  or potent ial
c o n f l i c t .  The re a l i za t io n  that such issues must not be sidestepped led
to a revised working d e f in i t i o n  o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  as
the organized e f fo r t s  to increase control  over 
resources and regula t ive  in s t i t u t io n s  in given
social s i tua t ions  on the part o f  groups and 
movements o f  those h i ther to  excluded from such 
contro l  ( i b id .  : 8).
Pa r t ic ipa t ion  thus defined represents an unambiguous i d e n t i f i c a t io n
with disadvantaged social  groups.
Par t ic ipa t ion  is seen in a number o f d i f f e r e n t  dimens ions.4
Primary for UNRISD are analyses o f  the a n t i - p a r t i c ip a to ry  structures and
ideologies as out l ined above and encounter between the "excluded" and
those tha t  maintain exclusion. Such encounter may take on many forms,
from bargaining to armed struggle , between groups, classes, or
organizat ions. An "encounter model" is  devised, whereby p a r t ic ipa t ion
is seen as being concerned with "struggle over terms o f  incorporat ion"
(Pearse 1980 : 2) in the context o f  change and loss o f  effect iveness and
relevance o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Moreover, the struggle is not
seen as a simple encounter o f  v i l l a g e  with state or any other defined
rura l  social un i t  with the larger  system, fo r
the fac t  of p a r t i c ip a t io n  by the v i l la g e  in 
regional and national a f f a i r s  ( i . e .  as p o l i t i c a l  
force, source o f  commodities, re c ip ie n t  o f  
services, as suppl ier of labour,  e tc . )  is no
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guarantee tha t  i t  acts as an agent o f  popular 
p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  though indeed i t  may i f  national  
class d iv is io ns  do not penetrate and d iv ide  i t  too 
deeply  (Pearse 1980 : 6; emphasis added).
The importance o f  th is  proviso w i l l  become apparent in our discussion of
the terms o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in Lan Sak below.
I have dwelt at some length on the UNRISD formulat ion of
p a r t i c ip a t io n  fo r  two main reasons. F i r s t ,  the importance attached to 
underlying s t ruc tu ra l  aspects o f  the p o l i t i c a l  economy corresponds with 
the production approach used in th is  study, and the resu l t ing  emphasis 
on control  is  o f  value fo r  the fo l lowing analysis of p a r t ic ipa t ion  in
the context o f  changing production re la t ions  in Lan Sak. Second, the
rigorous avoidance by the UNRISD studies of universal appl ica t ions and 
consequent focus on (world) reg ional,  na t iona l ,  and local contexts is  
o f  value in a l o c a l l y  bound study such as th i s  one.
Indeed, UNRISD as part o f  i t s  continuing programme has revised
i t s  approach fo r  d i f f e re n t  world regions. The i n i t i a l  regional
d is t in c t io n  is  between the Asian and Latin American contexts, due to the
d i f f e re n t  constra in ts  faced by a l te rna t ive  movements in the two sets o f
studies. Whereas in Latin America popular autonomous act ion has had a
long t r a d i t i o n ,  in the Asian case the more pervasive power o f  the state
allows less "space" fo r  such movements. Thus where the working
d e f in i t i o n  o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  stated above is s t i l l  applied in the Latin
American studies,  i t  has been amended in l i g h t  o f  experience in the
Asian context to include
reference to po l ic ies  o f  pa r t icu la r  states and 
governments whose purported aim is  to devolve such 
control  to the people (Pearse and S t ie fe l  1979).
As we w i l l  see in the fo l lowing sect ion,  the approach is  modified yet
fu r the r  w ith in  ind iv idual national contexts.
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V I I I  J J i  Conceptual izat ions o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  ; Thailand
The World Bank has long held inf luence in o r ie n ta t io n  o f  the Thai 
nat ional development strategy. Since the early  1960s, with the s ta r t  o f  
national economic planning, the Bank has promoted a growth oriented 
strategy in which t r a d i t i o n a l  economic ind icators have been used to 
r e f l e c t  a buoyant economy and remarkable success in the Bank's own terms 
(IBRD 1959). Yet toward the end o f  the 1970s, as the resu l ts  o f  the 
forementioned strategy became ever more apparent in s tead i ly  increasing 
inequa l i t ies  between town and countryside, regions, and social groups 
within each o f  these, the Bank turned i t s e l f  toward issues o f  
r e d is t r ib u t io n .  In part t h i s  represented a s h i f t  in th ink ing among 
conventional development economists toward the " re d is t r ib u t io n  with 
growth" orthodoxy tha t  had emerged in the 1970s.^ in the Thai case, 
i t  led to a repor t  e n t i t l e d  "Thailand : toward a strategy o f  f u l l  
pa r t ic ip a t io n "  (IBRD 1980),
The Bank's in te rp re ta t io n  o f  p a r t ic ip a t io n  is clear from th is  
repor t  even though i t  i s  not e x p l i c i t .  The problems o f  past development 
stra tegy, according to the Bank's analysis,  stem not from the c a p i t a l i s t  
penetrat ion o f  the Thai economy, ra the r ,  they stem from the fac t  that i t  
has not gone fa r enough, tha t  i t  has not involved a l l  in i t s  "bene f i ts " .  
Those who have "pa r t ic ipa ted"  most f u l l y  to date are those on the edges 
o f  the Central Plains who have managed to d i v e r s i f y  by movement into 
non-r ice agr icu l tu re  in response to market signals. In the local terms 
o f  the present study, t h i s  makes Lan Sak farmers exemplary 
"p a r t i c ip a n ts " ,  the more so in Ban Mai than in Ban Dong. Wider 
p a r t i c ip a t io n  is thus to be achieved by ensuring more complete 
involvement o f  the mass o f  the population in the c a p i t a l i s t  economy. 
Non-cap ita l is t  elements are to be ironed out by road construct ion,
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extension o f  c r e d i t ,  improved marketing, and other measures designed to 
increase the cash income o f  the rura l  poor.^
Although t h i s  analysis c lea r ly  represents exogenous inf luence, i t  
cannot be represented in iso la t ion  from Thai discourse on development.
The approach is  tha t  adopted by the mainstream macro-economic planners 
o f  the NESDB. Indeed, t h i s  strand of discourse has been prominent ever
since the early 1960s with the popular slogan o f  then Prime Minister
Field Marshall S a r i t ,  "Ngaan kheu ngoen ngoen kheu ngaan bandaan
suk : Work is  money, money is  work, creat ing happiness".
A contrast ing Thai discourse on pa r t ic ipa t ion  is  contained in the
UNRISD pro jec t  on Thai land. This involved a group o f  Thai academics,
development workers, and the rura l  poor themselves in an attempt
to document and contr ibute to a popular h is to ry  o f  
organized and everyday e f fo r t s  made in the past 
few years by (and on behalf  of)  the rural  poor to 
enhance t h e i r  l ive l ihood  and social power [and to]  
assess the p o te n t i a l i t i e s ,  obstacles, and 
l im i ta t io n s  o f  such e f fo r t s  (Turton 1984a : 2).
Not only was the analysis broadened beyond simple p a r t i c ip a t io n  in the
market, but the market i t s e l f ,  or ra ther  lack o f  control  over i t ,
emerged as a ubiquitous problem.
The UNRISD studies id e n t i f y  power as a key element in
p a r t ic ipa to ry  struggles o f  the rura l  poor. In l ine  with the Asian focus
stated above, the power o f  the state is o f  key s ign i f icance .  Thus, i t  is
concluded:
While the public statements o f  governments may 
give some currency to values o f  democracy, 
p lu ra l ism, s e l f - r e l i a n c e ,  and popular i n i t i a t i v e ,  
in pract ice government po l ic ies  and agencies have 
la rge ly  had the e f fe c t  o f  fragmenting, 
demobi l iz ing, and preventing autonomous forms of 
s o l i d a r i t y  among and between various s t ra ta  and
sectors o f  the people ( i b id .  : 4).
This i s  not to say tha t  ind iv idual government o f f i c i a l s ,  groups, or
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programmes are not supportive o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n .  Indeed, the study found 
tha t  no p a r t i cu la r  form o f  organizat ion was i t s e l f  enabling or l im i t i n g  
in any absolute sense. However, i t  was found that fo r  the most part 
o f f i c i a l  groups s t i f l e  i n i t i a t i v e ,  work to r i g id  bureaucratic standards, 
and provide unrepresentative leadership. In order to meet with success 
in terms o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  as set out in the UNRISD d e f i n i t i o n ,  groups 
have to overcome these drawbacks.
More important than the nature o f  spec i f ic  groups, however, are 
underlying cu l tu ra l  and p o l i t i c a l  economic elements tha t  explain the 
a n t i - p a r t i c ip a to ry  organizat ion o f  Thai society.  A “ cu lture o f
subordinat ion" i s  i d e n t i f i e d ,  and Turton speaks o f  the fragmenting
e f fe c t  o f  the increasing va r ie ty  o f  labour processes and the
in te n s i f i c a t io n  o f  labour. At the local l e v e l ,  socio-economic
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  the v i l l a g e  and the l inks  between v i l l a g e  e l i t e s  and 
the state are id e n t i f ie d  as the f i r s t  stage in surplus accumulation. 
As a r e s u l t ,  c o n f l i c t  and p a r t ic ip a t io n  are seen to be inseparable,
since c o n f l i c t s  o f  in te res t  are already so f i rm ly  establ ished. 
Suppressing p a r t i c ip a t io n  at present is not so much an absence o f  a 
sense o f  i n ju s t i c e  as a lack o f  "space" ( in  the le g a l ,  i n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  
and l i n g u is t i c  sense) fo r  c r i t i c i s m  of the social order ,  given the close 
associat ion o f  government, s ta te ,  nat ion, r e l i g io n ,  and monarchy.
A th i rd  set o f  discourses on p a r t i c ip a t io n  on the Thai 
development scene emerged from a conference held in February 1984
involving Thai c i v i l  servants, academics, and non-governmental
development workers. The resu l t ing  publ icat ion (Thawithong 1984) 
re f le c ts  well the va r ie ty  o f  in te rp re ta t ions  o f  pa r t ic ipa to ry  
development held among d i f f e r e n t  sections o f  the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , ^  but 
at the same time i t  points to an apparent consensus on the need for
broader involvement in the development process than has taken place
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h i th e r to .  The pr inc ipal di f ferences concern the terms o f  pa r t ic ip a t io n  
involved.
The contr ibu t ions f a l l  roughly into three categories, in l ine
with the three groups o f  par t ic ipan ts  in t h i s  dialogue. F i r s t ,  there
are the c i v i l  servants expounding the o f f i c i a l  version and po l ic ies  o f
popular p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  with heavy emphasis on o f f i c i a l l y  designated
in s t i t u t i o n s .  I t  must be stressed tha t  most o f  these are senior
o f f i c i a l s  whose statements r e f l e c t  accurately the rhe to r ic  but not
necessari ly the local pract ice o f  the state in promoting i t s  form o f
p a r t i c ip a t io n .  Pa r t ic ipa t ion  is defined by the Director  o f  the
Community Development Department as
the process by which the government promotes,
persuades, supports, and provides the 
oppor tun i t ies  fo r  people in the community, whether 
they be ind iv idua ls ,  groups, clubs, associat ions,  
foundations, or voluntary organizat ions, to take 
part in carry ing out any piece(s) of work . . .  in 
order to f u l f i l  s t ipulated development ob ject ives 
and po l icy  (Phairat 1984 : 6; my t ra n s la t io n ) .
Par t ic ipa t ion  is something sponsored by outs iders, and i t s  aim is to
encourage local involvement in achieving object ives th a t  are st ipu la ted
elsewhere. Other vehicles for pa r t ic ip a t io n  than formal government
in s t i t u t i o n s  (e.g. cooperatives, farmers' groups, tambon counci l )  are
permissible, but the examples o f  "non-formal" organizat ions given are
hardly independent i n i t i a t i v e s  *. V i l lage Scouts, National Defense
Volunteers, Rotary Clubs, Lions Clubs.8 The emphasis in these
contr ibu t ions is  on improving the e f f i c ie n c y  o f  sp e c i f ic  mechanisms such
as the admin is tra t ive framework o f  the tambon counci l (Chit 1984).
The s ta r t ing  point is  tha t  o f  encouraging a h i the r to  apathet ic or
ignorant v i l l a g e  population to take an in te rest  in o f f i c i a l  pro jects.
Within th is  framework there i s  much ta lk  o f  the need for pro jects to be
s e l f  susta in ing, involve v i l l a g e rs  from the s ta r t  in assessing needs and
in planning, implementation, and fol lowing up.
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The academic contr ibut ions are c r i t i c a l  of  t h i s  pro ject 
o r ien ta t ion  and emphasis on o f f i c i a l  channels as media for 
p a r t i c ip a t io n .  Thawithong c r i t i c i z e s  the ambiguity o f  the F i f th  Plan 
regarding the place of popular pa r t ic ipa t ion  in development po l icy ,  
espec ia l ly  in the p o l i t i c a l  economic sphere. In p a r t i c u la r ,  he regards 
o f f i c i a l  conceptions of pa r t ic ip a t io n  as misguided, since they are
concerned p r im ar i ly  with expanding a c t i v i t i e s  o f  each department (or
"empire : anaanikhom" in Chai-anan's words) and with increasing the 
number o f  v i l la g e s  ra ther than the q u a l i ty  of work in any one pro ject:
The [ o f f i c i a l ]  meaning of p a r t ic ip a t io n
tends to be used as a means to get people to 
cooperate in a c t i v i t i e s  or pro jects tha t  the state 
or i t s  o f f i c i a l s  have st ipulated . . .  Most state 
o f f i c i a l s  th ink  th a t  p a r t ic ipa t ion  is a new
instrument or technique fo r  get t ing  v i l l a g e rs  to 
accept the a c t i v i t i e s  already la id  out by those
o f f i c i a l s  (Thawithong 1984 : 2 - 3; my
transl a t i o n ) .
This leads to v i l l a g e rs '  being forced into numerous a c t i v i t i e s  tha t
increase not only t h e i r  burden but also t h e i r  dependence on outsiders.
Saneh Jamrik in his c r i t i q u e  o f  Phairat 's  approach c r i t i c i z e s  the
idea th a t  i n i t i a t i v e s  and forms must be external to the community,
ignoring the potent ial  of what is  already there. He is p a r t i c u la r l y
worried about the use o f  "p a r t i c ip a to ry  development" as a tool for
imposit ion o f  a l ien  structures:
Vie overlook the resources tha t  already e x is t .
What is  already there is  l i k e  a local plant whose 
growth ought to be supported. Instead, what is  
being done now is  equivalent to uprooting and
discarding th is  plant and replacing i t  with one
unsuited to local condi t ions. In the end, the
plant dies (Saneh in ib id .  : 24; my t ra n s la t io n ) .
Saneh defines p a r t i c ip a t io n  as developing and using the f u l l  potent ial
capacity o f  people, in other words s ta r t ing  with what is  already there.
Thawithong expands the d e f i n i t i o n  as:
The development o f  popular or community capacity 
in managing and co n t ro l l ing  the use and 
d i s t r ib u t i o n  o f  resources and means o f  production 
ex is t ing  in society for the purpose o f  carry ing
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on social and economic l ive l ihood  ( i b id .  : 2; my
t r a n s la t i o n ) .
Meanwhile, a prominent Thai p o l i t i c a l  sc ien t is t  deals more d i r e c t l y  with 
pa r t ic ip a t io n  as involv ing issues of power and broader st ructura l  
aspects o f  the social  formation. Since p a r t i c ip a t io n  is concerned 
pr imar i ly  with the devolut ion of power from those who have i t  to those 
who do not, i t  cannot be divorced from the p o l i t i c a l  process. In the 
Thai context,  monopolization o f  leg i t imacy by the c i v i l  service system 
{rabob raachakaan) means th a t  i t  is above a l l  the ro le  and internal 
funct ioning o f  th i s  system th a t  needs to be addressed. In achieving 
p a r t ic ipa to ry  aims, there are essen t ia l ly  two a l te rna t ives  : voluntary
devolut ion o f  power on the part  o f  those with, versus use of pressure 
ta c t i c s  by those without (Chai-anan 1984).
Those closest to the pract ica l  concerns o f  pa r t ic ipa to ry  
development are the non-governmental development workers. While 
recognizing themselves as "ou ts ide rs" ,  they attempt to adopt a 
perspective as close to tha t  o f  v i l l a g e rs  themselves as is  possible (see 
Chapter I I ) .  One prominent such worker o f  many years' experience 
questions the premise tha t  v i l la g e rs  have not par t ic ipated in the past. 
On the contrary , enthusiasm was at f i r s t  great ,  with v i l l a g e rs  expending 
large amounts o f  time and other resources on p ro jec ts ,  meetings, and new 
forms o f  production brought in from the outside by developers. Many 
leaders were used by outsiders to the extent tha t  t h e i r  own fami l ies 
suffered hardship, and the f r u i t s  o f  t h i s  development went to a minor i ty  
o f  better  o f f  v i l l a g e rs .  Meanwhile, the re su l t  fo r  most was increasing 
indebtedness, loss o f  land, and destruct ion o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  ways o f  l i f e .  
More fundamental ly, and going even fur ther  back, v i l l a g e rs  were not 
without t h e i r  own ways o f  making decisions, working in groups, and 
changing things fo r  the be t te r .  Outside interference in the name o f  
development has, over the past 30 years or so, tended to undermine such 
indigenous organizat ion. Recent concern to enable v i l l a g e rs  to
362
par t ic ipa te  is often i l l u s o r y ,  since p a r t ic ip a t io n  is with in  a 
predetermined framework set out by non-v i l lagers ,  and pa r t ic ipa t ion  is  
considered simply as a technique; meanwhile, i t  is a convenient way o f  
blaming fa i lu re s  on local level de f ic ienc ies ,  neglect ing to take account 
of how n a t ion a l ly  set p r i o r i t i e s  l i m i t  and determine local act ion.  True 
p a r t i c ip a t io n  (though not e x p l i c i t l y  defined as such) must involve 
v i l l a g e rs  as the main actors, outs iders being relegated to a support 
ro le .  This involves a re-evaluat ion o f  past development by v i l la g e rs  
and a reassessment o f  t h e i r  own a t t i tudes by outside development 
workers, who must seek to bu i ld  on the ex is t ing community rather than 
t r y  to replace i t  with a l ien forms. F in a l l y ,  there is a need for 
reconsiderat ion o f  the re la t io n sh ip  between community and national 
object ives : to date the community's task has always been to accommodate 
na t ion a l ly  set p r i o r i t i e s  and in te rp re t  them in to  local act ion; there is  
a need to reverse th i s  in order that nat ional d i re c t io n  is set at the 
local level (Bamrung 1984).
V I I I ^ l j i i  Structures and discourse o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in Lan Sak
Par t ic ipa t ion  has become a catchword attached to ,  i f  not quite as 
pervasive as, "development". This has worked i t s  way through a l l  
leve ls ,  from the conventional and more radical in ternat ional
organizat ions concerned with development, such as the World Bank and 
UNRISD respec t ive ly ,  through mainstream and a l te rna t ive  national
development organizat ions, to local level st ructures. At one le v e l ,  
th is  merely re f l e c t s  the desire o f  each o f  the developers to involve 
people in i t s  own p a r t icu la r  form o f  development. More fundamental ly, 
however, i t  re la tes  to the terms o f  involvement. Such can be
i l l u s t r a te d  by reference to structures and discourse o f  pa r t ic ip a t io n  in
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Lan Sak, p a r t i c u la r l y  as observed in Ban Dong and Ban Mai.
The two key o f f i c i a l  s tructures fo r  p a r t i c ip a t io n  (kaan khao 
maa mi i  suan ruam) are the tambon council (TC) and the v i l la g e  
committee (VC). Although the TC has been in existence since 1956, i t  
has gone through several modif icat ions and only in the F i f t h  Plan has i t  
been stressed to the current extent as a p r inc ipa l  vehicle for popular 
pa r t i c ip a t io n  in development. As in every other tambon in Thai land, 
the counci ls in Ban Dong and Thung Khaa are presided over by th e i r  
respect ive kamnans. In addi t ion , a l l  v i l l a g e  headmen and elected 
elders (phuu songkhunawut) s i t  on the counc i l ,  as do a local 
headmaster as secretary and tambon (v i l la ge )  doctor. Al l  these must 
be approved by the D is t r i c t  O f f icer .  Local health and community 
development o f f i c i a l s  attend the council in an advisory capacity. 
Meanwhile, the VC is  presided over by the v i l la g e  head and is  made up of 
several other elected members (see Appendix 7).
Through such bodies, according to the Lan Sak D is t r i c t  O f f ice r ,  
" v i l l a g e rs  are now the regulators  : t o ' n  n i i  chaobaan pen phuu
kamnod". However, a closer examination o f  these structures in the two 
study v i l l a g es  reveals two substant ial  weaknesses v i s -a -v is  
p a r t i c ip a t io n  in any other than the formal senses out l ined in the 
previous sect ion. The f i r s t  weakness has to do with o f f i c i a l  
conceptual izat ions o f  the ro le  o f  TC and VC. The second is the extent 
to which these bodies represent the interests  o f  a l l  sections o f  the 
community.
The synaptic ro le  o f  o f f i c i a l l y  sanctioned v i l l a g e  in s t i t u t io n s  
and leaders^ places them in an ambivalent s i tua t ion  with respect to 
re la t io n s  between v i l l a g e rs  and the wider p o l i t y .  At a development 
t ra in ing  programme for  v i l l a g e  heads in Lan Sak in 1985, the Senior
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Deputy D i s t r i c t  Of f icer summed up the funct ion o f  the VC in the
fo l lowing words: "Kamakaan muubaan hai khwaamhencho'b kae nuai
raachakaan taang taang nai pheunthi i  kho1ng muubaan : The VC gives
approval to government units with in  the bounds o f  the v i l l a g e " .  This
le g i t im iz a t io n  ro le  as expressed in local o f f i c i a l  development discourse
is  a r e i t e r a t io n  o f  wider o f f i c i a l  conceptual izat ions such as the
fol lowing statement concerning the TC:
[ I t ]  i s  not an organization fo r  local
admin is tra t ion . Nor does i t  have independent 
legal status {n i t ibukkhon) . Rather, i t  is  the 
basic un i t  o f  government administrat ion 
{nuaingaan pheun thaan kho’ ng thaang raachakaan)
(Chit  1984 : 54 - 55; my t ra n s la t io n ) .
These expressions c o n f l i c t  sharply with p a r t i c ip a to ry  notions as
conceived by academics and non-governmental development workers. Many
high level bureaucrats have taken progressive ideas concerning
p a r t i c ip a t io n  on board, recommending for example tha t  p a r t i c ip a t io n  o f
v i l la g e rs  must involve decision making, planning, carrying out work,
b ene f i ts ,  and evaluat ion, and tha t  o f f i c i a l s  should take a back seat
ro le  as "phuu hai kham naenam : advisers" rather than "phuu
kratham : doers" (Chit  1984). However, the r e a l i t y  o f  the funct ioning
o f  the VC and TC as observed in Lan Sak shows them to be more relevant
as too ls  o f  state power at the v i l la g e  and s u b -d is t r i c t  level than as
vehicles fo r  a r t i c u la t io n  o f  community in te res ts  in deal ings with the
state a u th o r i t ie s .
I f  the VC and TC serve p r im ar i ly  as vehicles fo r  o f f i c i a l  entry 
to local communities, what o f  t h e i r  role in serving the communities by 
representat ive leadership? In both Ban Dong and Ban Mai, v i l l a g e  
committees are dominated by the v i l l a g e  head and one or two cronies,  in 
a l l  cases men o f  exceptional economic status in the v i l l a g e  context.
The TC in Ban Dong and Thung Khaa are both heavi ly dominated by th e i r
respect ive kamnans. In both these cases the head of the VC or TC is  
an e x -o f f i c i o  member who remains in o f f i ce  up to the age of 60 and has
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an exceptional status by v i r tue  o f  his  pos it ion in the v i l l a g e  or
tambon. As a r e s u l t ,  VC and TC meetings are dominated by these
persona l i t ies ,  who because o f  th e i r  economic status are not seen as 
representat ive by the majo r i ty  o f  v i l l a g e rs  (see Section
below). This pattern i s  typ ica l  of VCs and TCs a l l  over Thailand (e.g.
Pathaan 1984; Turton 1984b).
The main o f f i c i a l  forum fo r  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in v i l l a g e  a c t i v i t i e s  
i s  the monthly v i l l a g e  meeting. In Ban Mai, attendance is  compulsory on
penalty o f  a 50 baht f i n e .  The meeting is dominated by the VC, in
p a r t i cu la r  by i t s  president,  the v i l la g e  head. The meeting takes place 
a t the temple hall  or at the v i l l a g e  school. A microphone is used to 
address the 400 or so v i l l a g e rs  present in Ban Mai, fewer in Ban Dong, 
and the VC s i t s  at the f r o n t .  Up to two hours is  spent reading o f f i c i a l  
announcements from the D is t r i c t  Administrat ion {Amphoe) . Occasional 
proposals are presented by d i s t r i c t  o f f i c i a l s  or the v i l la g e  head, who 
require a yes or no vote ra ther than a choice between a l te rna t ives .
Government personnel including pol ice and army o f f i c e r s ,  to whom a show
o f  deference is made by the v i l l a g e  head, regu la r ly  use the meeting as a 
forum fo r  disseminat ion o f  o f f i c i a l  po l icy ;  indeed, the meeting is  timed 
to occur a few days a f te r  the meeting of v i l l a g e  heads at the Amphoe 
at the beginning o f  each month.10 Any other business is  then cal led 
f o r ,  t h i s  in the knowledge that there is another hour and a h a l f ' s  r o l l  
c a l l  before anyone can leave fo r  lunch and what is  l e f t  o f  the day's 
work, and ra re ly  does any other business ar ise .  There is occasional 
con tr ibut ion from the f l o o r ,  but too much spontaneous in te r je c t io n  
evokes a reprimand from the v i l l a g e  head, who in s is ts  on anyone who 
wants to speak ra is ing  a hand and wait ing to be ca l led upon before being 
given the f l o o r ,  unaided by microphone.
Another o f f i c i a l  forum fo r  pa r t ic ip a t io n  is the array o f  t ra in in g
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programmes provided by various government departments at the v i l l a g e
leve l .  These take place mainly during the a g r icu l tu ra l  off-season 
(February to A p r i l ) .  Attendance is often compulsory. A common method
is fo r  Amphoe o f f i c i a l s  to state pub l ic ly  at a v i l l a g e  meeting that i t
would r e f l e c t  badly on the v i l la g e  i f  not a l l  households sent a 
represen ta t ive , placing the onus on the v i l l a g e  head to ensure that a l l  
households "p a r t i c ip a te " .  The fol lowing dialogue at a VC meeting in 
Ban Dong discussing arrangements fo r  a two day t r a in in g  programme for 
the "Phaen din tham Phaen din tho'ng"  pro ject (see section I l . l . i i )  
speaks for i t s e l f  about the terms o f  p a r t ic ip a t io n :
Kamnan : To'ng bangkhap hai maa thuk khon!
(Everyone must be forced to attend!)
O f f i c ia l  : Mai yaak hai chai w i t h i i  kaanbangkhap 
khuan j a  chai w i t h i i  kaan chakchuan 
( I  don ' t  want to force people; they 
should be persuaded).
Kamnan : Man khi aai khl aai  kan s i !  (They amount
to j u s t  about the same th ing ! )
More important ly,  v i l l a g e rs  themselves frequently express the fee l ing of
being forced ( thuuk bangkhap) into attending numerous meetings and
t ra in in g  sessions. The content o f  the t ra in in g  is  la rge ly  ideo log ica l,
with emphasis on l o y a l ty  to the national symbols o f  chaat saat kasat
(nat ion, r e l i g io n ,  monarchy), dut ies as a c i t i z e n ,  un i ty ,  and
anti-Vietnamese rh e to r ic .  Another aspect o f  thuuk bangkhap is
mandatory p a r t ic ip a t io n  in "development days" proclaimed by the
Amphoe, when the VC is  responsible for organizing a c t i v i t i e s  such as
roadside grass cu t t in g .  In 1984, v i l l a g e  heads were chided by the
Amphoe fo r  not being zealous enough in securing p a r t i c ip a t io n .
Non-governmental st ructures of p a r t ic ip a t io n  in Ban Dong and Ban 
Mai are few, and p a r t ic ip a t io n  has yet to enter into n on -o f f ic ia l  
discourse. Even the Bung Khiew Rice and Buffalo Banks, perhaps the most 
genuinely p a r t i c ip a to ry  s tructures in e i ther  o f  the two communities 
(according to the approach used below), are not spoken o f  by members in
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terms o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  as such, but rather in terms o f  chuai kan
{mutual help) or ruam meu kan (cooperat ion).  Discourse and structures
are thus independent and not always coincident a r t i c u la t io n s  o f
p a r t i c ip a t io n  in any s i tu a t io n ,  and in the case o f  structures
p a r t i c ip a t io n  must be interpreted according to c r i t e r i a  im p l i c i t  in the 
various conceptual izat ions set out above. I t  can be seen, moreover, 
tha t  the more radical o f  these include n o n - in s t i tu t io na l  act ion and 
expression of power by the powerless as important elements o f  
p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  which might be taken to include resistance to o f f i c i a l  or 
hegemonic programmes.^
V I I I . 2 Revised concepts o f  pa r t ic ipa t ion
Even though the previous section d e l ibe ra te ly  avoided being 
d e f i n i t i v e  about p a r t ic ip a to ry  development as a universal concept, i t  
w i l l  have revealed two th ings. One is tha t  any not ion as widely 
appl icable - and appl ied - is  capable o f  more or less i n f i n i t e  
ideological manipulation. The other is tha t  i t s  app l icat ion  and 
in te rp re ta t ion  are h igh ly context bound. The present section u t i l i z e s  
strands from the various in te rp re ta t ions  out l ined above to develop a 
revised approach th a t  is  o f  relevance in examining issues o f  
p a r t ic ipa to ry  development in the context o f  changing production 
re la t io n s  in recent ly  sett led forest  areas such as Lan Sak. The 
approach is  d e l ibe ra te ly  context bound and adopts, as do a l l  
in te rp re ta t ions ,  spec i f ic  ideological assumptions. ^
Two emergent themes in the discussion o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  have been 
the determinat ion by various actors o f  the course o f  t h e i r  own l ives  and 
the involvement o f  the "h i th e r to  excluded". More genera l ly  expressed,
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these are the basic themes o f  control  and power. The fol lowing two
sub-sections re la te  these themes to issues discussed in Chapters V and
VI respec t ive ly ,  and th is  is  followed by a reconsiderat ion o f
p a r t i c ip a t io n  as i t  appl ies to the p o l i t i c a l  economy o f  Lan Sak
a g r ic u l tu re .
V I I I P a r t i c i p a t i o n  and production
A notable feature o f  the programmes involv ing the discourse o f  
p a r t ic ipa t ion  in Lan Sak described above is  tha t  they are only 
marginal ly concerned with production per se . Some o f  the tra in ing
programmes include ag r icu l tu ra l  advice and some o f  the TC projects
involve construct ion o f  in f ras t ruc tu re  with a d i re c t  or ind i re c t  bearing 
on production such as i r r i g a t i o n  f a c i l i t i e s  or roads, but most 
a c t i v i t i e s  under th is  heading are concerned with admin is tra t ive  or 
ideological aspects o f  development. None enter into the area o f  
production re la t io n s .  This tendency fol lows experience elsewhere in
Asia, as evidenced by a set o f  ten p a r t ic ip a to ry  studies in seven
countr ies,  which show tha t  the majo r i ty  o f  p a r t ic ip a to ry  pro jects are 
peripheral to the main production process and therefore have l i t t l e  
e f fe c t  on p roduc t iv i ty  o f  the poor. The reason fo r th is  i s  tha t  most 
pro jects bypass the issue o f  the share o f  the poor in the main 
production process (e.g. wages, tenants'  shares, access to inputs) and 
t r y  to work outside the main economy, where the resource base is  
correspondingly small (Mehta 1981). In Lan Sak, most o f  the project 
or iented p a r t i c ip a t io n  is  l ikewise peripheral to the main economy.
The a l te rna t ive  approach out l ined here s ta r ts  with production as 
the pr inc ipa l  ta rge t  o f p a r t i c ip a t io n .  The p r inc ip les  o f  pa r t ic ipa t ion
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as on the one hand increasing (or maintaining) control  over factors  
inf luencing one's own l i f e ,  and on the other power v i s -a -v is  the wider
system, are taken as the s ta r t ing  po in t ,  but i t  is  considered v i t a l  to
address these primary issues to areas o f  v i l l a g e r s '  l i ves  tha t  a f fe c t  
t h e i r  circumstances most d i r e c t l y .  For t h i s  reason, the emphasis is  on 
product ion, based on the premise that production is o f  importance both 
in i t s e l f  and as a determinant of wider social re la t io n s .  The issues 
o f  control  and power are related to production as fo l lows.  F i r s t ,  since 
production is  the basis fo r  l i v e l ih o o d ,  the l i n k  between control  over 
inf luences a f fec t ing  one's l i f e  and control  over fac to rs  o f  production 
is  inex t r icab le .  Second, power within  the communities under study and
in re la t ions  between the communities and outside inf luences (notably
state and ca p i ta l )  are c losely  re lated to production.
Movement from subsistence oriented production toward c a p i t a l i s t  
re la t io n s  of production involves steady erosion o f  decision making power 
in a number o f respects. Most basic in the p o l i t i c a l  economic analysis 
is  the a l iena t ion  o f  labour by c a p i t a l ,  i . e .  the treatment o f  labour as 
a commodity as any o ther ,  which u l t ima te ly  leads to i t s  subsumption by 
c a p i ta l .  The process by which t h i s  occurs is  complex and extremely 
var ied, and in peasant agr icu l tu re  i t  often occurs in "disguise" in that 
i t  may not involve clear cut or immediate a l iena t ion  o f  land or other 
means o f  production as in the classic Lenin is t  model. Moreover, 
s u p e r f i c ia l l y  c a p i t a l i s t  spec ia l iza t ion  often provides an appearance o f  
d iv e rs i f ie d  production choices. However, from the point o f  view o f  the 
rural  producer, these choices are la rge ly  i l l u s o r y  in that most o f  the 
parameters a f fe c t in g  the ul t imate choice recede ever fu r th e r  beyond the 
producer's c o n t r o l . ^
I t  is  useful to d iv ide these parameters a f fec t ing  production into 
two categories. The f i r s t  has to do with the fa c t  o f  producing for the
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market rather than fo r  own use. This involves such areas as pr ices, 
marketing s t ruc tu res ,  transpor t o f  goods to market. In such a case, 
loss o f  control  is  over the value o f  the product, whi le i t s  production 
may remain unchanged from subsistence methods. In an ideal case with no 
other inf luences, a producer faces a s t ra ight  t ra d e o f f  between personal 
consumption o f  the product and sale, re ta in ing  control  over everything 
but the terms o f  sale. The second set o f  parameters has to do with 
res t ruc tu r ing  o f  the production process i t s e l f ,  whereby control  is  los t  
over factors  o f  production. These include land, labour, t i l l a g e ,  and 
material  inputs. The f i r s t  case is  one o f  commoditization o f  produce, 
the second o f  commoditization o f  factors o f  product ion. The f i r s t  is 
typ ica l  of almost every type o f  peasant a g r i c u l t u r e , ^  wh i ie  the 
second is  a feature o f  "Green Revolution" technologies and associated 
changes in production re la t io n s .  In the context o f  the present study, 
the f i r s t  i s  an idealized representat ion of Ban Dong r i c e  ag r icu l tu re ,  
whereby t r a d i t i o n a l  production methods are u t i l i z e d  and only r i ce  
surplus to subsistence requirements is  sold, whereas the second case is 
representat ive o f  Ban Mai, where production is not only almost e n t i r e l y  
market o r ien ted ,  but also i t s e l f  heavi ly commoditized. These 
representat ions are expanded on in Section V II I  >2 J i i  below.
A l te rn a t iv e ly ,  the subject ive experience o f  ru ra l  producers can 
be considered. In th is  case we can postulate a progressive loss o f  
control  over work processes in the move from use o f  family labour and 
labour exchange (ao raeng) to day labouring and contracted extended 
employment. In add i t ion ,  "subsumption" leads to subject ive experience 
o f  loss o f  control  over what is normally classed as family  labour. 
Examples o f  these experiences are raised also in Section V II I  
below.
Together with the information presented in Chapter V, such an
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analysis suggests tha t  h i ther to  development has been notably
a n t i - p a r t i c ip a to ry  in e f fe c t .  Given tha t  commoditization f i r s t  of
ag r icu l tu ra l  produce and then o f  the production process i t s e l f  involves
progressive loss o f  co n t ro l ,  p a r t i c ip a t io n  as a regain ing, maintaining,
or increasing o f  control  cannot avoid concern with production re la t ions .
Regarding s tra teg ies fo r  p a r t i c ip a t io n  with th i s  emphasis, i t  has been
shown above tha t  o f f i c i a l  pa r t ic ipa to ry  development schemes f a i l  to
attack t h i s  problem. NGOs, on the other hand, concern themselves both
in t h e i r  analyses and in some cases in pract ical  action with production.
Broadly, there are two schools o f  thought among NGO developers. The
f i r s t ,  which may be termed "avoidance", is  to aim for s e l f - s u f f i c ie n c y ,
concentrat ing f i r s t  and foremost on subsistence pr oduct i on. Thi s
approach is  seen as t ry ing  to "thuan krasae : swim against the
cu r ren t " ,  fo r  many determinants o f  production (e .g . debt,  consumer
ideology) preempt any such re tu rn .  Atavism is c r i t i c i s e d  by Scott ,  who
regards the s e l f  help approach as " r e t r e a t i s t " , fo r
i t  involves 'making do' with the resources at hand 
rather than recaptur ing the surplus taken in taxes 
and rents by the state and landowners. A large 
share o f  the community's land and i t s  product, 
a f te r  a l l ,  is  now contro l led by outsiders. Most 
o f  the opportun i t ies  fo r  employment, education, 
and assistance are no longer in the hands o f  
v i l l a g e rs  and even the e f f o r t  to minimize external 
demands fo r  taxes and rents requires connections, 
d i r e c t l y  or i n d i r e c t l y  ( s i c ) ,  with the external 
world (Scott  1976 : 206).
The a l te rna t ive  s tra tegy, which can be termed "engagement", involves
a l te r ing  the power balance with in  the system in order to increase
control  over production. Because o f  the l im i ted power o f  the indiv idual
ru ra l  producer, t h i s  usual ly involves cooperative e f f o r t s ,  which are the
subject o f  the fol lowing sect ion.
V I I I > 2 j i  P a r t ic ip a t io n  and cooperation
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I t  was shown in Chapter VI tha t  the ra t iona le  fo r  cooperation is 
in allowing ind iv idua ls  greater bargaining power and potent ial  for 
mobi l iza t ion o f  resources as a group than any o f  them would have on
t h e i r  own. In seeking greater  control over product ion, there fo re ,
cooperative endeavour is often a necessary element in t h i s  aspect o f  
p a r t i c ip a t io n .  Cooperative marketing is  the main way o f  increasing 
bargaining power so as to establ ish control over the value o f  produce. 
In the case o f  co n t ro l l i n g  the production process i t s e l f ,  cooperation 
extends to c re d i t  arrangements, labour organizat ion, t i l l a g e ,  and in 
exceptional cases communal production.
The problematic fo r  cooperation is determining who cooperates
with whom for what, and for whose benef i t .  We have seen in section
V I I ^ I J  the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  establ ish ing norms and preventing free 
r ide rs  in any cooperative enterpr ise. In the struggle for pa r t ic ipa t ion  
through increased con t ro l ,  the problematic can only s t a r t  to be resolved 
by considerat ion of where or to whom control  has gone. For example, has 
control  over surplus gone to persons or mechanisms external to the
community? Is production contro l led by key ind iv idua ls  with in  the
community? Only when such questions are answered can forms o f  
cooperation be establ ished.
This raises a common dilemma faced by cooperative i n i t i a t i v e s  in 
the context o f  v i l l a g e  society : should cooperative action involve a 
socio-economically r e la t i v e l y  homogeneous group, or should a
heterogeneous group be involved? The advantages o f  the former rest with 
the commonality o f  in te res t  tha t  l i e s  within a more uniform group and 
the correspondingly reduced potent ial  for in ternal c o n f l i c t .  The
advantages o f  the l a t t e r  include the increased material  resources and 
social  inf luence tha t  can be brought to bear on behalf  o f  the group by
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inc lus ion o f  more powerful elements within the community. The general ly 
non-exclusive nature of Thai v i l la g e  society,  in which there are no 
t ra d i t io n a l  caste boundaries, does not lend i t s e l f  to exclusive 
organizat ion o f  the poor. L a t te r l y ,  exclusion has occurred at the other 
end of the spectrum, where a v i l l a g e  " sangkhom : soc ie ty ” has emerged 
(Turton 1984b : 30 - 31). This c lea r ly  poses a problem to cooperative
attempts to establ ish control  where such has been usurped with in  the 
community.
V I I I ^ 2 J i i  P a r t ic ip a t io n  and Lan Sak agricu l ture
The above discussion holds that p a r t ic ipa t ion  is  concerned with
establ ish ing control over factors determining production decisions, and 
in redressing power imbalances tha t  re su l t  from in iqu i tous  production 
re la t io n s .  The present section appl ies t h i s  approach with in  the 
spec i f ic  s i tu a t ion  faced by Lan Sak rural  producers. I t  is  suggested 
tha t  i t  is  a general desire fo r  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in t h i s  wider sense that 
explains many courses o f  action taken by rura l  producers in the two 
communities under study, and subject ive experiences are brought in as
evidence o f  the importance o f  control  and power in determining 
s tra tegies o f  l i ve l ih o o d .
In Chapter V above, we saw evidence o f  loss o f  control  over
factors o f production as a re s u l t  o f  the change from subsistence 
or iented production in the r e la t i v e l y  isolated fo rest community to
commercialization in the context o f  ru ra l  development. Family and 
reciprocal labour,  determined by social  re la t ions  in ternal to the
community and established by the par t ic ipan ts  themselves, have given
way to wage labour contro l led by cash arrangements, placing control  in
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the hands o f  those with cash resources, i . e .  the more powerful within 
and even outside the community. Control over land has in many cases 
passed out o f  the hands o f  poorer v i l l a g e rs  as a re s u l t  o f  debt 
o b l iga t ion ,  e i the r  through ou t r igh t  sale or through e f fe c t i v e  mortgaging 
to debtors. Rising land prices are another way o f  concentrat ing land 
ownership in the hands o f  a few v i l l a g e rs  or outs iders. Control over 
production has been fu r the r  undermined by changes in the production 
process i t s e l f .  Control over t i l l a g e  is  often in the hands o f  a few 
t ra c to r  owners, whi le control  over inputs rests with v i l l a g e  traders. 
Access to these increasing ly essent ial  fac tors  o f  ag r icu l tu ra l  
production requires cash, control over which is  concentrated in the 
hands o f  v i l l a g e  t raders ,  ag r icu l tu ra l  middlemen, and state c re d i t  
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  who use th i s  as leverage fo r  control over ag r icu l tu ra l  
production decisions. One stage removed, production decisions are 
affected by pr ice  changes tha t  are determined in Bangkok and Chicago, 
over which producers have no contro l .
The subject ive experience o f  t h i s  loss o f  control  is expressed in 
a number o f ways. One such expression is found in the categorizat ion o f  
forms o f  labour control  from tham eng (own production) through khaek 
raeng (reciprocal  labourer) to khaek jaang (hired labourer),  7uuk 
jaang (extended contract labourer) ,  and k h i i  khaa (low down slave).  
The impl icat ion is th a t  tham eng involves greatest control  over one's 
own labour and by extension over production. This i s  evidenced by the 
fac t  tha t  family  labour is almost exc lus ive ly  used before any other type 
o f  labour,  except by the few households well enough o f f  to be able to 
l i m i t  family  labour use to a supervisory ro le .  P a r t i c u la r ly  ind ica t ive  
o f  the premium placed on control  af forded by use o f  fami ly labour is  i t s  
use in tasks where the im p l i c i t  return is subs tan t ia l l y  below the 
going wage r a t e . ^  The maintenance o f  ao raeng reciprocal exchange 
arrangements where possible demonstrates a preference for re ly ing  on
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resources over which family and community maintain i n t r i n s i c  con tro l .  
The uncertainty  o f  re ly ing  on khaek jaang arrangements is  twofo ld. In 
periods o f  peak a c t i v i t y ,  competit ion with be t te r  o f f  members o f  the 
community means having to pay higher wage rates to secure labour.
Meanwhile an existence as permanent 1 uuk jaang is precarious, 
involving day to  day uncertain ty over l ive l ih o o d ,  as i s  described more 
f u l l y  in Section V I I I  ^ 3 below. The contrast between being a 1 uuk
jaang and tham eng is expressed in the feel ing that as a debtor o f 
middlemen, v i l l a g e  t raders, or even BAAC, one becomes a 1uuk jaang on 
one's own land since production decisions and even choice o f  crop may be 
determined by the c re d i to r .  The low status o f  having to rah jaang , or 
depend on day to day employment fo r  l ive l ih o o d ,  is  expressed by one
landless labourer in the expectation that his teenage ch i ld ren,
cu r ren t ly  working in Bangkok, " khong mai phon aach iip  rab jaang : 
probably won't escape [ in  the sense o f  r i se  above] labouring".  Many 
debt-r idden farmers see labouring as a la s t  reso r t  in case o f  
des t i tu t ion  through bankruptcy. In extreme cases, where the c re d i to r 's  
choice o f  crop, t iming of product ion, or other decisions c o n f l i c t  most
sharply with preferences o f  the producer, i t  i s  not uncommon to hear the 
expressed fee l ing of being k h i i  khaa khao ( th e i r  low down slave).
Where the control  i s  l o s t  to less re a d i ly  id e n t i f i a b le  or more anonymous 
fac to rs ,  expressions such as " thuuk se thak it b i ib  : l i t .  being
squeezed by the economy" are common.
Loss o f  control  by one group is complemented by i t s  assumption by 
another. Control over labour i s  enhanced by those with access to cash. 
Control over land by c red i to rs  and control  over spec i f ic  aspects o f  
production by t r a c to r  owners and v i l la g e  traders gives them control over 
production in a wider sense. Control over production by c a p i ta l ,  
including in te rna t iona l  c a p i t a l ,  is  mediated by local c re d i t  and
marketing s tructu res. Whereas loss o f  control  over the value o f  produce
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in the r e la t i v e l y  isolated and undi f ferent ia ted community was to outside 
t raders ,  the loss o f  control  over production suffered in the
d i f fe re n t ia te d  community is  in the f i r s t  instance to fe l low  v i l l a g e rs .  
The impl icat ions fo r  cooperative attempts to increase p a r t ic ipa t ion
through re-establ ishment o f  such control  are c lea r ,  and signal the
repeated f a i l u r e  o f  community development e f f o r t s  tha t  take an
undi f fe rent ia ted approach.
I f  Ban Dong ac tua l ly  matched the ideal case postulated above, 
loss o f  control  would be p r imar i ly  to external t raders who would have 
l i t t l e  control  over production with in  the community. In fa c t ,  debt, 
d i v e r s i f i c a t io n  in to  market oriented cash cropping, and v i l l a g e  level 
d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  has led to increased control  over production by key 
v i l la g e  traders. Nevertheless, the dominance o f  r i c e  in the v i l lage  
economy and the maintenance o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  methods o f  t i l l a g e  and labour 
sharing have made i t  possible fo r  many to re ta in  control  over most
aspects o f  product ion. This is  p a r t i c u la r ly  true in sub-communities 
such as Bung Khiew, where d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  is  r e l a t i v e l y  minor and is 
based on ownership o f  d i f f e re n t  amounts o f  land rather than on
e xp lo i ta t i ve  re la t io n s  between v i l l a g e rs .  However, consumerism and crop 
fa i lu re s  due to the f a i lu re  to secure control  over water have
exacerbated debt,  g iv ing outs iders increased control  over production
with in  the community.
In Ban Hai th i s  process is  much fur ther  advanced, both because o f  
the ecology o f  the area which r e s t r i c t s  subsistence based production and 
because o f  the a c c e s s ib i l i t y  afforded by the ALRO road network tha t  
enables spec ia l iza t ion  in production for the market. In Ban Mai loss o f  
control has been to three main groups : t ra c to r  owners, v i l l a g e  traders 
and supp l ie rs ,  and c red i to rs .  However, as we saw in Chapter VI,  these 
are la rge ly  the same few in f lu e n t i a l  v i l l a g e rs  who invest surplus
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capital  in a l l  three o f  these lu c ra t ive  enterpr ises, securing increasing
control  over v i l l a g e  production.
So f a r ,  the ro le  o f  the state in th is  loss o f  control by the 
majo r i ty  o f  ru ra l  producers has not been discussed. At a basic leve l ,  
i t  can be seen tha t  the emphasis on roads, e l e c t r i c i t y  and associated 
consumer cu l tu re ,  ideology o f  khwaamjaroen (p rosper i ty ,  c i v i l i z a t i o n )  
as described in Chapter I I ,  BAAC c re d i t  and associated high input 
ag r icu l tu re  are a l l  part o f  the ethos o f  i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  c a p i t a l i s t  
development. S p e c i f i ca l ly  in the case of Ban Mai, state control  is
heavi ly f e l t  in the s t ipulated settlement pat tern ,  which places 
important constra in ts  on production. Resistance to residence in the
nucleated sett lement can be seen as an expression of the desire fo r
co n t ro l ,  p a r t i c u la r l y  in the area o f  production. Inva r iab ly ,  a b i l i t y  to
keep a close eye on one's land, raise chickens, p lant f r u i t  t rees, get 
in some work before breakfast,  and other aspects o f  the convenience of 
production on the isolated homestead were advantages most keenly 
extol led by those who had held out against resett lement in 1984 - 85.
More fundamental is the ro le  o f  rural  development in providing 
the state with access to v i l l a g e  in s t i t u t i o n s .  As we saw in section
V>Iai i i  9 the pr inc ipa l  i n s t i t u t io n s  fo r  v i l l a g e r  "p a r t i c ip a t io n "  are
now the TC and VC. Yet i f  we examine the membership o f  these bodies, we 
f ind tha t  they are in the hands o f  the same people who are assuming 
control  o f  the v i l l a g e  economy, p a r t i c u la r l y  in Ban Mai. At the same 
t ime, they are taking on the ro le  o f  minor state funct ionar ies  by v i r tue  
o f  t h e i r  new ru ra l  development ro le .
In the context o f  Lan Sak a g r icu l tu re ,  what pa r t ic ipa to ry  
s t ra teg ies ex is t  to regain control  over production? Certain individual 
s tra teg ies were discussed in Chapter VI, and these included moving from
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the area a l together .  Forest encroachment is a means o f  regaining
control  over the basic fac to r  o f  production, land, and escaping from the 
constra in ts  o f  capita l  in a subsistence or iented existence. Urban
migration represents an adaptation to the market economy, in which cash 
is the means o f  securing control  over key fac tors  o f  production. This 
l a t t e r  move is  more often a desperate attempt to avoid fu r th e r  loss of 
control  rather than a means o f  enhancing long term control  over
ag r icu l tu ra l  production.
Within the community, constra in ts  imposed by local condit ions
impair p a r t i c ip a to ry  cooperation. The in te n s i f i c a t io n  of work in Ban 
Mai leaves the majo r i ty  with l i t t l e  free time fo r  so c ia l i z in g ,  not to 
mention involvement in meetings; such are the 1uxuries o f  v i l l a g e
e l i t e s .  This is  not such a problem in Ban Dong, where the ag r icu l tu ra l
o f f  season is  a period o f  soc ia l iz ing  and cooperative a c t i v i t y ,  and when
there is s t i l l  considerable time avai lable fo r  organizing cooperative 
a c t i v i t y .  However, in Ban Dong as in Ban Mai, the very size o f  the 
admin is tra t ive community represents an obstacle to cooperative
development, since the increasing ro le  o f  the s ta te  means tha t
organizat ion is more along l ines o f  admin is tra t ive convenience than o f  
natural  communities. The success of Bung Khiew i n i t i a t i v e s  can be 
traced pa r t ly  to the involvement o f  a cohesive natural  community rather  
than an a r t i f i c i a l  and cumbersome administrat ive un i t .
V I I I . 3 Issues o f  control
The discussion in Section V I I I . 1 noted d e f in i t i o n s  o f  
pa r t ic ipa t ion  tha t  stressed modes o f  con t ro l ,  whi le Section V I I I . 2 
placed these in context by reference to production and cooperative
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i n i t i a t i v e s  in Lan Sak. The present section examines spec i f ic  issues o f  
control  faced by v i l l a g e rs  in Ban Dong and Ban Mai in the context o f  
change. Control is a two way process, in that ind iv idua ls  can control 
and can be con t ro l led .  The tension that t h i s  creates underl ies the 
fol lowing discussion o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  leadership, and uncertainty and 
th rea t  in the two communities under study.
V U I ^ ^ i  In s t i tu t io n s
I t  w i l l  be recal led from Chapter I I  th a t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  are defined 
in t h e i r  widest sense as means by which common expectations o f  behaviour 
are formed. I n s t i t u t io n s  mediate the control which people exercise over 
inf luences on t h e i r  l ive s  in two main ways. F i r s t ,  the s tructure o f  a 
given i n s t i t u t i o n  determines the terms on which ind iv idua ls  in te rac t  
with the wider soc ie ty ,  for example in gaining access to resources. 
Second, the actual shaping and modif icat ion of i n s t i t u t i o n s  is  carr ied 
out by people who thereby control  the terms o f  con t ro l .  This l a t t e r  
aspect o f  control  is often hidden in the manipulat ion of i n s t i t u t i o n s  
concerned with ru ra l  development.
Tradit ional  i n s t i t u t i o n s  (e.g. k insh ip, pa t ron-c l ien tage , land 
r i g h t s ,  water users' groups) emerge as a set o f  im p l i c i t  agreements that 
are leg i t im ized in local cu l tu ra l  norms and expectations. Control over 
labour is  achieved by means o f  family bonds and neighbourly 
rec ip rocat ion. Control over land is secured by recogni t ion  o f  r ig h ts  by 
others in the community, despite the fac t  th a t  no legal t i t l e  deeds have 
been issued. Control over water is attained by establishment o f  a 
cooperative group with in  the community. The means by which such 
in s t i t u t i o n s  are established are indigenous to the community, a f ford ing
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an inherent leg i t imacy.
New forms, on the other hand, are exogenous. Rural development 
provides an aegis under which standardized in s t i t u t i o n a l  forms can be 
imposed on v i l l a g e  society.  Most o f  these are in the name o f  enhancing 
control  by v i l l a g e rs  over wider societal  resources as part o f  the 
incorporat ive process. However, the terms under which such control  is 
exercised are themselves contro l led by the designers o f  the new 
development i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  and inasmuch as they replace indigenous forms, 
such i n s t i t u t i o n s  may thus represent a loss o f  control  within  the 
community. This contrad ic t ion  can be i l l u s t r a te d  by reference to 
spec i f ic  programmes in the state led ru ra l  development strategy 
involv ing i n s t i t u t i o n a l  change. I wish to demonstrate in pa r t icu la r  how 
apparent ly cooperative in s t i t u t i o n a l  innovation ac tua l ly  accelerates 
processes o f  ind iv id u a l iza t io n  and leads to a loss o f  control  by poorer 
rura l  producers.
As was i l l u s t r a te d  by the account in Chapter V, a major problem 
faced by producers, espec ia l ly  in Ban Mai, i s  the r i s in g  investment cost 
o f  commercial a g r icu l tu re ,  due both to in f la ted  costs o f  inputs and to 
changing ecological condi t ions.  Demand fo r  c re d i t  and associated usury 
have been eased by the expansion of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  cooperative c re d i t ,  
p a r t i c u la r l y  th a t  o f  BAAC. Such a trend may be seen to represent a step 
toward ra t iona l  , equi tab le , and cooperative p a r t i c ip a t io n  in the market 
economy by small farmers. Certa in ly  such c red i ts  represent one o f  the 
government's major f inanc ia l  commitments in i t s  rura l  development 
programme and are presented as welfare measures to ease the burden o f  
usury from the small farmer's back.
Yet any programme that increases the involvement o f  rura l  
producers in commercial agr icu l tu re  also serves to remove them from
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decisions a f fec t ing  product ion. Associated with BAAC c r e d i t ,  moreover, 
are s t ipu la t ions  as to the type and quant i ty  o f  inputs to be used, and 
c re d i t  is given pa r t ly  in kind. The only c re d i t  normal ly given in cash 
is  expressly for payment o f wages or h ire  o f  machinery. BAAC c re d i t  is  
thus heavi ly  biased against peasant ag r icu l tu re  and is designed to 
hasten adoption o f  c a p i t a l i s t  production re la t io n s .  I t  is  also biased 
against any major change in the ag r icu l tu ra l  regime, p a r t i c u la r ly
re levant in Ban Mai where present ag r icu l tu ra l  pract ices are causing
rapid environmental de te r io ra t ion .  While th i s  is  not to suggest tha t
BAAC i t s e l f  is  responsible for adoption o f  such prac t ices ,  these biases 
do mean a loss o f  control  over production, and they represent a 
contrad ic t ion  in terms o f  surv iva l  o f  the small independent producer. 
Meanwhile, the cooperative element is for the convenience and secur i ty  
o f BAAC rather  than a means o f  enhancing the bargaining posit ion of
group members (although as was shown in section V I I there are 
advantageous u n o f f i c ia l  organizat ional sp in o f f s ) ,  and the c re d i t
provided is part  o f  the ind iv idu a l iza t io n  o f  production that was 
described in Chapter VI.
Another form o f  cooperation that is supposed to increase 
community control  over resources i s  the range o f  pro jects i n i t i a t e d  by 
the Community Development Department (CDD). CDD discourse emphasizes 
i t s  own mode o f  community p a r t i c ip a t io n  {kaankhaomaa m il  suanruam :
l i t .  come in and take pa r t ) .  No budget is  provided by CDD, and
v i l la g e rs  provide "voluntary" labour and donated materia ls  fo r  schemes 
such as a daycare centre. The housewives' and associated savings groups 
are run by v i l l a g e rs  through committees. In p r in c ip le ,  there fo re ,  these 
projects or kl um (groups) o f fe r  v i l la g e rs  increased opportun it ies fo r  
improving control  over t h e i r  own welfare.
In fa c t ,  these klum have been used as a means o f  enforcing
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"pa r t ic ip a t io n "  on the terms o f  outsiders and key ind iv idua ls  within  the 
v i l l a g e .  The case o f  housewives' groups has been described in Section 
V I I ^5J  above. Control o f  the terms o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  is in the hands 
o f  state fu n c t io n a r ie s , who determine the standardized forms o f  such 
groups. Day to day running o f ,  and benef i t  from, the groups is
contro l led  by a small m inor i ty  o f  v i l l a g e  "sangkhom : soc ie ty " ,  whi le 
the only a c t i v i t y  rela ted to product ion, v iz  the savings group, is  
l im i ted  to be t te r  o f f  members o f  the community since the treasurer w i l l  
not make loans to anyone o f  i n s u f f i c ie n t  status to ensure prompt 
repayment.
Bureaucrat izat ion o f  procedure is another aspect o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
innovation on outs iders '  terms, whereby supposedly p a r t ic ipa to ry  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  become channels o f  access from state into v i l l a g e ,  tha t  can 
be observed as part  o f  the ru ra l  development stra tegy in Ban Dong and 
Ban Mai as elsewhere. P ro l i fe ra t io n  o f  committees and rules is  a
component o f  the klum referred to above, but most prominent in the 
current ru ra l  development strategy is  the tambon council as the 
cornerstone o f  the popular pa r t ic ipa t ion  programme. Through a
combination o f  bureaucrat ic and nominally democratic procedures,
v i l l a g e rs  now have, in p r in c ip le ,  a say in requesting certa in  projects 
and thereby gaining access to state development resources (see Appendix 
7).  Yet the TC is  merely consultat ive  v i s -a -v is  the state 
bureaucracy. Actual decisions over the use o f  resources are made by the 
l a t t e r ,  and the TC has no independent source o f  revenue or independent 
legal status. The f ive  year plan presented by the TC was described to 
me by one NESDB o f f i c i a l  as being a kind of "menu" from which government 
departments could order a t t h e i r  own whim (o r ,  i n c id e n t ly ,  have dishes 
made to o rder) .  The drawing up o f  projects is  done by the v i l la g e  
e lders, v i l l a g e  heads, and kamnan who make up the TC, with advice from 
technical personnel provided by the amphoe and local headmaster, who
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acts as secretary. In fa c t ,  the status and education o f  the l a t t e r  give 
them a disproport ionate say th a t  eas i ly  goes beyond th e i r  advisory role 
(see Chapter V I I ,  footnote 20). V i l lage representat ives are free to 
consult  v i l l a g e rs  or otherwise in t h e i r  proposal o f  p ro jec ts ,  and as is  
evident from the account in Section V I I I , l , 1 i i  above, the nature o f  
v i l la g e  meetings is such as to minimize p a r t i c ip a t io n  in project 
formulat ion or other TC r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s .
V I I I , 3 , i i  leadership
Control through i n s t i t u t i o n s  is  not established by an automatic 
process o f  mutual assent, even in the r e la t i v e l y  cohesive indigenous 
community. As we saw in Chapter I I ,  ear ly  leadership in the person o f  
the khon to was an important element in the making and enforcing of 
ru les in Ban Dong and Thung Khaa. Likewise, development i n s t i t u t io n s  
re ly  on new forms or adaptation o f  older forms o f  leadership. However, 
control  through leaders f i r s t  impl ies control over leaders, i . e .  that 
the leaders are representat ive o f  th e i r  communities. The co ro l la ry  is
tha t  non-representative leaders reduce control  exercised by the
community as a whole and may increase outside control over i t .
The concept o f  "leader : phuu nam" is indigenous to the
community. Several categories embrace th is  pos it ion . As was described
in Chapter I I ,  the t ra d i t i o n a l  leader in Ban Mai was the khon to  ( l i t .
big person). Another category is  the phuu y a i , used for someone o f  
exceptional status. Thai social  hierarchy is  often defined in terms o f  
phuu ya i  and phuu noi ( l i t .  large and small people respec t ive ly ;  see 
G ir l ing  1981 : 38 - 39). Hua naa means "head", or someone with some
a u tho r i ty .  Naai , or "boss" is a remnant o f  the feudal ( sakdina)
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d iv is ion  of Thai society into naai and phrai ( se r fs ) .  The formal 
leadership posts are kamnan (head of a tambon) , who has occupied 
the leadership pos it ion  in Ban Dong for some 50 years, and phuu ya i  
baan ( v i l l a g e  head). A recent category is  tha t  o f  phuu m ii ith iphon  
or simply i th ip h o n , meaning "(those with) in f luence",  re fe r r ing  to 
persons with u n o f f i c ia l  and often i l l e g a l l y  wielded au tho r i ty .
The extent to which leadership and feared au thor i ty  are 
coincident in the indigenous community is  i l l u s t ra te d  by the terms given 
to the two most feared wi ld animals in the early  Ban Dong and Ban Mai 
communities. Tigers were known as kamnan, whi le elephants were 
referred to as phuu ya i baan. The actual khon to attained and 
maintained his pos it ion by a combination o f  patronage, respect,  and 
fear.  Yet u l t im a te ly  a leader depended on resources tha t  could be 
mustered from with in  the community. Local resources were the basis o f  
the v i l l a g e  economy and the p o l i t y  was such tha t  support came from 
with in  ra ther  than without the community. In the l im i ted  dealings with 
state a u th o r i t ie s ,  the leader served as representat ive o f  the community, 
and in the case of Thung Khaa th is  fo r  long involved a resistance to 
state in tervent ion through land reform, defo resta t ion ,  and construction 
o f  roads. Negotiations for supplying a v i l la g e  teacher were carr ied out 
by the khon t o , whom both v i l l a g e rs  and government o f f i c i a l s  saw as 
representat ive o f  the community in dealings with the outside as well as 
in organizat ion and adjudicat ion o f  v i l l a g e  a f f a i r s .
I t  i s  a misconception to view the isolated fo res t  v i l l a g e  as a 
homogeneous and democratic community. Dif ferences in economic status 
predate changes in production re la t io n s ,  and leadership was exercised 
according to "the law o f  the fo rest : kodmaai paa" However,
di f ferences in economic status were l im i ted and based on varying scales 
of production in an undi f fe rent ia ted production regime, so that any
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e xp lo i ta t i ve  re la t io n s  were external to the community. While the law o f  
the fo rest appears undemocratic in form, i t  is  based on normative 
concepts o f  ju s t i c e  established by the v i l l a g e rs  themselves. The 
ul t imate sanction over v i l l a g e  leaders rests with v i l l a g e r s ,  and the 
outcome o f  struggles depends on the resources th a t  the leader is able to 
muster w ith in  the community. The khon to* s resistance to changes 
associated with land reform was in part  due to a sense o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  
to the community i f ,  as he expected, things were to go wrong.
Opening up o f  the community involves a number o f  changes with 
regard to control  over and through leadership. On the one hand, 
incorporat ion into the nat ional p o l i t y  and ru ra l  development programmes 
mean adherence to apparently democratic norms. The v i l l a g e  heads and
kamnans must now be elected, committees are set up in the name o f
community p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  and apparent ly a rb i t ra r y  systems o f  j u s t ic e  and 
enforcement are replaced by defined legal sta tu tes. However, the new 
leaders'  ro le  can only be properly understood in terms o f  changing
production re la t ions  alongside the changing p o l i t y .  Opening up o f  the 
v i l la g e  and associated d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  as described in Chapter VI 
resu lts  not only in increasingly divergent economic fortunes o f  
ind iv idua l  members o f  the community, but also in in te rn a l iza t io n  o f  
e x p lo i ta t i ve  re la t ionsh ips  with in  the community. Meanwhile, as the 
v i l la g e  economy and p o l i t y  becomes ever more dependent on external
forces, the pos it ion  o f  v i l la g e  leaders as representat ives o f  the 
community i s  diminished as they come to depend on external resources and 
hence are seen as representat ives o f  state and capita l  within the 
v i l l a g e .  This is  best exemplif ied by reference to the pos it ion o f  the 
kamnans, v i l l a g e  heads, and v i l l a g e  committees in Ban Dong and Ban 
Mai.
The Ban Dong kamnans have always come from among the Lao
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sect ion o f  the community. In the past there was l i t t l e  to d is t ingu ish
the kamnan in economic status. Contact with o f f i c i a l s  was rare. In
the one instance o f  abuse of pos i t ion ,  the kamnan was replaced by the
community. In contras t ,  the present kamnan (also v i l l a g e  head) is
except ional ly wealthy. Following forest  clearance by TPC, he sold o f f  
large areas o f  land in Bung Khiew and elsewhere at many times the pr ice 
he had paid for i t .  Although he s t i l l  rents out land, he does not farm 
and his main business in te res ts  l i e  outside the community. Unt i l  
recen t ly ,  he owned the only a i r  conditioned restaurant in the provincial  
town 50 ki lometres away. More impor tant ly ,  h is  w i fe ,  who is a
Provincial  Assembly member (see Appendix 4) ,  runs a construct ion 
business, and th is  wins contracts fo r  most local development schemes, in 
p a r t icu la r  road construct ion.  In 1984 she won a 100,000 baht tender 
for reconstruct ion o f  the bridge tha t  had been washed away in the 
previous year 's f loods. The kamnan used his pos i t ion  to summon labour
from w ith in  the v i l l a g e ,  and wood was cut from nearby fo res t  reserve
land. V i l lagers  received l i t t l e  or no payment and estimate that a
p r o f i t  o f  at  least 50,000 baht was made. A s im i la r  case o f  corrupt 
pract ice was recounted in the case of the previous year's road
construct ion into Bung Khiew. Meanwhile, the pos it ion  o f  the kamnan 
as v i l la g e  head provides opportun it ies for sel f-enrichment and 
patronage. Regis tra t ion o f  b i r th s  and deaths requires a small "service 
charge : khaa borikaan". At e lec t ion time the local member of
parliament disburses large sums via the kamnan. State welfare is at 
the d isc re t ion  o f  the kamnan, invo lv ing handouts o f  blankets, r e l i e f  
in case o f  f looding or f i r e ,  and free health treatment cards for the 
poor. Awareness o f  corrupt ion and favouri t ism is evident in local 
discourse, p a r t i c u la r l y  o f  the poor. There is t a l k  o f  "ngoen rua : 
l i t .  leaky money" in the context o f  development funds, while sometimes 
the comment is  more d i r e c t :
"Kin ngoen yaang diew mai dai koed prayoot a ra i
tae man d i i  yaang 1 uuk no1ng khao dai m i i  ngaan
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tham kae dai rua i : Al l  [he] does is  eat up
money without any bene f i t  [ to  anyone]; but i t ' s  
good in one way, his underl ings have work and get 
r i c h "  (Ban Dong v i l l a g e r  in pr ivate  conversat ion).
The Thung Khaa kamnan1 s wealth is  based more on local
resources. Following land reform and deforesta t ion,  he made large sums
in land sales to new s e t t le r s  in Ban Mai, fo re s t ry  subcontract ing,
and i l l e g a l  fo rest  poaching. He gained favour with the amphoe by
supporting land reform and road construct ion, and he enjoys the same
benef i ts  by v i r tue  o f  h is  pos it ion as does the Ban Dong kamnan. The
Ban Mai v i l la g e  head i s  also from one of the older Thung Khaa fam i l ies .
He was elected unopposed fo r  his youthful  ness and energy, but there is
now general d is i l lus ionment  with his favour i t ism,  i n e f f i c ie n c y ,  and
corrupt pract ices. I witnessed his a b i l i t y  to use his pos it ion  as minor
state funct ionary fo r  own economic gain in his a b i l i t y  to summon labour
from a household tha t  had i t s  own urgent tasks to attend to but dared
not refuse for fear o f  not being able to ca l l  on his help in deal ing
with the au th o r i t ie s  in the fu tu re .  He runs one o f  the two local bus
services to U tha i than i , acts as a moneylender, and rents land o f
c re d i to rs ;  he is a large employer o f  labour fo r  his tapioca production.
Both he and the kamnan have received sums o f  money from the local MP
at e lect ion time and in exchange for re c ru i t in g  labour fo r his pineapple
p lanta t ion in Cha-am.
The VCs in the two v i l lages  are somewhat more heterogeneous in 
composition, although the poorest sections are not represented in e i ther  
community. However, the VC is  dominated by the v i l l a g e  head and one or 
two other i n f lu e n t ia l  people. In Ban Mai, the kamnan' s eldest 
b ro ther ,  who is also tambon doctor and one o f  the weal thiest traders 
and t ra c to r  owners in Ban Mai, is  also an in f lu e n t i a l  member o f  the VC. 
The same is true o f  Maen (case 6, section V l ^ l j i i )  in Ban Dong. In 
Ban Mai the VC members are as of 1986 allowed to carry twin bore 
shotguns as part o f  the or phor por ( s e l f  defence v i l l a g e )  scheme,
388
adding a p o te n t ia l l y  repressive element to th e i r  ro le .  They are 
ide n t i f ie d  closely with the t ra c to r  owners and traders and referred to 
c o l l e c t i v e ly  as the "hua naa muubaan : heads o f  the v i l l a g e " .  Their 
posit ion is  c learest at v i l l a g e  meetings and on community work days. In 
1984 the King's bir thday was set aside by the amphoe as such a 
workday, and the v i l la g e  head decreed th a t  grass along the road edges 
should be cut.  The VC took up a supervisory r o le ,  not ac tua l ly  taking 
part in the manual work, leading to comments tha t  "kamakaan muubaan 
k h i i  kho'o  : The VC r ide  on [our ]  backs [ l i t .  necks]".
The connection between economic status and o f f i c i a l  leadership 
pos it ion  is  not co inc identa l .  To begin w ith, the amount o f  time that a 
v i l l a g e  head has to spend at Amphoe meetings and other o f f i c i a l  
engagements would make i t  d i f f i c u l t  fo r  most v i l l a g e rs  to take on the 
pos it ion .  In the local cu l tu ra l  context,  " to be o f  consequence : m ii  
naa m ii  taa" is  increasing ly  l inked to economic status, and th is  is  a 
prerequis i te  to e lec t ion .  More d i r e c t l y ,  large sums are now spent by 
contenders fo r  such posit ions since the potent ial  rewards are large, 
though not so i f  measured only in terms o f  o f f i c i a l  salary (400 baht 
per month fo r  a v i l l a g e  head). The v i l la g e  head is  expected to be able 
to enter ta in o f f i c i a l s  or other outsiders, and th i s  is  impossible fo r  
most v i l l a g e rs .
This i s  not to suggest tha t  a l l  leaders are concerned purely 
with personal bene f i t  or tha t  those tha t  are so motivated are e n t i r e l y  
devoid of respect from with in  the community. The culminat ion o f  the 
Songkran new year water fe s t iva l  {song namphra : bathing of the
Buddha image) is preceded in Ban Dong by bathing of the kamnan as a 
sign o f  respect and r i t u a l  washing away o f  antagonisms. Unt i l  recent ly ,  
the kamnan was popular fo r  his in fo rm a l i ty  and, s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  in that 
he " l e f t  you alone" (from o f f i c i a l  matters).  However, the point to
389
stress is  th a t  leaders depend less and less on the indigenous economic 
and social  resources o f  the community for th e i r  pos it ion and more and 
more on external resources o f  state and c a p i ta l .  Many o f  these 
resources enter the v i l l a g e  via such leaders in the name o f  rura l
development programmes or as in d i re c t  resu l ts  o f  changes in production 
re la t io n s  tha t  are themselves part  o f  the underlying ru ra l  development 
strategy.
A f in a l  point to note is tha t  so cal led "natural  leaders : phuu 
nam thamachaat"18 emerge, such as in the case o f  Boi in Bung 
Khiew. A key ro le  played by such leaders is  as a l in k  with the outside,  
as spokesperson who can represent v i l l a g e rs '  in te res ts .  Boi ’ s ro le  in 
the r i ce  barn controversy (sect ion I/ I l ^ S J i )  and the Bung Khiew
i r r i g a t i o n  channel (sect ion VI I h5 J v )  demonstrates t h i s  c le a r l y .  Such 
a leader requires a number of q u a l i t i e s ,  including wi l l ingness to 
represent community before personal in te res ts ,  a b i l i t y  to communicate in 
o f f i c i a l  language, a non-confronta t ion is t  approach which often means
involvement in many o f f i c i a l  programmes (c f .  Turton 1984a : 104), and
the t r u s t  o f  the local community.
In summary, the opening up o f  the v i l la g e  is not the beginning of 
the process o f  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n .  Rather, i t  marks a change in the 
control  exercised through v i l l a g e  leadership as a re s u l t  o f  the changed 
s t ruc tu ra l  pos it ion  o f  such leaders. The leadership funct ion is  
increasing ly  or iented to that o f  intermediary between v i l l a g e  and 
bureaucracy and between petty producer and external c a p i t a l ,  giv ing 
external resources a more important place in maintaining the leader 's  
standing as they play an increasing ly  important ro le  in the p o l i t i c a l  
economy o f  the v i l l a g e .  At the same t ime, d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  is a 
consequence o f  increasing interna l commoditization o f  labour,  which 
means tha t  those in posit ions o f  power are now in d i r e c t  e xp lo i ta t i ve
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re la t ionsh ips with other v i l l a g e rs .  Lost is the sanction that 
dependence on local or in terna l resources afforded. Meanwhile, control  
over v i l l a g e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and economy by state and external capital  is 
f a c i l i t a t e d  by the minor funct ionary status that formal leaders now take 
on. In th is  context,  leadership o f  pa r t ic ipa to ry  i n i t i a t i v e s  usual ly 
requires the emergence o f  a l te rna t ive  leaders who may or may not pose a 
challenge to ex is t ing  formal leaders.
V I I I t 3 J i i  Uncerta in ty and th rea t
A th i r d  dimension o f  control  re la tes to the ce r ta in ty  or
otherwise th a t  decisions or courses o f  action are going to lead to the
intended resu l ts .  Peasant l ive l ihood  is normal ly considered to be one
fraught with uncerta in ty ,  and many o f  the measures associated with
rura l  development are at least nominally concerned with reducing th is
uncerta in ty .  In p a r t i c u la r ,  the vagaries o f  the weather and other
natural  elements are to be overcome by technological innovations tha t
are a part o f  the "green revo lu t ion"  strategy. However, the a l te rna t ive
face o f  such change is  a d i f f e re n t  sort  o f  uncer tainty  th a t  resu lts  from
changes in production re la t io n s  as a part  o f  the incorporat ive  rural
development strategy:
The consequence [ o f  change] is a substantial  loss 
o f  autonomy and the exchange o f  one type o f
uncertainty  fo r  another involving greater 
dependency on others, on remote economic
developments, and on sh i f t in g  p r i o r i t i e s  in 
government po l icy  (Hainsworth 1982 : 16).
This new uncerta in ty  serves as an obstacle to increasing popular
pa r t ic ip a t io n  through control  over production.
A recent ly  deforested area such as Lan Sak d i f f e r s  from other 
s i tua t ions  o f  ru ra l  development inasmuch as natural  uncertaint ies
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a c tu a l ly  increase over time. The degradation o f  s o i l s ,  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  
r a i n f a l l ,  and increase in pests was documented in Chapter IV, and th is  
has led to decreased control  over the environment by ag r icu l tu ra l  
producers. As such, many o f  the modern inputs o f  f e r t i l i z e r ,  
i r r i g a t i o n ,  and pest ic ides are seen as compensatory ra ther than as 
pos it ive  measures o f  improvement in l ine  with the extension worker's 
perspect ive. This is  p a r t i c u la r l y  the case in a s i tua t ion  of decl in ing 
y ie ld s .
A second set o f  uncerta in t ies resu l ts  from the commercial 
o r ien ta t ion  o f  ag r icu l tu re .  Whereas in the subsistence or iented 
community local resources could be used fo r production, control  over 
which was achieved by community based i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  c re d i t  is  needed for 
the increasingly  cap ita l  intensive production. Uncertainty over c re d i t  
stems from the dependence on middlemen or BAAC, both outside community 
con t ro l .  Equal ly important,  c red i to rs  gain control  over debtors' 
product ion, leading for example to uncer ta in t ies in ploughing schedules 
as in the case of Lak (case 10, section V I ^ l j ' v ) .  Increased 
dependence on the market leads to uncertaint ies over pr ices, and table 
8.1 below shows the basis fo r  th is  uncertainty in terms o f  f luc tua t ion  
o f  the pr inc ipa l  crop prices observed in Ban Dong and Ban Mai.
Table 8.1 Crop pr ices in Lan Sak 1984 - 1986
Rice^ ; Maize-*- : Tapioca** : Mung Beans**
1984 2700-2900 4000-4200 1800 110-130
1985 2900-3100 3200-3800 900 110-130
1986 1700-2400 2300-2600 1800 110-130
Notes : 1. Price per kwien
2. Price per tonne
3. Price per tang
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Marketing is one o f  the main uncerta in t ies fo r  producers in Ban Dong and 
Ban Mai. Most depend on the middleman coming to the homestead, and 
pr ices can vary from week to week. A common ta c t i c  in Ban Dong is to 
agree p rov is iona l ly  on a pr ice ; a fo r tn ig h t  l a t e r ,  when the lo r r y  
arr ives and the sale is made, the pr ice has fa l le n .  Middlemen use th e i r  
access to marketing information, control over the scales, and 
determination o f  q u a l i ty  to th e i r  own advantage, a t least in the eyes o f  
the farmer. Indeed, i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  fo r the loca l  middleman to
make any substant ial  p r o f i t  without some cheat ing, so low are the 
margins.
Another uncertainty ar ises from the increasing dependence on 
labouring income for subsistence. Whereas a cer ta in  amount o f planning 
is possible in own product ion, day to day wage labouring depends on the 
demands o f  the labour market, which in agr icu l tu re  vary from season to 
season and from year to year. In Ban Mai, there are many occasions when 
an employer requests labour fo r  the fol lowing day at d is tan t  f i e ld s  and 
then f a i l s  to turn up to co l le c t  the day labourers, by which time i t  is 
too la te  to arrange an a l te rna t ive  d a i ly  income. In the longer run, 
fami l ies  planning on a more steady income can be s im i la r ly  misled. Two
examples occurred during 1984 - 85. The f i r s t  was a proposal by the
local HP to employ labour from Ban Mai and surrounding v i l lages  on his
pineapple p lanta t ion in Cha-am. The kamnan and v i l l a g e  head were to
arrange t ranspor t ,  with each labourer paying 300 baht per head to go 
(the return fare by publ ic  transpor t would have cost under 200 baht ) .
O r ig ina l ly  the leaving date was to be the end of March. This kept on
gett ing delayed, u n t i l  f i n a l l y  at the end of the dry season the scheme 
was cal led o f f ,  with those wait ing to go having l i t t l e  or no chance o f  
local employment in the meantime. In the event, several ended up
seeking work in Bangkok instead, including Phad (case 7, section
VI t l xi v ) .  A second prospect o f  sustained employment tha t  f e l l  through
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was the reservo i r  b u i l t  by ALRO above Ban Mai. The planning of t h i s  was 
done without any consulta t ion o f  v i l l a g e rs ,  but i t  was rumoured tha t  i t  
would employ many labourers fo r  several months at ALRO minimum wage 
ra tes ,  i . e .  nearly double the ag r icu l tu ra l  wage. In the event, ALRO 
brought in i t s  own contractors , and much o f  the construct ion was carr ied 
out using heavy mach inery .^
An important aspect o f  uncertainty in connection with changes in 
ag r icu l tu ra l  production pertains to knowledge systems. As we observed 
in section V^2^v19 local knowledge has been downgraded not only in 
terms o f  i t s  status but also in terms o f  i t s  relevance to the new 
production regime. Whereas subsistence production in the isolated 
community u t i l i z e d  a body o f  l o c a l l y  acquired and adapted knowledge, use 
of new inputs and production techniques requires a body o f  knowledge 
th a t  cannot as re a d i l y  be assimilated by local producers. As a r e s u l t ,  
crop fa i lu re s  may be wrongly in te rp re ted ,  e f fec ts  o f  appl icat ions o f  new 
inputs may lead to unexpected side e f fec ts  on both plants and users, and 
long term e f fec ts  o f  new inputs may not appear u n t i l  i t  is  too la te  to 
r e c t i f y .  This uncertainty  is  rein forced by the lack o f  knowledge o f  
local condit ions by extension workers, making i t  d i f f i c u l t  for farmers 
to turn to them in adapting new inputs.
On the pro jec t  side o f  rura l  development, uncerta in ty  takes on
many forms. A basic element o f uncertainty i s  over r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  for
in f ra s t ru c tu ra l  work. In the isolated community, a l l  community schemes 
were the j o i n t  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  v i l l a g e rs ,  usual ly at the behest o f  a 
community leader. In Bung Khiew, fo r  example, roads were constructed by 
the v i l l a g e r s ,  while in Thung Khaa v i l la g e rs  constructed t h e i r  own
school. At present, the uncertainty over whether government or
v i l l a g e rs  are responsible fo r  such projects  often leaves work undone, as 
in the case o f  road repair  a f te r  the 1983 floods (see sect ion I V ^ J ) .
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The r e s u l t ,  in the words o f  the old khon to in Thung Khaa is doen 
ko‘ mai da i ;  tham naa ko' mai dai s i a i i k  : [now] you can ' t  go
anywhere [ l i t .  walk ],  nor can you plant r i c e  [ i n  reference to the land
the roads have 'eaten' : sect ion 7V]". The piecemeal and
haphazard way in which the REGP scheme is  carr ied out also leads to
uncertainty  and work l e f t  undone. One reason is the uncertainty  both by 
v i l l a g e rs  and loca l  government o f f i c i a l s  as to whether the pr inc ipal aim
of work is  to create employment or to bu i ld  up rura l  i n f r a s t r u c tu re . In
1984, work was stopped halfway through construct ion o f  a dyke around Ban 
Dong school to prevent f looding since the piecework ra tes ,  measured
in cubic metres o f  ear th , became less and less a t t r a c t i v e  as earth 
needed to be brought from fu r ther  and fu r the r  a f i e ld .  Eventually
machinery had to be brought in to f i n is h  the job. In 1985 and 1986, no 
local labour was used at a l l  in the water ja r  construct ion that REGP 
money was used fo r ,  since s k i l l e d  art isans were required for the
standardized model of j a r  s t ipulated by the amphoe. Instead a 
contractor was brought in with his own team, making a p r o f i t  o f  over 
100,000 baht a f te r  labour and materia ls .
Such uncertainty about government programmes among v i l l a g e rs  
resu l t ing  from devia t ion from pr inc ip les  or lack o f  c l a r i t y  in such
pr inc ip les  in the f i r s t  place is  pa ra l le l led  by uncertainty  within the 
local adminis tra t ion over re s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  p a r t icu la r  programmes. The 
dupl icat ion and lack o f  coordinat ion among departments a t every level 
was noted in section I I h3 J i .  This impinges most strongly on 
v i l l a g e rs '  experience at v i l l a g e  meetings or t ra in in g  programmes, where 
i t  is  not uncommon to hear the D is t r i c t  Agr icu l tu ra l  Of f icer ta lk ing 
about the bene f i ts  o f  giving up d r in k ,  the pol ice c h ie f  about ra is ing  
chickens, the Community Development Of f icer on the dangers o f  communism, 
the Health O f f icer  about l o y a l ty  to the King, the local headmaster about
the need fo r  v ig i lance and national secur i ty in the face o f  imminent
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invasion by the Vietnamese, and the abbot about the need to fo l low the 
government's advice on ru ra l  development.
Associated with the contradic t ions inherent in state led rural 
development is  uncertainty produced by an ambiguous development 
discourse. The very word fo r  development, kaanphatthanaa, is  a t once 
associated with general improvement in l ive l ihood  and programmes that 
impinge on one's time and freedom of ac t ion.  Khwaamjaroen 
( c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  p rosper i ty ) ,  which is  often equated with 
kaanphatthanaa, is  also associated with debt and other consequences o f  
commercial ization. In the words o f  one longstanding Ban Dong res ident,  
buf fa lo  th e f t  commenced " t o 1n khwaamjaroen roem kheunmaa : when
c i v i l i z a t i o n  started to a r r ive  [from lower down, i . e .  on the p la in s ] " .  
Khwaamsaduak, or convenience tha t  is  often associated with roads and
e l e c t r i c i t y ,  benef i ts  those who can a fford  t ranspor t  and connection 
costs. Yet longer standing Ban Mai residents associate the coming of 
moneylenders with the coming of the roads. The word duulae ( to watch
over) as an aim o f  development is used ambiguously in the need to 
duulae thuatheung , or watch over everyone, t rans la tab le  a l te rna te ly  
as "take care o f"  in the welfare sense and "keep an eye on" in the sense 
o f  surve i l lance. S im i la r ly ,  khwaammankhong (secur i ty )  impl ies safety 
against external th rea t  (see below) while giv ing powers th a t  increase
repressive potent ia l  w ith in  the v i l l a g e .  The ambiguity o f  saamakhii
has been referred to in Chapter 7, footnote 23 above. Last, 
kaan(khaomaa)mii suan ruam ( p a r t ic ip a t ion )  i t s e l f  is  used to mean 
semi-compulsory jo in ing  o f  o f f i c i a l  schemes in the name o f  giving 
v i l la g e rs  a say in t h e i r  own l i v e s .
A f in a l  aspect o f  uncertainty  concerns the issue of leg i t imacy.  
In the face o f  rapid expansion o f  state involvement in v i l la g e  a f fa i r s  
through i t s  ru ra l  development s trategy,  the leg it imacy o f  i n i t i a t i v e s
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tha t  do not conform with the recognized structures is  cal led into 
question. An example o f  th is  uncertainty came ear ly  on in the sett ing 
up o f  the Bung Khiew r ic e  bank, whose status v i s -a -v i s  the Anphoe was 
a subject o f  some doubt and concern. A month a f te r  the f i r s t  r ice  
deposits had been made, a group o f  NGO workers from Chiengmai came to 
v i s i t  and exchange experiences with Bung Khiew v i l l a g e rs .  The th rus t  o f
the exchange was to compare s im i l a r i t i e s  and d i f fe rences. This, 
combined with the manner of one o f  the v i s i t i n g  development workers, 
caused several o f the v i l l a g e rs  to suspect that they were government
o f f i c i a l s  sent to spy on the group. The reasons fo r  concern were the 
apparent non-conformity between the Bung Khiew group and that o f  the 
v i s i t o r s  and the assumption th a t  any v i s i t o r s  who were not farmers (some
v i l la g e rs  commented tha t  "you only have to look at th e i r  feet to see
tha t  they have never planted r i c e ! " )  must be o f f i c i a l s  (see Section 
11,3 J ) .
This br ings us to the area where uncertainty and control  impinge 
most fo r c e fu l l y  : th rea t .  This can i n i t i a l l y  be divided in to  two areas, 
threat by the state and threat by non-state inf luences, but i t  w i l l
become apparent tha t  the two are u l t ima te ly  inseparable. Fear o f state
repr isa l  for i l l e g a l  i n i t i a t i v e s  as evidenced by the above account are 
not u n ju s t i f ie d .  Unt i l  approximately the s ta r t  o f  the F i f th  Plan
(1982), the cl imate o f  suspicion in rura l  Thailand was extreme. Use of 
p a r t icu la r  words by v i l l a g e rs ,  associat ion with v i s i t i n g  students or NGO 
workers, voluntary s p i r i t ,  and a number o f  other t r a i t s  were enough to 
place someone under suspicion (see Turton 1984b : 51). Although th is
cl imate has relaxed considerably, there are s t i l l  many ways in which the 
watchful eye o f  the adminis tra t ion is kept on any po ten t ia l  dissidence. 
Every v i l l a g e  has "volunteers" who " l i s te n  out : haa khaao" . The 
Community Development Department's (CDD) tambon level workers are
responsible for keeping an ear to the ground and report ing any
397
suspicious a c t i v i t y . 20 The danger o f  "phai khommunnit: communist
menace” is  s t i l l  f requently  invoked, and i t  can be used as a generic 
form of accusation against non-conformists. In one Lan Sak kamnan' s 
words, you can always t e l l  a communist from among v i l l a g e r s ,  for 
1 khra ikhra i mai khao kab thaokae khong m ii  thaokae yuu khaanglang 
: whoever does not re ly  on a [moneylender] patron must have a
[subversive] patron behind [him or he r ] . "  Such insinuat ion  is not mere 
rhe to r ic  in terms o f  state th re a t ,  for the h is to ry  o f  violence against 
leaders o f  movements o f  the rural  poor is well known.21 The pol icy o f  
" keb" ,  a se lec t ive  k i l l i n g  o f f  o f  "undesirables" - cr iminals and 
p o l i t i c a l  d iss idents a l ike  - is  appl ied widely,  p a r t i c u la r l y  in northern 
Thailand. At a less o ve r t l y  p o l i t i c a l  l e ve l ,  the local pol ice are 
general ly  feared and detested in Lan Sak and, commonly being referred to 
as " joon nai khreuangbaeb : thieves in uniform".
However, the cl imate o f  ru ra l  violence is not genera l ly  perceived 
as being perpetrated d i r e c t l y  by state a u th o r i t ie s .  More commonly
feared are ce r ta in  i n f lu e n t i a l  people, and these are increasingly  those 
in o f f i c i a l  leadership posit ions. When asked in pr ivate  conversation
why no voice of protest is  raised at the sometimes b la tan t  abuses o f
pos it ion  by the Ban Dong kamnan, v i l l a g e rs  who complain o f  such abuse 
commonly rep ly  tha t  "klua doon ying hua : [we're] a fra id  of being shot 
in the head". The general level o f  violence in Lan Sak over r e la t i v e l y  
minor c o n f l i c t s  o f  in te res t  provides a constant reminder o f  the basis 
fo r  such fears. The case o f  Dam (sect ion V>2J) i l l u s t r a te s  the
extent to which b la tant  in jus t ices  w i l l  be borne as a re s u l t  o f  th rea t .  
Although the level o f violence has declined g rea t ly  since the la te  1970s 
(the period o f  peak inm igra t ion) ,  the murder rate in 1984 was s t i l l  four 
times the (already high) national average o f  25 per 100,000. A 
su rp r is in g ly  uniform f igure  of 70 - 80,000 baht was quoted on a number 
o f  occasions as the amount needed to get away with murder ( l i t e r a l l y )  by
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br ib ing  the local pol ice.
Returning to the theme o f  con t ro l ,  we f ind tha t  the uncertain ty 
imparted by the atmosphere o f  th rea t  is  a means o f  maintaining control  
over action and discourse on the one hand, and preventing the assumption 
of control  by independent bargaining power on the o ther ,  through what 
Turton {1984b : 5 9 f f . )  terms "the ideological mediation o f  fea r" .
This is  the combination o f  hegemonic ru le  by establishment o f  leg i t imacy 
and fo rcefu l  suppression by creat ion o f  a cl imate o f  fear o f  dissidence. 
In Lan Sak in 1984 - 85, rura l  development programmes loomed large in
the le g i t im iz a t io n  o f  the state at the v i l la g e  l e v e l ,  g iv ing state 
funct ionar ies control  over v i l l a g e  a f f a i r s  through key intermediar ies 
whose pos it ion re l ie d  increasing ly  on power divested le g i t im a te ly  via 
external l inks  and semi- legal ly  or i l l e g a l l y  as part  o f  the co l lus ion  o f  
what may be re ferred to as " loca l powers" (Turton : 1987).
V I I I . 4 Issues o f  power
As we saw in Section V I I I . 1, a p o l i t i c a l  economic in te rp re ta t ion  
of p a r t i c ip a t io n  concerns basic issues o f  power. According to the 
UNRISD analys is ,  the aim of p a r t i c ip a t io n  is to empower the powerless. 
As such, p a r t i c ip a t io n  involves the recognit ion and reso lu t ion  of 
cer ta in  contrad ic t ions .  This inev i tab ly  involves c o n f l i c t s  o f  i n te res t .  
In most community development analyses, such c o n f l i c t s  are seen as 
ex is t ing  between the community and the outside,  fo r  example between 
v i l la g e  and external sta te. However, incorporat ion o f  v i l l a g e  by state 
and capita l  and associated d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  a l te rs  the axes o f  power 
s truggle , and many contrad ic t ions are now internal to the community.
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The present section deals with the contrad ic t ions o f  rura l  
development strategy in terms o f  power. The f i r s t  par t  o f  the analysis 
shows how state ru ra l  development programmes enhance the power o f  the 
state in v i l l a g e  a f f a i r s ,  a f fo rd ing  a new type o f  hegemony. However, 
the process by which th i s  is  achieved i t s e l f  involves certa in  
transmutations o f  power tha t  are in ternal to the v i l l a g e .  The second 
part o f  the analysis thus goes on to in te rpre t  the contrad ic t ion  in 
terms o f  contemporary v i l la g e  p o l i t y  and production re la t io n s .  The 
subject ive experience o f  the l a t t e r  by the "excluded" in Ban Dong and 
Ban Mai is  i l l u s t r a te d  by reference to the discourse o f  the "hidden 
t r a n s c r i p t " .22
V II I> 4 , i  State power and p a r t ic ip a t io n
Stephen Young characterized the Thai v i l l a g e  as a 
"non-par t ic ipa tory  democracy". I t  is  a democracy because o f  the 
sanction held by v i l l a g e rs  over th e i r  leaders. I t  is  non-par t ic ipa tory  
because o f  four axiomatic p r inc ip les  guiding action in the p o l i t i c a l  
sphere : l im i ted  government; minimal public involvement with government; 
government le g i t im iza t io n  through concern with the publ ic in te re s t ;  and 
obedience to a u tho r i ty .  These guides to p o l i t i c a l  behaviour r e f l e c t  the 
t ra d i t i o n a l  separation between state and v i l la g e  a f f a i r s ,  whereby state 
a u th o r i t ie s  have re s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  defined funct ions, mostly connected 
with the provision of publ ic in f ras t ruc tu re .  The separation o f  
funct ions or dut ies {n a [ a ] t h i [ i ] )  is such tha t  v i l l a g e rs  play no part 
in state a f f a i r s ,  which are thus l e f t  to those who wish to get involved 
in p o l i t i c s  {kaanmeuang) . Young was cautious about the l i k e l y  
p a r t i c ip a t io n  o f  v i l l a g e rs  to be expected in the Developing Democracies
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Programme (part  o f  the Thai-US development / containment programme in 
the 1960s} with which he was concerned; he placed greater f a i t h  in
estab l ish ing the presence o f  state power or au thor i ty  a t the v i l l a g e  
l e v e l ,  in l ine  with his four th  axiom, so as to maintain i t s  ro le  as the 
" s ig n i f i c a n t  other" (Young 1968 : 873 - 886). The rura l  development
strategy pursued since tha t  time has, as was int imated in the previous 
sect ion, involved a combination o f  t h i s  presence with a more v i s ib le  
incorporat ion .
The normal ra t io n a l iz a t io n  o f  the incorporat ive rura l  development 
strategy is  tha t  v i l l a g e rs  have h i the r to  been excluded from the 
management and f r u i t s  o f  e x t ra -v i l l a g e  resources, i . e .  th a t  the v i l la g e  
has not played i t s  due ro le  in state a f f a i r s .  Democratization means 
providing the i n s t i t u t i o n s  tha t  give v i l l a g e rs  some hold over
s u p ra -v i l1 age resources, in p r inc ip le  making state au tho r i t ies
accountable to v i l l a g e rs  ra ther than vice versa. As we have seen,
however, the r e a l i t y  o f  incorporat ion is tha t  state a u th o r i t ie s  gain an 
increasing inf luence in v i l l a g e  a f f a i r s  via t h e i r  monopolization o f
v i l l a g e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  and th is  is  done pa r t ly  by means o f  a coopt ive 
strategy involv ing cer ta in  powerful ind iv iduals  w ithin  the v i l l a g e .  Thus 
profusion o f  committees, klurn , and individual "volunteer" posit ions
represents an entry  o f  the state in to  v i l la g e  a f f a i r s  in the name o f
v i l l a g e r  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in a f f a i r s  o f  the wider p o l i t y .  The p o te n t ia l l y  
repressive element o f  such an entry  i s  expressed c lea r ly  by one such 
vo lunteer,  the deputy v i l l a g e  head of Ban Mai, who in his ro le  o f  
" saaiseub : in te l l igence "  sees his duty as one of co l lec t ing
information on anyone who t r i e s  to form an independent group or "pluk  
radom : s t i r  up t roub le ,  mobi l ize" .
The hold tha t  th i s  entry gives state developers over v i l l a g e  
a f f a i r s  can be i l l u s t r a te d  by reference to a key aspect o f  the state
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ru ra l  development s tra tegy, tha t  o f  holding v i l l a g e  competi t ions. This 
epitomises the s h i f t  in the s t a t e - v i l 1 age power balance in a number o f 
ways. F i r s t ,  i t  is part  o f  the standardization th a t  is  basic to state 
led rural development. Second, i t  involves cooptat ion o f  v i l la g e  
leaders. Th i rd , i t  enhances the competit ive element in the ethos o f  
rural  development. Fourth, i t  places state o f f i c i a l s  as ins t ig a to rs ,  
a rb i te rs ,  and bene f ic ia r ies  in programmes tha t  are a t  best o f  marginal 
relevance to the needs o f  the majo r i ty  o f v i l l a g e rs .  F i f t h ,  i t  favours 
short term reward or iented projects at the expense o f  long term 
s t ruc tu ra l  change.
A typ ica l  v i l l a g e  competit ion is tha t  held in Ban Dong in 1985. 
At the in s t ig a t io n  o f  the Amphoe, the Ban Dong kamnan entered the 
v i l la g e  for the prov inc ia l  competi t ion. The normal pract ice is  for each 
Amphoe to concentrate i t s  resources on a single v i l l a g e  that i t  can 
show to v i s i t i n g  senior o f f i c i a l s  as an example o f  "development". In 
t h i s  case, v i l l a g e  development involved a number o f  steps. The f i r s t  
and most v i s ib l e  e f f o r t  was to bu i ld  bamboo fences around each house 
p lo t ,  in l in e  with the Phaen din tham Phaen din tho ' ng (see section 
I I , l J i )  po l icy  o f  having every v i l l a g e  fenced. The purpose o f  th i s  
i s  twofold from the point o f  view o f  the amphoe. F i r s t ,  i t  gives the 
v i l la g e  an appearance o f  " c i v i l i z a t i o n "  {khwaam rungreuang) compared 
with the "messy" (keeka) appearance o f  an unfenced v i l l a g e .  Second, 
i t  enhances control  by the amphoe and v i l l a g e  o f f i c i a l s  over 
v i l l a g e r s ,  expressed as "pokkhro1ng n ga ii ; l i t .  ease o f  
adm in is t ra t ion" ,  since i t  allows fo r  easy id e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  house plots 
and res idents. This is  fu r the r  enhanced by the construct ion o f  awnings 
and name signs at the f ron t  o f  each house. The fence bui ld ing was 
effected by the constant exhortat ion of the kamnan, who threatened to 
withdraw a l l  cooperation ( i . e .  s ta tu tory  services, such as issuing 
i d e n t i t y  cards) from anyone who refused to comply. V i l lagers  had to
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provide mater ials themselves, involv ing wood fo r  posts, bamboo, and 
na i ls  : t h i s  involved some expense, due to the shortage o f  n a tu ra l ly  
avai lable mater ia ls .  Despite some grumbling, most o f  the Ban Dong road 
frontage was fenced. The backs o f  houses were not fenced, and in Bung
Khiew i t  was decided to take a common stand against fence bui ld ing 
unless the kamnan could provide the mater ia ls ,  since i t  was f e l t  tha t 
the fences provided no tangib le  bene f i t  and tha t  in any case they would 
soon f a l l  into d is re p a i r .  This united stand at the regular meeting of 
Bung Khiew v i l l a g e r s  to discuss the r i c e  bank and other community 
matters raised the confidence o f  ind iv idua ls  to re s is t  the scheme.
The non-material side o f  preparation for the competit ion was to 
set up eight "development groups : klum phattanaa" . This was done
at a Ban Dong v i l l a g e  meeting by the kamnan, who divided up the 
v i l la g e  and appointed group heads to be responsible for each group.
Some o f  these were absent at the time o f  the meeting, as in the case o f
Yot, a Bung Khiew resident who normally has l i t t l e  to do with the rest 
o f  the community but now found himself  head o f  the Bung Khiew group. 
The kamnan has since used these groups for relaying orders via the 
group heads, placing them in often uncomfortable posit ions since they
are not natural  leaders and the orders they carry are perceived to be 
the whim of the kamnan. The f i r s t  duty was fo r  each group to provide
several "volunteers" to  go on a t r i p  to v i s i t  a v i l la g e  in a
neighbouring province that had won the previous year 's regional 
competit ion. Those who went had to provide the 70 baht bus fare
themselves, and on the day only about ha l f  the busload turned up; a f te r
some discussion the kamnan agreed to pay the remainder o f  the charter 
fee. Before enter ing the v i l l a g e ,  the D is t r i c t  O f f icer  gave a welcoming 
t a l k  to the v i s i t i n g  Ban Dong v i l l a g e rs ,  in which he gave advice on how 
to win a competi t ion. Most o f  t h i s  consisted o f  how to take good care 
o f  the judging committee and how to catch th e i r  eye, fo r  example by
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select ing a p re t ty  g i r l  to welcome the judges and to know what they were 
looking fo r .  This was followed by a v i s i t  to the v i l l a g e ,  at which the 
v i l l a g e rs  provided a hospitable welcome and showed the group around the 
model houses [baan tua yaang) that had been selected for the i r  
c leanl iness and conformity to set c r i t e r i a .
At the meeting fol lowing the fence b u i ld in g ,  the D is t r i c t  DAE 
o f f i c e r  spoke o f  his admiration at how the v i l la g e  had developed almost 
overnight.  The material e f fec t  was less e n th u s ia s t ica l ly  appreciated by 
some v i l l a g e r s ,  who in the past would have been able to cut across each 
o ther 's  land but now had to go the long way round because o f  the 
fencing. The pr inc ipa l  benef i t  went to the kamnan, who came second in 
terms o f  the annual award of "khwaamdii khwaamcho'b : meri t  po in ts " ,  
for which he received an undisclosed sum o f  money from the provincial  
admin is tra t ion . Had he come f i r s t ,  he would have received a gold medal 
and a revo lver .  Following t h i s ,  however, his uncharacte r is t ic  burst o f  
enthusiasm fo r  v i l l a g e  "development", which had surprised many v i l la g e rs  
who had grown accustomed to his concern for his own pr ivate  business 
a f f a i r s ,  waned. By 1986, the fences had fa l len  into d is re p a i r .
As a one-off  event, the competit ion is symbolic rather than
cha rac te r is t ic  o f  the various aspects o f  exercise o f  state power through
ru ra l  development out l ined above. However, these can be expanded on with 
reference to the broader thrust  o f  state led rura l  development strategy 
in Ban Dong and Ban Mai. Standardization is  a key element in th is
strategy and can be viewed in a number of ways. At an organizat ional 
le v e l ,  standardizat ion r e f le c t s  the incorporat ion o f  v i l l a g e  
in s t i t u t i o n s  in to  the bureaucrat ic framework ( rabob raachakaan) , 
which places stress on un iformi ty .  Thus committees, modes o f  operat ion, 
structures o f  a u th o r i ty ,  and even specif ic  mater ial aspects o f
development such as fence bu i ld ing are a l l  determined by a set o f  rules
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imposed from outside and above. At a p o l i t i c a l  le v e l ,  standardizat ion 
is part  o f  the stress on the one-ness o f  the Thai nation and 
metropol i tan cu l tu ra l  domination. This hegemonic aspect can be seen 
m a te r ia l ly  in Ban Dong and Ban Mai in the awnings in f ro n t  o f  each 
roadside house, many o f  which are painted in the red, whi te , and blue 
colours o f  the national f lag and some of which d isp lay p ictures o f  the
royal family  and slogans e x to l l in g  c iv ic  v i r tues  tha t  have been provided
by the Amphoe. More genera l ly ,  the various klum and t ra in ing  
sessions described in Chapter VI I  above are each used as a forum for 
disseminat ion o f  o f f i c i a l  po l icy  by Amphoe o f f i c i a l s .  Many o f  the 
schemes th a t  are introduced r e f l e c t  an urban o r ie n ta t io n ,  both in the 
discourse o f  " khwaamjaroen : c i v i l i z a t i o n "  and in the material
emphasis such as construct ion of waste bins,  imposition o f  f ines for 
c a t t l e  dung on the v i l l a g e  streets in Ban Mai, and gr id  pattern o f
roads.
The cooptation o f  v i l la g e  leaders is part o f  the process by which
the state uses ru ra l  development as a means o f  gaining control  over
v i l l a g e  in s t i t u t i o n s .  The Ban Dong kamnan and the Ban Mai v i l la g e  
head f ind i t  in t h e i r  own economic in te res t  as well as p o l i t i c a l l y  
convenient to serve as the mouthpiece o f  the Amphoe at the v i l l a g e  
le v e l ,  even though in pr ivate conversation they a t te s t  to the
s u p e r f i c i a l i t y  o f  amphoe programmes ( in the words o f  the Ban Dong 
kamnan, such programmes "kao t h i i  mai khan; mai kao t h i i  khan 
scratch where i t  doesn't  i t c h ;  don’ t  scratch where i t  i tches" .  Mot only 
do they gain the major benef i ts  o f  rewards fo r  performance in
competit ions, but they serve as the channels through which resources 
enter the v i l l a g e ,  and these resources are greater fo r  v i l lages  which 
are seen as "phro'm  : ready, together" than others. In th is  context,  
the advantage o f  the awnings described above is  la rge ly  symbolic. In 
Yot's words,
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"Thaa khao hen was rao phro'mphriang kan khao ja  
maa chuai rao reuang eun : I f  they see that
we're ready, together [ to  conform] they [Amphoe 
o f f i c i a l s ]  w i l l  come and help in other matters ."
This is  confirmed in o f f i c i a l  discourse by the DAE o f f i c e r ' s  repeated
analogy o f  amphoe and v i l lages  as mother and chi ldren : the ch i ld  who
cr ies  the loudest ( i . e .  the v i l l a g e  which shows i t  is  phro1m : ready,
together) gets fed (helped) f i r s t .  Readiness becomes conformity,
togetherness unanimity o f  response to superior au tho r i ty .
The competi t ive ethos o f  ru ra l  development stra tegy is  enhanced 
by v i l l a g e  level competit ions. The emphasis is  on doing bet ter  than 
one's neighbour or neighbouring v i l l a g e .  This re in forces the
consumerist ideology th a t  a f fec ts  v i l l a g e  l i f e  to an increasing extent,  
as each t r i e s  to outdo or a t least keep up with others in terms of 
gadgetry, size o f  ceremonial fe a s ts ,23 or simply in providing th e i r  
ch i ld ren with packaged snacks (see Mid, case 1, sect ion V l ^ l j i i ) .
The same fee l ing of not wanting to be "aai khao : ashamed [before]
them" is  used in exhortat ion by o f f i c i a l s  to jo in  in o f f i c i a l  schemes so 
as not to lose ind iv idual or c o l le c t i v e  face.
The power o f  sta te o f f i c i a l s  is  also enhanced by such schemes in 
tha t  they serve as the e f fe c t ive  ins t ig a to rs ,  a rb i t e r s ,  and
benef ic ia r ies  o f  many programmes. The Amphoe decides which v i l l a g e  is 
to be given p r i o r i t y  and what type of programmes are to be put into 
e f fe c t .  Since the judges are a l l  senior d i s t r i c t  or provincial  
o f f i c i a l s ,  conformity with t h e i r  c r i t e r i a  o f "development" is  the key to 
success.2^ i f  success is  achieved, the immediate reward goes to 
v i l l a g e  and d i s t r i c t  level funct ionar ies in terms o f  khwaamdii 
khwaamcho'b, which fo r  v i l la g e  o f f i c i a l s  may mean a material  reward, 
while salar ied o f f i c i a l s  are rewarded by a double jump on the c i v i l  
service promotions scale ( leuan so'ng chan : l i t .  move [up] two
steps) .
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A f in a l  point to make about the rura l  development strategy 
epitomized by v i l l a g e  competit ions i s  the sup e r f ic ia l  and short term 
o r ien ta t ion  i t  gives to i n i t i a t i v e s .  I t  is  a r e f l e c t i o n  o f  the power 
tha t  state o f f i c i a l s  and t h e i r  v i l l a g e  representat ives have over v i l l a g e  
a c t i v i t y  th a t  many o f  those involved in fence bu i ld in g ,  t ra in in g  
programmes, and other i n i t i a t i v e s  see them as o f  marginal relevance to 
t h e i r  needs, but they are unable to do other than comply or f ind 
compliance less cos t ly  than otherwise. Non-compliance does take place 
on occasion as in the case o f  Bung Khiew, and th i s  depends in part 
on strong independent leadership, although Boi had no part  in th i s  
pa r t icu la r  i n i t i a t i v e .  More often non-compliance is a fragmentary 
dragging o f  fe e t ,  which i s  interpreted as apathy and re su l t s  in more 
fo rcefu l  measures o f  compulsion, leading to the common complaint 
associated with development measures o f  fee l ing "forced : thuuk
bangkhap" , p a r t i c u la r l y  in Ban Mai. In add i t ion ,  t h i s  o r ien ta t ion  
leads to an associat ion o f  development with su p e r f ic ia l  i n f r a s t ru c tu re , 
pre-emptively usurping the concept and preventing i t s  associat ion with 
more substant ial  s t ruc tu ra l  change.
V I I I  , 4 J i  Power 0 production  t and p a r t i c i  pation
I t  has often been noted tha t  the powerlessness o f  the poor is  
compounded by th e i r  lack o f  voice (e.g. Chambers 1983 : 1 3 1 f f . ) .  Here
I would l i k e  to modify the Ban Mai v i l l a g e r ' s  statement at the head o f  
t h i s  chapter by suggesting that what the rura l  poor lack is  a public  
vo ice, but th a t  t h e i r  "hidden t ra n s c r ip t "  (see footnote 22) expresses 
eloquently t h e i r  pos it ion v i s -a -v is  various forms o f  power, the 
statement i t s e l f  being one example.
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In re la t io n  to the power o f  the s ta te , spec i f ic  rural  development 
schemes are punned via th e i r  acronyms or otherwise : ro ' pho4 cho '
(Accelerated Rural Development) becomes ruam phuak khon chua (a 
gathering of the ev i l  [ c o r ru p t ] ) ;  ko‘ so' cho' (Rural Employment 
Generation Programme) becomes e i ther  kin saam chan (eat [ i . e .  be on 
the take] at three leve ls  [ v i l l a g e  head, kamnan, amphoe o f f i c i a l ] )
or koong sin chaat (cheat the l i f e  out o f  the nat ion) ;  and Phaen
din tham Phaen d in  tho' ng becomes Phaen din th o 1 Phaen d in  thae 
(land o f  desperat ion).
The s i tua t ion  o f  the rura l  poor v is -a -v is  power not d i r e c t l y  
associated with the state is expressed in statements such as "khwaam
yuthitham 1aew tae khwaam pho1j a i  kho*ng khon to : [ i n  a reference to 
corrupt ion by v i l l a g e  leaders and o f f i c i a l s ]  ju s t ic e  i s  at the whim o f  
the 'b ig  boys '" .  More d i re c t  statements are made with reference to 
spec if ic  instances o f  perceived in ju s t i ce  : "A/o' khuud r i i d  khon
jon : [One o f  the Ban Mai t ra c to r  owners] exp lo i ts  the poor", t h i s  in 
reference to the low wages he pays and the high prices he charges in his
shop and fo r  medical treatment since he is also tambon doctor.
However, the power o f  the state and the power o f  cer ta in
ind iv idua ls  are not seen as e n t i r e l y  separate. The associat ion between 
state and other local powers is  captured in the observation that : 
"Rathabaan khao mai thaung chaorai chaonaa khao theung khae 
pho'khaa : The government doesn't  reach [us] farmers; i t  only gets as
far as the merchants". With reference to the po l ice ,  i t  is  often 
commented tha t  they ntha i khon jon  : squeeze [ l i t .  p l o u g h ^ ]
poor". One o f  the most v iv id  analogies I heard was to compare the poor 
with f ish  in a water j a r ,  which could eas i ly  be caught; the r ich  are 
l i ke  f i sh  in a stream, d i f f i c u l t  to catch {khon jon  meuan piaa nai
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oong jab ngaai khon ru a i  meuan piaa nai lamhuai jab  yaak) . Another 
was to represent poor v i l la g e rs  who use wood on t h e i r  own land as 
"meuan 1 uuk j i a b  nai meu khao : l i ke  chicks in t h e i r  [ o f f i c i a l s ' ]
hands" which (who) could be squeezed at any t ime, while timber 
contractors go scot- free i f  they br ibe the r ig h t  amount.
The above discourse o f  the poor is  an a r t i c u la t i o n  of the 
subject ive react ion to exercise o f  power in the context o f  the changing 
p o l i t y  and production re la t ions  at the v i l la g e  le ve l .  The previous 
section showed how the attempt to increase one form of c o n t r o l , over 
the vagaries o f  the natural  environment, leads to a loss o f  other forms 
o f  control  as a r e s u l t  o f  the change in production re la t ions  and the 
associated transformation o f  the v i l l a g e  p o l i t y  th a t  i s  a part o f  t h i s  
change. However, t h i s  does not represent a neutral  subs t i tu t ion  o f  one 
type o f  control  by another. The key di f ference is  th a t  between con t ro l ,  
or lack o f  i t ,  by people over th e i r  natural environment, and control  by 
people over other people. In other words, the essent ia l  var iable  is  the 
aspect o f  p o w e r .
Returning to the theme o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  the means by which 
control  over production can be increased by the ma jo r i ty  o f  rura l  
producers becomes the key chal lenge, and th is  requires an understanding 
o f  the re la t io n sh ip  between production and power in the two communities 
under study. This re la t ionsh ip  is  reviewed b r ie f l y  below in three main 
dimensions : the associat ion o f  control  over production in the context
o f  changing production re la t ions  with posit ions o f  p o l i t i c a l  power at 
the v i l l a g e  le ve l ;  the way in which exercise o f  power a ffec ts  
product ion; and the embryonic forms o f  countervai l ing power that show 
signs o f  emerging in indigenous attempts to re ta in  control  over 
product ion.
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Chapter VI and section VIII>3>i1  above document the coexistence 
o f  economic and other posit ions of power in key ind iv idua ls  at the
v i l la g e  leve l .  That th is  coexistence is more than coincidence is 
implied by the c r i t e r i a  for assumption o f  formal v i l l a g e  leadership 
detai led in section V I I I >3J i , and i t  has been shown that these
posit ions are then re in fo rc ing  o f  economic status. The s ign i f icance o f  
th i s  overlap is  tha t  decentra l izat ion o f  power in the name o f
p a r t ic ip a t io n  through in s t i t u t i o n s  such as the TC merely serves to 
decentral ize inequa l i ty  and re in force or reshape, rather than replace, 
"non-ra t iona l"  aspects o f power and economic re la t io n s .
Ind i rec t  expression o f  power a ffec ts  production in a number o f  
ways. The desire fo r  control  as expressed in the resett lement o f  Ban
Mai v i l l a g e rs  in the nucleated gr id-p lan sett lement precludes a range o f  
productive economic a c t i v i t y  and makes f i e ld  cropping less convenient 
fo r  those with f i e ld s  at a distance from the v i l l a g e .  Training sessions 
and v i l l a g e  meetings are time consuming, and during the ag r icu l tu ra l  
season they are regarded as ser iously  d is rup t ive  by those with urgent 
tasks to attend to . Power o f  feared ind iv idua ls  in several cases 
deprives producers temporari ly  or permanently o f  control  over key means 
o f  production to which they are e n t i t l e d .
Countervail ing power is expressed qu ie t ly  and, to  most outs iders,
almost i n v i s ib l y .  In Ban Mai, resistance to resett lement is  j u s t i f i e d
f i r s t  and foremost in terms o f  convenience o f  production, although there
is also a subject ive expression o f  the freedom ( isa ra ) from being
forced (bangkhap) or pestered ( j u k j i k ) .  In the words o f  one who has
resisted resett lement:
"Whose convenience is i t  [ resett lement]  fo r  - ours 
or the i rs?  For them i t ' s  f i n e ,  they can keep 
con t ro l .  Here [on the farmstead he has res is ted 
leaving] we're out o f  s ight  and earshot (klaihuu
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k l a i t a a ) ,  and that worries them. Yet here we 
can ra ise  chickens and ducks, can get some work in 
before b re a k fa s t . . . " .
Although much everyday resistance is fragmentary, t h i s  p a r t icu la r  case
involves a number o f  homesteads in one o f  the older communities o f  Ban
Mai. Other forms o f  resistance include the Bung Khiew refusal to bu i ld
fences. ^
V I I I . 5 Pa r t ic ipa t ion  and rura l  development in perspective
In t h i s  chapter we have considered the various in te rpre ta t ions  
and manipulations o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  as i t  has been used in rura l  
development. Par t icu la r  stress has been placed on the issues o f  control 
and power as the key elements in a revised approach. The approach is 
context bound in i t s  emphasis on production in a loca l  s i tu a t ion  of 
rapid change. This f in a l  section examines local rural  development 
schemes in the revised perspective. The questions to be asked 
concerning a p a r t icu la r  i n i t i a t i v e  are as fo l lows. How re levant is  i t  
to p roduct ion?^ pow does i t  a f fe c t  re la t ions  o f  control  and power? 
Who in the community i s  i t  re levant to and in what way? The i n i t i a t i v e s  
covered are those discussed in section V I I . 5.
BAAC c re d i t  i s  c lea r ly  o f  immediate relevance to production. As 
we saw in Chapter V, 30% of c re d i t  fo r  inputs to ag r icu l tu re  in Ban Dong 
and 18% in Ban Mai comes from th i s  source. This form o f  c re d i t  is  
cheaper than n o n - in s t i tu t io n a l  c re d i t ,  and as such i t  gives rec ip ien ts  
control  over inputs tha t  would be d i f f i c u l t  to a t ta in  otherwise. In 
th is  respect BAAC c re d i t  as the state*s pr incipal  f inanc ia l  commitment 
to agr icu l tu re  in Lan Sak and elsewhere enhances p a r t ic ip a t io n  in the 
high input production regime tha t  predominates. However, by promoting
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involvement in such a regime and by enforced cont inuat ion o f  involvement 
by means o f  the debt cyc le , c r e d i t  on easy terms i r o n i c a l l y  serves to 
decrease control  in the long run by those with i n s u f f i c i e n t  means o f  
production to keep th e i r  heads above water. This i s  manifested both 
d i r e c t l y  in the c re d i t  in kind that BAAC c l ie n ts  are forced to take and
in d i r e c t l y  in the loss o f  control  over production decisions tha t  are
deta i led in Chapter V. I t  is  i ron ic  tha t  many o f  the poorest farmers in
Ban Dong and Ban Mai forego BAAC c re d i t  not only because they are
excluded by v i r tue  o f  t h e i r  economic status from jo in ing  a BAAC group, 
but also sometimes because they prefer to borrow from fe l low  v i l l a g e rs  
over whom they feel they have some sanction and who can therefore be 
expected to show some f l e x i b i l i t y  and accept p a r t ia l  repayment in 
services other than cash. Since BAAC works more or less independently 
o f  the amphoe admin is tra t ion and v i l la g e  p o l i t y ,  BAAC groups do not 
impinge on power re la t ions  with in  the v i l l a g e  to any s ig n i f i c a n t  degree. 
Where BAAC does enhance the posit ion o f  the better  o f f  v i l l a g e rs  is  in 
giving long-term c re d i t  for purchase o f  machinery, in pa r t icu la r  
t rac to rs  and power t i l l e r s .
The CDD housewives' group only a f fec ts  production marginal ly in 
i t s  associated savings scheme. In Ban Dong, t h i s  scheme involves a
larger  number o f  women than in Ban Mai, but in ne ither case has the
l im i ted  amount o f  savings been put to any productive use. Rather, such 
groups place ind iv idua ls  in posit ions of au tho r i ty  as minor state 
funct ionar ies with in  the v i l l a g e  and give state o f f i c i a l s  access to 
v i l la g e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and v i l l a g e  women's labour in support o f  i t s  own 
programmes. Proposed t r a in in g ,  which would fo l low CDD use o f  
housewives' groups observed elsewhere in Thai land, involves handicraft  
production as cottage ind u s t ry .29 As suggested in Chapter V I I ,  these 
i n i t i a t i v e s  tend to impose urban standards on production by women,
fa i l i n g  to take into account th e i r  ro le  in ag r icu l tu ra l  production.
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The Bung Khiew r i ce  bank is  relevant to production inasmuch as
i t  provides a cheap means of c re d i t  for a subsistence crop and
maintains resources with in  the community. I t  removes one o f  the main 
forms o f  dependence on external resources tha t  existed in the marginal 
r i ce  economy o f  Bung Khiew, which was the need to borrow r i c e  in d e f i c i t
years. As such, i t  increases the control  o f  the community as a whole
over the basic item of subsistence, and since lending p r i o r i t y  is  based 
mainly on need, i t  benef i ts  the least well o f f  most, although th is  is  
less relevant by 1986 when the 17 kwien tha t have been accumulated are
s u f f i c i e n t  to f u l f i l l  most borrowing needs among the 40 members. 
Control over the terms o f  lending and the shape o f  the i n s t i t u t i o n  are 
also in the hands o f  the members. The r i c e  bank also serves as a forum
for  other community i n i t i a t i v e s ,  and has the potent ia l  (expressed by
members) fo r  communal marketing and purchase o f  inputs , increasing the 
bargaining power o f  Bung Khiew v i l l a g e rs  v i s -a -v is  the market. Already 
i t  has been used to negot iate external resources in the form o f  the r ice  
barn and a stock o f  r i c e .  Thus i t  has moved beyond the r e t r e a t i s t
" se l f -he lp "  funct ion c r i t i c i s e d  by Scott .
The Bung Khiew bu f fa lo  bank is  also of d i r e c t  relevance to 
production in tha t  i t  gives farmers d i re c t  control  over the means o f  
t i l l a g e .  I t  removes another main area o f  dependence on external 
resources for subsistence production in Bung Khiew ag r icu l tu re .  Control 
is c o l l e c t i v e ,  and leadership is  representat ive o f  t h i s  r e la t i v e l y  
und i f fe rent ia ted community. The i n i t i a l  bene f ic ia r ies  have been the 
poorest members o f  the community. Control over t h i s  i n s t i t u t i o n  is less 
indigenous than in the case o f  the r i c e  bank since the resources have 
i n i t i a l l y  come from the outside in the form of donat ion. As a r e s u l t ,  
the bu f fa lo  bank members s t i l l  feel  accountable to the NKYFRD, and in 
the cases where there has been a problem ( fo r  example the death o f
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several b u f fa lo ) ,  these outsiders have been consulted. This can be 
expected to decrease as more o f  the bank's buffa lo  are o f fsp r ing  o f  the 
o r ig ina l  herd and are thus seen as indigenous community resources, but 
th is  w i l l  take many years to become establ ished.
The f ina l  scheme under consideration fo r  i t s  p a r t ic ipa to ry  
content i s  the Bung Khiew I r r ig a t io n  Channel. This was part  o f  an 
e f f o r t  to secure control  over another facto r  necessary fo r  subsistence 
product ion, water. Unlike the r ice  and bu f fa lo  banks, i t  was not 
inherent ly  concerned with production re la t ions  but rather  with 
mobi l iza t ion o f  a resource fo r  community use. This i n i t i a t i v e  had i t s  
roots in indigenous forms o f  cooperative development, and i t  was 
preceded by several attempts tha t  re l ied  so le ly  on local resources. 
Through a local leader, Bung Khiew v i l la g e rs  cal led on and secured a 
commitment to provide external resources in t h e i r  attempt to construct 
the channel in 1984 ** 85, both from NGO sources and from the sta te. The 
p a r t ic ip a to ry  nature o f  t h i s  scheme was thus based on indigenous modes 
o f  mobi l iz ing community resources, but i t  included an adaptation to 
incorporat ion in to  the wider community in i t s  use o f  key " l i n k "  f igures 
to secure assistance from fu r the r  a f ie ld .
Conclusion
I f  the tone o f  t h i s  chapter has been somewhat negative, i t  is 
because the emphasis has been on a fundamental con trad ic t ion  concerning 
p a r t i c ip a t io n  and the ex is t ing  terms o f  incorporat ion faced by Ban Dong 
and Ban Mai v i l l a g e r s .  Where possible, potent ia ls  have been id e n t i f ie d  
and "spaces" pointed out. The concluding chapter tha t  fol lows pursues 
some o f  these po ten t ia ls  and examines some o f  the wider impl icat ions of
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pa r t ic ipa to ry  ru ra l  development.
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N o t e s
1. The f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  in te rp re ta t io n  o f  "democracy : prachaathi pa ta i"  
in the Thai context opens i t  to s im i la r  manipulat ions in the 
cons t i tu t iona l  f i e ld  to those o f  pa r t ic ip a t io n  in the f i e ld  of 
development. Thai "democracy" celebrated i t s  f i f t i e t h  anniversary in 
1982, the 1932 a b o l i t i o n  o f  the absolute monarchy having marked the 
s ta r t  o f  the "democratic" era. However, most o f  th i s  period has seen 
domination o f  the p o l i t i c a l  arena by the m i l i t a r y  and several 
abrogations o f  the Const i tu t ion . Democracy is popularly used in 
con t rad is t inc t ion  to communism and is thus associated with support fo r  
the national symbols o f  chaat saat kasat (nat ion, re l i g io n ,  
monarchy). One Lan Sak v i l la g e  headman pointed out the newly ins ta l led  
publ ic address system in his v i l l a g e  as evidence that democracy had 
a r r ived ,  since the national anthem could now be played for a l l  to hear 
and stand at a t ten t ion  to each day at 8 a.m. and 6 p.m. On a more 
mocking note, the Thai p o l i t i c a l  system is often referred to as 
"prachaathipatai baeb t ha i t ha i  : Thai s ty le  democracy" or 
"prachaathipatai khreung bai : half-baked democracy".
2. Uthong (1986 : 9 f f . )  warns against use o f  local knowledge as a tool 
in the hands o f  outs iders , and c r i t i c i z e s  the prevai l ing  academic 
in te res t  in local knowledge as p r im ar i ly  concerned with i t s  u t i l i t y  to 
s c i e n t i f i c  research. Lacking is an understanding o f ,  or in te res t  in ,  
how knowledge funct ions within the community and i t s  re la t ions  with 
other i n s t i t u t i o n s .
3. The dilemma o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  through revo lu t ionary  act ion has been 
commented on in the context o f  the Bhoomi Sena movement in Maharashtra :
Often, in order to promote p a r t ic ipa t ion  on a wide 
scale, macro-action w i l l  involve struggles with 
opposing macro-forces representing the status quo 
o f  the social s tructure and i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  and the 
contingencies o f  such struggles may necessitate 
tha t  the immediate issues and methods o f  action be 
determined c e n t ra l l y .  The dilemma is tha t  in thus 
seeking to " l i b e r a te " ,  the very thing to be
l iberated - i . e .  people's c r e a t i v i t y  - may f a i l  to 
be created, and what has not been created cannot 
be 1ibera ted . In such a s i tua t ion  the most 
l i k e l y  outcome o f  a successful macro-action would 
seem to be the domination o f  the new in s t i t u t i o n s  
by one or another o f  the forces tha t  already ex is t  
(e.g. party  or government bureaucracy), to promote 
the i r  power rather than "people's power"
(Rahman 1981 : 20 - 21; o r ig in a l  emphasis).
The d is i l lus ionment  tha t  led to the decl ine in fortunes o f  the Communist
Party of Thailand a f te r  1979 was pa r t ly  due to t h i s  high level o f
c e n t ra l i z a t i o n .
4. Six dimensions are discussed o ve ra l l ,  as fo l lows. Pa r t ic ipa t ion  is 
seen as encounter between the excluded and those who maintain
exclusion. Such encounter may take many forms from bargaining to armed
struggle , between groups, classes, organizat ions, e tc .  Movements and
organizations are o f  inherent i n te re s t ,  and the focus is  on internal 
organizat ion, in te res ts ,  leadership, forms and too ls  o f  s truggle,
c i r c u la t io n  o f  information, and education regarding the aims o f  the
movement or organizat ion. Individual experience is re levant to 
p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  since ind iv idual consciousness is  "the cruc ib le  in which 
'socia l  forces'  are put into human act ion" .  This is  termed the
"biographical approach". Programmes or pro jects implemented from 
above are o f  in te re s t ,  p a r t i c u la r l y  regarding the motivat ion o f  t h e i r  
sponsors : are such programmes "system maintaining" or "system
transforming"? More abs t rac t ly ,  po l icy  con tr ibu t ing  to national 
development is a determinant o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  : most systems espouse
the ideals o f  democracy, but i t  is  important to see in what form i t  is  
promoted. The space fo r  increased p a r t i c ip a t io n  ex is ts  as an "open 
f r o n t ie r  . . .  in a l l  soc ie t ies and the main forces o f  most popular and 
emancipatory movements . . .  are deployed along i t  or seeking i t  ou t" .
Last, a n t i - p a r t i c ip a to r y  st ructures and ideologies need to be 
examined, in p a r t i cu la r  in the context o f  contemporary forms o f  
modernization and nation bu i ld ing .
5. See in pa r t icu la r  Chenery et a l . 1974. This study was i t s e l f
sponsored by the World Bank. I t s  s ta r t ing  point was inequal i ty  
associated with growth in LDCs, but i t  did not see the two as necessary
corre la tes . The study examined the context and scope for in tervent ion
and ide n t i f ie d  target groups before going on to a more technocrat ic
analysis o f  po l icy  opt ions.
6. The emphasis on cash income in part r e f l e c t s ,  and in turn is 
re f lec ted  by, the use o f  income as the pr inc ipal  ind ica tor  o f  rural  
poverty. The World Bank fol lows the National S ta t i s t i c a l  Of f ice (NSO) 
d e f i n i t i o n  of poverty in ru ra l  areas as per capita monthly income below 
150 baht (IBRD 1980 : 61 - 62). The NESDB def ines ru ra l  poverty in
the F i f th  Plan poverty eradicat ion programme as per capita  monthly 
income below 165 baht. C r i t ic ism  of use o f  such a crude c r i t e r io n  
can be leve l led  on a number o f  counts. In an economy in which 
subsistence production is s t i l l  important, cash income does not
accurately r e f l e c t  opportun i t ies fo r  consumption or other improvements 
in l i v e l ih o o d .  In a s i tua t ion  o f  widespread debt, income f igures are o f  
l im i te d  meaning, since outlays may ac tua l ly  exceed income in any one 
year. Cost o f  l i v i n g  varies considerably from one part o f  the country 
to another, and the local natural  resource s i tu a t io n  may a f fec t  
s ig n i f i c a n t l y  the extent to which a cash income determines leve ls  o f  
consumption, espec ia l ly  o f  fuel  and proteins. In add i t ion ,  a l l  c u to f f  
points are to some extent a r b i t r a r y ,  the more so fo r  an u l t ima te ly  
r e la t i v e  concept such as poverty which cannot re a d i l y  be compared over 
time and space. Turton (1987) warns o f  the " p i t f a l l s  o f  inappropr ia te ly  
precise conceptual c la s s i f i c a t io n "  in def in ing rura l  poverty.
7. Note the category panyachon discussed in Section I I , 3 , i  .
8. See Muecke (1980) on Vi l lage Scouts. The president o f  the Ban Dong 
V i l lage  Scouts, which is  now more or less ina c t ive ,  is  a wealthy r ice  
m i l l  owner and bu f fa lo  ren ter .  Turton (1984b : 32) notes that the 
membership o f  Rotary and Lions Clubs consists o f  local e l i t e s ,  who often 
wield power in semi-legal or i l l e g a l  and repressive ways.
9. For the dual ro le played by t ra d i t io n a l  v i l l a g e  leadership, see 
Moerman (1969) on synapt ic leaders. In 1960 the headman of Ban Ping, a 
r e la t i v e l y  homogeneous and isolated community, was facing the d i f f i c u l t y  
o f  having to please two const i tuenc ies, namely o f f i c i a l s  and v i l l a g e rs ;  
he was the "door" ( i b id ,  : 543) of the v i l l a g e .  Par t ly  by comparison 
with v i l la g e s  tha t  had been more f u l l y  integrated in to  the wider p o l i t y  
and economy, p a r t l y  by far-s ightedness, Moerman foresaw the decl ine o f  
the synapt ic ro le  o f  the leader as he became more accountable to and 
dependent on o f f i c i a l s  and external resources.
10. The timing of meetings at various leve ls  is  a c lear ind ica t ion  of 
the persistence o f  the "top-downward" o r ie n ta t io n ,  despite rhe to r ic  on 
p a r t i c ip a t io n  tha t  would suggest the contrary. Meetings at each level - 
v i l l a g e ,  d i s t r i c t ,  p ro v in c ia l ,  reg iona l ,  national - are timed to fo l low 
the meeting at the level immediately above, ind ica t ing  the d i re c t io n  in 
which information and po l icy  orders are designed to f low.
11. See Scott and others on everyday forms o f  peasant resistance in the
January 1986 issue o f  Peasant Studies. The reluctance o f  v i l l a g e rs
to attend meetings may be interpreted as one form o f  resistance in Ban 
Dong; the fac t  tha t  they have to be forced under penalty o f  f ine  in Ban 
Mai also indicates a resistance o f  consciousness, i f  not o f  act ion - 
t h i s  type of phenomenon as re fu ta t io n  o f  the idea o f  false consciousness 
is  discussed by Scott (1976 : 230), who suggests tha t  increase in
repressive powers i s  i t s e l f  evidence that compliance is through other 
than passive acceptance o f  au th o r i ty .  In t h i s  sense, resistance to
resett lement by Ban Mai v i l l a g e rs  can be viewed as a move to re ta in  
control over l ive l ihood  and is  thus pa r t ic ip a to ry  in the terms out l ined 
above. A more c o l le c t i v e  case o f  resistance occurred in 1985 during a 
meeting at Ban Dong temple. Having invested heavi ly and made a loss in 
a temple f a i r  without consult ing v i l l a g e r s ,  the Abbot and members o f  the 
V i l lage Committee attempted to make up the loss by securing 
contr ibut ions o f  200 baht from each v i l l a g e r .  One respected v i l l a g e  
elder stood up to speak against the proposal, asking why v i l l a g e rs  had 
not been consulted. Following t h i s ,  the Abbot and VC members went on at 
length about the v i l l a g e rs '  moral ob l igat ion to " s t i c k  together".  While 
they were ta l k in g ,  the v i l l a g e rs  one by one stood up and descended from 
the temple hal l  where the meeting was being held, despite pleas from the
VC member to remain. Resistance to forced purchase o f  f e r t i l i z e r  has
already been mentioned, and t h i s  may take on ingenious forms : one Bung 
Khiew farmer said, "phom mai deuad r o ‘ n meuan khon eun : I 'm not
troubled l i k e  other people",  and went on to explain tha t  he borrows from 
BAAC ostensib ly  to buy a b u f fa lo ;  t h i s  he does, se l l s  one o f  his own (he
has f i v e ) ,  and uses the proceeds for r ice  farming, thereby avoiding the
s t ip u la t io n  that those who borrow fo r  r ice  farming must buy f e r t i l i z e r !
12. The main ideological assumption I use consciously is  tha t  
p a r t i c ip a t io n  and rural  development should be or iented toward improving 
the l o t  o f  the disadvantaged, be they described as "poor",  "powerless", 
"excluded" or in other terms. A subsidiary assumption is th a t  local 
c u l tu ra l  values and more universal values such as human d ig n i t y ,  the 
r ig h t  to a basic l i v e l ih o o d ,  and involvement at various leve ls  o f  
society on equal terms, are o f  inherent importance and should not, 
there fo re ,  be subjugated to al ien forms or crude economistic or 
m a te r ia l i s t i c  measures o f  "we l l-be ing" .  Doubtless I have other 
unconscious assumptions underlying my approach, as do a l l  t rea t ises  
concerning the organizat ion o f  society ,  and I apologize only for not 
being able to make them more e x p l i c i t .
13. I am gra te fu l  to Anan Kanjanaphan for ins igh t  into t h i s  perspective 
tha t  I gained from his discussion with students on a f i e l d  study in Nong 
Kham on 19 October, 1984.
14. In his Peasant Society and Culture, Robert Redfield defines the 
peasantry in terms o f  i t s  place as a "par t  soc ie ty " ,  emphasizing not 
only i t s  indigenous agrarian t r a d i t i o n  but also i t s  production 
re la t io n sh ip  with the larger society (1956 : 17 - 22; 2 3 f f . ) .
15. Recently, the need fo r  se l f - re l ia nce  (pheung ton eng) has found 
i t s  way in to  the discourse o f  state led ru ra l  development. In par t ,  
t h i s  is  a progressive step in the approach o f  state funct ionar ies . 
However, skeptics see t h i s  emphasis as a means o f  cu t t ing  costs and
reducing the burden on strained government budgets. Certa in ly  at the 
local level the frequent lambasting o f  v i l la g e rs  fo r  s i t t i n g  back and 
wait ing fo r  government assistance is evidence o f  t h i s  a t t i tu d e  among 
some o f f i c i a l s .  One c r i t e r i o n  fo r  select ing outstanding kamnans and 
v i l la g e  heads in the o f f i c i a l  local admin is t ra tor 's  d ia ry  for 1984 is  
help in construct ion o f  publ ic in f ra s t ru c tu re , without re ly ing  on publ ic 
money, to the tune o f  at least 50,000 baht . This includes schools,
health c l i n i c s ,  meeting h a l l s ,  roads, br idges, i r r i g a t i o n  channels,
weirs,  f i r e  engines, w e l ls ,  community ponds, amphoe headquarters, 
pol ice s ta t ions ,  and houses fo r  government o f f i c i a l s  (Department of 
Local Administrat ion 1984 : 73; see Appendix 5).
16. Chayanov character izes the peasant's penchant for subsistence
production using household labour as s e l f - e x p lo i t a t io n ,  since im p l i c i t  
returns to labour are fa r  below those found elsewhere in the economy. 
However, viewed another way, the opportuni ty costs o f  using household
labour for subsistence production are discounted against the 
uncerta in t ies and loss o f  control  associated with wage labour or 
production for the market. See Chapter VI, footnote 8 for
perspectives on th is  analysis.
17. Compare kodmaai paa with kodmuu ( l i t .  group ru les)  of Phra Pho 
Pan in Ban Mai Sawan (Tanabe 1986). Many aspects o f  t ra d i t i o n a l  
leadership and changes there in fol lowing increased state a t tent ion  to 
th i s  previously isolated v i l l a g e  are s im i la r  to the s i tu a t ion  o f  the 
khon to and leaders who succeeded him in Ban Mai. See in pa r t icu la r  
pp. 37 - 41.
18. Phuu nam thamachaat (natural  leader) is commonly used in NGO
discourse to d is t ingu ish  leaders with genuine respect and au tho r i ty  in 
the community and who are seen as community representat ives from the 
formal leaders recognized by the government.
19. ALRO employs several labourers in Ban Mai. Because o f  the 
favourable rates o f  pay, there is  heavy competit ion for such work and a 
cer ta in  amount o f  i l l  fee l ing is generated through jea lous ies ,  including 
accusations o f  favouri t ism against i n f lu e n t ia l  v i l l a g e rs  who hold sway 
with ALRO o f f i c i a l  s.
20. CDD was set up in the ear ly  1960s with the e x p l i c i t  ro le  o f  being 
the government's eyes and ears at the v i l l a g e  l e v e l ,  as well as
f u l f i l l i n g  the hegemonic funct ion o f  showing concern for v i l la g e
development. While co l lec t ing  data at Lan Sak, I overheard the amphoe
CDD o f f i c e r  g iv ing his monthly b r ie f in g s  to the tambon level workers,
stressing above a l l  the need to repor t  immediately there was any unusual 
gathering (chumnum) or s t i r r i n g  {khleuanwai) w ith in  th e i r  areas. In
a moment o f  frankness during an in terv iew, t h i s  same o f f i c e r  to ld  me 
that he had shot and k i l l e d  two v i l l a g e rs  during his previous posting in 
a sens it ive area in Nakorn Panom province in northeastern Thai land, 
since he had " re l i a b le  information" that they were out to get him as he 
had a (CPT) pr ice on his head (khaahua) .
21. In p a r t i c u la r ,  leaders o f  the Farmers' Federation o f  Thailand (FFT) 
were targets o f  assassinat ion by r i g h t  wingers. In 1975 over 30 FFT 
leaders were k i l l e d  in t h i s  way, without a single assassin being caught. 
(Kanoksak and Kanchana 1985 : 22).
22. The "hidden t ra n s c r ip t "  o f  the rural  poor is  a concept used by James
Scott to re fe r  to the discourse o f  the powerless in the absence o f  the
powerful . Public discourse only provides a l im i ted  expose o f  real
a t t i tu d e s ,  and the greater the d is p a r i t ie s  o f  power, the greater the
extent o f  the "hidden t r a n s c r ip t " .  Such a thesis conforms with the
nature o f  publ ic and pr ivate discourse in Ban Dong and Ban Mai, the more 
bla tant power d i f fe rences in the l a t t e r  being re f lec ted  at once in a 
greater level of b i t te rness expressed in p r iva te ,  often hushed 
conversation, and a smaller number o f  opportunit ies  for public exchange. 
(James Scott : publ ic  lecture at Thammasat Univers i ty on 16 May, 1985).
23. In recent years, ceremonial occasions such as topknot cu t t in g ,  
ord inat ions, weddings, and funerals ,  have involved ever greater expenses 
as local entertainments and cater ing have given way to h i r in g  o f  f i lm s ,  
l i kee  (Thai s t reet  opera), loudspeaker equipment, and provision o f  
large quan t i t ies  o f  alcohol th a t  must be purchased. Several v i l l a g e rs  I 
spoke to are p r iv a te ly  contemptuous o f  the waste involved, p a r t i c u la r l y  
in the competit ive aspect ( khaengkan) ,  but since most fear the 
cast igat ion  through gossip that fa i lu re  to provide such entertainment 
invokes, the competit ive atmosphere is maintained. The urban 
or ien ta t ion  to t h i s  competit ive ethos (see Chapter I I )  is  evident on 
such occasions, with the la te s t  trend for those who can afford i t  (and 
many who cannot!) being provision o f  tables and chairs and even issuing 
in v i ta t io n  cards. However, there is  now a movement fo r  sharing of
expenses by j o i n t  ord inat ion o f  monks. In 1985, several youths from Ban 
Dong and Ban Mai were ordained at a j o i n t  ceremony fo r  200 monks at the 
temple o f  a respected monk near Nong Chang, while in 1986 a j o i n t  
ord inat ion o f  50 monks was organized at Ban Dong temple. This cuts the
cost for each family  and increases the scale o f  entertainment tha t  can
be provided. This tension between ostentat ion and modesty in 
expenditure i s  also present in more permanent use o f  savings. On the
one hand, wealth invested in an urban sty le  concrete or b r ick  house
helps someone "mi i  naa mi i  taa : to be o f  consequence". On the
o ther ,  i t  can arouse envy. One farmer who l i v e s  in a modest abode
outside the Ban Mai sett lement to ld  me o f  his desire to keep wealth
tucked away ( in  th is  case in a bank account), fo r  he "mai yaak
thayoethayaan : d o [e s ]n ' t  want [ to  appear] ambit ious",  otherwise he
would not be able to count on his neighbours as now fo r  help in
c u l t i v a t io n  or when he is  i l l .
24. The power that the state achieves over organizat ion o f  v i l la g e  
society through competit ions i s  akin to tha t  re ferred to by Foucault in 
his discussion o f  examinations:
The examination combines the techniques o f  an
observing hierarchy and those o f  a normal izing 
judgment. I t  is  a normalizing gaze, a
surve i l lance  th a t  makes i t  possible to q u a l i f y ,  to 
c la s s i f y  and to punish. I t  establishes over 
ind iv idua ls  a v i s i b i l i t y  through which one 
d i f fe re n t ia te s  them and judges them. That is  why, 
in a l l  the mechanisms o f  d is c ip l in e ,  the
examination is h igh ly  r i t u a l i z e d .  In i t  are 
combined the ceremony o f  power and the form o f  the 
experiment, the deployment o f  force and the 
establishment o f  t r u th .  At the heart o f  the 
procedures o f  d is c ip l i n e ,  i t  manifests the 
subject ion o f  those who are perceived as objects 
and the o b je c t i f i c a t i o n  o f  those who are 
subjected. The super imposit ion o f  the power 
re la t io n s  and knowledge re la t ions  assumes in the 
examination a l l  i t s  v i s ib le  b r i l l i a n c e  (1977 : 184 
- 185).
Competitions are the epitome, not the sum of state power, ju s t  as they
provide the symbol, not the substance o f  i t s  ru ra l  development strategy.
25. Compare th is  with James Scott 's  t rans la t ion  o f  the Malay word for 
exp lo i ta t ion  as "ploughing : membajakkan" the peasantry {publ ic 
lecture at Chulalongkorn Universi ty on 15 May 1985).
26. This is  re f lec ted  in popular sentiment as expressed in Seni 
Saowapong's novel Pisaat (D ev i l ) ,  in which he fol lows Sai 's thoughts
a f te r  nearly gett ing  shot:
Back in the days o f  clear ing the fo res t ,  humans 
only faced wild animals and nature; we could at 
least an t ic ipa te  how and when the danger was going 
to come and take some steps to protect ourselves
in advance. But in these days o f  e xp lo i ta t io n ,
use o f  power, competing in te res ts ,  we can hardly 
t e l l  when and in what form the danger w i l l  be upon 
us, when people are corrupted into despising each 
other with br ibes and other forms o f  e v i l . . .
( Pi saat : 283) [my t r a n s la t io n ] .
27. Scott (1986) emphasises the importance o f  such everyday res istance, 
as at once the "unremitt ing g u e r r i l l a  warfare tha t  [ takes] place day in 
and day out" (p .5) and an e f fe c t ive  i f  not revo lu t ionary  means o f  
re s is t in g  demands o f  the state and dominant classes. Scott defines 
everyday resistance among peasants as:
. . .any act(s) by member(s) of the [oppressed] 
class tha t  is  (are) intended e i ther  to m i t iga te  or 
to deny claims (e.g. ren ts ,  taxes, deference) made 
on tha t  class by superordinate classes (e.g. 
landlords, the s ta te , owners o f  machinery, 
moneylenders) or to advance i t s  own claims (work, 
land, c h a r i t y ,  respect) v is -a -v is  these 
superordinate classes ( p .22).
Thus, although c o l le c t i v e  action is emphatical ly not a necessary part  o f  
res is tance, in tent ions and symbolism or ideology are part o f  the act.
28. This is  not to suggest th a t  aspects o f  rura l  development not 
d i r e c t l y  re lated to production are i r re levan t  to people's needs. 
However, the emphasis here is on production as the basis fo r  people's 
l i ve l ih o o d ,  which is what most people are most concerned about and which 
i t s e l f  is  the most important determinant o f  other forms o f  wel l -being.
29. For example, crochet was being taught at a t r a in in g  session in Phrao 
in 1985. Housewives's groups elsewhere help to market hand icra fts ,  such 
as dried phak tob chawaa (water hyacinth, or Eichhornia crassipas)  
weaving in Phayao. These general ly give very low incomes, the l a t t e r  
case y ie ld ing an average o f  10 to 15 baht per day; the advantage is 
tha t  they can be carr ied on in spare time at home.
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION
The purpose o f  t h i s  thes is  has been to i d e n t i f y  and examine a 
contrad ic t ion  inherent in p a r t ic ipa to ry  rural  development, especia l ly  
regarding production for the majo r i ty  o f  rura l  producers. B r ie f l y  
recap i tu la ted ,  t h i s  is the loss o f  local control over resources
necessary for production enta i led in an incorporat ive development 
strategy in which "p a r t i c ip a t io n "  is invoked as a means o f  a fford ing 
access to wider societal  resources. The examination has focussed on 
processes o f  change, both directed change and spontaneous responses to a 
changing social  and physical environment. There has been no attempt to 
propose a l te rna t ive  s t ra teg ies fo r  development, fo r  in revised 
perspective p a r t ic ipa t ion  i s  seen as a d ia le c t i c a l  process concerning 
power re la t ions  at the local level rather than an implementation of 
standardized prescr ip t ions .  In t h i s  short concluding chapter I would 
l i k e  to examine some o f  the wider impl icat ions o f  adopting such a
p a r t ic ip a to ry  approach to development.
Since local context and aspects o f  power have been important in 
the preceding account, i t  is  worthwhi le reviewing some sa l ien t  empirical  
f ind ings. Lan Sak ag r icu l tu re  has seen a rapid set o f  mater ial  changes 
as a r e s u l t  o f  changing social  and physical environments in the context 
o f  recent sett lement o f  previously isolated communities. The changing 
material  basis fo r  product ion, new opportun it ies and cons tra in ts ,  and an 
increasing ro le o f  capital  in production, form the background to
changing production re la t ions  with in  the communities under study. 
However, the nature o f  these changes d i f f e r  between the communities as a 
re s u l t  o f  factors such as eco log ica l ly  determined d i f ferences in
production regime; patterns o f  sett lement;  the ro le  o f  state and other 
developers; patterns o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ;  and response to resource 
shortage. Changes in power re la t ions  are such as to create internal 
axes o f  tension where previously the pr inc ipal axis was between a 
r e la t i v e l y  isolated community and the outside world. Not only are these 
interna l manifestat ions o f  power in t imate ly  connected with changes in 
production re la t io n s ;  they are also important in determining control  
w ith in  nominally "pa r t i c ip a to ry "  in s t i t u t io n s  th a t  are part o f  rural  
development s trategy.
IX .1 Dilemma o f  p a r t ic ip a to ry  development
In terms o f  the contradic t ion id e n t i f i e d ,  the dilemma o f
p a r t i c ip a to ry  development becomes one o f  how to maintain control  over 
production w ith in  the local community while at the same time increasing 
community control  over wider resources necessary fo r  product ion. As we 
have seen, attempts to secure such wider control  f requent ly  lead to 
concentrat ion o f  control  and power within the community, and the
object ive of p a r t ic ip a t io n  a t  a wider level is  l o s t  in the
d is in te g ra t ion  o f  control  over local i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The dilemma can be 
viewed in two main dimensions : as a problem o f  organizat ional design 
and as a s t ruc tura l  problem concerning the p o l i t i c a l  economy o f  the 
v i l 1 age.
The organizat ional dimension o f  the dilemma is the problem of how 
to adapt ex is t ing  i n s t i t u t i o n s  or estab l ish new fora for action without 
resu l t ing  in a bureaucrat izat ion o f  process in which non-par t ic ipa tory  
structures are inherent.  The problem is  exacerbated by exclusive 
a t ten t ion  to organizat ional forms and consequent neglect both o f  how
these forms are established and of in te rac t ion  w ith in  new i n s t i t u t i o n s  
and social  processes, p a r t i c u la r l y  v is -a -v is  power re la t io n s .  For some 
state developers, the primary ob jec t ive  may well be to establ ish such a 
bureaucrat izat ion o f  v i l la g e  process, and in t h i s  sense the 
contrad ic t ion  is more apparent than real in the terms in which 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  is  conceived by such developers. However, t h i s  is  not 
true o f  a l l  state developers and manifest ly not so fo r  NGO developers. 
The problem for the l a t t e r  is  in the f i r s t  instance one o f  how to 
establ ish innovat ive forms o f  p a r t ic ip a t io n  that do not c o n f l i c t  with 
indigenous modes o f  control over and through v i l l a g e  leaders. 
Subsequently, the issue o f  spreading such forms to cover a wider area 
than the single community or sub-community, both in terms of 
" r e p l i c a b i l i t y "  and in widening s o l i d a r i t y  networks, ra ises the problem 
of standardizat ion and consequent lack o f  local involvement in shaping 
new i n s t i t u t i o n s .
The s t ruc tu ra l  dimension o f  the dilemma is concerned above a l l  
with d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  with in  the v i l la g e  and the consequent divergence o f  
in te res t  between the major i ty  o f  rura l  producers and those who secure 
control  not only over important areas o f  the v i l l a g e  economy but also 
over supposedly p a r t i c ip a to ry  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  This poses a number o f 
a l te rna t ives  for pa r t ic ip a to ry  i n i t i a t i v e s .  On the one hand, 
i n i t i a t i v e s  can be exclusive in order to minimize internal  power 
d i f fe rences. On the other ,  they may work with in  the t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
non-exclusive modes o f  v i l l a g e  society and make use o f  the wider 
connections and larger  resources tha t  inclusion of wealth ier  v i l l a g e rs  
allows. I n i t i a t i v e s  may address areas o f  major s ign if icance to 
d i s t r ib u t i o n  o f  resources with in  the community, or they may avoid 
c o n f l i c t  by concentrat ion on peripheral areas o f  the v i l l a g e  economy. 
I n i t i a t i v e s  may be or iented to a p a r t i cu la r  group such as by age, sex, 
or residence with in  the v i l l a g e ,  or they may be geared to a pa r t icu la r
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issue or a c t i v i t y .
IX .2 Obstacles to p a r t i c ip a t io n
Faced with the above dilemma in i t s  organizat ional and s t ruc tu ra l  
aspects, I would l i ke  to re i te ra te  some o f  the more concrete obstacles 
and "spaces" fo r  p a r t ic ipa to ry  act ion before going on to discuss the 
impl icat ions o f  a pa r t ic ip a to ry  approach. The obstacles to 
p a r t i c ip a t io n  fo r  the rura l  poor in Ban Mai and Ban Dong have been seen 
in terms o f  obstacles to control  over production in the face o f  lack o f  
p o l i t i c a l  and economic power with in  the v i l l a g e .  An important 
con tr ibu tor  to th i s  powerlessness i s  the problem o f  fragmentat ion, by 
which I mean the set o f  processes tha t  al ienate ind iv idua ls  in three 
important dimensions : s p a t i a l l y ,  consciously,  and so c ia l l y .
For ind iv idua ls  in Ban Dong and even more so in Ban Mai, lack o f  
control  over basic resources for production has meant having to seek 
opportun it ies external to the v i l l a g e ,  and th is  is  an area where 
p a r t ic ip a to ry  i n i t i a t i v e s  have l i t t l e  potent ia l  fo r  organizing the rura l  
poor. Temporary or permanent migrat ion beyond the v i l l a g e  is one o f  the 
most fragmenting o f  a l l  the consequences o f  i n a b i l i t y  to secure a 
l ive l ihood l o c a l l y ,  and th is  obstacle to p a r t i c ip a t io n  is thus 
p a r t i c u la r l y  relevant in the more t ra n s i to ry  s i tu a t ion  o f  recent ly  
sett led communities o f  Lan Sak.
Other fragmenting aspects o f  change that make i t  d i f f i c u l t  fo r  
the poorer sections o f  the v i l la g e  to take part  in cooperative 
i n i t i a t i v e s  designed to f a c i l i t a t e  control  include ambiguous class 
id e n t i f i c a t io n  and in te n s i f i c a t io n  of work. The lack o f  c lear class
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  among the peasantry is  enhanced by the ambivalent 
s i tua t ion  o f  ru ra l  producers who are at once wage labourers and 
employers o f  labour;  concurrent ly tenants, landowners, and even renters 
out o f  (mortgaged) land; and simultaneously subsistence farmers and 
commercial croppers. In te n s i f i c a t io n  o f  work among debt ridden farmers 
is  a re s u l t  o f  in t roduct ion  o f  double cropping, off-season employment to 
pay o f f  debt or accumulate the capita l  necessary fo r  inputs in the 
increasing ly  cap i ta l ized  production regime, or intensive labour input in 
a de te r io ra t ing  natural  environment in an attempt to avoid debt that 
resu l ts  from c a p i ta l i z a t io n .
The e f fec ts  o f  such fragmentation fo r  p a r t i c ip a to ry  i n i t i a t i v e s  
are to reduce the time avai lable for organizat ional aspects o f  
p a r t i c ip a t io n  and to undermine potent ial  communality o f  i n te res t .  Many 
o f  the poorest fam i l ies  in Ban Mai f ind i t  d i f f i c u l t  to attend monthly 
meetings despite the f ine  imposed fo r  absence, since they may be away 
from the v i l l a g e  for periods o f  labouring, involved in labour intensive 
c u l t i v a t io n  on th e i r  own f ie ld s  due to lack o f  c a p i t a l ,  or engaged in 
wage labouring on other people's land in a hand to mouth existence. For 
th i s  group, any extra demands on th e i r  time beyond o f f i c i a l  meetings are 
d i f f i c u l t  to j u s t i f y .  The co ro l la ry  o f  t h i s  i s  the posit ion o f  
wealthier v i l l a g e rs  who employ wage labourers on th e i r  f i e ld s  and have a 
correspondingly greater amount o f  time for involvement in formal 
in s t i t u t i o n s  such as the VC and the establishment o f  contacts with 
amphoe o f f i c i a l s .  On the other hand, v i l l a g e rs  in Bung Khiew s t i l l  
have periods o f  the year in which social  a c t i v i t y  is  important,  and th is  
has been a v i t a l  element not only in maintaining the cohesion o f  the
community but also in cater ing for the organizat ional demands o f  the
Rice and Buffalo Banks. Indeed, poorer v i l l a g e rs  working th e i r  own land 
in Ban Mai frequently express as one o f  the hardships o f  being a
chaorai  as opposed to chaonaa tha t  one never has any free t ime.
Since many aspects o f  development cater s p e c i f i c a l l y  for 
smallholders working th e i r  own land, the d i re c t  or in d i re c t  a l iena t ion  
of poorer farmers from control  over production precludes successful 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in many types o f  i n i t i a t i v e .  Wealthier farmers and ALRO 
o f f i c i a l s  in Ban Mai to ld  me on several occasions tha t  smaller farmers 
11mai ao j i n g  : are not serious" about farming, fo r  example in not
providing the proper inputs or spending too much time away from the 
farm. However, smaller farmers themselves explain th i s  as being due to 
"thuuk khao b i i b  : being squeezed". This resu l ts  in short term 
stra tegies for surv iva l  and a fa i lu re  to pract ise longer term so i l  
conservation such as by p a r t i c ip a t io n  in compost t r a in in g  programmes run 
by the Land Development Department. Demonstration plo ts  become
i r re levan t  when maintained by salar ied DAE o f f i c e r s .  Meanwhile, 
wealthier farmers who rent in debtors'  land have l i t t l e  incentive for 
long term soi l  management, and a vicious c i r c le  is continued of
decl in ing y ie lds  and short term response in which local o r ien ta t ion  in
the management o f  resources is  s tead i ly  undermined.
Par t ic ipa t ion  through cooperative in s t i t u t i o n s  is  d i f f i c u l t  to 
es tab l ish  in the face o f  increasingly  dominant moneylenders. Som's 
(case 9, sect ion V I , l , i v )  daughter was to have been sent fo r  t ra in ing  
to the NYKFRD cooperative t ra in in g  centre near Uthaithani,  but the need 
fo r  c re d i t  forced her to work as a housemaid fo r  her mother's c re d i to r .  
Cooperative marketing cannot be establ ished so long as farmers are 
obliged to se l l  produce through th e i r  c red i to rs  and suppl iers. 
Moreover, increasing i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c re d i t  does not on i t s  own solve the 
problem, since such c re d i t  is  incremental and condit ional on a 
p a r t i cu la r  (and unsustainable) production regime ra ther  than l ib e ra t ing  
from the constra in ts  o f  the moneylenders. In the past, such control  
over production was l im i ted  to external moneylenders and i t s  e f fec ts
were minimized by a low-input production regime. However, as more 
control  is assumed by key v i l l a g e rs ,  so i t  becomes interwoven with 
v i l l a g e  level production re la t io n s  and community based cooperative 
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  posing obstacles to pa r t ic ipa to ry  i n i t i a t i v e s .
Another set o f  obstacles to pa r t ic ipa t ion  is  connected with 
subject ive aspects o f  change. As we noted in Chapter I I ,  the 
t ra d i t i o n a l  class s truc tu re  of Thai society is  one o f  masters and 
fo l lowers , and the assumption o f  power by ind iv idual  v i l la g e rs  often 
does less to blur t h i s  d i f fe rence or give the l a t t e r  representat ion 
among the former than to transform such v i l l a g e rs  in to  jaonaai  
(masters) themselves. Not only does t h i s  have a d iv is iv e  e f fe c t  at the 
v i l la g e  leve l ;  i t  also re in forces the sense among the majo r i ty  tha t  
ce r ta in  domains remain the a f f a i r s  o f  others. Thus in s t i t u t i o n s  such as 
VC, TC, and other development i n s t i t u t i o n s  become the preserve o f  these 
key ind iv idua ls .  Such a lack o f  sense o f  ownership (expressed in 
development discourse as "khwaampen jaokho'ong")  of  new i n s t i t u t i o n s  
among the ma jo r i ty  o f  v i l l a g e rs  is  also apparent even where power 
d i f ferences are minimized, fo r  example in the case o f  Bung Khiew Buffalo 
Bank, which v i l l a g e rs  s t i l l  see as the property of NKYFRD. This points 
to another pr inc ipa l  obstacle, tha t  o f  uncertainty as discussed in the 
previous chapter. The absolutism o f  the Thai state and weak development 
o f  c i v i l  society (Turton 1987) undermines confidence in the leg it imacy 
o f  non-state i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  and rhe to r ica l  statements by o f f i c i a l s  as to 
the r ig h ts  and dut ies o f  v i l la g e rs  do l i t t l e  to o f f s e t  the pervading 
cl imate o f  suspicion and fear tha t  surrounds innovative and n o n -o f f ic ia l  
act ion. Meanwhile, w ith in  the bureaucracy the accountab i l i ty  to seniors 
and lack o f  accountab i l i ty  "downward" leads to a h ierarch ica l  and 
non-par t ic ipa tory  mode o f  act ion that re a d i ly  extends i t s e l f  to the 
bureaucrat izat ion o f  v i l l a g e  procedures. The f r u s t ra t io n  o f  some local 
o f f i c i a l s  with development i n i t i a t i v e s  that contravene such control from
above can be detected in the D i s t r i c t  Accountant's recommendation that I 
study royal projects  ra ther than development i n i t i a t i v e s  in Lan Sak, 
since the royal pro jects get things done by having someone to "kho'oi  
j i i  : point an accusing f in g e r ,  oversee [ i . e .  maintain c o n t ro l ] " .  He
sees the f a i l u r e  o f  local state led projects to do the same as a problem 
o f  inadequate resources rather than d i f fe rence o f  approach.
IX .3 Spaces fo r  action
Despite the considerable obstacles to p a r t ic ip a to ry  development 
resu l t ing  from concentrat ion o f  control and power within the 
communities under study and perpetuation o f  t ra d i t i o n a l  
non-par t ic ipa tory  a t t i tu d e s ,  recent developments have opened up a 
cer ta in  "space" fo r  act ion. One such opening is the leg i t im a t ion  o f  NGO 
a c t i v i t y  in ru ra l  areas. Part ly  as a re s u l t  o f  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  state 
development po l icy  and p a r t l y  due to an awareness o f  the constra in ts  and 
openings among NGO workers themselves, the working atmosphere between 
the two sectors has eased. Each main region now has a Working Group 
responsible fo r  coordinat ion between NGOs and state developers. 
Although NGO workers were i n i t i a l l y  wary o f  the potent ia l  cooptive 
p i t f a l l s  o f  such cooperation, espec ia l ly  since non-governmental 
organizat ions were at f i r s t  to include agribusiness ( th i s  sector has now 
been given i t s  own coordinat ing group under the Sixth Plan), growing 
confidence among NGO workers has allowed them to take part on an equal 
level in such exchanges and thus also to increase potent ia l  inf luence 
over development strategy at a wider level than is possible with in  the 
l im i ted  geographical scope afforded by NGO pro ject areas. The 
prominence o f  ind iv idua l  NGO workers at a local level is exemplif ied by 
the example o f  the head of NKYFRD, who uses his pos it ion as president of
the Agr icu l tu ra l  Univers i ty (Kasetsart) Alumni Associat ion in Uthaithani 
to e f fe c t  in securing cooperation from i r r i g a t i o n  o f f i c i a l s ,  ALRO, DAE, 
and elsewhere (see section V I I , 5 , i v ) .
This br ings us on to a second posit ive  development regarding a 
more p a r t i c ip a to ry  strategy : increasing awareness o f  the wider meaning 
of p a r t i c ip a t io n  by cer ta in  o f f i c i a l s  and others such as doctors, monks, 
and teachers. This has been afforded in part by increased contact with 
the "cadre" type o f  approach of NGO workers and the disseminat ion of 
ideas in magazines such as "Folk Doctor", "Social  Development", and 
newsletters o f  various organizat ions. However, i t  is  also par t ly  a 
spontaneous response by ind iv idual o f f i c i a l s  committed to social
development and presented with new opportun i t ies as ru ra l  development
becomes a major plank o f  state strategy in ru ra l  areas. Thus cer ta in  
o f f i c i a l s  provide isolated examples o f  changing a t t i tudes  with in  the 
bureaucracy, such as the DAE head in Uthaithani (see section V I I , 5 , i i )  
and the DAE o f f i c e r  in tambon Lan Sak, who in eschewing chemical 
f e r t i l i z e r s  in many cases maintains a distance from o f f i c i a l  DAE pol icy
in favour o f  s t ra teg ies in l in e  with local r e a l i t i e s .
Among v i l l a g e r s ,  the potent ia l  for p a r t i c ip a to ry  action is 
enhanced by a slowly growing confidence in the leg it imacy o f  independent 
act ion. Many local level workers comment that "chaobaan klaa kheun : 
v i l l a g e rs  are becoming bolder" or "chaobaan chalaad kheun v i l l a g e rs  
are gett ing cleverer [ a t  deal ing with a u th o r i t y ] " .  In par t ,  these 
trends are due to in tegra t ion  into a national p o l i t y  tha t  plays at least 
l i p  service to p r inc ip les  o f  democracy. However, the most s ign i f i ca n t  
factor  in enhancing pa r t ic ip a to ry  act ion by v i l l a g e rs  w ith in  and beyond 
the v i l l a g e  is  the emergence o f  local leaders who at once d i f f e r  from 
the unrepresentative formal leaders such as the Ban Dong and Ban Mai 
v i l la g e  heads, whi le managing to u t i l i s e  new st ructures fo r the benef i t
of the community. An example o f  such a leader is Boi in Bung Khiew, who
has been instrumental in involv ing v i l l a g e rs  in the various programmes
described in Chapter V I I .  An important aspect o f  Boi 's  leadership is 
his concern to involve other community members in assuming 
re s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  in order to avoid the common phenomenon found at every 
level of Thai society o f  ind iv idua ls  who "wear many ha ts" ,  and in such
concentration o f  re s p o n s ib i l i t y  and power in a single individual
diminish both p a r t i c ip a t io n  and e f f i c ie n cy  within the organizations for 
which they are responsible.
IX .4 Impl icat ions o f  p a r t i c ip a to ry  development
Since p a r t i c ip a t io n  has become such a common item of development 
discourse, we might best be able to gain an understanding o f  i t s  
impl icat ions by re f le c t in g  b r i e f l y  on i t s  ra t iona le  : why par t ic ipa t ion?  
As we noted in the previous chapter, each actor on the development stage 
ra t io na l ize s  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in terms o f  a p a r t icu la r  perspective on how 
people are to be involved in a wider p o l i t y  and economy. Par t ic ipat ion  
is  to involve people in something from which they have h i ther to  been 
excluded, in order to spread the material  and social  benef i ts  o f  
inc lus ion. The impl icat ions o f  p a r t ic ipa to ry  development, then, are in 
two main areas : the reversals  inherent in a stra tegy tha t  s ta r ts  with 
people making choices over wider st ra teg ies tha t  a f fe c t  the way in which 
t h e i r  l i ve s  are run rather than having such st ra teg ies  determined by 
others; and the way in which incorporat ion i t s e l f  a f fec ts  the l ive s  o f  
those involved.
As v i l lages  such as Ban Dong and Ban Mai are integrated more 
f u l l y  in to  nat ional structures o f  state and c a p i t a l ,  the reversals
impl ied by a pa r t ic ip a to ry  approach can be seen less and less as bound 
by local considerat ions. S ign i f i can t  areas o f  v i l l a g e rs '  l ives  are 
affected by decisions taken at centres remote from Lan Sak, and control 
over such decisions can be established only by representation at a 
higher level or by increasing co l le c t i ve  bargaining power. Exist ing 
means o f  non-local representat ion (notably the nat ional parl iament) are 
at present meaningless in terms o f  o f fe r ing  a l te rna t ives  concerning 
issues a f fec t ing  the l ive s  o f  v i l l a g e rs .  Organs fo r  co l le c t i ve  
bargaining among farmers are s t i l l  weakly developed in rura l  Thai land, 
but i n s t i t u t io n s  such as Bung Khiew Rice Bank can be seen as embryonic 
forms o f  organizat ion that may provide the base for an extended 
s o l i d a r i t y .  I t  has been noted how leadership associated with th i s  
i n i t i a t i v e  has been instrumental in l im i ted  but s ig n i f i c a n t  ways in 
negot iat ing for external resources and in maintaining a stand against 
ex te rna l ly  imposed programmes. However, the broader prospects for 
establishment o f strong bargaining instruments in the hands o f  
i n d iv id u a l ly  powerless sections o f  the rural  community are s t i l l  dim, 
and there i s  an ever present tension in the desire for state developers 
to maintain control  over new groupings.
The impl icat ions fo r  ind iv iduals  o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n  via 
incorporat ive ru ra l  development strategy are ambivalent. On the one 
hand, incorporat ion in p r in c ip le  involves people in the material  
benef i ts  o f  the wider society and in deciding how those benef i ts are to 
be d is t r ib u te d .  On the other hand, t h i s  study has shown how skewed such 
involvement is  at the local l e v e l ,  and tha t  t h i s  resu l ts  from, and is  
not in spite o f ,  the "pa r t ic ip a to ry "  approach o f  state led rural  
development. Incorporat ion as i t  impinges on the l i f e  o f  the poorer 
rural  producer takes the form of increasing demands on his or her t ime, 
r i s in g  leve ls  o f  debt,  higher leve ls  of uncertainty regarding means of 
l i v e l ih o o d ,  and decreased sanction over local leaders.
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An a l te rna t ive  approach to impl icat ions o f  p a r t i c ip a t io n ,  and one 
tha t  perhaps transcends some o f  the rhe to r ic  associated with the 
concept, is  to consider in what areas p a r t ic ipa t ion  i s  o f  relevance in 
improving the l ive l ihood  of the majo r i ty  o f  ru ra l  producers. Clearly 
cer ta in  aspects o f  ru ra l  development require technical and 
adminis tra t ive expert ise and therefore d i re c t io n  tha t  is  beyond the 
immediate c a p a b i l i t y  o f  ind iv idua l  v i l l a g e rs .  Thus the notion o f  
maximizing d i re c t  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in every aspect o f  ru ra l  development is 
ne ither r e a l i s t i c  nor desirable from the point o f  view o f  most o f  those 
involved. Johnston and Clark 's  (1982} combination o f  "cog i ta t ion"  and 
"act ing out" (see Chapter I ,  footnote 7) is c le a r l y  a sine qua non , 
and the question becomes one o f  how the cog ita t ion  can best be oriented 
to the needs o f  less powerful sections o f  the community in such a way as 
to reduce uncertainty and increase control  tha t  people have over 
1ive l ihood .
In the context o f  state led rura l  development in Lan Sak, a key 
area for increasing control  in t h i s  sense is  in c la r i f y i n g  the status 
and funct ion o f  external developers v i s -a -v is  the local communities. 
The head of NKYFRD says that he would now prefer not to be seen as a 
"nakphathanaa : developer", fo r  such a status has become ambiguous and 
tends to usurp moral r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  that people have in deciding fo r  
themselves. He would rather  be seen as an "educator",  leaving i t  up to 
people to apply his teaching or otherwise. From the point o f view o f  
v i l l a g e r s ,  such a c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  status espec ia l ly  among the numerous 
state o f f i c i a l s  and t h e i r  v i l l a g e  level proxies would seem essent ial  i f  
state developers are to be seen as providing services to be called on by 
l o c a l l y  responsive and representat ive groups ra ther than as d ic ta to rs  of 
change from above.
In the la s t  instance, though, p a r t i c ip a t io n  as increased control  
over l ive l ihood  cannot be divorced from the material  r e a l i t i e s  of 
production in a local context. The NGO worker re ferred to above does 
not see the d i f fe rence between Ban Mai and Bung Khiew as e ssen t ia l ly  one 
o f  a t t i tu d e  or social  cohesion : in his words, "chaobaan pro'on t h i i
j a  khuud r i i d  kan : the v i l l a g e rs  are ready to exp lo i t  each other" in 
Bung Khiew ju s t  as they are already doing in Ban Mai; the fundamental 
d i f fe rence between the two communities is  tha t  in Bung Khiew they have 
not reached the same level or type o f  mater ial  development. On 
the one hand, t h i s  thesis has attempted to move beyond a purely 
m a te r ia l i s t  analysis o f change and has used local discourses to assess 
i t s  subject ive meaning. On the other hand, we have seen that the 
shaping of p a r t i c ip a to ry  i n i t i a t i v e s  in these two recent ly  sett led and 
rap id ly  changing communities depends la rge ly  on h i s t o r i c a l l y  and lo c a l l y  
spec i f ic  material  condit ions and social re la t ions  o f  production. In 
p ract ice, the re fo re ,  the research imperative as a basis fo r  pract ical  
action is  to gain an understanding o f  these r e a l i t i e s  both through 
"ob jec t ive"  f a m i l i a r i t y  with local condit ions and through the medium of 
discourse.
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APPENDIX 1 
Structured Survey
The Ban Dong and Ban Mai survey was preceded by a p i l o t  
survey o f  ten households in a th i rd  Lan Sak v i l l a g e  in October 1984. 
Modif icat ions to the interview schedule were made fo l lowing the p i l o t ,  
and the main survey was carr ied out between February and May 1985. 
Households were selected in a systematic sample of 25 per cent by taking 
each fourth  household on v i l l a g e  re g is t ra t io n  l i s t s .  148 households 
were interviewed, 75 in Ban Mai and 73 in Ban Dong. The interview 
schedule is summarized below.
Section 1 : Household census, place o f  o r ig in ,  education.
Section 2 : Local employment, non-local employment, cottage industry .
Section 3 : Land holding, type, r e n ta l ,  use.
Section 4 : Crop production, inputs , y ie ld s ,  and sale.
Section 5 : Vegetable garden, f r u i t  t rees, domestic animals, f ishpond. 
Section 6 : Credit .
Section 7 : Water, machinery, household f a c i l i t i e s .
Section 8 : Group membership, ag r icu l tu ra l  advice from o f f i c i a l s .
Section 9 : Miscellaneous - Domestic r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s ,  contingency, use 
o f  hypothet ical  l o t t e r y  earnings.
Data from the survey were processed using the SPSS package on the Amdahl 
computer at the Universi ty  o f  London Computer Centre.
APPENDIX 2 
T ra n s l i te ra t io n
Thai terms are t r a n s l i t e r a te d  according to the fo l low ing  system :
Thai l e t t e r  T rans l i te ra ted  Approximate sound
1. Voiced u b bal l
stops f) d dog
q j job
2. Voiceless 1.1 P spot
unaspirated 91 t stop
stops n k sj< id
3. Voiceless v! f
aspirants s s i t
t h hut
4. Voiceless 91 kh kick
aspira ted VI ph po t
stops VI th tap
ch chat
5. Lateral a 1 Jess
6. T r i l l 5 r rob
7 . Nasa1 U m man
U n not
>3 ng sinp
8. Front
*
i s j t
rounded i i see
vowels t - B e set
I ee estuary
11 ae act
9. Central
«* 4
~ 5 ~ eu -
rounded i - a oe 1 earn
vowels *> a s i t t e r
a an
a 3, la s t
saw
10. Back _ u hood
rounded uu whose
vowels u ^ 00 hal 1 o
11. Voiced ( i n i t i a l ) y ^es
semi­ a ( f i n a l ) i da j
vowel s ( i n i t i a l ) w wet
1 ( f i n a l ) w few
12. Dipthongs 'I 1 ai 1 ie
13. Vowel ml - t ) ia sk ier
combinations i - a eua -
Tones are not ind ica ted .  Where names are spelled accorc
establ ished convention or preference, these ru le s  do not apply.
APPENDIX 3
Rainfa l l  in Uthaithani 1957 - 1983
Year Total March
1959 1091.0 51.8
1960 1109.8 20.8
1961 1118.6 12.1
1962 1229.1 13.7
1963 1241.8 35.1
1964 1317.0 44.1
1965 1185.2 44.1
1966 1091.2 51.5
1967 1002.0 52.7
1968 1004.2 41.1
1969 991.5 29.7
1970 1077.5 30.4
1971 1145.2 26.0
1972 1240.0 30.0
1973 1210.8 22.8
1974 1203.8 24.0
1975 1181.4 23.3
1976 1147.7 17.1
1977 981.7 8.8
1978 n .a . 3.2
1979 892.1 0.0
1980 810.9 0.2
1981 n .a . 0.2
Figures are f ive  year running means, in m i l l ime t res  as measured at
Uthaithani meteorological s ta t ion .
Change can be measured by co r re la t ing  r a in f a l l  with t ime. In the case
o f  change in annual r a i n f a l l  since 1959, th is  produces a Pearson's r 
s t a t i s t i c  o f  -0.413, ind ica t ing  a decl ine in r a i n f a l l  s ig n i f i c a n t  at the
0.05 leve l .  In the case o f  pre-ploughing season r a i n f a l l ,  a Pearson's r
s t a t i s t i c  o f -0.649 is  obtained, showing a decl ine s ig n i f i c a n t  at a
0.0005 leve l .  However, i f  we look at change over the main period o f  
defo resta t ion, since 1972, we f ind  Pearson's r  s t a t i s t i c s  o f  -0.937 and 
-0.923 for to ta l  and March r a i n f a l l  f igures respec t ive ly ,  both
s ig n i f i c a n t  a t the 0.0005 leve l .
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APPENDIX 4
Local Powers
A f u l l  analysis o f  local power structures would require a 
study in i t s e l f .  The fo l lowing is  meant to  be an i l l u s t r a t i v e  rather 
than exhaustive presentation o f  the l inks  between economic and p o l i t i c a l  
power at the local level in Lan Sak, through i n f lu e n t i a l  persons.
Level O f f i c i a l /
p o l i t i c a l
DISTRICT Member of Parliament,
AND deputy head of Chat Thai
ABOVE Party
Chinese t rader ,  provided 
land fo r  D is t r i c t  HQ
Sawang Arom Education 
O f f i ce r ;  used to be Lan 
Sak Education O f f ice r ;  
stood in 1983 e lect ion as 
Social Action Party 
candidate for MP
TAMBON Ban Dong kamnan , head
tambon counci l (also 
Ban Dong v i l l a g e  head)
Thung Khaa kamnan, head 
o f  tambon council
Ban Dong tambon doctor ,  
i n f lu e n t i a l  V i l lage 
Committee member
Thung Khaa tambon doctor,  
brother o f  kamnan, 
i n f lu e n t i a l  V i l lage 
Committee member
VILLAGE Ban Mai v i l l a g e  head
President of Ban Dong 
Vi l lage Scouts
Commercial / 
economic
Owns largest  pineapple p lantat ion 
and canning fac tory  in Thai land, 
located in Cha-am but employs 
some Lan Sak labour.
Had large fo res t ry  in te res ts  in 
Lan Sak in 1970s, b u i l t  Paak 
Meuang market; shot dead 1981, 
wife ca r r ies  on business.
Wife is teacher who owns nursery 
school fo r  ch i ldren of Lan Sak 
o f f i c i a l s  and merchants; owns 
land to be developed in to  market 
near D i s t r i c t  HQ, also "own" 
forest  reserve land near Rabam.
Sel ls ,  rents local land; "owns" 
several ‘ 000 r a i  o f  fo rest  land 
in Khlong Lan (Kamphaengphet) , 
is  se l l ing  fo r  300 baht per 
r a i ; Owns a/c restaurant in 
Uthaithani;  wife runs construct­
ion business; helps MP buy votes.
Sold large amount o f  land in Ban 
Mai; had extensive fo res t ry  
in te res ts ;  helps MP buy votes.
Owns small r i ce  m i l l ;  serves as 
local agent for MP.
In f lu e n t ia l  Ban Mai t r a c to r ,  
t ruck owner, moneylender, farms 
own, debtors, and community land; 
helps MP secure labour for 
plantat ion and fa c to ry ;  runs 
chemist and a g r icu l tu ra l  supply 
shop in Ban Mai.
Moneylender, runs pickup service, 
farms several debtors' p lo ts ,  
helps MP buy vo tes.
Rice m i l l ,  t ruck owner; large 
scale bu f fa lo  owner, rente r .
Assistant Ban Dong 
kamnan
Shopowner, v i l l a g e  trader,  
moneylender.
APPENDIX 5
C r i te r ia  fo r  select ion o f  "Outstanding Kamnan or V i l lage  Head"
The Local Administration Department's (1984) Local 
adm in is t ra to r 's  d ia ry  notes tha t  f inanc ia l  compensation to v i l l a g e  
o f f i c i a l s  i s  not commensurate with th e i r  wide range o f  dut ies. As a 
re s u l t ,  outstanding o f f i c i a l s  are to be selected according to the 
fol lowing c r i t e r i a :
1. Carries out o f f i c i a l  work and dut ies with good re su l t s ,  serving as an 
example in the fo l low ing main ways:
- Dedicates time to dut ies and cooperates with the government in 
carrying out dut ies ;
- Pays a t ten t ion  to meetings, t ra in ing  v i l l a g e r s ,  looks a f te r  
the wel l-being o f  area, protects against and suppresses 
bandits,  c a t t l e  t h e f t ,  and other crime;
- Pays a t ten t ion  to invest igat ion o f  inc idents or movements 
which may be o f  danger to the Nation and Crown, and f inds ways
to prevent such danger as far as able;
- Fu l ly  cooperates with the government in encouraging and 
inducing v i l l a g e rs  to develop the area or community to
increase prosper i ty ;
- Pays a t ten t ion  to and supports the l ive l ihoods  o f  v i l l a g e rs ,  
improves land and water communications, and helps combat
animal epidemics;
- Helps in ensuring f u l l  tax co l le c t io n ;
- Maintains a speedy postal service;
- Supports educat ion, r e l i g i o n ,  cu l tu re ;
- Carries out r e g is t ra t io n  dut ies properly;
- Pays a t ten t ion  to preventing disease;
Is respected by v i l l a g e rs .
2. Risks l i f e ,  fo r  example in suppressing te r r o r i s t s  or major c r im ina ls .
3. Helps construct useful publ ic works or o f f i c i a l  bu i ld ings without 
having to use state funds, or f ind cash or material  worth at least 
50,000 baht fo r  example in bu i ld ing schools, health s ta t ions ,  meeting 
h a l l s ,  roads, br idges, i r r i g a t i o n  channels, weirs,  f i r e  engines, we l ls ,  
publ ic ponds, amphoe headquarters, po l ice s ta t ions ,  or residences fo r  
government o f f i c i a l s .
4. Carries out work spec ia l ly  al located by the government with good 
r e s u l t s .
The D i s t r i c t  Of f icer  submits names o f  deserving v i l l a g e  o f f i c i a l s  
to the Provincial  Governor, who appoints and presides over a committee 
of heads o f  department at the provinc ia l  leve l ;  t h i s  committee then 
judges as to who is  most deserving o f  a p r ize ,  and the decision is  
f in a l  (Department o f  Local Administrat ion 1984 : 72 - 73; my
t r a n s la t i o n ) .
APPENDIX 6
Marketing Structures fo r  Rice and Maize
The fo l low ing  are diagrammatic represent ions o f  the p r inc ipa l  marketing 
struc tu res fo r  the main crops grown by Ban Dong and Ban Mai farmers.
1. Rice Marketing
r ------- > FARM
\'/
SMALL MILL - PADDY TRADER
MEDIUM MILL
LOCAL TRADER
LOCAL CONSUMER
LARGE MILL
CUSTOMERS
ABROAD
BANGKOK WHOLESALE TRADER
EXPORTER BANGKOK 
RETAIL TRADE
GOVERNMENT ■^BANGKOK 
CONSUMER
Flow o f  r ice  
Flow o f  paddy SOUTHERN WHOLESALE TRADER
Adapted from : Chirmsak Pinthong (1978), A Price Analysis o f  the Rice 
Marketing System. Unpublished Ph.D. d is s e r ta t io n ,  Stanford Un ivers i ty ,  
p. 69.
2. Maize Marketing
FARMi
LOCAL WHOLESALERS
BANGKOK TERMINAL 
MIDDLEMEN
BANGKOK TERMINAL 
ANIMAL FEED 
PROCESSORS
LOCAL ANIMAL FEED 
PROCESSORS
THA RUA TERMINAL
BANGKOK TERMINAL 
EXPORTERS OR 
WHOLESALERS
COOP. FARMERS
1L........
LOCAL COOP.
\1
CENTR/ L^ COOP.
EXPORTS
Adapted from : Chaiwat Konjing (1981), Marketing System and Pol icy o f  
Thai Maize Trade. Report submitted to the National Economic and Social 
Development Board, p. 4.
APPENDIX 7
Local Administrat ion and Rural Development Structures 
1. NESDB Chart o f  Poor Rural Areas Development Plan
Submit budget
J o in t l y  f i x  budget 
 >
MINISTRIES
THE CABINET
>  NRDCOFFICE OF NESDB
Col lect provinces' 
request to f i x  
i n i t i a l  budget
Inform the 
budget approved
A
V
Submit for 
approval
Submit plans to 
o f f i c e  of NESDB
PDC
Inform the 
budget, target
Fix ta rgets fo r  
di s t r i c t
V
1/
Formulate the Poor Rural 
Area Development Plan
Consider the pro jects
ADC
VC
Choose the 
v i l l a g e
Prc
/V
Submit the need 
o f  the pro ject
or
Consider the pro ject 
request ,  set p r i o r i t y ,  
submit to ADC
Give technical support
RDOS
— I . 
CCDSV
Note : NRDC = National Rural Development Committee
NESDB = National Economic and Social Development Board
PDC = Provincial  Development Committee
PDS = Provincial  Development Scheme
ADC = Amphoe Development Committee
TC * Tambon Council
VC -  V i l lage Committee
CCDSV = Central Committee o f  the Development and Self-  
Defence Vi l lage 
RDOS-= Rural Development Operational Support
Source : National Economic and Social Development Board document.
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